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ABSTRACT 
This study examines how networks fight, and how to counter networks. Networks, 
empowered by information technology, play a powerful role in many different aspects of 
social and organizational interaction. Notably, recent confrontations with networked 
opponents have strained the U.S. military, and produced time-intensive, brutally 
complex, and costly irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. The challenges that these 
fighting networks present require a close examination of how they fight, and most 
importantly, how to combat the threat they pose. 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the role of networks in irregular 
warfare, where they are central and prevalent. Regardless of its many forms, the most 
salient aspect of modern irregular warfare is the increasingly networked nature of the 
antagonists. Countering these opponents requires a detailed understanding of the 
organization, doctrine, methods, and information usage, which both empower networks 
and generate vulnerabilities. 
This research generated a theoretical framework that draws on the rich bodies of 
knowledge that inform network theory, network-based operations, irregular warfare, 
organizational theory, and information strategy. Each of these theoretical areas provided 
hypotheses for identifying causal factors, which led to an understanding of how networks 
fight, and development of a systematic framework for countering them.  
Comparative case studies focused on a cluster of networks engaged in irregular 
warfare, which served to test this framework. This cluster consists of three cases, each 
marked by “tough opponents,” and network-based organizations operating in the 
information age: the Chechen separatists, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. 
Overall, this thesis advances theory in a way that provides a systematic understanding of 
how to counter networked opponents, while generating additional perspective about 
irregular warfare. 
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A.  BACKGROUND 
This thesis is a study about irregular conflict, and particularly about the qualities 
that allow modern, violent fighting networks to challenge nation-states. The oft-quoted 
statement, “it takes a network to fight a network,” prompted this research.1 While this 
statement appeals to a form of common sense, it is also a significant proposition with 
serious implications. If it does truly take a network to fight and defeat another network, 
then this requires considerable organizational re-evaluation, as well as innovation in areas 
such as doctrine, communications systems, and information strategy. 
Examining this proposition requires initially answering the basic question—how 
do networks fight? The details behind this answer provide significant insight into not 
only how networks fight, but also what they are; as well the opportunity to explore the 
nature of modern irregular warfare. It appears that if a network is simply an 
organizational type, then not much significance exists behind the proposition. However, 
using their organizational typology, modern fighting networks advance doctrine, promote 
tactical innovation, and shape information strategy to achieve near-parity in multiple 
aspects of conflict. Networks are empowered by information technology, but are not 
always reliant on its use, highlighting the importance of the other factors. 
Countering such networks may require similar innovation and the ability to adapt 
to dramatic changes. The clearest aspect of this change is the dramatic increase in the role 
of information in irregular warfare. This increasing importance favors networks, which  
 
 
                                                 
1 Stanley A. McChrystal, “It Takes a Network:  The New Frontline of Modern Warfare,” Foreign 
Policy, March/April 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network; Greg 
Grant, “The Man Behind Irregular Warfare Push:  Mike Vickers,” April 7, 2009, 
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/04/07/the-man-behind-irregular-warfare-push-mike-vickers; “It Takes a 
Network,” Meeting of the International Counter-Terrorism Academic Community, ICT Newsletter, Spring 
2010, http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Q-dvDwLODkc%3d&tabid=68. 
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provide for enhanced communication, and the asymmetries of irregular warfare present 
the opportunities to capitalize on such strengths. As a result, understanding how networks 
fight is crucial to determining how to fight them.  
B.  OVERVIEW 
The application of the network concept to the realm of illegal activity and conflict 
generates such descriptions as terrorist and guerrilla networks, trans-national criminal 
networks, and even such generally descriptive terms as dark networks and violent 
networks. Security studies increasingly reference networks to not only describe aspects of 
insurgency, terrorism, and crime, but also to provide a vehicle for analysis and facilitation 
of measures of effectiveness. This study proposes and uses the term “fighting network” to 
describe these illegal, violent networks more accurately and fully that in many ways blur 
traditional distinctions of illicit activity. Within the study of international relations, these 
fighting networks are classified as non-state actors, and are usually separated from 
peaceful non-governmental organizations by the description of violent non-state actors 
(VNSAs).2 Notably, recent confrontations with networked opponents have strained the 
U.S. military, and produced time-intensive, brutally complex, and costly irregular wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. These opponents are the greatest challenge professional militaries 
face today, and fighting networks are explicitly identified in the most recent U.S. national 
military strategy, with countering violent extremism listed as the primary national 
military objective.3 The challenges that these networked opponents present require a 
close examination of how they fight, and most importantly, should lead to an 
understanding of how to counter the threat they pose.  
A network is an organizational concept that provides meaning to process and 
interaction, and is often used to describe a system of linked computer technology. 
However, the network perspective is much broader than this application. It is a way of 
                                                 
2 Neal A. Pollard, “Globalization’s Bastards: Illegitimate Non-State Actors in International Law,” Law 
Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 12, no. 3 (2004): 211, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0966284042000279009. 
3 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United 
States, February 8, 2011, 4–6.  
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defining much of how the world works today. In this larger sense, networks, empowered 
by information technology, powerfully describe many different aspects of social and 
organizational interaction. The network perspective is one of the defining aspects of 
modern inquiry in numerous fields and the term “network” is common in everyday usage. 
According to Jorge Raab and H. Brinton Milward, “the term network has been one of the 
most widely used notions in the social sciences for the last two decades…,” and it can be 
understood as a description of structure, a label, and as a concept for understanding social 
activity.4 In this thesis, the term network will be used broadly to describe organizations 
defined by certain organizational characteristics, doctrine, operational methods, and 
information strategy. 
Networks are composed of two primary elements, nodes, and the linkages that 
connect these nodes. The nodes and their connections can be nearly anything, such as 
people and friendships, computers and communication lines, cities and highways, 
providing a breadth of application and analysis.5 This study focuses on social networks 
composed of individuals, and groups, as nodes and their relationships, which is a critical 
distinction. While the physical science aspects of network study provide empirical data, 
leading to more quantitative analysis, the human nature of social networks makes such 
rigorous conclusions difficult.6 Moreover, human networks are constantly changing and 
display fluid behavior influenced by psychological and cultural aspects, which are far less 
tangible notions than physical structure. Incorporating these distinctions into an idea of 
networks provides a broad range of typologies united under a common purpose, but are 
decentralized, exhibit high degrees of autonomy, dispersed communications flow, and 
informal authority.  
Fighting networks transcend many of the classic distinctions in irregular warfare, 
and they increasingly define the nature of modern conflict. Irregular warfare, also loosely 
                                                 
4 Jorge Raab and H. Brinton Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory,” (October 2003): 417. 
5 Mark Newman, Albert-László Barabási, and Duncan J. Watts, ed., The Structure and Dynamics of 
Networks (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 3.  
6 Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley, “Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as 
Networks,” Joint Special Operations University Report 05-03 (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations 
University Press, 2005), 10. 
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referred to as unconventional warfare, partisan war, guerrilla warfare, or characterized by 
“small wars,” is a timeless aspect of human conflict that despite its many variations, has 
exhibited constant themes.7 Regardless of its many forms, the most salient characteristic 
of modern irregular warfare is the networked structure of most opponents. The networked 
form is uniquely suited to take advantage of the “engines of globalization,” which are 
primarily characterized by modern information technology.8 While traditional measures 
reveal an asymmetric disparity between large nation-states and weaker opponents, 
modern information technology provides capabilities that enhance the ability of the latter 
despite this difference. The combination of timeless, irregular warfare characteristics and 
modern technology creates a synergy that produces increasingly dangerous opponents. 
Countering these irregular opponents requires a detailed understanding of the 
organization, doctrine, operational methods, and use of information, which both 
empowers networks and may reveal vulnerabilities. 
This research employs a theoretical framework that draws on the rich bodies of 
knowledge informing network theory, network-based operations, irregular warfare, 
organizational theory, and information strategy. Initially, examining each of these 
theoretical areas produces a detailed description of how networks fight. The second part 
of this analytic framework creates hypotheses focused on how to counter networks. The 
primary methodology employed in this study is comparative case studies focused on a 
cluster of networks engaged in irregular warfare. This cluster consists of three cases, each 
marked by “tough opponents,” and network-based organizations operating in the 
information age: the Chechen separatists, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. 
These cases test the hypotheses generated in the second portion to understand better how 
to confront networks effectively in irregular conflict. 
                                                 
7 Lewis H. Gann, Guerrillas in History (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 1. Gann’s 
work provides a concise, yet heuristic, view of the timeless qualities of guerrilla warfare. Other notable 
surveys include Walter Laqueur, The Guerrilla Reader (New York, 1977); John Ellis, A Short History of 
Guerrilla Warfare (London, 1975); Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New 
York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975); Gerard Chaliand, ed. Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical 
Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan (Berkley: University of California Press, 1982). 
8 Pollard, “Globalization’s Bastards,” 215. 
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C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand how networks fight, and how to 
counter networks that engage in irregular warfare. Overall, this thesis seeks to provide a 
deeper understanding of irregular warfare, viewed through the network perspective, and 
to advance theory in a way that generates a better understanding of how to counter 
networked opponents. As the information age unfolds, nation-states are increasingly 
challenged by violent, non-state actors, most of which organize, operate, and fight in non-
conventional ways. It is these attributes that challenge formal militaries and that provide 
networked opponents their ability to pose such great risks to security and stability. While 
this basic challenge is readily recognized, a lack of overall awareness and understanding 
exists about how best to counter these fighting networks. In addition, traditional 
characterizations of these threats as guerrillas, or in terms of insurgent goals and 
strategies, provide only a limited perspective of the overall threat. By focusing on 
fighting networks, this thesis illustrates the importance and transformative nature of 
network-style warfare, and addresses ways to counter these networks. 
While the network perspective is expansive, this thesis focuses on fighting 
networks in irregular warfare, and the scope of the study is designed to provide insights 
into this arena of conflict. To describe and analyze networks, the integration of multiple 
methods and approaches is necessary. In addition, it must be emphasized that many tools 
exist that must be employed against the complex problem sets of irregular warfare. A 
focus on countering networked opponents is but one aspect of a comprehensive effort to 
ensure security and stability. In this regard, this study focuses on addressing the 
immediate threats that networked opponents pose, and gives secondary emphasis to the 
deeper roots of conflict, such as ideological differences, cultural clashes, and popular 
grievances. Still, efforts to understand the broader aspects of social networks and their 
cultural environment provide vital support. Moreover, a clear recognition exists that the 
focus on countering fighting networks must be synchronized and integrated with efforts 
that seek to correct the fundamental origins of conflict. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
x How do networks fight, and how do we fight the networks that 
increasingly define irregular warfare?  
The preliminary question that must be addressed is what is a network? Also, what 
characteristics make it possible to describe certain organizational attributes as network-
based? An understanding of the network perspective is required to know what constitutes 
a network. From this point, the study of network capabilities provides a means to address 
how fighting networks might use conflict to achieve their aims. In essence, the first part 
of the research question seeks to understand the organizational characteristics, doctrine, 
operational methods, and information strategy that these opponents employ to fight. The 
second part of the question is contingent on an understanding of how networked 
opponents fight. This understanding provides the basis for proposing organizational 
attributes, doctrine, and operational methods that exploit vulnerabilities and provide 
effective ways to counter fighting networks. 
E. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This thesis design draws on multiple bodies of knowledge to provide a theoretical 
framework for generating hypotheses. This framework employs the network perspective 
in conjunction with an understanding of irregular warfare to generate a combined concept 
that answers the research question. The theoretical framework that informs this research 
consists of the following areas of knowledge: network theory, network-based operations, 
irregular warfare, organizational theory, and information strategy. Each of these bodies of 
knowledge provides insight into fighting networks and their interaction in the realm of 
current warfare, and a closer examination generates testable hypotheses. 
Network theory provides the starting point for theoretical research. This rapidly 
expanding field answers the question of what constitutes networks, and provides 
descriptions for further analysis. A combination of mathematic and scientific discoveries 
over the last 50 years provides the basis for network theory, which seeks to provide 
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“…insights into the structure and workings of complicated networks.”9 These discoveries 
form an exciting and novel perspective about numerous interactions, both social and 
physical, in today’s world. The noted physicist Albert-László Barabási describes network 
theory as “the next scientific revolution.”10 In addition to the scientific breakthroughs, 
network theory is providing impetus to various aspects of social science, including social 
network theory and actor-network theory. An understanding of network principles 
provides a foundation for examining how networks fight, and is critical to formulating 
ways to counter them. This focus on network theory seeks to define key principles 
governing networks and establish their essential attributes. One of the unique aspects of 
network theory is the universality of key characteristics, such as connectivity, centrality, 
order, and growth. The fact that biological, computer science, and social networks all 
share fundamental principles suggests common attributes governing networks, and 
contributing to their effectiveness.  
Network research in the last several decades reveals that, despite differences in 
substance and form, network architecture possesses fundamental characteristics.11 These 
characteristics form the following milestones in the development of network theory. 
While the numerous discoveries by a network of scientists are too many to list, the basic 
milestones are: the degree of separation experiments (Stanley Milgram, 1967), the 
importance of clustering and weak links (Mark Granovetter, 1973), the small-world 
model (Duncan Watts and Steve Strogatz, 1998), the role of hubs and free-scale networks 
(Albert-László Barabási and Rika Albert, 1999), and the ideas of competition and growth 
in networks (Ginestra Bianconi and Albert- László Barabási, 2001).12 In the social 
                                                 
9 Mark Buchanan, Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Theory of Networks (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2003), 18.  
10 Albert-László Barabási, Linked: The New Science of Networks (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 
2002), 8. 
11 Buchanan, Nexus, 15. 
12 Stanley Milgram, “The Small World Problem,” Psychology Today (1967): 60–67; Mark 
Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology (1973): 1360–1380; Duncan 
Watts and Steve Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” Nature (1998): 440–442; 
Albert-László Barabási and Rika Albert, “Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks,” Science (1999): 
509–512; Ginestra Bianconi and Albert-László Barabási, “Competition and Multi-scaling in Evolving 
Networks, “Europhysics Letters (EPL) (2001): 436–442. 
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sciences, social network analysis utilizes network theory discoveries, and forms the basis 
for much of the research on networks. Social network analysis is “a mathematical method 
for ‘connecting the dots’…[that] allows us to map and measure complex, sometimes 
covert, human groups and organizations.”13 Yet, rather than focus exclusively on the 
inner-workings of networks, this study incorporates a broader understanding of network 
theory to refine and advanced principles of networks in conflict. 
The second base of theoretical knowledge that informs this research is network-
based operations. The study of network-based operations seeks to clarify how networks 
operate, and clearly distinguishes between different uses of the network perspective. This 
theoretical concept provides structure and meaning for network-based conflict, and adds 
an operational dimension to the idea and concept of networks in conflict. The idea of 
network-based operations stems from the concept of network-style warfare, or “netwar,” 
first proposed by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. This study develops this idea beyond 
the concept level, providing operational insights focused on fighting networks in irregular 
warfare.14 It is important to distinguish that this conceptual framework is different from 
the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense’s Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) 
concept, which seeks increasing awareness and control in a system that links decision 
makers with sensors and shooters.15 NCW focuses on technological connections, which 
provide situational awareness for a shared network of war-fighting systems. Instead, 
network-based operations go beyond the physical architecture designed to achieve 
control, and recognizes that networks operate in ways that are often random, 
decentralized, and self-empowered. Further, network-based operations are increasingly 
recognized as the most suitable concept for achieving sustainable partnership networks 
                                                 
13 Valdis Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” Connections 24, no. 3, 45, 
http://www.sfu.ca/~insna/Connections-Web/Volume24-3/Valdis.Krebs.web.pdf. 
14 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). 
Also see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the 
Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997); John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., Network and 
Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). 
15 Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare,” Proceedings 24, 
no. 1, (United States Naval Institute Press, 1998), 28–35. 
 9
that unite numerous actors against complex problems.16 Ironically, these two very 
different concepts are often conflated, but their most distinguishing characteristic is that 
while NCW seeks to eliminate the “fog of war,” through superior technology and 
information dominance; network-based operations are characterized by fluidity and 
recognize that fog and friction are fundamental conditions of war.17 In addition, while 
network-based operations recognize the empowerment of modern information 
technology, they are characterized by a holistic approach that incorporates multiple 
aspects, such as organization, leadership, doctrine, information strategy, and social 
factors. Network-based operations both inform and are robustly developed throughout the 
course of this study. 
The information revolution has provided tremendous strength to networked forms 
of organization.18 “Like the large numbers of private corporations that have embraced IT 
[information technology] to operate more efficiently and with greater flexibility, terrorists 
are harnessing the power of IT to enable new operational doctrines and forms of 
organization.” 19 The proliferation of computer and cellular communications technology 
provides decentralized, informal organizations the means to achieve greater impact on the 
battlefield. Most terrorist and insurgent organizations are characterized by network-based 
organization and doctrine, and the netwar concept proposes, “it takes networks to fight 
networks.”20 If this is the case, those seeking to counter networks should, it seems 
logical, employ network-based operational principles. The degree to which this is true 
may correlate with operations that successfully degrade enemy networks, and conversely, 
                                                 
16 David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary, U.S. State Department, “Fighting Networks with Networks: 
Partnership and Shared Responsibility on Combating Transnational Crime,” Keynote Speech, Trans-Pacific 
Symposium on Dismantling Illicit Networks, Honolulu, Hawaii, November 10, 2009, 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/131805.htm.  
17 An example of this mixing of concepts is the Joint Special Operations University Report, 
“Implications for Network-Centric Warfare,” which provides an excellent examination of network-based 
operations, but under the NCW moniker. Jessica Glicken Turnley, “Implications for Network-Centric 
Warfare,” Joint Special Operations University Report 06-3 (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations 
University Press, 2006). 
18 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 1. 
19 Michele Zanini and Sean Edwards, “The Networking of Terrorism in the Information Age,” in 
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 30.  
20 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 15. 
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a lack of network-based operations may prevent the degradation of an adversary network. 
Yet, this hypothesis may not be sufficient and other aspects of both organizational theory, 
such as hierarchical forms, and doctrine, may be able to counter networks.21 The focus on 
network-based operational theory provides a framework to establish critical 
vulnerabilities of network-based organizations, and assists in defining those key tasks 
essential to attacking those vulnerabilities. Despite a growing understanding of networks, 
little discussion occurs of how networks actually engage in conflict, or descriptions of 
their doctrinal methods at the operational level, which is not a new phenomenon in war, 
as doctrine generally lags behind the development of new technologies and concepts. 
The study of irregular warfare forms the third theoretical basis for an examination 
of the research question. Networks are prevalent in the irregular warfare environment, 
and a study of its dynamics seeks to understand why this is the case. Irregular warfare is 
doctrinally defined as “a violent struggle against state and non-state actors for legitimacy 
and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and 
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 
capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”22 According to 
U.S. military joint doctrine, irregular warfare consists of five core activities: counter-
terrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counter-insurgency, stability 
operations, and numerous related activities.23 The Department of Defense definition of 
unconventional warfare (UW) provides a primary source for formal doctrine describing 
the antagonist’s perspective in much of irregular warfare, which is fundamentally 
unconventional to the point that the two terms are used interchangeably outside of formal 
                                                 
21 David Tucker, “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom is Wrong,” in 
Homeland Security Affairs 4, no. 2 (June 2008): 2, http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.5. 
22 U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operational 
Concept v.2.0 (Washington, DC:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), B–2; U.S. Department of 
Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.7; Irregular Warfare, (Washington, DC:  U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2008), 11; U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02), (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 280. 
23 Each of these terms has specific doctrinal definitions based on the application of U.S. military force. 
For instance, guerrilla warfare, which is the most frequently used term to describe irregular warfare 
activity, is not included because unconventional warfare (UW) defines an advisory effort in support of 
guerrilla activity, not unilateral guerrilla action. Written to support a larger traditional warfare framework, 
these tightly defined doctrinal definitions leave out a large range of special operations and paramilitary 
activity. “Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats,” Joint Operational Concept v. 2.0, 5.  
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military doctrine. While a great degree of attention is given to irregular warfare, its 
current focus only defines the nature of operations, and uses terms, such as asymmetric 
threats, non-linear conflict, or doctrinal categories, such as counter-terrorism (CT) or 
counter-insurgency (COIN). The purpose of focusing on irregular warfare is to 
understand how networked opponents fight. The initial portion of this study on networks 
in irregular warfare is informed by aspects of guerrilla warfare and UW, and the second 
portion examines CT and COIN.  
 
Irregular Warfare Doctrinal Terminology 
Irregular Warfare 
(IW) 
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy 
and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare 
favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, although it may 
employ the full range of military and other capabilities to erode an 




Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or 
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, 
auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area. (Training Circular 18-
01, DEC 10). 
Counter-Insurgency 
(COIN) 
Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an 
insurgency and to address any core grievances. (Joint Publication 
3-24, OCT 09) 
Counter-Terrorism 
(CT) 
Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to 
influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable 
to terrorist networks.  (Joint Publication 3-26, NOV 09). 
Guerrilla Warfare  
Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or 
hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. 
(Joint Publication 3-05.1, APR 07). 
Insurgency 
The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or 
movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing 
authority. (Joint Publication 3-24, OCT 09). 
Terrorism 
The calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful 
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate 
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally 
political religious, or ideological (Joint Publication 3-07.2, APR 
06). 
Table 1.   Current Irregular Warfare Terminology According to U.S. Military Doctrine 
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UW is a formal doctrinal term that expresses an advisory relationship in what has 
traditionally been the defining characteristic of irregular warfare—guerrilla warfare. 
Guerrilla warfare is a set of tactics and techniques that have consistently been the choice 
of weaker opponents who seek to oppose the strong (usually formal governments), and 
seeks to avoid direct confrontation by relying on speed and surprise in attacks. For most 
of history, guerrilla warfare was seen as a minor aspect of war, and not one that could be 
used against a regular military. Despite its use as a reaction against European colonial 
expansion, it remained a largely secondary means of conflict until after World War II, 
when it was paired with anti-colonial liberation, and used by theorists, such as Mao Tse-
Tung in a revolutionary manner.24 In addition, terrorism is also employed as a tactic, 
often in conjunction with guerrilla warfare, but also as a single means of political 
violence.25 
Fighting networks, including terrorist, insurgent, and even foreign-state-sponsored 
networks seek to defeat their opponents using terrorism and other asymmetric tactics. 
Counter-terrorism is one of the current leading aspects of irregular warfare, and it seeks 
to defeat terrorist-based threats. An examination of CT literature shows that a void exists 
in how to defeat terrorist networks systematically, with discussions focused on leadership 
targeting, reconciliation, repression, and even how fighting networks sometimes defeat 
themselves.26 Recently, the term CT has been taken to mean an exclusive focus on 
countering an enemy threat directly, using primarily kinetic means. This focus usually 
takes the form of direct leadership targeting, or an emphasis on killing or capturing high-
value targets (HVTs). However, very little discussion of the operational approaches 
required to disrupt, and perhaps defeat, an entire networked organization occurs. 
COIN is the most examined aspect of irregular warfare, and most COIN studies 
emphasize an indirect approach that places the population’s loyalty as an essential 
condition to success. Classic scholars of counter-insurgency, such as David Galula, Julian 
Paret, and Roger Trinquier, all argue that the population’s support is essential to ensuring 
                                                 
24 Chaliand, ed. Guerrilla Strategies, 7. 
25 Ibid., 30.  
26 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1 (1991): 47. 
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control in counter-insurgency.27 More recent authors, such as John Nagl and David 
Kilcullen, agree, and stress the importance of providing security for the population, as a 
part of a comprehensive framework.28 However, a focus on “nation-building” has tended 
to produce an overemphasis on a “hearts and minds” campaign in COIN, resulting in 
failures to address networked insurgent forces fully.29 Most classical counter-insurgency 
strategy promotes a comprehensive approach that seeks to both secure the local 
population and defeat their networked opponent. In this regard, while CT and COIN may 
serve as useful distinctions, their primary activities are both essential aspects within a 
larger struggle for control in an irregular warfare environment. This struggle for control, 
and its direct relationship with legitimacy, is succinctly described in Gordon 
McCormick’s “Diamond” COIN model, which describes the application of both indirect 
and direct means to counter-insurgent organizations.30 This model provides the clearest 
depiction of the fact that modern distinctions of COIN and CT separate what are really 
two key aspects of counter-insurgency; elements that must be synchronized for effective 
counter-insurgency. 
The common end-state of irregular warfare is the defeat of a network-based 
enemy organization, marked by their loss of control over the population. While historical 
examples may lack certain characteristics of modern-day networks, the doctrinal 
principles remain the same. A focus on irregular warfare provides numerous aspects of 
CT and COIN from which to analyze examples of counter-network operations. The 
irregular warfare lens informs this study by providing insight into optimal methods for 
conducting counter-network activities in an irregular warfare environment. 
                                                 
27 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1968); Julian Paret, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Walker 
and Company, 1967), 176; Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, PSI 
Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2006). 
28 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 266; John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: 
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 83. 
29 John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Strategy and Insurgency: An Evolution in Thinking?” 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/. 
30 Gordon McCormick, “Diamond Insurgent/COIN Model,” depicted in Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic 
Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare 18, no. 2 (September 2005): 5–6. 
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Aspects of organizational theory form another theoretical perspective, and provide 
insight into what empowers network-based operations. The use of network-based 
organizational structure is one of the defining characteristics of the primary threats in 
irregular warfare. As Sean Edwards and Michele Zanini note, “just as companies in the 
private sector are forming alliance networks to provide complex services to customers, so 
too are terror groups ‘disaggregating’ from hierarchical bureaucracies and moving to 
flatter, more decentralized, and often changing webs of groups united by a common 
goal.”31 Organizational theory provides insight into aspects of organizational structure, 
environmental interaction, and important human resource dynamics, such as leadership. 
Furthermore, organizational theory provides a well-developed conceptual basis to 
understand the interaction of aspects of size, decentralization vs. centralization, and span 
of control.32 The primary aspect of organizational theory that examines the shaping of 
organizations is contingency theory, and it seeks to “predict the performance or 
effectiveness of an organization based on the extent to which the organization’s structure 
matches contextual contingencies such as organizational size, technology, and the 
environment.”33 Each of these contingencies presents characteristics within organizations 
and provides insight into network-based organizations.  
The study of information strategy provides additional theoretical knowledge, and 
it shapes both the conduct of information operations, including the use of intelligence, 
and the employment of information technology. The rise of information technology 
empowers both operational action within irregular strategy and expands the network-
based opponent’s capacity to conduct information warfare. Information warfare consists 
of seven forms: Command-and-Control Warfare (C2W), Intelligence-based Warfare 
(IBW), Electronic Warfare (EW), Psychological Warfare, “Hacker” Warfare, Economic 
Information Warfare (EIW), and Cyberwarfare.34 A conventional military’s strengths in 
                                                 
31 Zanini and Edwards, “The Networking of Terrorism in the Information Age,” 30.  
32 Steven L. McShane and Mary Ann Von Glinow, Organizational Behavior (Boston: McGraw-Hill 
Irwin, 2007), 22. 
33 Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell 
University Press, 2008), 9. 
34 Martin Libicki, What is Information Warfare? (Washington, DC: National Defense University, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1995), Preface.  
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C2W, IBW, and EW are based primarily on conflicts involving traditional doctrine and 
strategies that emphasize technological advantages in Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), as 
well as a corresponding degree of precise and overwhelming firepower. In keeping with 
the asymmetric nature of irregular warfare, these strengths provide mixed relative 
advantages against a dispersed, networked organization. Network-based organizations 
use different methods within these forms to gain advantages in the asymmetric nature of 
irregular warfare. In addition to providing a framework for the information dimension of 
conflict, information strategy is essential in understanding the strengths and weaknesses 
that the proliferation of information technology presents for network forms. Examining 
the information strategy of network-based organizations provides further insights into the 
important nature of information in how networks fight. 
F. METHODS 
The primary method employed for this research is comparative case studies that 
focus on networks in irregular warfare contexts. These case studies are employed as a 
part of a congruence process, where the theory derived from directly examining the 
research question in the initial chapters is evaluated based on its ability to explain 
outcomes in each case.35 A cluster of cases was chosen for this study for the following 
reasons: they are examples of irregular warfare, they display the capabilities of the 
networked opponent, and they are empowered by information technology. Another 
consideration common to each of the cases is that they provide examples of “robust” 
opponents, and therefore, serve as tough tests of attempts to counter networks. There are 
other examples of networked threats, and certainly numerous insurgent and terrorist 
examples throughout history. However, a unique aspect of the fighting organizations in 
these cases is their ability to use information technology in ways that dramatically 
empower their networked aspects. 
                                                 
35 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 181.  
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The first case study focuses on the Russian conflict with Chechen opponents in 
both the 1st Russo-Chechen War (1994–1996) and the 2nd Russo-Chechen War (1999–
present). The 1st Russo-Chechen War had its origins in the Chechen declaration of 
independence in the wake of the 1991 Boris Yeltsin-inspired autonomy movement.36 
After the brutal 1st conflict, and following an uneasy period of relative quiet, the 2nd 
Russo-Chechen War began with an Islamic-extremist-led offensive movement into 
neighboring Dagestan.37 While the Russian government states that the war ended in 
2009, most observers believe that it has simply entered a new phase, marked by dispersed 
and lethal terrorist attacks in the Russian heartland and a spread into neighboring 
provinces.38 This case is noteworthy for the ability to contrast Russian and Chechen 
efforts in two separate episodes of this conflict, and to study the evolving nature of the 
networked challenge. 
The second case study focuses on the Israeli conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah, 
and in particular, analyzes the results of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah clash in Lebanon. 
From its inception in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has been a non-state actor, acting with 
support from various sources, but always characterized by a popular socially based 
militant movement focused on resisting the actions of Israel and its supporters.39 In this 
sense, it is an instructive case, because it highlights the character of irregular warfare, and 
a non-state actor challenging national powers by directly confronting their military 
forces. Israel invaded southern Lebanon in 1978 and in 1982 to deny the area to the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization. The start of a withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 
1985 coincided with the formation of, and direct challenges from, an increasingly 
aggressive Hezbollah network, and by 2000, Israel had withdraw its forces back to its 
formally recognized border. The 2006 conflict marked the start of a second overt clash, 
and began with Hezbollah’s daring raid into Israel to ambush an Israeli motorized patrol, 
                                                 
36 MAJ Raymond C. Finch, “Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya,” Foreign Military Studies 
Office Special Study 98–16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center For Army Lessons Learned, 1998), 1. 
37 Paul Murphy, The Wolves of Islam (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2004), 2. 
38 Brendan Fogarty, “Chechnya Redux? Violent Conflict in Ingushetia.” Harvard International 
Review 31, no. 4 (January 1, 2010): 8, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/.  
39 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 38.  
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resulting in the capture of two soldiers and the killing of three others. The conflict that 
followed highlights a further evolution in methods and aspects of irregular warfare, to the 
extent that some observers have called it a classic example of a “hybrid-war.”40 One of 
the commonly referenced aspects of hybrid warfare is the super-empowered network 
characteristics of its opponents, and this case study is expected to provide unique insights 
into the nature of these conflicts. 
The third case study focuses on the United States and Iraqi struggle against Al-
Qaeda in Iraq from 2004–present. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 prompted an Iraqi-
led popular insurgency, which grew in scope and diversity to include numerous insurgent 
groups. One of the catalytic groups, and perhaps most powerful, was Al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
which was recognized as a part of the Al-Qaeda network by Osama bin Laden in 
December 2004.41 Al-Qaeda in Iraq sought increasing control and organizational 
supremacy over the insurgency in Iraq, as seen in violent clashes with other insurgent 
groups and the formation of its umbrella organizations, the Mujahedin Shura Council 
(MSC) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).42 By examining the conflict with al-Qaeda in 
Iraq in two phases, from 2004–mid 2006, and from 2006 until the present, unique aspects 
of the conflict present themselves, including the role of the Sunni tribal awakening, and 
the U.S. surge in forces. Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s violent tactics, use of information operations, 
and quest for organizational control combine to make it a unique network opponent. The 
study of this organization and the efforts to counter it provide a clear example of a 
conflict with a network-based opponent, and its current nature provides for a depth and 
richness of study. 
An examination of these conflicts highlights the organizational characteristics, 
doctrine, operational methods, and information strategies that characterize each of these 
network-based opponents. These examples generate insights to compare against and test 
                                                 
40 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 35.  
41 Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency & Counter-insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2006), 143. 
42 Evan F. Kohlman, “State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq,” 
http://www.nefafoundation.org/index.cfm?pageID=24.  
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hypotheses. Within each of these case studies, a process tracing method reveals the 
presence of a causal chain between various hypotheses-derived independent variables, 
and the dependent variable of effectively countering networks. Process tracing seeks to 
“identify a causal path that depicts how the independent variable leads to the outcome of 
the dependent variable.”43 Overall, this occurs in a four-stage process, with the first stage 
focused on how networks fight, and the second stage using that analysis to identify 
variables leading to a counter-network framework. These causal relationships are tested 
in the third stage with an examination of each case study. Finally, a comparative analysis 









































Figure 1.   Thesis Methodology Flowchart 
                                                 
43 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 183.  
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II. HOW NETWORKS FIGHT 
What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. 
Therefore, I say: know your enemy and know yourself and in a hundred 
battles you will never be in peril.44 
        - Sun Tzu 
 
A. THE RISE OF NETWORKS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE  
The modern age is witnessing a revolution in irregular warfare, with dispersed 
non-state actors wielding more power and confronting modern professional militaries in 
new and innovative ways. “Without a shadow of a doubt, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
encapsulate a new form of waging war in a manner that circumvents traditional defence 
postures—ones geared toward protecting the nation from the armed forces of another 
state, not cosmopolitan and sophisticated terrorists.”45 The networks that violently 
confront nation-states pose the defining challenge of modern irregular warfare.46 These 
fighting networks utilize network-style warfare to confront superior opponents, are 
capable of dramatic change, and adaptable enough to incorporate multiple forms of 
strategy and tactics. John Robb calls these modern networks “global guerrillas,” because 
“this new method of warfare offers clear improvements (for our enemies) over traditional 
terrorism and military insurgency.”47 Another attempt to characterize this challenge 
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describes these opponents as “techno-guerrillas.”48 In fact, fighting networks may utilize 
some guerrilla warfare techniques, but they are not constrained by many of the traditional 
limitations of irregular warfare. Insurgent goals, terrorist tactics, or a blend of forms may 
characterize these networks, but they fight in an unconventional manner, a manner best 
described by the netwar concept.49 The netwar concept emphasizes the irregular nature of 
networks in conflict, featuring “small, dispersed units that can deploy nimbly,” with the 
ability to “penetrate and disrupt, as well as elude and evade.”50  
In addition to their organizational features, the ability of irregular opponents to 
achieve adaptable power is based primarily on their utilization of modern information 
technology in a synchronized method of fighting that is a product of the modern 
information age. Information technology provides tremendous empowerment by allowing 
further connections and communication, while at the same time, increasing a network’s 
ability to remain de-centralized. Rapid innovation in modern information technology is 
changing multiple aspects of warfare, making politically motivated violence more potent 
and increasing the spectrum of capabilities available to all combatants. However, the 
dramatic rate of technological changes favor networks more than their opposition, 
because they create new asymmetries beyond just force considerations.51 Moreover, it is 
not just that modern technologies super empower networks; these networks use the latest 
technologies themselves as weapons, with aircraft turned into guided missiles, cellular 
technology used to detonate improvised explosive weapons, and computers facilitating 
cyber attacks against a spectrum of targets.52 These networked opponents use information 
technology as a tool, but it is essential to recognize that every aspect of their fighting is 
synchronized and “attuned to the information age.”53  
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Fighting networks display timeless characteristics of irregular opponents, such as 
terrorists, guerrillas, and insurgents, but are best defined by their synthesis of tactics and 
use of modern information technology in ways that provide unique advantages. These 
networks represent the violent, lawless side of network forms, which also includes social 
networks that organize and operate under many of the same principles. Like other social 
networks, the decentralized nature of networks in irregular warfare is possible, and 
enhanced by combinations of social linkages, more than formal, hierarchical structures. 
Bruce Hoffman describes the modern terrorist threat as being, “…a new breed of terrorist 
entity to which traditional organizational constructs and definitions do not neatly 
apply.”54 Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s initial description of the netwar concept highlights the 
characteristics that define networks in irregular warfare:  
an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of 
traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms 
of organization and related doctrine, strategies, and technologies attuned 
to the information age. These protagonists are likely to consist of 
dispersed organizations, small groups, and individuals who communicate, 
coordinate and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often 
without precise central command.55 
While the unprecedented scale of the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks galvanized public 
attention, the terror networks of the 1970s and 1980s provided an initial indicator of the 
potential power of these loosely coupled organizational forms. In 1981, Claire Sterling 
described “…an international terrorist circuit, or network, or fraternity,” that was not 
necessarily welded in a formal structure, but whose elements were “linked.””56 More 
recently, some theorists have even gone so far as to propose networked opponents as a 
significant element in a new generation of warfare, most notably William Lind, in his 
description of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW).57 However, much of what characterizes 
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these networks is not a generational leap in warfare, but a distinctly different form of 
irregular warfare with unique characteristics derived from innovations in organization, 
doctrine, and modern technology. Network-style warfare is truly a “paradigm shift,” 
much like the scientific breakthroughs in network theory, and is an excellent example of 
this phrase, first proposed by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to 
describe such breakthroughs.58 Fighting networks meld the timeless elements of 
unconventional warfare with modern information technology to produce a blend of 
organization, doctrine, operations, and strategy that are challengingly sophisticated. Yet, 
unlike traditional unconventional threats, these fighting networks achieve success with 
organizational and doctrinal features synchronized and in-stride with the rapid changes of 














Figure 2.   Netwar, the Warfighting Paradigm of the Information Age  
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While the defining elements that characterize fighting networks stem from a 
combination of recent innovations and a synchronized style of warfare, some of their 
characteristics are recognizable throughout the history of irregular warfare. Irregular 
opponents have sought to confront and frustrate larger, professional armies from the 
earliest beginnings of organized warfare, and have done so using a variety of strategies 
and tactics. In his survey of irregular warfare, historian Lewis H. Gann stated, “the art of 
small wars is as old as the history of warfare itself.”59 These opponents are variously 
designated as partisans, guerrillas, insurgents, terrorists, and the like, and despite 
differences in origin, ideology, and aims, they have fought in similar ways. Generally 
out-numbered and facing a force disparity, these irregular opponents utilize concealment, 
sudden and shocking attacks, and sheer persistence to challenge professional armies. 
These commonalities have manifested themselves throughout the history of irregular 
warfare, and logically flow from the conditions of the conflict environment. “The 
technique of partisan warfare cannot be labeled either reactionary or progressive. It is 
based essentially on the precepts of common sense, and requires no particular mystique 
for its elucidation.”60 Perhaps because its principles are based on “common sense,” it was 
not formally studied in the modern era until Colonel Le Miere de Corvey wrote his Des 
partisans et des corps irreguliers.61 While irregular warfare received some attention from 
strategists, such as Clausewitz and Jomini, it was not viewed as a decisive form of 
warfare.62 These studies relegated the idea of irregular warfare to a secondary technique, 
despite its extensive usage in wars of resistance; including those in America, Tyrol, 
Russia, and in Spain, where the term guerrilla, meaning little war, originated during the 
Spanish-Portuguese irregular resistance to French occupation from 1808–1813.63 
Resistance to colonial control formed the motivation for many of the small wars that 
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marked the rest of this century.64 By the 20th century, irregular warfare was a fairly 
common occurrence, especially in the twilight of the colonial era, but it was not until the 
middle of the 20th century, with the writings of Mao Tse Tung, that irregular warfare 
came to be seen as a systematic way to achieve political change.65 Since that time, 
numerous antagonists have incorporated, or solely pursued, irregular warfare as a means 
to achieve their political end-state, most notably insurgents fighting wars of national 
liberation and modern terrorist groups. This history is significant because it reveals 
fundamental dynamics of irregular warfare, dynamics that lead to many of the ways in 
which networks fight and that produce strengths and weaknesses of these irregular 
opponents. 
One of the primary characteristics of irregular struggles is the asymmetry in force 
between opponents. Irregular opponents are unable to oppose larger armies directly due 
to insufficient force, which is a combination of mass, firepower, and technical expertise. 
In addition, due to this disparity, if a professional army locates irregular opponents, they 
can be rapidly disrupted, if not eliminated. This lopsided result stems from the superior 
force advantage, and often, superior mobility that professional armies bring to bear.66 The 
dynamic that results is one in which it is in the weaker opponent’s best interest to remain 
undetected, or hidden, and where the stronger opponent seeks to find its “inferior” 
opponent. The fighting that does occur between these two sides hinges on the idea of 
relative combat power, where irregular forces seek to attack vulnerable points that 
present a favorable force ratio. Irregular opponents will use difficult terrain, urban, rural, 
and now the cyber realm, as well as the population, to provide concealment for their 
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activities. Complex terrain provides the concealment necessary to remain undetected, as 
well as to frustrate the generally superior mobility of the professionals. In addition, larger 
populated areas provide the means to blend in and often seek support from the population 
base. Those irregular opponents that seek the larger support of the population are 
generally called insurgents, and aim to wrest political control from an existing 
government. Insurgent networks operate with an information advantage, because they are 
able to conceal themselves, which provides a counter to their larger opponent’s force 
advantage.67 The terror tactics they employ, tactics that use many of the techniques of 
guerrilla warfare, properly define terrorist networks, which generally lack popular 
support for these tactics and have fewer ties to the larger population, and which requires 
more clandestine measures to be hidden. These characteristics are more in line with some 
modern irregular networks than guerrilla fighters are as they “do not function in the open 
as armed units, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid 
engaging enemy military forces in combat and rarely exercise any direct control or 
sovereignty over either territory or population.”68 Overall, the ability of these irregular 
opponents to conceal themselves presents a counter to their opponent’s force superiority, 
and creates the primary challenge of finding elements of these networks. 
Within the realm of irregular warfare, fighting networks employ both guerrilla 
and terrorist tactics displayed by irregular fighters throughout time. Yet what makes a 
network’s fighting characteristics revolutionary is the ability to fuse such techniques with 
innovations in organization and doctrine. This integration makes the network perspective 
crosscutting and a valuable characterization of irregular warfare, which provides insights 
into multiple types of irregular opponents. These characteristics provide such significance 
that their appearance dramatically changes irregular warfare, and has produced different 
attempts to characterize these changes. Martin van Creveld heralded this transformation, 
by stating, “in the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today 
call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more 
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formal titles to describe themselves.”69 More recently, David Killcullen highlights this 
change by describing a “…tendency toward hybrid forms of warfare combining 
terrorism, insurgency, propaganda, and economic warfare to sidestep Western 
conventional capability….”70 Hybrid warfare, or hybrid war, describes the fusion that 
results from networks employing irregular, conventional, and terrorist forms of conflict in 
a synthesized manner, a manner that poses a significant threat to the conventional armies 
of modern nation-states.71 According to the 2007 U.S. National Maritime Strategy, 
“conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular 
tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors….using both simple 
and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways.”72 It is the fluid ability of networks to 
utilize a range of irregular tactics, while employing modern weapons systems, and 
harnessing the innovations of the information age that results in the hybrid nature of these 
conflicts. Displaying timeless characteristics, but heralding a revolution in warfare, 
networks are the primary threat to security and stability, and the ways in which they fight 
present considerable challenges for traditional war-fighting practices. Network style 
warfare provides a synthesized mode of fighting that revolutionizes, and, in many ways, 
transcends historical irregular warfare techniques. 
B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WARFARE 
Despite the revolutionary changes occurring in irregular warfare, it is common for 
dated terminology and generally descriptive language to be used to describe dramatically 
new threats. Significantly, the most advanced non-state actors today are still referenced 
using basic terms, such as guerrillas or terrorists, or even less descriptive terms, such as 
insurgents. While insurgents are accurately described as those fighting to change a 
governing authority, the term reveals little about the way in which they fight—its 
description is of a political nature. Much of irregular warfare is defined by insurgent 
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goals and terror tactics, but its characterizing style of fighting is guerrilla warfare. As 
previously described, guerrilla warfare generally speaks to irregular operations, and 
according to U.S. military doctrine, occurs in contested or occupied areas, and usually by 
indigenous people.73 Since guerrilla warfare has served as the dominant descriptor of 
many revolutionary and insurgent struggles, it is often assumed it is synonymous with 
these efforts. However, while they both employ guerrilla warfare, the term itself is more  
accurately used generally to describe irregular opponents and the tactics they employ. 
Derived from, and representing “small wars,” its descriptive power wanes in an era of 
globalization and flattening of technology. 
In contrast, network-style warfare describes a method of fighting dramatically 
different from traditional warfare, and makes past descriptions of guerrilla warfare 
obsolete for defining today’s unconventional networked threats. Netwar is a perspective 
that highlights the dramatic changes in conflict occurring in the information age and the 
rise and empowerment of networks as a form, which currently predominates across the 
spectrum of conflict.74 Using the framework of organization, doctrine, operational 
methods, and information strategy, a comparative analysis of guerrilla warfare and 
violent netwar reveals their distinguishing elements, and highlights the revolutionary 
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Forms of Warfare Displayed in an Irregular Warfare Environment 



















































Table 2.   A Comparative Look at Forms of Warfare Existing in the Irregular Warfare 
Domain. 
Organizationally, guerrilla warfare and netwar both feature small elements, but 
beyond this, their similarities end. Guerrilla warfare tends to organize small elements in a 
hierarchical manner, with traditional ideas of command and control. Authority is pushed 
down the chain in a vertical manner, and uses cellular structures and security measures in 
an attempt to conceal this hierarchical structure. While networks are composed of nodes, 
the formation of linkages between these nodes, and the manner in which they form 
clearly distinguish netwar from guerrilla warfare. The small nodes in netwar are robustly 
linked in various structural combinations, but trend towards all-channel formation, with 
multiple linkages forming a robust network form.  
Doctrinally, guerrilla warfare centers on the strategic defensive and aims to build 
up forces to confront a superior opponent. Since guerrillas are inherently weaker, they are 
limited to hit-and-run tactics, and are focused more on disrupting than on defeating an 
opponent. The goal of this disruption is to wear out the enemy opponent over time, 




distinctions of offensive and defense and describes more fluidity in operations. The 
hallmark doctrine of network-style warfare is swarming, which involves self-









Figure 3.   A Classic Guerrilla Structure with Hierarchical Organization75  
Operationally, guerrilla warfare is focused on deliberate attacks that seek to attrite 
an enemy’s will over time. This attrition is focused on attacks, which are designed to 
disrupt an opponent’s military efforts, but more importantly, convince the population of 
the guerrilla’s stronger will. Guerrillas operate deliberately, and require intelligence to 
achieve surprise. Further, their tactics are based on a concept of hit-and-run attacks, 
which generally have little decisive effect. Fundamentally weaker, guerrillas also require 
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a safe-haven to recover and reorganize. Netwar focuses on fluid attacks that seek a 
decisive effect. Often, networks attack in a pulsing manner with cycles of information 
collection and analysis, then decisive attacks. Networks may benefit from the 
inaccessibility that physical terrain provides, but the networked form allows them to 
achieve concealment in ways that reduces the need for a purely physical safe haven. 
The information strategy employed by guerrillas attempts to achieve control over 
popular opinion at the local level, which is generally accomplished by attempting to gain 
commitment to a cause. Networks understand the dynamics of the information age and 
seek to dominate information strategy throughout the conflict. Networks go beyond such 
elusive goals as winning hearts and minds, and use information as a powerful lever 
against their opponents. The narrative dimension of netwar describes the information 
aspect, which provides an overarching concept and unifies disparate and dispersed nodes. 
In fact, netwar as a whole tends to place more emphasis on information strategy than it 
does on actual conflict. 
Netwar and guerrilla warfare are dramatically different at the organizational and 
doctrinal levels, and networks seem to be leading in information strategy innovations 
across all types of warfare. At the tactical level, some similarities exist, as networks still 
functions as small elements, or nodes, and utilize aspects of small unit tactics, such as the 
raid and ambush. The notable guerrilla Colonel Russell Volkmann, who conducted stay-
behind actions against Japanese forces in the Philippines, presciently stated, “a future 
war, waged with highly mobile forces, supported by scientific and mechanical means of 
tremendous destructive potential, will lead to a greater dispersion of forces, fluid battle-
fronts, and widespread isolated action—a setting ideal for guerrilla warfare.”76 While 
Volkmann foresaw changes in irregular warfare, the dramatic changes resulting in the 
rise of network style warfare, have far surpassed expectation. While “network warfare 
looks a lot like guerrilla warfare with incredibly powerful weapons,” its characteristics 
make it truly unique, and a “…new significant step…” in warfare.77 Networks display 
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these characteristics with a fluidity that highlights their ability to synchronize multiple 
tactics, integrate modern technology, and leverage modern war-fighting concepts, such as 
the use of combined arms and sensors. The comparison of these modes of conflict 
displays the dramatic changes in irregular warfare, and the unique suitability of the 




Figure 4.   The Noordin Mohammed Top Terrorist Network78  
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C. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Network terminology describes numerous elements and structural forms, and its 
use is increasingly prevalent with a growing awareness of network properties. At their 
most basic level, networks are composed of two primary elements, nodes, or actors; and 
the linkages, or ties that connect these nodes.79 Given these basic structural attributes, 
networks are ever present, and the term defines combinations in the physical realm, such 
as telephone networks, and in the social realm, such as interpersonal networks—leading 
to the term “networking.” In general, it is used to describe social organizations composed 
of more informal linkages, and is now a common appendage to describe irregular 
opponents, such as terrorist networks, insurgent networks, and narco-trafficking 
networks. These networks have elements that form deliberately, but also in many cases, 
utilize the normal networking that people conduct on an informal, ad-hoc basis. As non-
state actors become increasingly prevalent, and empowered by modern information 
technology, networks are formed by virtue of the informal relationships that exist among 
those joining. These networks are fluid in composition and their informal nature 
differentiates them from more established organizations, such as the hierarchical 
structures that define nation states, or large business organizations. This section of the 
thesis examines characteristics of violent, illicit networks in irregular warfare and seeks 
to understand the ways in which they fight, as well as provide a framework of strengths 
and weaknesses, that is both historically informed, and incorporates the latest innovations 
in unconventional tactics and techniques. Bruce Berkowitz describes these networks’ 
fluid nature and their essential features:  
Fighting networks can be as small as a three-man terrorist organization or 
as large as a joint task force. They can operate on the scale of a few city 
blocks or an entire hemisphere. The can use cheap, simple handheld 
weapons or weapons that cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Their 
essential feature lies in how they use information technology and how they 
operate.80 
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Fighting networks in irregular war operate violently outside the legal constraints 
of nation states, and conduct illegal activities ranging from criminal enterprise, 
insurgency, and terrorist activities, usually in a combination of various activities and 
ways. A common description of network threats is “dark networks,” a reference to the 
“covert and illegal” nature of illicit networks.81 The “dark-side” of networks originally 
referred to violent networks to differentiate them from social networks, which is a useful 
distinction that focuses on their violent behavior.82 It has since been expanded to include 
the difficulties of identifying and locating irregular opponents, but in this sense, it may be 
overemphasized, because those tasked with such activities, may see more of a network 
structure than is commonly understood. Most importantly, networks in irregular warfare 
have both “dark” and “light” aspects, and one of their fundamental challenges is the 
push-pull between the need to maintain clandestine elements required for secrecy, and the 
need to conduct essential overt activities, such as generate resources, recruit, conduct 
operational activity, and influence popular opinion.  
Fighting networks have elements of clandestine structure, but also elements of 
open connectivity. The clandestine attributes of networks derive from concealment and 
their compartmentalized attributes, which preserve the organization’s existence. The 
traditional, tightly controlled, and hierarchical models of insurgent and terrorist activity 
call for a cellular structure built off recruitment in a hierarchical manner. However, these 
organizations require a high degree of control, intensive security measures in the form of 
cut-outs, and excessive redundancy. Models that depict a formal, structured underground 
that is highly cellular and compartmentalized place excessive emphasis on these features; 
features which discourage autonomy, flexibility, and innovation.83 While some aspects of 
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terrorist and insurgent networks manage to maintain a clandestine, cellular structure, the 
costs involved include limited operational activity, tight control, and restricted 
communication. The reality of networks is that attempts are made to maintain clandestine 
control, mostly within the leadership structure, but that deliberate compromises are often 
made to keep the network functioning and operationally viable. Networks are far more 
decentralized, fluid, and open, balancing these attributes with some elements of structural 
control; where control is required for planning, operations, or to preserve leadership 
structure. These reasons prompted the noted al-Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al-Suri to 
reject such “secret—regional—hierarchical,” models in favor of the “open fronts, 
…methods of individual jihadi operational activity, [and] the methods of total 
resistance,” which reflects this network’s transition to a netwar orientation.84 
Networks have both strengths and weaknesses, and while much of the literature 
emphasizes the advantages of the networked form, understanding a networked 
opponent’s weaknesses is critical in the brutal conflicts of irregular warfare. While some 
network studies draw primarily on business models that emphasize the advantages of the 
horizontal collaboration displayed by networks in the short product life cycles and rapid 
technological changes of the global economy, it is imperative also to incorporate the 
unique set of constraints, or pressures, that networks face.85 Existence as a clandestine 
organization involves high risk and pressure from hostile, external forces, which 
produces a set of influences that impact the effectiveness of the network form.86 
Understanding the impact of these pressures provides a critical aspect of understanding 
the strengths and weaknesses of networks in the dynamic and hostile environment of 
irregular warfare. In addition, the distinction between networks and hierarchies from a 
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strictly organizational perspective limits and ignores the synchronized nature of network-
style warfare. While organizational structure provides a significant aspect, studies that 
only examine networked-based threats on this basis incompletely assess the full range of 
strengths and weaknesses that a synthesized system of network-style warfare provides.87 
To understand the threats from today’s fighting networks, this study begins with a 
detailed analysis that combines principles of irregular warfare with insights from network 
theory and examines the impact of modern information technology. The principles of 
irregular warfare derive from the historical record and modern usage, and represent 
tactics and techniques used by insurgent and terrorist networks, as well as unique aspects 
displayed by modern networked opponents. While many aspects of truly revolutionary 
fighting networks exist, and reflect the current dynamic of the information age, this is not 
to suggest that previous studies of irregular warfare are obsolete. An analysis of multiple 
bodies of knowledge provides the foundation for generating characteristics, which offers 
a combined understanding of how networks fight. For the scope of this study, networks in 
irregular warfare exhibit characteristics defined by their organizational attributes, 
doctrine, operational methods, and information strategy. These “lenses” provide an 
overall perspective, which produces specific characteristics. Each of these characteristics 
adds to the understanding of networks and describes ways in which they fight. Other 
frames of analysis include the narrative and social dimensions, both critical elements in 
forming and uniting networks, and essential parts of a comprehensive view of 
networks.88 In this study, relevant elements of the narrative and social dimensions are 
examined through the lenses of organizational attributes and information strategy, to  
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provide a succinct picture of how networks fight. These characteristics are then examined 
to provide a summary of the strengths and weaknesses exhibited in the ways networks 
fight.  
1. Organizational Perspectives 
Networks are organizations socially derived from a composition of actors and 
linkages. These basic foundations are no different than any other organization, which are 
“groups of people working together to achieve some common purpose,” that facilitate the 
ability to “accomplish more than we could ever do alone.”89 The distinct structural 
characteristics of networks are “limited central control, local autonomy and informal, 
flexible interaction based on direct, personal relations….”90 Most of the study of 
organizations is derived from organizational theory, but this study incorporates social 
network analysis and traditional cultural forms to provide a comprehensive description of 
the organizational characteristics of networks. Organizational design is the defining level 
of network analysis, and a network’s structure provides the basis for other war-fighting 
aspects.91 In most ways, organizational characteristics are generally similar across both 
violent networks and their more socially acceptable counterparts, an aspect which speaks 
to the applicability of the netwar concept and reinforces the importance of network-based 
organizations.  
a.  Organizational Theory 
Organizational theory holds that differences exist in attributes among 
organizations, and these distinctions are significant enough that they influence an 
organization’s performance. These differences have a pronounced effect in the dynamic, 
high-risk environment of irregular warfare. Many of the fundamentals of organizational 
theory stem from the assumptions of the Machine Age, and hold that an “organization is 
like a machine: a collection of parts that need to be standardized and centrally 
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controlled.”92 However, it is now commonly understood that an organization is more like 
a system, where the relationships of all the pieces and their total interaction are what is 
important. These recent ideas portray organizations as a combination of interrelated parts 
that interact with its environment, such as the organization’s purpose/goals, inputs, tasks, 
and output. The idea of an organization as a system that functions in relation to its 
environment led to the idea that no fixed ideal organizational form exists, but that 
organizational effectiveness is contingent on various aspects of the environment. This 
belief is the core of organizational contingency theory, which provides considerable 
insight into the study of networks, and aids in understanding that the modern irregular 
warfare environment requires certain forms.93 
From an organizational perspective, hierarchies provide a structure that 
dispenses authority, material resources, and ideology in a vertical manner.94 In a 
hierarchy, particularly one based on machine-type bureaucracy, complex tasks are broken 
down into specific jobs to achieve greater efficiency. However, this organizational type 
may limit communication outside of specific divisional or functional areas, “thus, a 
hierarchical mode of thinking tends to ignore the potential and real influence of formal 
and informal ties among actors that cut across social categories and group boundaries. It 
also ignores other forms of everyday social relations that affect actors’ identities, 
attitudes and behavior.”95 Organizationally, networks allow for a greater degree of 
connectivity and are more resilient to disruption. Arquilla and Ronfeldt define a network 
as a “set of diverse, dispersed nodes that share a set of ideas and interests and are arrayed 
to act in a fully internetted ‘all-channel’ manner.”96  
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b. Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis holds that all combinations of social linkages are 
networks regardless of hierarchical or decentralized attributes.97 Using the social network 
analysis method, even the most formal hierarchical structure is technically a network; it is 
just organized with specific attributes. Social network analysis describes these attributes 
as variations in network typography. Some of the basic assumptions of social network 
analysis include the following. 
x Actors and their related actions are interdependent with other actors 
x Ties between actors are seen as channels for the transfer or flow of various 
types of resources 
x Social structures are seen in terms of enduring patterns of ties between 
actors 
x An actor’s position in the social structure impacts its beliefs, norms and 
observed behavior 
x Social networks are dynamic entities that change as actors, subgroups, and 
ties between actors enter or leave the network98 
Social network analysis may be applied on the macro level, examining groups of people, 
organizations, and even countries, or at the micro level, addressing individual actors and 
their connections. These social structures are a “network of social ties,” which “transmit 
behavior, attitudes, information, or goods.”99 While the structural framework is 
important, what moves between the linkages is also important in social network analysis. 
Measures of network topography include metrics for an entire network, 
individual actors, and those that measure the flow of resources within a network. For 
example, the network density measures the total number of ties within a network divided 
by the total possible number of ties, which provides a picture of how many of the 
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potential linkages between actors are utilized. Network density is positively related to a 
stronger following of accepted norms and behavior within the social network.100 
Individual actor measurements include measures of centrality, which seeks to determine 
the position of an actor in the network based on the assumption, that because of their 
position, they “often enjoy better access to information and better opportunities to spread 
information.”101 Social network analysis metrics apply to the most hierarchical 
organizations, with rigid, formal linkages, and to the most informal organizations, with 
little to no organized structure.  
Two main types of network formation exist, random and free-scale. 
Random networks are more theoretical and static and scale-free networks exhibit the 
“real-world” characteristics of growth and preferential attachment. One of the oldest 
forms of network models, the random graph, displays random networks but this graph has 
a scale, defined by a normal distribution around an average node.102 Scale-free networks, 
in contrast, have a power-law degree distribution, or long-tail graph, which reflects that in 
most actual networks a small number of nodes are more connected than the rest.103 
Growth reflects the dynamic nature of real-world networks, while preferential 
attachments describes the phenomena that nodes prefer to attach to more connected 
nodes.104 The majority of data-based studies suggest that most social networks have free-
scale characteristics, and it may be a universal characteristic of many networks.105  
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Figure 5.   Differences in the Distribution of Random and Scale-Free Networks106  
Network theory provides a basis for three general topologies, which are 
used in social network analysis and most descriptions of network activity. According to 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, there may be combinations and variations of these three types, but 
the basic topologies are the following. 
x Chain—the network resembles a linear fashion, where contacts are 
separated from each other in an end-to-end fashion, and people, goods and 
services move through intermediate nodes in sequential fashion. 
x Star, or Hub—in this network form nodes are linked to a central node in a 
hub and spoke configuration and resources and communication must flow 
through the central hub. 
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x All-Channel—the network forms in a matrix of connections with every 
node connected to each other node in a dense fashion.107 
Chain,orline,Network Star,orhub,Network AllͲchannelNetwork
 
Figure 6.   Three Basic Forms of Network Structure 
c.  Cultural Forms 
Networks are dynamic and while it is clear that network theory provides a 
fundamental mode of analysis, multiple paradigms provide greater perspective. Ronfeldt 
provides one such viewpoint by describing the al-Qaeda organization as a “classic tribe, 
one that wages segmental warfare.”108 This idea of a tribal organizational structure 
provides another viewpoint on network organization, one that “…overlaps with the 
network view, but has its own implications.”109 The tribal paradigm is a cultural form 
that emphasizes kinship and religion in organizational constructs that are egalitarian, 
segmental, and acephalous, or lacking formal leadership.110 While standard works on 
modernization and development assessed tribal and clan structures as archaic and having 
fading relevance, in many societies they remain, and greatly enhance social 
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connectivity.111 Kinship is the formative factor in tribes and family ties build into 
groupings usually designated as clans. Multiple clans who share similar cultural values 
and religious beliefs loosely organize into tribes, coalescing through similar ideology, but 
achieving cohesion and structure through their kinship-based tribal groupings. According 
to Ronfeldt, “…kin and their associates operate on lateral as much as vertical ties…,” 
making for “….highly flexible social possibilities that resemble not only circles within 
circles but also circles across circles.”112 These organizational structures stem from the 
nature of classic tribal principles. The first principle is that classic tribes are egalitarian, 
meaning that there is a high degree of respect for individual autonomy. This promotes an 
ethos that limits hierarchical tendencies, and promotes leadership that is “…modest, 
generous, self-effacing and treat[s] others as peers.”113 The basis behind the segmental 
principles is that each tribe is more or less similar, and there is no real specialization, or 
from an organizational theory perspective, differentiated. This provides for structures that 
are able to have high degrees of fusion and fission, uniting and separating with a 
remarkable fluidity. The third principle is that classic tribes are acephalous. Those who 
were in positions of authority, such as a chief, had influence as a broker or advisor, but 
decision making was based on deliberation and consensus, usually in the form of open 
tribal councils. These insights from cultural forms are particularly valuable in describing 
fighting networks formed from social networks within a culture that emphasizes tribal 
characteristics. As Richard Schultz states, “one of the more disturbing trends of non-state 
armed groups is the extent to which such groups, including these clan-based groups, are 
cooperating and collaborating with each other in networks that span national borders and 
include fellow tribal groups, criminal groups, and corrupt political elements.”114 
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2. Organizational Attributes 
Each of these organizational perspectives provides insights into the organizational 
factors operative in networks. While there is analytical value in describing every social 
construct through a lens of social network analysis, for the purpose of this study, 
networks are organizations that emphasize the following attributes of decentralization, 
greater autonomy, informal chains of authority, and dispersed communications flow, and 
this separates them from organizations commonly characterized as hierarchies. The 
application of contingency theory to the study of networks is a developing field, as most 
network analysis is derived from elements of network theory, but the combination of the 
two perspectives provides for a richer understanding of networked organizations. The 
tribal form also provides valuable insight into understanding the formative ties within 
networks, and the norms that emphasize segmented activity. The following organizational 
characteristics are essential elements in understanding how networks fight. 
a. Decentralization 
Networks are structurally characterized by high levels of decentralization, 
which allows for autonomous action and high degrees of operational initiative. 
Organizational structures are generally configured to the nature of their task, and must be 
to achieve any degree of efficiency. Organizations faced with routine tasks and simple 
communications prefer a centralized structure, but organizations that must face complex 
tasks and a high degree of information transfer decentralize to achieve greater 
efficiency.115 Decentralization refers to an element of structure that captures the degree 
of autonomy at all levels of the network. In addition, decentralization provides a means to 
describe authority within an organization, and in most networks, in irregular warfare, a 
distribution of authority exists. However, although authority flows vertically, there is 
much less control and direction, in the form of orders and plans, than in most 
organizations. This combination of vertical authority, but less directive control enables 
sub-elements of the network to remain flexible based on the conditions they face. 
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Organizational theory postulates two ways to achieve decentralization of authority, 
vertically and horizontally. Vertical decentralization describes delegation of power down 
a vertical chain of authority, while horizontal decentralization describes the distribution 
of power out away from a vertical chain.116 Networks achieve their best fit to the 
environment and their goals using a combination of these aspects of decentralization. 
Further, the pressure placed against networks in response to their illegal, violent activity, 
is a significant factor in producing a complex environment. “Because of external 
pressure, global guerrillas have atomized into loose, decentralized networks that are more 
robust and learn more quickly than traditional hierarchies.”117  
Information technology allows networks to decentralize further, as they 
substitute information flows via technology for what previously may have required a 
more hierarchical structure.118 These advantages, combined with the tendency of 
networks to grow increasingly dense to maintain strong affiliations in dangerous 
circumstances, produce conditions that favor decentralization over centralized 
hierarchical control. The greater decentralization, which characterizes networks, creates 
more autonomy and freedom of action, especially in all-channel networks. In fact, 
networks achieve much of their effectiveness because greater autonomy at the individual 
actor level allows for faster decision making.119 This freedom of action is a hallmark of 
small-unit maneuver throughout warfare, and it allows these small units to exert 
tremendous operational initiative. Since these units are able to act independent of a 
centralized control system, they are able to take the initiative at the tactical level. Even in 
conventional, hierarchical military commands, local initiative usually determines success 
on the battlefield, and it is a hallmark of tactical advantage. Numerous instances of junior 
leaders taking the initiative, even when outside their direct responsibility, have proved the 
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value of initiative in determining the outcome of battle.120 This is certainly true in 
irregular warfare, where much of the conflict occurs at the local, tactical level, and where 
rapidly changing conditions require swift responses independent of a formal order, or 
planning process. In fact, initiative at the nodal level provides the capacity to execute 
fluid swarming attacks. 
b. Synchronized Nodes 
Networks fight with nodes or cells, small elements that provide 
advantages in tactical control and security. Although networks are generally smaller than 
their opponents, as in the case of a non-state actor confronting a modern military, this is 
not always the case, and the asymmetry between opponents is due to differences in force. 
Mass is rarely a factor in irregular warfare engagements, and dispersion provides a better 
measure of force arrays. For this reason, smaller nodes provide multiple advantages to 
networks, including ease of tactical control and greater security.121 These smaller groups 
require less direction and control to maneuver, and can achieve greater autonomy because 
they do not require complex direction. Yet, the same attributes that make nodes easy to 
control at the tactical level provide challenges in mass coordination of multiple elements. 
Paget highlights these challenges when writing about irregular forces in the mid-20th 
century, “This system of small groups is forced on the insurgents by their need for 
dispersion and mobility, and it suffers from the resultant weakness that effective control 
and good communications are both difficult to maintain.”122 However, information 
technology provides modern fighting networks with the ability to synchronize their 
efforts and communications more effectively while maintaining small, decentralized 
elements. Unlike traditional irregular opponents, networks allow greater communications, 
and their fundamental building blocks of nodes and cells are linked and empowered by a 
high-degree of connectivity. 
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Finally, nodes also provide for greater security, by compartmenting 
throughout the network, and by facilitating evasion. By ensuring small, segregated 
groups, a network is able to restrict information flow when necessary. “Security is always 
a problem to the insurgents who have to guard constantly against subversion, informers, 
traitors and deserters. Their security is always of the highest standard, and vital 
information is protected by adopting the ‘cell’ system, whereby only one person in each 
group knows the details and future plans and can identify his next superiors and 
juniors.”123 The cellular system is composed of small groups with strong ties, which 
provide some advantages in ensuring that segregation exists between cells, but with 
obvious downsides once, the cell itself is compromised. Operationally, smaller elements 
provide networks the means to disperse, and aid in remaining un-detected. Large groups 
of personnel are easily identified through visual means, and face greater difficulties 
achieving stealth during evasion.  
c. Resiliency 
Irregular warfare is dynamic and networks achieve resiliency through 
organizational structures with multiple linkages. According to network theory, random 
weak links provide resilient strength in network structure. Mark Granovetter, in his 
highly influential paper, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” established that the crucial links in 
overall network formation are the weak links between actors.124 This is somewhat 
counter-intuitive because it is natural to assume that strong ties would be the most 
effective bridges that tie various elements of networks together. However, weak links 
actually provide the “…social shortcuts, that if eliminated, would cause the network to 
fall to pieces.”125 Weak ties provide a high degree of resiliency because they allow a 
network to form bridges even when the strong ties are severed (strong ties usually 
characterize the most active parts of the network, and hence, the once most subjected to 
pressure and change).  
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This structural property works in conjunction with the role of hubs, which 
are actors with a high degree of connections to other actors. Hubs ensure that networks 
remain connected and resilient in a way that redundancy alone cannot achieve. “The hubs 
act as a kind of glue within the network. Since an uncoordinated attack targets elements 
at random, it almost always knocks out unimportant elements with few links, while 
missing the hubs. In this way, the small-world architecture makes a network resilient 
against random failure or unsophisticated attack.”126 Further, networks utilize hybrid 
forms of chain, star, and all-channel structures in sophisticated combinations, which 
increase task efficiency and aid in overall network resiliency. 
From an organizational theory perspective, resiliency is often (but not 
only) explained through redundancy. If one actor or system were to be removed from the 
organization, there would be another waiting to replace it. Yet, networks must balance 
their ability to control with the costs imposed by additional organizational structure, and a 
high-level of redundancy imposes costs in flexibility, resources, and coordination. 
Networks remarkable persistence in irregular warfare shows that, “…decentralized 
structures are more resilient than centralized ones because the violation of the integrity of 
any one of their branches has little effect on the ability of other branches to function and 
because their leaders are less useful to target.”127  
d. Flexibility 
Effective networks are flexible, adapting their structure to the 
environmental conditions, which makes them resistant to any one form of pressure. 
Networks must be able to react to the pressures they face, and return to an equilibrium 
state based on their goals and environment. Inflexible networks will be unable to adjust to 
changes in the environment, fail to react to pressure, and incur higher operational risks. 
An optimal structure exists where networks are neither too strong and redundant, nor are 
ties too weak and loose. Social network analysis distinguishes between these two sets of 
characteristics with the terms “provincial,” as in “confined to the provincial news and 
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view of their close friends,” or “cosmopolitan,” meaning open exchanges between many 
loose acquaintances 128 Networks under extreme pressure are generally loosely 
organized, and less able to mobilize for operational activity. Networks that find 
themselves in a provincial state, with close, strong ties may be more operationally 
effective, but also more isolated. In either situation, networks exhibit flexibility by 










Figure 7.   Efficient Network Structure129 
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Approaching the same aspect in a similar manner, but using different 
language, organizational theory posits that networks exhibit flexibility through their 
balance of differentiation and integration, and the proper balance of these two 
characteristics provide resiliency. These distinctions by Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch 
determine organizational characteristics in relation to the environmental requirements. 
Differentiation is the “extent to which actors in a social system are structurally and 
functionally different from each other.”130 The denser a network, the more integrated it is 
likely to be, as integration is based on the quality, quantity, and structure of linkages. 
These linkages may be obtained by formal or informal communication, shared beliefs, 
common goals, and even organizational structures.131 The contingency outlook shows 
that organizations must find the best combination of differentiation and integration for 
their environment to be most effective.132 In fighting networks, different skills allow for 
increased operational complexity. Lawrence and Lorsch found that organizations in more 
uncertain environments tend to be both more differentiated and place more emphasis on 
integrating.133 This would mean that the more dynamic an environment the network is in, 
the more it is required to decentralize, segment, and increase linkages between nodes. 
Greater integration at the operational level facilitates fluid actions and inter-operability 
between nodes in a network. Overall, the ease with which they are able to weigh various 
aspects of these two qualities and select the appropriate combination determines a 
network’s flexibility.  
e. Trust-Based Relations 
Networks form primarily through trust-based relationships, which sustain 
high-risk activity and provide operational advantages. Due to the risk that clandestine 
activity presents, networks must be decentralized, rely on a unique combination of weak 
and strong ties, and most importantly, be based on a high degree of trust between 
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members. In fact, trust may even be an essential antecedent condition for the 
development of network structures, especially ones leading to operational activity. Susan 
Boon and John Holmes define trust as, “a state involving confident predictions about 
another’s motives with respect to oneself in situations entailing risk.”134 The concise 
form of this definition highlights the basic elements of trust, and illustrates that trust in 
not necessarily based on “friendship” or “likes,” but rather on predictions in terms of risk. 
Different levels of trust determine the strength of ties, and illegal, violent networks may 
have ties ranging from blind trust (rarely), rational calculation, to the strongest form, 
identify-based.135  
Primarily, though, the high degree of trust required in fighting networks 
places an emphasis on identify-based ties within trusted social relationships. According to 
Raab and Milward, “every secret organization has to solve a fundamental dilemma: how 
to stay secret and at the same time ensure the necessary coordination and control of its 
members.”136 Trust provides an element of cohesion and forms ties between actors that 
create a sense of security, which is crucial to conducting operational acts. The 
organizational structure of the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attackers “…seems to have been based on 
prior trusted contacts between members.”137 Bonnie Erickson highlighted this attribute 
by stating that secrecy is a necessary condition of high-risk activity, and so “…trust 
becomes a vital matter and hence preexisting networks set the limits of a secret 
society.”138 The general requirement for trust in networks ensures that linkages are 
formed from relationships between actors that share a high degree of trust. Clusters of 
these linkages are also referred to as cliques, which are crucial to ensuring secrecy within 
an organization. High degrees of trust are primarily evident in the case of strong links, 
usually based on close ties, such as kinship and friendship. Marc Sageman studied the 
                                                 
134 Susan D. Boon and John G. Holmes, “The Dynamics of Interpersonal Trust: Resolving Uncertainty 
in the Face of Risk,” in Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior, ed. Robert Hindle and Jo Groebel (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 167–182, cited in Barbara D. Adams and Robert D. G. Webb, 
“Trust in Small Military Teams,” 1, http://www.dodccrp.org/events/7th_ICCRTS/Tracks/pdf/006.PDF. 
135 Piotr Sztompka, Trust (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
136 Raab and Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” 442. 
137 Ibid., 424. 
138 Erickson, “Secret Societies and Social Structure,” 195. 
 51
Global Salafi jihadist network in his groundbreaking work, Understanding Terror 
Networks, and found that 68% of all those affiliating with the global jihad had pre-
existing friendship bonds. In addition, and a strong indicator of those ties characteristic of 
tribal organization, kinship played a role in 14% of the mujahedin participating, with 
entire families involved in some instances.139 However, it is also important to note that 
these strong ties may reduce a networks ability to sever ties to increase flexibility, both in 
overall structure, as well as physical movement.140  
In addition to enabling participation in high-risk activity, trust also 
enhances operational activity by increasing the ease of coordination and communication. 
This performance in high-risk environments is crucial, as, “…the tactical unity of men 
working together in combat will be in the ratio of their knowledge and sympathetic 
understanding of each other.”141 High levels of trust allow for intent, rather than directive 
mission orders, and ensure a common outlook. Robert Coram states, “trust emphasizes 
implicit over explicit communications. Trust is the unifying concept. This gives the 
subordinate great freedom of action.”142 
One of the primary means of forming trust is a shared ideology, or cause, 
and it provides an over-arching umbrella for other relationships, motivations, and 
geographic origins in networks. Throughout history, guerrillas and those involved in 
armed opposition have been united under a common cause, motivated by grievances, and 
inspired by common beliefs and values. These ideological motivations provide a common 
umbrella from which to organize. In discussing the al-Qaeda organization, Ronfeldt states 
that it is held together “…by a gripping sense of shared belonging, principles of fusion 
against an outside enemy, and jihadist narrative so compelling that it amounts to both an 
ideology and a doctrine.”143 This use of ideology as an organizing element is also a 
function of tribal structures, where religion and kinship are fused to provide a nearly 
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comprehensive sense of identity. Weak ties that share a common ideological milieu might 
provide a more significant bond than would otherwise be the case. Those outside this 
identity are viewed as “others” and are not trusted, where those who share a common 
identity are granted a great deal of trust.  
f. Decontrol 
Networks rarely exhibit direct command and control, which provides 
flexibility and autonomy in tactical decision making, but may decrease collective 
direction and efficiency. Leadership in a network provides overall strategic direction and 
purpose, but seldom more than necessary to synchronize action. This leadership direction 
is instrumental in mobilizing and organizing, as well as providing an overall element of 
cohesion, but it rarely takes direct control of nodes. The authority that exists in networks 
is not focused on direct control, and differs from standard military authority that 
emphasizes hierarchical command. Instead, it provides direction and inspiration with 
lines of authority less rigid than in a hierarchical organization, striving for “decontrol.”144 
However, negative aspects of a lack of centralized leadership exist. Decision making may 
be complicated and protracted when trying to achieve organizational consensus and 
direction.145 While complex decisions at the small unit level may occur rapidly due to 
increased autonomy, decision making for the entire network may occur less efficiently. 
Rapid decisions made by autonomous nodes or individual actors are seldom synchronized 
without unity of purpose and communication. 
The noted sociologist, Georg Simmel held that secret organizations were 
deliberately built by a central power and required a great degree of authority to maintain 
control.146 However, this hierarchical view of clandestine organizations fails to account 
for the dynamics of risk in irregular warfare, and the fact that pre-existing networks tend 
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to form the basic structure of most secret organizations.147 Still, the requirement for 
security in a clandestine organization requires some amount of authority to ensure 
compartmentalization—where relationships and linkages are kept to a minimum. This 
requirement would likely produce a hierarchical method of control, except for the 
organizational requirements to remain decentralized. Leadership in networks requires an 
element of vertical authority, where a leadership figure might provide direct guidance, 
but also a high degree of decentralized authority, relying on individual nodes to maintain 
security. By providing less directive control, leadership in networks ensures that each 
element has the maximum amount of autonomy. Leadership plays a less active role in 
controlling decentralized and autonomous fighting elements. According to Hoffman, this 
is an increasing characteristic of terror networks where “this phenomenon, variously 
termed ‘leaderless resistance,’ ‘phantom cell networks,’ ‘autonomous leadership units,’ 
‘autonomous cells,’ ‘networks of networks,’ or ‘lone wolves,’…has become one of the 
most important trends in terrorism today.”148 These networks display collective security 
not through a centralized authority, as in traditional guerrilla or terrorist organizations, 
but rather through cultural norms and the necessity to ensure operational security to 
survive. 
3. Doctrine 
Military doctrine seeks to determine the way in which warfare occurs, and 
characterizes the fundamentals that guide the application of military forces. Doctrine 
influences all levels of warfare and provides “fundamental principles” that guide 
operational practice to achieve strategic goals.149 According to General George H. 
Decker, “doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a 
common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”150 Historically, doctrine is 
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used as a term that defines critical components of a national security policy, and is guided 
by grand strategy. Doctrine describes how military forces organize, and how they will 
counter threats to national security, and it usually takes the form of offensive, defensive, 
or deterrent action.151 Offensive doctrine seeks to disarm an adversary, usually through 
destroying their armed forces. A modern example of offensive military doctrine is the 
U.S. Army’s Air Land Battle doctrine developed in the 1980s, which emphasized deep-
strikes behind “front-lines” using long-range fires, while maneuver forces exploited 
weaknesses to attack follow-on forces.152 Defensive doctrine emphasizes denying an 
adversary the objective that they seek. The aim of deterrent doctrine is to punish an 
aggressor by raising their costs.153  
An opponent’s military doctrine reveals the expectations of its leadership, its 
preferred manner of waging war, its capabilities, the resources it acquires, and its type of 
forces. Doctrine enables strategy by providing the means and ways to conduct warfare, 
enabling strategy’s employment of “…power in a synchronized and integrated 
fashion….”154 Networks seek to use all manner of resources in their employment of 
strategy, and there are no purely military means, which restrict their development of 
doctrine. In addition, the fundamental nature of irregular warfare is a competition 
involving the population, not just military means, and so the scope of doctrine available 
to a network is arguably wider than that available to a professional force focused intently 
on military affairs. While professional militaries traditionally employ doctrine that 
consists of offensive, defensive, or deterrent forms, networks are not limited by these 
strict constructs and blur characteristics over time and through the space of an irregular 
conflict. 
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Networks also have doctrine, but it is much less formalized, or structured than 
professional militaries. By incorporating certain elements of unconventional warfare and 
updating with modern “best practices,” networks display the ability to rapidly evolve 
doctrine in ways that traditional militaries find challenging. As a strategist for the al-
Qaeda network (and perhaps one of the most noteworthy strategists since Mao), Abu 
Musab al-Suri references “Mao Tse-Tung, Guevara, Giap, Castro, and others,” calling 
them the “greatest theoreticians in military art,” as he cautioned against a tactical defense 
for the Al-Qaeda network.155 Al-Suri provides a clear example of the use of guerrilla 
warfare as an element of this network’s doctrine, stating, “…one has to establish firmly 
the principles of the Islamic doctrine in general, and the jihadi doctrine in particular.” 
Expanding on this topic, “it is also necessary to focus on understanding the theory of 
guerrilla warfare in general, and the basis for jihadi guerrilla warfare in particular.”156 
Yet, it is far too simplistic to describe al-Qaeda as a guerrilla organization as they have 
transcended traditional practices by their skilled utilization of the network form and 
netwar principles. Quite simply, just as it does for a professional military, doctrine 
provides principles for networks in conflict.  
In their insightful article, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” Andrew Kydd and 
Barbara Walter show that terrorists employ a doctrine based on costly signals. This 
doctrine of signaling highlights the unique combinations of offensive, defensive, and 
deterrent doctrine that networks employ.157 Terrorist violence, or the act of terrorism, is 
designed to achieve an intended result, and in many instances, it seeks to both convey a 
message and provoke a reaction. “Terrorism works not simply because it instills fear in 
target populations, but because it causes governments and individuals to respond in ways 
that aid the terrorists’ cause.”158 The five principle “strategies” that Kydd and Walter 
identify as a part of their signaling doctrine are: 1) attrition, 2) intimidation, 3) 
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provocation, 4) spoiling, and 5) outbidding.159 Each of these forms of terrorist strategy 
involves offensive attacks, and it would appear that terrorism has an offensive doctrine. 
However, terrorist organizations, like most networks, are inherently weaker than their 
nation-state opponents, and terror tactics provide a means to achieve defensive aims by 
also denying an adversary the objective they seek. In addition, the doctrine of signaling 
also has a deterrent component, as it aims to punish an aggressor and so raise their costs 
without reducing the terrorists’ own.160 
While much of doctrine is focused on traditional warfare, with an emphasis on the 
principles of war that favor nation-states, irregular warfare contains other principles and 
strategies. While networks lack the formalized, and perhaps limiting, doctrine of modern 
nation-states, they draw on timeless principles of irregular warfare. These principles have 
shaped irregular action for as long as the weak have confronted the strong, and they place 
special emphasis on elements, such as surprise and deception. Most notably, networks 
utilize doctrinal principles that are fluid in nature, and that foremost, seek to ensure that 
the network is able to adapt to changing circumstances. Rather than seek to entrench 
doctrine, in the bureaucratic nature of hierarchical militaries, networks view doctrine as a 
free-flow exchange of innovative ideas. The doctrinal characteristics described in this 
section emphasize this ability to flex, and to wage war in a manner consistent with the 
situation at hand, rather than attempt to fight based on fixed means. For these reasons, 
networks blur the lines between strictly offensive or defensive doctrine, and utilize 
elements of population-centric strategy foreign to conventional military forces. Network-
style warfare provides distinctive doctrinal attributes, which provide dramatic change 
from even fairly recent notions of unconventional warfare. 
a. Blurring of Offense and Defense 
Networks fight using a unique combination of doctrine, which often blurs 
offensive and defensive attributes. While conventional conflict traditionally occurs 
between two militaries occurs vis-à-vis their forces, the conflicts in irregular warfare 
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more directly involve the population. This conflict makes it difficult to define doctrine in 
such straightforward terms as offense and defense, which traditionally describe 
relationships between military forces. However, attributes of offense, defense, and 
deterrence are incorporated in netwar doctrine, which often present themselves in blended 
forms.  
In many cases, networks will seek to frame their struggle through 
defensive terms at the strategic level, while at the same time, conducting offensive 
attacks. Existing force asymmetries mean that networks mainly use the offensive when 
they have the initiative. “It is the secret of the guerrilla force that, to be successful, they 
must hold the initiative, attack selected targets at a time of their choosing, and avoid 
battle when the odds are against them. If they maintain their offensive in this way, both 
their strength and their morale automatically increase until victory is won.”161 Despite his 
focus on conventional war between nation-states, even Clausewitz’s strategic thinking 
recognized that irregular actions provided a potent defensive tool.162 Often, the strategic 
goal of networks is not to defeat opposing forces in a decisive manner, but show a 
stronger will, and thereby, defeat their will to continue fighting. The aim of defeating the 
will of an opponent focuses on both the will of the military adversary, as well as the will 
of the people who support it. Popular will may prove decisive within irregular warfare, 
and by maintaining the strategic defensive, networks can preserve their forces, prolong 
the conflict, and thereby, wear down their opposition. “They will play the part of a 
vicious gnat stinging and eluding a larger, rather clumsy beast, until it retreats in fury and 
frustration.”163 Networks defend in aggressive fashion, seeking to inflict damaging blows 
through a combination of ambushes and swarming attacks. These offensive actions are 
utilized to deny the enemy its objective, and are incorporated in a defensive strategy 
whose pro-active nature is remarkable. While it will be explored further in a case study, 
the Chechen response to the Russian invasion in 1996 provided hallmark examples of 
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offensive actions that sought to inflict serious damage on advancing Russian forces, 
culminating in the initial battle for Grozny.164 The Chechen response even took the 
conflict beyond its borders to include strikes inside Russia and demonstrated information 
operations synchronized with action. 
Tactically, networks tend to remain on the offensive and avoid fixed 
defensive engagements. Strategists throughout history have identified that irregular forces 
must be tactically offensive, and that they will be quickly overwhelmed if attempting to 
fight defensively at the tactical level. Modern-day networks are no different, and their 
operations are offensively focused. Despite a general force disadvantage, networks fight 
offensively, and mitigate their lack of superior mass and firepower through surprise, rapid 
or indirect attacks, and the ability to engage and re-engage in a way that maintains 
relative power. At the tactical level, networks utilize tactics, such as swarming to great 
effect, as clearly demonstrated by the swarms of vehicle-born improvised explosive 
device (IEDs) that terrorized Baghdad during al-Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) struggle for 
control of that city. Traditionally irregular forces would incur tremendous risk by 
attempting tactical defensive action, but a blurring of offensive techniques, such as the 
ambush, or swarming, enables networks with defensive aims. These forms of aggressive 
action are typically considered in offensive terms, but may occur to achieve a defensive 
objective, or in response to an opponent’s attack, demonstrating the fluidity of network 
doctrine. 
b. Swarming 
Networks utilize swarming as a fundamental aspect of their doctrine, and 
one that provides a distinguishing element from other forms of irregular war. Swarming 
describes the combined offensive action of small, highly mobile forces that attack and 
withdraw in a pulsing manner.165 The requirements for effective swarming attacks are 
large numbers of smaller units that have the ability to coordinate with each other 
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autonomously, as well as a command element just as connected, but that exerts control 
only when required.166 Swarming is a unique doctrine that allows numerous small 
elements the ability to attack swiftly in mass, but still possess the ability to disperse 
rapidly when necessary. Swarming is not limited to physical forces, but most notably 
includes long-range fires and the employment of sensors in ways that simultaneously 
enable synchronized action. As Sean Edwards describes, “swarming occurs when several 
units conduct a convergent attack on a target from multiple axes. Attacks can either be 
long range fires or close range fire and hit-and-run attacks.”167 Swarming provides a 
method of warfare uniquely suited to the high information levels, but overall 
decentralized structure that characterizes fighting networks. 
Swarming occurs throughout history, and irregular forces, such as the 
Finnish army in their remarkable campaign against the Russian invasion in 1939–1940, 
utilize aspects of swarming with great effect.168 While employed by guerrillas at times, 
swarming doctrine highlights key differences separating networks in conflict from 
guerrilla warfare. First, guerrilla warfare is generally employed by an inferior force, and 
in support of insurgent, or political goals. As Liddell Hart emphasized, “in the past, 
guerrilla war has been a weapon of the weaker side, and thus primarily defensive….”169 
Further, and most importantly, guerrilla warfare primarily employs hit-and-run tactics by 
small units, which achieve little decisive effect against an enemy because they are limited 
in scope and lack synchronized action. Swarming emphasizes multiple nodes that attack 
in a synchronized manner and are capable of conducting the repeated and decisive action, 
which displays the power of a networked force. This ability to conduct sustained pulsing 
attacks by multiple units clearly differentiates swarming from standard guerrilla 
warfare.170 While swarming presents a tremendous advantage to weaker forces, if they 
are sufficiently networked, forces of any type may also employ it.  
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While swarming is not unique to irregular warfare, fighting networks 
utilize swarming due to their decentralization and a high degree of information. The 
following figure depicts the relationship between these components and shows a trend 
line depicting the overall nature of warfare to-date. Fighting networks generally fall 
within the center of the upper-left quadrant. Swarming has three important enablers on 
which it relies: elusiveness, superior situational awareness, and standoff capability.171 
Elusiveness is generally a function of stealth and a network’s ability to remain concealed, 
while situational awareness results from information shared in a networked fashion. 
Standoff capability reflects the employment of fires and indirect weapons, while at the 
same time, keeping nodes from being directly targeted (through either greater range 
and/or concealment). A recent emphasis on swarming doctrine is the mysterious Abu 
Bakr Naji’s publication in Sawt al-Jihad, the al-Qaida Internet magazine, urging jihadists 
to “strike with your striking force multiple times and with the maximum power you 
possess in the most locations.”172 
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Figure 8.   Four Forms of Warfare with General Trend-Line Depicting Overall 
Employment173 
c.  Protracted and Rapid Warfare 
Networks are capable of fighting in a protracted manner, but will take the 
initiative when it presents itself, which demonstrates staying power, but also seizing on 
opportunities for rapid victory. While the asymmetry of irregular conflict generally 
promotes being able to “outlast” instead of directly “outfighting” superior opponents, this 
does not exclude decisive action. Networks differ from classic irregular opponents, which 
primarily use guerrilla warfare strategies based on minor actions. The most common 
guerrilla strategy is a classic war of exhaustion, one that seeks to wear down the opponent 
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using smaller attacks that gradually weaken their opponent’s military forces. Another 
classic strategy is based on continuing to disrupt the enemy while attempting to build 
forces from an irregular army to a larger regular army able to confront a superior 
opponent conventionally. The end state of this focus is Mao's third phase of guerrilla 
strategy, which he describes as a “war of movement,” and which culminates in 
conventional warfare capabilities. Networks rarely use these two strategies, but as 
complex adaptive systems, networks are able to generate remarkable powers of 
survivability and persistence.174 
Another strategy, which is perhaps most applicable to modern networks, is 
simply persisting in attacks against any element of power (to include military forces, 
civilian will, and economic centers). This form of attack may require considerable time 
because it requires a combined approach that is actually a total war, but conducted in an 
irregular manner. As well, systems disruption’s primary approach is swarming, which if 
conducted in a pulsing manner, may require additional time to wear down an 
opponent.175 Since its focus is on total war, and unlimited attacks on any aspect of its 
opponent’s power, this approach will generate considerable pressure against the network. 
This pressure requires a flexible approach, and operational activity able to oscillate 
between periods of intense activity and dormancy, to prevent compromise and ensure 
persistence over time. This strategy most closely describes the nature of al-Qaeda’s 
campaign against Western interests.  
Another situation that clearly illuminates fighting networks is the 
combination of persistence and decisive victory displayed by the Chechen devolution 
from a semi-professional military force, into smaller bands of highly trained fighters. 
Instead of following a classic guerrilla strategy of building into a conventional force, 
these bands utilized their professional training in organizational and doctrinal ways that 
favored their decentralized clan-based relationships. Most militaries would have 
crumbled out of their hierarchical structure; a disintegration, which the Russians 
expected. However, the Chechens were able to metastasize into a formidable network, 
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and thereby, persist against the Russian offensive.176 Network opponents are able to 
persist over time, and utilize the context of their situation to fashion campaigns, which 
favor their ability to resist in multiple ways. They balance the need for operational 
activity with the need for persistence, which is complimented by structural aspects of 
resiliency on an operational level.  
d. Deception 
Networks rely heavily on deception, largely in the form of concealment, to 
ensure favorable conditions from the tactical through strategic levels. Deception is 
paramount in warfare of all types, but Sun Tzu’s aphorism holds greater value in irregular 
warfare, “All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; 
when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, 
that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him.”177 
Networks employing deception in irregular warfare gain significant advantages through 
various stratagems, which seek to gain a relative force advantage. 
Tactically, networks rely on elements of deception to infiltrate an area of 
operation and it plays a primary role in achieving surprise against stronger opponents. 
Fighting networks rarely utilize uniforms, and generally lack distinctive markings. Their 
appearance as a member of the civilian population provides a tremendous amount of 
concealment, so much so that in professional militaries, only selected organizations are 
granted this ability, and even then, it has traditionally carried a distasteful notion of 
subterfuge. These distinctions are irrelevant to networks and they utilize every advantage 
possible to conceal their intentions and deceive the nature and manner of their attacks. 
For this reason, terrorism is a powerful tool employed by networks, as it carries the shock 
of surprise, and a devastation that is both concealed and unexpected. 
At the strategic level, networks maintain their defenses through their 
ability to hide, in real or virtual domains, or conceal themselves. The asymmetry in force 
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requires those waging irregular war to remain undetected. The advantage of being able to 
hide within the population or difficult terrain provides advantages to a networked force. 
The primary means of concealment for networks is to blend into the general population, 
and utilize day-to-day activity as a means of concealing oneself and disguising 
operational activity. In many cases, this is as simple as only taking up arms, or 
conducting identifying activities, when conducting operations. Within a larger population 
base, enough anonymity exists to achieve greater operational freedom, especially if the 
existing relationships might constraint activity.  
e. Systems Disruption 
Networks attack weakness using systems disruption, in addition to directly 
confronting an opponent’s forces. The concept of systems disruption is a form of indirect 
strategy, and perhaps represents the apex of indirect attacks. As the noted strategist B. H. 
Liddell Hart stated, “the true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic 
situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation 
by a battle is sure to achieve this.”178 T. E. Lawrence, in his irregular campaign during 
WWI, focused on destroying the Turkish army’s scarce material resources, rather than 
confronting their larger forces, and in doing so, he formulated a new theory of irregular 
warfare, one that focus more on a winning strategy, than on winning battles.179  
The idea of system disruption employed by networks uses the same 
principles, but focuses on all aspects of an opponent’s power, not simply military forces. 
The strategic nature of these attacks reveals themselves in terror strikes, which also “seek 
to impose severe and growing economic costs on their targets.”180 Today’s nation states 
exist on arteries of fuel, electronic grids, power generation, transportation, and inter-
connected computer systems. These systems provide new targets for networks, which 
target them as a way to weaken their opponent’s resource base, economy, and 
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transportation capability.181 Iraqi insurgents targeted coalition force convoys with IEDs, 
to damage and disrupt the flow of material resources, more than inflict casualties, but 
more tellingly launched hundreds of attacks against population centers and industrial 
targets. On the global level, al-Qaeda strategy promotes attacks on economic systems, as 
seen in attacks against petroleum related infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
States. Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin, the operational commander of al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) paraphrased similar writing from Ayman al-Zawahiri and Musab al-
Suri when he stated that the “purpose of these targets is to destabilize the situation and 
not allow the economic recovery….to have foreign investments withdrawn from the local 
markets.”182 Systems disruption provides a form of doctrine that enables fighting 
networks to fight nation states on a strategic level, through the “sabotage of critical 
systems to inflict economic costs on the target state.”183 
4. Operational Methods 
Operational methods focus on the operational and tactical level of warfare, while 
recognizing that the traditional levels of war are not clear distinctions in irregular 
warfare. Since networks fight with smaller numbers, yet seek to have a disproportionate 
effect on popular perception, there is significant crossover, with tactical actions 
producing tremendous strategic effect, and strategy hinging on tactical behavior. For this 
reason, operational methods describe the blend of activities that occur at the operational 
and tactical levels, and reflect the integration of information strategy. Operational 
methods stem from doctrine; hence, aspects like flexibility, surprise, concealment, and 
adaptability are fundamentals of irregular tactics. These fundamentals allow for 
improvisation at the operational level, where networks seek to achieve significant 
strategic effects through each tactical action. The operational level of war blends tactics 
and strategy, synchronizing the means of tactical actions with the goals of strategic 
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objectives. According to U.S. military joint doctrine, actions at the operational level are a 
form of art, which requires imagination, skill, knowledge, and experience to organize and 
employ military forces in campaigns.184 The operational level of war is the crucial aspect 
of warfare, and networks understand this, as well as professional armies. Al-Suri 
describes operational theories and an organizational setup based on a “system of action: 
not a secret organization for action,” and discusses how the “Islamic Resistance units 
develop their operational methods…with regards to the military theory….”185 
Tactics are focused on combat actions, and seek to describe the art and science of 
actions that occur on the battlefield. This includes the technical application of techniques 
and procedures, and modern military doctrine usually combines all three of these aspects 
into a comprehensive whole of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Network 
tactics also include “engagements,” and “activities,” recognizing that the battlefield may 
not be the primary space for irregular conflict.186 Networks succeed at the tactical level 
far more than at any other level, primarily because their operational methods favor small, 
decentralized units of action rather than larger ones requiring much operational 
synchronization.  
Information technology provides the means to achieve greater internal and 
external communications and it has tremendous effects on operational methods. The tools 
and resources that information technology provides contribute to the operational methods 
employed by networks, and perhaps more than any other factor, have added increased 
viability to these methods. The primary aspect of enhancement is internal 
communications. Networks utilize modern information technology to increase the amount 
of communications that occur between otherwise disconnected, decentralized elements. 
While radios have provided some of this connectivity in irregular warfare, the rapid 
proliferation of cellular phones allows every single node in the network the ability to 
communicate with another. This degree of communications, which surpasses that of most 
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modern armies, enhances their ability to decentralize, increases mobility, and allows for 
synchronizing activities. Moreover, this increased use of technology provides networks 
with the ability to acquire greater standoff, leading to an increase in number and lethality 
of indirect attacks. This standoff is a critical part of a swarming doctrine, and information 
technology provides the means to coordinate such action further, as well as the physical 
technology to launch attacks. A disposable cell phone provides the means both to 
coordinate explosive swarming attacks and serves as the tool to initiate the actual 
detonations. 
Operational methods function as a blend of operational art and tactical application 
that utilizes information technology in a system remarkably adaptable to the 
revolutionary aspects of the information age. While there are doctrinal characteristics, 
which provide some guidelines for the application of force, the fundamental nature of 
network operational methods lies in the willingness to combine multiple aspects of the 
irregular warfare environment in a system that is both coherent, yet shifting. The 
following characteristics seek to provide additional clarity to the complex ways in which 
networks actually engage in violent activities. 
a. Economy of Force 
Networks generally lack resources compared to their opponents, but being 
lightly armed provides multiple operational advantages. A lack of resources actually 
provides some advantages to the irregular opponent, and illustrates the principle of 
economy of force. Economy of force is a fundamental principle of war, and describes the 
“judicious employment and distribution of forces,” which is critical given networks’ 
small elements and lack of redundant capabilities.187 While much of modern warfare 
hinges on resource production, fewer resources mean that networks have little to defend, 
less to transport, and require less sustainment for operational activity. Limited resources 
provide an antecedent condition that contributes to network doctrine, shapes tactical 
application, and shapes much of their capacity for action. In some cases, the idea that less 
is more actually rings true and networks are unencumbered by excessive equipment and 
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the logistical requirements they entail. Much like an alpinist that moves through vertical 
terrain with greater speed, achieving less risk than climbers that attempt to siege with 
heavy equipment over greater time, networked fighters move faster because they are 
lighter. Tactically, the use of economy of force provides a significant maneuver 
advantage to the small elements within networks.  
The corollary to limited resources is that a constant requirement exists to 
gain sufficient resources. Networks accomplish this gain primarily by taking, or utilizing 
the resources of their logistically superior opponent. Raids and ambushes are launched 
with the purpose of harassing the enemy, but also to gain resources. In this manner, 
logistical requirements are fairly simple—networks utilize their opponent’s assets. This 
ideal has perhaps found its furthest expression in al-Qaeda’s use of aircraft as weapons 
for the September 2001 attacks. Armed with next to nothing, these irregular warriors 
succeeded in launching a devastating attack using their opponent’s resources and tools. In 
fact, it was their lack of resources, or a tremendous display of economy of force, that 
allowed them to infiltrate their target area and achieve surprise. If the 9/11 hijackers had 
attempted to use even the lightest military armament to accomplish their operation, the 
likelihood of their detection and subsequent failure would have been much higher. This 
ability to infiltrate as a member of the population, with no weapons, provides a 
tremendous advantage to networks.  
In many situations, resources and technology may be increasingly 
available and inexpensive, to the point where networks rarely concern themselves with 
logistical matters, but instead utilize the tools and technologies readily available in 
everyday use. Information technology is a critical tool that allows tremendous economy 
of force, and their ability to extend their base of support in a global dimension. Frank 
Hoffman, in describing modern terrorist networks notes that “modern irregular warriors,” 
are not limited to the weapons they’ve always had, but now “…include the mini-cam and 
videotape, editing suite and attendant production facilities; professionally produced and 
mass-marketed CD-ROMs and DVDs; and most critically, the laptop and desktop 
computers, CD burners and e-mail accounts, and Internet and World Wide Web 
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access.”188 The number of laptop computers recovered by those combating these 
networks in remote desert locations and mountainous terrain reinforces the ubiquitous 
nature of this modern force multiplier. 
b. Stealth 
Networks display a high degree of stealth, which is a fundamental attribute 
of their tactical decision making. Stealth provides networks with the capability to conduct 
surprise attacks, use the ambush as a defensive maneuver, and ensure a secure 
disengagement or evasion when necessary. Stealth is best described as a combination of 
mobility and concealment, or the ability to move undetected. Stealth highlights the use of 
concealment and deception and is another example of the way networks blend various 
attributes. Networks must maintain a high degree of mobility to ensure survivability, an 
attribute which reinforces their concealment capability. Mobility allows a small element 
to move and avoid being found, and most importantly, if found, rapidly withdraw to 
avoid a tactical defense and the risk of destruction. Since an irregular force’s numerical 
strength is generally inferior, and because it is primarily focused on survival, the primary 
aspect of its tactics is evasion.189 The ability to evade generally connotes a defensive 
aspect, but it also allows irregular opponents to conduct offensive attacks against superior 
opponents. The small size of independent nodes dictates that they conduct attacks where 
unexpected, which requires being able to move rapidly, and then to ensure a fast 
withdraw to initiate other attacks. In fact, this forms an offensive cycle, where an 
irregular opponent’s mobility determines the tempo of offensive operations possible to 
conduct. In addition, mobility by itself is of some value, but provides little advantage if 
networks are not able to conceal themselves as well.  
The requirement for maintaining stealth presents a challenge depending on 
the degree to which irregular opponents require a connection with the population. One of 
the ways they maintain this connection is through an increased use of information 
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technology, which provides a distributed means of connecting with the larger population. 
Physical access is not necessarily the requirement as it was for traditional guerrilla 
warfare. Information technology plays a significant role in allowing networks to balance 
mobility with connection. The media, and especially the use of the Internet, provides a 
means to ensure that a network’s messaging is connected to the population despite having 
to remain mobile and concealed. 
c. Surprise 
Networks require surprise, which provides the decisive element in attacks 
against stronger opponents. Whether these offensive actions take the form of direct 
attacks or indirect attacks, they rely on the fundamental element of surprise. At its basic 
level, surprise allows for weaker opponents to achieve considerable effects with minimal 
force. As Richard Simpkin states in his chapter on small-force maneuver theory, “given 
free reign, surprise is a matchless combat multiplier. Revolutionary warfare exploits it to 
carry the principles of economy of force to lengths unimaginable to the conventional 
military mind.”190 Surprise is a principle of war, and is sought by all military forces, but 
lightly armed irregular forces require it to maintain operational effectiveness. Networks 
utilize surprise gained from their emphasis on stealthy movement and an overall focus on 
concealed action. Surprise is a key tactical attribute, but is also displayed operationally, 
as seen in network-style offensives, such as those displayed by Chechen fighters in 1996. 
Tactically, the primary forms of direct attacks are raids and ambushes, 
whose basic principles are incorporated into aspects of swarming. Both forms require the 
same principles of precise intelligence and solid planning to achieve surprise. In both of 
these methods of attack, irregular opponents are directly confronting their enemy, and 
seeking to maximize their strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses. Further, surprise 
overcomes a potential offset in numbers and firepower, which creates a window of 
advantage. Detailed planning, with an emphasis on terrain, coordination, and intelligence, 
allows networks to confront their opponents with the highest degree of success. For this 
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reason, networks rarely conduct movement to contacts, or hasty attacks, because the 
chance of achieving surprise are relatively low, and the nature of the engagement cannot 
be controlled. In contrast, a raid achieves surprise through good intelligence, and is 
distinguished by other forms of attack by a swift infiltration and a planned withdrawal. 
More than any other form of offensive attack, the raid relies on a high degree of stealth. 
An ambush achieves surprise by concealment and maximizes its effects through a careful 
selection of the terrain.191 Networks also conduct strikes by assassination, which is a 
form of attack that directly targets individuals. Assassinations are particularly effective 
because of their precision, and are generally used to eliminate specific individuals within 
the opposition, to deny critical skills, or for general terror effects. 
Indirect attacks have two main forms, the use of indirect fire weapons, 
such as mortars, rockets, and improvised launched explosives, and the use of remotely 
detonated IEDs. Both aspects maximize the attribute of surprise, while providing the 
added benefit of less risk to force. Swarming employs indirect attacks alongside direct 
engagements to maintain the element of stand off where forces are unable or unwilling to 
directly clash.  
Networks employ surprise at the tactical level, but also in their innovation 
in doctrinal ways. The ability to adapt is crucial to achieving surprise, and the evolution 
of IEDs shows how a form of attack is continually adapted to overcome countermeasures. 
The evolution from using radios to detonate IEDs to the use of common items, such as 
garage door openers, remote car-door openers, and cellular phone technology, provides a 
tremendous advantage in achieving surprise because these items are commonly used. The 
next evolution in network indirect attacks is very likely to come in the form of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD), with devastating effects.  
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d. Clandestine Mechanisms 
Networks require clandestine mechanisms to maintain secrecy, but they 
create operational inefficiencies. Communications are a critical part of maintaining an 
organization of any type, especially a robust network requiring synergistic effects of 
small, often diverse activities in a complex irregular war. Networks require some degree 
of communications to establish themselves, organize, and pursue a common vision and 
purpose. All of these requirements are difficult for organizations in general, let alone a 
decentralized organizational structure operating at great risk. The requirements for 
secrecy impose a tremendous cost on network’s ability to communicate both internally, 
and to a degree externally. In fact, the very existence of communications provides a 
linkage that if discovered, reveals organizational attributes. For this reason, networks rely 
on clandestine mechanisms, which shape the organizational structure, and type of 
communications. However, the pressures to remain as clandestine as possible conflict 
with the ability to maintain strong social ties, influence the greater population, as well as 
achieve operational efficiency. An idealized clandestine structure, with 
compartmentalization, works well in theory, but requires tremendous control, time to 
establish, and is generally operationally inefficient.  
Organizations must communicate to exist, and in many situations, a 
compromise occurs between the restrictions of secrecy and the requirements for speed 
and flexibility. “Even in optimum circumstances communication problems tend to have 
the most severe effects both on the pursuit of the armed struggle and on the internal 
nature of the rebel organization. Secrecy carries a fearful cost.”192 When this cost meets 
the dynamics of irregular warfare, the requirements of survival and action generally 
produces a response that sacrifices elements of speed, technology, and efficiency.193 This 
dilemma of secrecy vs. efficiency characterizes the nature of covert communications, and 
an overall desire to secure communications. Pressure against a network forces constraints 
on communications, often to the point of tremendous inefficiency. A general pattern that 
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emerges is that those in positions of leadership or operational responsibility generally use 
lower-tech methods of communication to ensure secrecy, while those in operational units, 
fighters, use high-tech communications, trading an element of secrecy for the flexibility 
required in operational action. Despite guidance from leadership to avoid these high-risk 
types of communications, this usage occurs with surprising frequency, as a former 
international narco-trafficker explains, “there are many who say they never use the phone 
because it is too insecure. They are either lying or not doing any business.”194 An 
example of this is the use of couriers by senior leadership, and cellular and Internet 
technology employed in a more frequent manner by those conducting operations. Overall, 
clandestine measures are made easier with the advantages of technology that the 
information age provides, and their omnipresence tends to create more communication 
between dispersed nodes than would otherwise be the case. 
5. Information Strategy 
Networks achieve success through their understanding of the information age, and 
one of the primary dynamics is the increasingly effect of information strategy. It is 
increasingly apparent that information strategy holds as great an importance in 
accomplishing many of the same aims as traditional military strategy. Information 
strategy is a “still-forming phenomenon” that incorporates the many complexities of the 
information domain, and seeks to provide structure for the information flows that both 
impact the enemy and strengthen an individual’s self.195 An examination of current 
conflicts highlights the rise of the information domain in irregular warfare, and in 
particular, the almost constant interplay of information strategy with traditional military 
action.196 It appears that networks seem to understand this well and their operations are 
closely tied to information operations. The skillful use of information strategy both 
enhances the application of traditional military means, directly counters the opponent’s 
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aims, and ensures the network’s own moral and will. The role of information strategy 
holds greater importance for networks than a purely military strategy due a force 
disadvantage and the information age’s defining impact on modern conflict. Frank 
Hoffman describes this growing trend: 
The informational component of war is increasing in impact. Modern 24/7 
news cycles and graphic imagery, combined with the worldwide networks, 
produce even faster and higher response cycles from audiences around the 
globe and offer powerful new tools. Advanced methods and ever lower 
costs allow many insurgent or terrorist groups to communicate directly to 
their target audiences.197 
As an example, the strategic communications skill displayed by al-Qaeda continues to 
empower their jihadist efforts, while the massive amount of battlefield media operations 
serves to increase morale and recruitment. 
A useful way to examine information strategy is by focusing on its internal 
effects, within the network and the population that may support it, as well as its external 
effects, against an opponent and their population. Internally, the information strategy of 
networks seeks to ensure fluid information flow, much as modern professional armies 
sought to use information technology to enhance command and control and shared 
situational awareness. However, because public perception is now as central to irregular 
warfare as the battlefield was in conventional wars, these internal factors have secondary 
importance to the external aspects. Externally, information strategy is focused on the 
populations involved, and thus, networks acquire the greatest asymmetric advantage. 
Those with close ties to the population (local insurgent networks) are able to reach the 
local audience more effectively, while those with less ties (global terrorist networks, such 
as al-Qaeda) are able to use an effective information strategy to transcend tradition 
population-centric notions.198 In light of these information age dynamics, the following 
characteristics provide insight into the nature of fighting networks’ information strategy. 
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a. Information Diffusion 
Network designs promote rapid information diffusion, which leads to swift 
tactical innovation and shared inspiration, increasing collective intelligence. The 
information revolution has impacted nearly every aspect of warfare, “but changes in 
telecommunication have an even more revolutionary impact on irregular forces.”199 The 
overall information flow within a network is enhanced by information technology, 
providing for enhanced communication within the network. The primary factor 
contributing to this greater capability is the dispersion of cellular and Internet-based 
technology, providing nearly every individual the means to communicate. This increased 
communications capability allows for further decentralization and autonomy and an 
increase in the speed of information transmission. The former provides for more 
innovation and action, and the later ensures that learning is shared in a rapid manner. 
Innovation is further decentralized as communities of interest are connected by new 
technology, and challenges are realized and reacted to at the lowest levels.200 This 
information and its accessibility is a key feature in what Robb calls, “open-source 
warfare,” or the idea that open collaboration with a common focus provides efficiency 
and innovation despite its lack of control. One of the primary features of this model is the 
idea of a bazaar, or a robust, open marketplace that facilitates information sharing and 
develops innovation.201 However, this increased ability must be balanced with the 
requirement for security, always a primary consideration, which necessitates 
compartmentalization and restrictions on communication. 
In addition, information technology provides the means to spread ideas 
rapidly and inspire a cause. Networks utilize their dispersed structures to further 
connections with numerous sources. This ability to form external connections is a 
tremendous advantage of the network structure. This external outreach, coupled with the 
information revolution, provides networks with the means to influence the population to a 
greater degree than previously thought possible. In fact, in many instances, the evolution 
                                                 
199 Rid and Hecker, War 2.0, 13.  
200 Ibid., 31. 
201 Robb, Brave New War, 118.  
 76
in information technology provides terrorists and insurgents the means to create and 
broadcast their message in ways not only much faster than traditional media, but that 
bypass it altogether.202 The Internet is the principle forum for this external 
communication and it provides the ability to link dispersed segments of the global 
population. Currently, all major terrorist and insurgent networks have their own Web 
sites, and many have the ability to regenerate sites rapidly when they are shut down.203 
Al-Qaeda and other networks utilize autonomous messaging and communication forums 
and reach out to dispersed audiences in a manner that enhances their appeal through tribal 
norms of communication.204 The Zapatista Movement in Mexico provides a compelling 
example for the power of networked communication as a dedicated focus. The 
Zapatista’s utilization of mass media and Internet connectivity to achieve social 
awareness provides the seminal example of information-centric conflict, and became the 
compelling force in their movement.205 As the Zapatistas leader and spokesman, 
Subcomandante Marcos called for a “network of information,” his ideal of the “word” as 
a weapon became a reality and displayed the power of a modern information strategy for 
a resistance movement.206 
b. Information Strategy Determines Operations 
Networks conduct operational activity to influence popular perceptions, 
which requires a close synchronization with information strategy. Despite differences in 
types of irregular warfare, and the motivations that drive networks in their asymmetric 
fights, public perception plays a greater role in netwar than in traditional warfare. The 
primary focus in irregular warfare is insurgency, which describes a type of warfare 
generally waged by people with grievances, and which has a political objective. As 
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Robert Taber states in War of the Flea, “successful insurgency presupposes the existence 
of valid popular grievances, sharp social divisions, an unsound or stagnant economy, an 
oppressive government.”207 Insurgencies take several forms, including wars of national 
liberation against an oppressive power, internal revolutionary struggles, and conflict 
waged by minorities to achieve various ambitions.208 An insurgent network is closely tied 
to the goals and aims of the people who support its formation, and seeks to convince the 
population that it is a better model for governance and security. 
The other focus in irregular warfare is terrorism, a tactic employed in a 
military manner to influence popular perception in insurgencies, but which may also be 
employed for primarily ideological ends as well. Networks that utilize terrorist tactics, 
especially against their own population, are generally less connected to, or dependent on 
popular support. While insurgencies may use terror tactics, they do so at the risk of 
alienating the very population they are seeking to influence. Still, terrorist networks seek 
to influence popular perception through their tactics, as terrorism uses violence against 
victims to influence a target audience. This target audience may be the local population, 
but in most instances, it is the existing government or external power influence. 
The underlying theme in the crafting of information strategy is the story, 
or what Sageman describes as the “grand narrative.”209 Arquilla and Ronfeldt address 
this aspect in detail with their use of the narrative framework, which is intimately linked 
to social connections.210 The narrative serves as a “rough guide to action, informing 
cadres whom they should attack and encouraging the rise of self-synchronized actions by 
the many who come under no one’s direct control.”211 In this sense, fighting networks are 
guided by their information strategy, and proactively seek out and design operations to 
gain advantages in the information realm. Professional militaries, and even traditional 
irregular opponents, utilize information strategy primarily as a reactive measure, to 
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mitigate and influence effects from military actions.212 In contrast, networks understand 
the inherent power of the information age and utilize narratives as an over-arching 
weapon.213 
c. Intelligence 
Networks require a high degree of intelligence, and its systematic use 
determines their operational tempo. In an effort to achieve their goals, networks place 
considerable emphasis on intelligence collection and planning, ensuring that they 
minimize their chances of failure and maximize success. Intelligence superiority is a 
fundamental attribute of irregular opponents attacks, describing the process of selecting 
targets, gathering information to aid in operational planning, analyzing weaknesses, and 
ultimately, providing the attacker with the greatest chance of success. In addition, in 
many cases, terrorists emphasize good intelligence not only to ensure mission success, 
but also their own survival, a critical factor with small numbers.214 While conventional 
military forces use intelligence as well, it is traditionally of secondary emphasis to the 
value of sheer maneuver.215 
Classically, intelligence provides irregular opponents with the information 
to anticipate an opponent’s movement, decipher intentions, and most importantly, 
identify weaknesses. In describing the challenges of intelligence in irregular warfare, 
Gregory Treverton argues that terrorists take intelligence in a different direction. Rather 
than simply a case of mirror-imaging analysis of an opposing force, terrorists shape their 
“capabilities to our vulnerabilities,” and conduct detailed reconnaissance to identify 
vulnerabilities, which then form the basis for planning.216 The vast quantities of 
information available using open sources, such as those on the World Wide Web, provide 
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a virtual and expansive library. Gabriel Weimann’s comprehensive work, Terror on the 
Internet, describes the collection of this information as “data mining,” and describes 
extensive research, information sharing using online forums, and al-Qaeda cells with 
“’large databases containing details of potential targets in the U.S.’”217 The vast amount 
of information that provides for everyday convenience imparts details for identifying 
weaknesses and serves as access for attack planning. While decentralization may limit 
information stockpiling and sharing, because such networks rarely have a central 
directory for cataloging and referencing information, most of the “usable” information 
they require is readily available.218 
d. Information Asymmetry 
Networks use modern information technology, in ways that complement 
their design, to achieve a strategic information advantage relative to their opponents. The 
proliferation of information technology in increasingly powerful forms, with greater 
availability, ensures that networks are as equipped with the means to communicate on the 
strategic level as their opponents. These technological tools increase capability, but the 
greater factor is the overall understanding of the importance of the possibilities that the 
information age provides. Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker describe six informational 
asymmetries that extend from the basic dynamics of irregular warfare. 
1. The counterinsurgent is bound by the truth; the insurgent is not 
2. The show of violence tends to benefit the insurgent; it damages the 
counterinsurgent 
3. In the media sphere, the insurgent has the initiative while the 
counterinsurgent reacts 
4. Anonymity benefits the insurgent while it harms the counterinsurgent 
5. The costs or media operations rise for the counterinsurgent while falling 
for the insurgent 
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6. Modern information technology—by and large—increases risks for the 
counterinsurgent; it decreases risk for the insurgent219 
While these asymmetries are framed in classic insurgency terms, they 
generally apply to many aspects of strategic information employed by networks. The first 
two are timeless, but the last four are either greatly enhanced or derive directly from the 
use of modern information technology. From the standpoint of initiative, a network’s 
ability to access mass media through modern data platforms allows it the ability to 
“flood” the presses, while those who oppose it must analyze, verify, synchronize and then 
respond. Likewise, anonymity is greatly increased by the ability to simply place 
messaging in the public sphere, either through a media outlet, or directly through 
unilateral media. In addition, increasing accessibility of information technology and 
communications platforms results in less cost for networks, even allowing superiority in 
real-time strategic communications. Finally, networks acquire a strategic information 
advantage because the modern tools of information technology pose less physical risk. It 
is far easier to erase electronic media on a commonplace system than it is to destroy a 
clandestine printing press. Overall, these asymmetries point towards increased violence, 
as is seen by a rapid acceleration in terror attacks. While these attacks are highly visible, 
networks exhibit more clandestine behavior, but despite this anonymity, successfully 
foster a significant media presence.  
D.  NETWORK-STYLE WARFARE 
Fighting networks represent a form of warfare that is truly a paradigm shift, and 
that reflects the revolutionary changes of the information age. These networks utilize 
timeless principles of irregular warfare, but are defined by unique organizational forms, 
doctrine, operational methods, and use of information strategy. The combined 
characteristics of each of these areas provide an overall understanding of how networks 
fight. 
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1. Characteristics 
a. Organizational Attributes 
1. Networks are structurally characterized by high levels of decentralization, 
which allows for autonomous action and high degrees of operational 
initiative. 
2. Networks fight with synchronized nodes, or cells, which provide 
advantages in tactical control and security.  
3. Irregular warfare is dynamic and networks achieve resiliency through 
unique organizational structures.  
4. Effective networks are flexible, adapting their structure to the 
environmental conditions, which makes them resistant to any one form of 
pressure.  
5. Networks form primarily through trust-based relationships, which sustain 
high-risk activity and provide operational advantages.  
6. Networks rarely rely on direct command and control, which provides 
flexibility and autonomy in tactical decision making, but may decrease 
collective direction.  
b. Doctrine 
1.  Networks fight using a unique, combined doctrine, which blurs offensive 
and defensive attributes.  
2. Networks utilize swarming as a fundamental aspect of their doctrine, and 
one that provides a distinguishing element from other forms of irregular 
war.  
3. Networks are capable of fighting in a protracted manner, but take the 
initiative when it presents itself, demonstrating staying power, but also 
seizing on opportunities for rapid victory.  
4. Networks rely heavily on deception, in the form of concealment, to ensure 
favorable conditions from the tactical through strategic levels.  
5. Networks attack weakness using systems disruption, in addition to directly 
confronting an opponent’s forces.  
c. Operational Methods 
1. Networks generally lack resources compared to their opponents, but being 
lightly armed provides multiple operational advantages.  
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2. Networks display a high degree of stealth, which is a fundamental attribute 
of their tactical decision making.  
3. Networks require surprise, which provides the decisive element in attacks 
against stronger opponents.  
4. Networks require clandestine mechanisms to maintain secrecy, but these 
can create operational inefficiencies.  
d. Information Strategy 
1. Networks promote rapid information diffusion, which leads to swift 
tactical innovation and shared inspiration. 
2. Networks conduct operational activity to influence popular perceptions, 
which requires a close synchronization with information strategy.  
3. Networks require a high degree of intelligence, and its systematic use 
determines their operational tempo.  
4.  Networks use modern information technology to achieve a strategic 
information advantage relative to their opponents.  
The organizational frame provides the dominant aspect for understanding 
how networks fight, and why network-based operations are considered a unique aspect of 
irregular warfare. Composed of numerous small elements, from the group to individual 
level, networks are fundamentally decentralized. This decentralization ensures a high 
level of autonomy, which provides tremendous initiative and allows these small elements 
to maneuver with significant stealth, maximizing both speed and concealment. Small 
elements favor increased control at the tactical level, and greater security overall. In 
addition, networks achieve a significant degree of resiliency through their organizational 
structure, as well as their ability to vary their operational activity to ensure organizational 
survival. This resiliency stems from their organizational flexibility, responding to 
changes in the environment, and ensuring that all aspects of their war-fighting systems 
flex as well. Finally, networks primarily form through trust-based relationships, utilizing 
friendship and kinship ties in ways that are more suggestive of basic cultural forms, such 
as clans and tribes. These strong ties sustain high-risk activity and provide operational 
advantages. 
These organizational characteristics are inherently tied to network 
doctrine, which provides a framework and common principles for irregular warfare. The 
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central role of the population in irregular warfare is the most significant feature, which 
characterizes doctrine. Irregular warfare further emphasizes the expression of war as the 
continuation of politics by other means, and it provides for a unique blend of doctrine. 
This doctrine blurs the lines between traditional forms of doctrine, such as offense, 
defense, and deterrence in ways expressed in a mix of strategic through tactical aspects. 
Popular will is as important as military force, and networks may prolong conflict as a 
means of demonstrating superior will, or may seek rapid and decisive victory. Deception 
forms a significant element of network doctrine, just as it does in guerrilla warfare, and it 
stems from the hider-finder dynamic produced by force asymmetries. Another aspect of 
asymmetry in irregular warfare is the doctrine of attacking weakness through systems 
disruption rather than directly confronting superior forces. This form of indirect strategy 
is increasing utilized as the information age provides greater connectivity and exposure of 
vital systems. 
Just as organization influences doctrine, and vice versa, the operational 
methods displayed by networks are more of a system of operations than rigid procedures. 
Networks are generally lightly armed, but utilize this characteristic to provide powerful 
advantages, which demonstrates that resources are not a determining factor in how they 
fight. One of the advantages that being lightly armed provides is the ability to achieve a 
high degree of mobility relative to their larger, heavily resourced opponents. This 
mobility is usually expressed in the form of stealth, and characterizes nearly every 
tactical decision, from infiltration to withdrawal. Stealth enables one of the primary 
aspects of network doctrine, the swarm, demonstrating the superiority of this 
characteristic over traditional principles, such as mass and firepower. Swarming, and 
nearly every operational characteristic of networks, is enhanced by the principle of 
surprise. While surprise is not unique to irregular warfare, networks require it to gain 
advantages over their opponent’s superior force, and it exceeds the importance of sheer 
maneuver. Operationally, nearly every aspect of war fighting is influenced by the 
requirement to maintain some level of secrecy, which creates inefficiencies in their 
ability to operate.  
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Networks display a fundamental understanding of information age impacts 
on irregular warfare; in fact, this attribute provides the most dramatic aspect of their 
evolution. The revolutionary dynamics of information technology influence each aspect 
of how networks fight, but it is most readily apparent in their use of information strategy. 
Internally, their use of information technology promotes rapid information diffusion, 
which creates innovation and inspiration. Their operational cycle flows from a 
requirement for intelligence, which in turn, is synchronized with media operations 
designed to influence popular perceptions. These popular perceptions drive an external 
information strategy that uses the advantages of modern information technology to 
produce asymmetrical advantages.  
Each of these aspects of analysis provides insight into how networks fight 
and their synchronized effects illustrate the overall effectiveness of network-based 
operations. Networks fight differently than professional western armies, but they also use 
a synthesized system of characteristics that provide for a unique method of fighting. 
Rather than follow Clausewitz and other strategists who focus on set-piece battles, 
networks are much more in line with Sun Tzu, and focus on indirect strategy, guerrilla 
warfare, and deception. In the chaos of irregular warfare, networks seek to promote 
friction in their opposing forces, rather than attempting to minimize their own. While 
using modern information technology, they are not necessarily constrained by it. In 
contrast to larger conventional militaries, they exhibit a high degree of flexibility, which 
begins at the organizational level, but influences every characteristic of their war fighting. 
While the origins of irregular warfare stretch back to the beginning of conflict, networks 
transcend much of the traditional techniques of unconventional warfare with an 
information age awareness that results in an unprecedented threat. 
2. Strengths and Weaknesses 
The strengths and weaknesses displayed by fighting networks are based on the 
previous collection of characteristics, as well as a holistic understanding of irregular 
warfare. Some overlap exists in strengths and weaknesses, recognizing that this trait is 
common in organizational aspects, doctrine, and even physical systems. In many ways, 
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these characteristics provide a double-edged sword and the capabilities they describe both 
empower and emperil. Generating strengths and weaknesses is a critical step in 
developing an understanding of an opponent and provides the initial basis for 
understanding critical vulnerabilities for targeting. 
a. Strengths 
x Decentralization provides greater autonomy in the realm of conflict, which 
allows for more operational initiative and self-synchronization.  
x The less directive role that leadership plays means that the network is less 
reliant on direct control. 
x Linked nodes allow synchronized tactical control and greater security in 
the form of concealment and compartmenting. 
x Network structures are more resilient to outside pressures, and often 
utilize multiple network forms in combination. 
x Network structures provide greater flexibility with respect to changing 
environmental conditions than hierarchies. 
x Networks achieve strength through trust-based relationships, which sustain 
high-risk activity and increase operational effectiveness. 
x A network’s ability to achieve concealment among the population and/or 
terrain is a tremendous advantage. 
x Lightly armed elements allow for greater stealth, providing advantages in 
mobility and concealment. 
x Networks use information technology to achieve an advantage in strategic 
communications. 
x Information technology allows networks to mobilize, train, recruit, and 
finance with little cost and wide access. 
b. Weaknesses 
x Decentralization makes it difficult to exert control over operations, as well 
as enforce security measures. 
x Small nodes are at a tremendous disadvantage without surprise at the 
tactical level, which is achieved through concealment-oriented deception. 
x Network structure provides for a great degree of resiliency, but it is more 
prone to total collapse if a significant amount of hubs fails. 
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x Networks are limited by their ability to achieve a balance between 
persistence and operations. 
x Trust-based relationships provide a means to identify network actors, as 
well as a potential point of fracturing. 
x All-channel connections increase the potential for infiltration into the 
network. 
x Networks must prepare to fight for a long duration, balancing decisive 
victories with an ability to persist. 
x The requirement for secrecy requires clandestine mechanisms, which 
create communication inefficiencies.  
x Operational tempo is limited by intelligence because raids and ambushes, 
and even swarming, require it in significant amounts. 
x Networks are increasingly reliant on public information technology—it 
both sustains and imperils. 
Examining both strengths and weaknesses reveals the impact of significant 
network commonalities, notably the important role of organization and 
information. Among the strengths, high levels of autonomy and 
decentralization generate swift operational action, but also create 
difficulties in forming consensus and coordinating complex actions. 
Organizational aspects provide the greatest impact of both strengths and 
weaknesses, but the role of information is not far behind, as its skillful 
employment provides significant capability for inherently weaker 
networks.220 Information also has a unique relationship with a network’s 
ability to remain concealed. On the one hand, those seeking to counter 
networks must possess the information necessary to find network nodes, 
while fighting networks strive to contain such information. In contrast, 
networks much continue to be visible and active in the information 
domain, for both strategic advantage and operational utility. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
A general consensus exists that the idea of networks provides the most descriptive 
means of identifying the irregular opponents that challenge security and stability globally. 
“Since the attacks [9/11], we have become accustomed to the idea that the West is 
battling against a decentralized ‘network of terrorist cells’ that lacks any hierarchical 
command structure and is distributed throughout the world.”221 However, despite this 
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growing awareness, much of the traditional methods of irregular and even traditional 
warfare continue to be employed to counter these networks. Fighting networks are the 
defining feature of modern irregular warfare, usually combining elements of guerrilla 
warfare and terrorism in ways that defy traditional analysis. Their utilization of 
unconventional fighting techniques and modern information technology demonstrates a 
revolutionary change from traditional insurgencies and unconventional warfare, and is 
now the defining challenge of conflict in the information age. These networks are 
increasingly empowered, and their ability to challenge nation states, despite their 
professional militaries, has significant implications. This analysis of fighting networks 
reveals that while they share features with their social network counterparts, these 
networks are redefining warfare. 
Networks include both insurgent and terrorist threats and utilize multiple aspects 
of irregular conflict, as the U.S. State Department’s 2003 Global Patterns of Terrorism 
described how the “line between insurgency and terrorism has become increasingly 
blurred.”222 This blurring requires a new paradigm that goes beyond traditional 
definitions, and the key differences between network-style warfare and traditional 
guerrilla warfare highlight the requirement for the netwar paradigm. While networks 
incorporate some aspects of guerrilla warfare, they are different from classic guerrilla 
organizations, and reflect information age dynamics in organization, technology, and 
strategic outlook. Advances in modern information technology enable flattened, 
empowered organizational structures and innovative operational methods. While 
technology provides the tools that enhance many of the classic methods of irregular 
warfare, it is simply a tool, and the most significant aspects are the ways in which this 
technology is applied. As seen in the distinction between NCW and netwar, the use of 
technology is not indicative of effectiveness, nor is the quantity or quality. Instead, the 
incorporation of organization, doctrine, operational methods, and information strategy  
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 88
provides a cohesive application, and results in achieving an effective system. The 
characteristics these lenses present synchronize into a coherent framework describing the 
ways networks fight, and revealing their strengths and weaknesses.  
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III. HOW TO FIGHT NETWORKS 
Victory in war is not repetitious, but adapts its form endlessly….The 
ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent 
is called genius.223 
        –Sun Tzu 
A.  FACING A NETWORK THREAT 
The fighting networks of the 21st century present a fundamentally different 
challenge than that posed by traditional militaries and classic irregular opponents. These 
networks leverage modern information technology to create new connections and 
possibilities in conflict that result in increasingly formidable opponents bringing change 
to warfare. Warfare in the information age poses significantly different threats, increasing 
in complexity and capability, which are best described by their network form. As Thomas 
Hammes describes these changes, modern warfare is utilizing, “all available networks—
political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision 
makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived 
benefit.”224 The traditional approach to war that simply assumes facing off against 
another professional military operating with a similar doctrine and similar technological 
advantages is increasingly less relevant. Given the unique advantages that networks gain 
through their synchronization of war-fighting techniques in the information age, it is clear 
that they pose significant challenges in the modern era.  
While a general survey of irregular warfare reflects multiple examples of irregular 
fighters successfully challenging nation-states, the rise of modern fighting networks 
presents an even greater challenge. Recent history shows irregular opponents to be 
increasingly successful in their efforts to counter professional militaries successfully. The 
Afghan mujahedin efforts to counter the Soviet Union in the late 1980s provide a clear 
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example of a guerrilla organization that forced a nation-state’s withdrawal from their 
country. Another notable example is the Habr Gedir clan that forced the U.S. withdrawal 
from Somalia in 1993.225 In 2000, Hezbollah, using classic guerrilla tactics and terror 
strikes against Israeli forces and their Lebanese proxy militia likewise forced them out of 
southern Lebanon.226 More recently, the examples of professional militaries frustrated by 
insurgent and terrorist networks in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the further 
empowerment of modern networks. After nearly a decade of war in Afghanistan, an 
international coalition of the most advanced military forces is still fighting an opponent 
with no army, navy, or air force, which clearly demonstrates the existence of factors 
beyond technological advantages and superior force levels. Moreover, a blend of 
network-style warfare, cutting-edge weapons and information capabilities provides more 
advanced non-state networks, such as Hezbollah, with tremendous capability. Fighting 
networks are increasingly empowered, and it is likely that the next major confrontation 
with such a network will present even greater challenges than those posed in current 
conflicts.  
Modern militaries tend to focus primarily on countering traditional opponents, 
which fight in a similar manner, only occasionally facing irregular and “revolutionary” 
opponents, as evidenced during the post-colonial period. However, despite the dramatic 
increase in irregular and low-intensity conflict, these wars are viewed as a sideshow to 
larger traditional warfare. The proliferation of insurgencies and an increase in terrorism 
throughout the globe brought numerous attempts to counter irregular opponents. 
However, while insurgency has been the most common form of armed conflict since 
World War II, professional militaries remain focused on traditional confrontations with 
similar opponents.227 In general, nation-states have a mixed record in facing the 
challenges presented by non-state actors, and even success has often carried a serious 
price. In addition, successes, such as that gained by Army Special Forces (SF) teams in  
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countering the Taliban in 2001, employed “another kind of war—guerrilla-style/light-
footprint/culture-centric and low-intensity,” whose gains were lost as the coalition 
reverted to a traditional warfare approach.228 Irregular war poses different dilemmas and 
military strategy wrestles with the dissonance created between the customary focus of 
fighting a similar foe to dealing with an irregular opponents. Some would argue that the 
risks associated with failure against another peer or near-peer adversary are much greater 
than that associated with failure against irregular opponents, necessitating a primary 
focus on major combat operations.229 However, in the same study of the 30 most recently 
resolved insurgencies from 1978–2008, all but eight resulted in losses for the “superior” 
nation-state COIN forces.230 This record, combined with the increasing empowerment of 
fighting networks, requires a more adaptable approach—one suitable to the changing 
nature of irregular conflict in the information age. 
As the information age progresses, pronounced aspects of the spectrum of conflict 
become clearer, with irregular threats presenting greater challenges. Just as nation-states 
struggled with the emergence of revolutionary war in the last century, the threat posed by 
fighting networks presents further challenges in contemporary warfare. Modern strategy 
shows that the Western powers embrace technological changes rapidly, but modify 
doctrine much more slowly, and “learning to cope with a very different kind of warfare, 
in which words do more to mask or distort military reality than to reveal it, has proved far 
more difficult.”231 Revolutionary warfare and dramatic technological changes ushered in 
an era defined by a revolution in military affairs, but threats are evolving as well, leaving 
modern militaries searching for ways to counter irregular opponents. Current U.S. 
military doctrine recognizes these changes in irregular warfare, but perhaps not as fully as 
required:  
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Faced with the conventional warfighting capacity of the United States, our 
adversaries will likely choose to fight using a hybrid of irregular, 
disruptive, catastrophic and traditional capabilities as a way to achieve 
their strategic objectives. The strategy of our adversaries will be to 
subvert, attrite, and exhaust us rather than defeat us militarily. They will 
seek to undermine and erode the national power, influence, and will of the 
United States and its strategic partners.232 
The primary aspect of this threat is that opponents of all types will use other than 
traditional military means, but still seek to defeat the United States in conflict. The 
Chinese military theorists, Qiao Lang and Wang Xiangsui, in their work, Unrestricted 
Warfare, highlight the growing trend of those who recognize force asymmetry, but seek 
to gain advantages by networking combinations military and nonmilitary power in new 
ways. They see warfare itself as being in the midst of dramatic change, as the “new 
principles of war are no longer “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to 
one’s will,’” but rather are “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, 
military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept 
one’s interests.”233 Qiao and Wang highlight the effects of the “most important 
revolution in the history of technology,” modern information technology, and show how 
it presents the means to transcend traditional notions of warfare with numerous non-war 
actions that “may be the new factors constituting future warfare.”234 They call this 
unrestricted warfare, and state that: 
This kind of war means that all means will be in readiness, that 
information will be omnipresent, and the battlefield will be everywhere. It 
means that all weapons and technology can be superimposed at will, it 
means that all the boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and 
non-war, military and non-military, will be totally destroyed, and it also 
means that many of the current principles of combat will be modified, and 
that even the rules of war may need to be rewritten.235  
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Unrestricted warfare stems from the advances and interconnectivity that the 
information age provides, and combines multiple aspects of warfare in a networked style. 
Fighting networks herald this style of unrestricted warfare, clearly recognizing force 
asymmetry but also the advantages the information age presents by enabling new forms 
of organization, doctrine, methods, and information strategy. Displaying every aspect of 
unrestricted warfare, increasingly empowered networks successfully confront nation-
states and deny them their objectives. A notable example is the confrontation between 
Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, and it is widely believed that future irregular conflicts will 
continue to be asymmetric, but will increase in complexity and intensity.236 As fighting 
networks grow stronger, empowered by increasingly sophisticated technologies and 
perhaps with weapons of mass destruction, once available only to an exclusive group, the 
damage inflicted by confrontations with these rogue opponents may be much greater, and 
pose an existential risk to nation-states.  
The emergence and increasing empowerment of insurgent and terrorist fighting 
networks, and the trend in irregular warfare that they represent, call for an effective way 
to counter these networks. This section provides the basis for a theory on countering 
fighting networks. The initial portion of this endeavor is based on the ways in which 
networks fight, and draws from the primary strengths and weaknesses they exhibit. These 
strengths and weaknesses are evaluated for vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are then 
examined in the context of irregular warfare to develop counter-network hypotheses 
leading to a set of variables that should provide for effective counter-network operations. 
As an intermediate evaluation of these variables, prior to being tested by each of the case 
studies, they are examined using four different models of warfare employed against 
fighting networks. The degree to which these models address the specific variables 
provides an indication of how instrumental they will be in an effective counter-network 
strategy. This process produces a proposed theory for countering fighting networks, one 
based on network vulnerabilities and evaluated against four common models. 
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B.  COUNTERING NETWORKS 
1.  Counter-Network Literature 
An increasing realization of the threat from fighting networks and a growing field 
of study is occurring, which seeks to develop ways in which to understand these 
networks. Much of this literature is focused on analyzing network structure using social 
network analysis tools to determine various aspects of the network.237 A notable study in 
this group is “Destabilizing Networks,” by Kathleen Carly et al., which provides insights 
beyond centrality measures and addresses significant factors, such as cognitive load, 
while seeking to address “large, adaptive, multi-plexed, multi-coloured networks, with 
high levels of missing data.”238 These descriptive approaches generate significant 
analysis of specific network aspects and hold great promise as tools within the 
development of a comprehensive approach to countering networks. A few other studies 
have addressed the idea of counter-network warfare, but usually in ways that focus more 
on strategic discussions.239 Overall, though, little is still written that may provide an 
effective concept and methodology for effectively countering fighting networks within 
irregular warfare.  
The most commonly discussed operational approach to countering fighting 
networks is COIN, under the assumption that most irregular threats consist of guerrilla 
with insurgent aims, which fills most of the irregular warfare field of study. The recent 
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confrontations against violent networks in Iraq and Afghanistan are described as 
insurgencies, as are most popular-based uprisings.240 However, counter-insurgency may 
not provide the best perspective for facing all networked-based threats, being ill-suited to 
addressing fighting networks that may not require, or seek, popular support. “Modern 
insurgencies tend to be loose coalitions of varied political tendencies. Correspondingly, 
their structure takes the form of a decentralized, even loose, network rather than a 
hierarchical organization.”241 In addition, fundamental assumptions of counter-
insurgency are based on countering a guerrilla threat; which is increasingly less true as 
networks embrace high-intensity warfare. Another approach commonly referenced is the 
use of CT techniques employed to counter the rise of modern terrorist organizations 
successfully in the 1970s and 1980s. However, these basic counter-terrorism models may 
not be adequate, primarily, because the nature of the threat is more complex, or has 
changed dramatically enough that most of the literature no longer fits. Moreover, in the 
quest to find ways to counter these networks, beyond just COIN or CT, some literature 
addresses both, or highlights the merits of one approach over the other.242 A growing 
recognition of the importance of networks exists, as both the current COIN and CT 
doctrinal manuals are beginning to address network aspects and analysis.243 However, a 
significant void does exist in both formal doctrine and irregular warfare studies in 
discussing highly adaptive irregular threats that employ neither classic guerrilla warfare 
nor just terrorism. Still, the focus on irregular threats within these areas provides further 
understanding of the principles governing irregular warfare and practices, which may be 
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effective. These principles from COIN and CT provide additional background, context, 
and insight by suggesting ways in which irregular threats may be countered, and aid in 
developing hypotheses to counter fighting networks.  
2.  Developing Counter-Network Theory 
Although the study of irregular warfare stresses the nature of its challenges, it is 
clear from the ways networks fight that they have both strengths and weaknesses. These 
aspects may be identified and countered. This effort to disrupt networks directly is 
essential, despite the challenges of ambiguity and complexity, but must also be 
synchronized with constructive efforts, such as Kilcullen’s proposal of friendly parallel 
networks.244 Carley et al. describe how it is difficult to destabilize decentralize, 
distributed networks, but provide three indicators of what destabilization would look like, 
including a reduced rate of information flow, difficulty in reaching overall consensus, and 
less effectiveness in overall task performance.245 U.S. military doctrine specifically 
identifies the threats posed by these networks in irregular warfare, and asserts that critical 
vulnerabilities may be targeted: 
Our enemies may be loosely organized networks or entities with no 
discernible hierarchical structure. Nevertheless, they have critical 
vulnerabilities to be exploited within their interconnected political, 
military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems. 
These actors often wage protracted conflicts in an attempt to break the will 
of the nation-state. Military operations alone rarely resolve such 
conflicts.246  
While this general statement provides little detail, other doctrinal manuals reinforce this 
overall view, stating that “a ‘networked enemy’ has certain vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited,” and “perturbations of nodes in the network may present opportunities for 
intelligence collection and/or allow more effective isolation. Networked enemies have 
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different vulnerabilities than hierarchical enemies.”247 An examination of the strengths 
and weaknesses of fighting networks identified in the previous section reveals a 
combination of factors that may create vulnerabilities, or opportunities to disrupt 
networks. One of the insights is that some of the same characteristics that provide 
advantages to networks also serve as potential vulnerabilities, a characteristic that is true 
of most organizational forms. For example, organizationally, decentralization provides 
for greater autonomy and more operational initiative, but it presents difficulties in overall 
operational control and security. Small nodes provide for advantages in tactical control 
and concealment, but their force limitations require the use of deception and a reliance on 
attack with the element of surprise. In this regard, while it may appear that countering 
networks is simply a matter of attacking weaknesses, the primary focus must be on the 
vulnerabilities that various characteristics provide. Using the strengths and weaknesses 
drawn from examining how networks fight, this portion of the study derives a set of 
network vulnerabilities. These primary vulnerabilities are the following. 
x The decentralized nature of networks provides for great initiative but may 
be countered by similar units using offensive swarming. 
(Organization/Doctrine) 
x Complex synchronization among multiple decentralized units requires 
overarching purpose and extensive communication. (Information 
Strategy/Organization/Doctrine) 
x Networks are reliant on their ability to conceal themselves. (Doctrine) 
x Free-scale network structure provides resiliency and flexibility, but is 
vulnerable to a concerted attack against its hubs. (Organization) 
x Strong ties based on trust provide a means to identify and “unravel” the 
network. (Organization) 
x Clandestine mechanisms preserve network secrecy, but hamper internal 
communications. (Doctrine) 
x Operational activity is limited by intelligence, as well as a requirement to 
influence public perception. (Operational Methods/Information Strategy) 
x The inter-connected aspects of network structure provide a vulnerability to 
infiltration. (Organization) 
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It is clear that networks have vulnerabilities, and these vulnerabilities provide the 
starting point for the formulation of basic hypotheses for countering networks. These 
hypotheses are further developed using insights from irregular warfare theories and 
approaches, primarily counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. Key variables from 
these hypotheses are then examined using four major models, representing primary 
approaches to countering irregular opponents. In addition, it is clear that contextual and 
environmental factors must also be considered. For instance, what is the primary strategy 
pursued by these rogue networks? Is it a popular insurgency, or is the network being 
challenged more of a clandestine terrorist network with few ties to the larger population? 
Fighting networks are elements of a larger social network structure, and understanding 
the population they interact with may be as critical to their disruption, as any other 
insight. Fighting networks are not standard military opponents, and in many cases, the 
primary effort must be “persuading the population.”248 The complexities of were, how, 
and why people interact are essential aspects of understanding the different nature of 
collecting intelligence in an irregular warfare environment. Cultural factors are obviously 
important as well, and they will influence the specific nature of these vulnerabilities. 
These vulnerabilities and the hypotheses that follow must be placed in light of unique 
cultural factors and strategic considerations. As Kilcullen states about COIN, “instead of 
approaching the threats we face solely on the plane of tactical or operational questions 
and making the choice of which field manual we should use in theater a primary issue—
rather than treating this properly as a doctrinal issue—we should start by establishing the 
context of the conflict.”249 Gordon Hahn reinforces this by stating, “efforts to split the 
insurgency cannot succeed without a detailed understanding of the network’s political, 
social, tribal, and economic cleavages. Detailed knowledge of the insurgent network’s 
historical, cultural, political-ideological, and structural intricacies is also essential.”250 
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With those imperative notes of caution in mind, and recognizing the critical importance 
of strategic decision making, the following hypotheses serve as a guideline to counter 
fighting networks. 
3.  Counter Network Hypotheses 
x The decentralized nature of networks may be countered by similar units 
taking the offensive against them.  
Fighting networks tend to favor the offensive form of maneuver, even though they 
blend, and often blur, aspects of offense and defense. In this regard, networks seek to 
attack when they have the initiative and when conditions provide for relative combat 
power at the point of attack. Further, networks must maintain an element of surprise to be 
offensively effective. Nodes are generally smaller to ensure that they maintain 
concealment up to the point of attack, thereby gaining surprise. A recent example of such 
decentralized small unit action is seen in the number of Taliban attacks against security 
installations in Afghanistan. These attacks are conducted by small, usually no more than 
4–6 attackers, cells that have increasingly used their opposition’s uniforms to conceal 
their infiltration and attacks against much stronger and heavily fortified targets.251 
These aspects of the offense may be mitigated, and even countered by a similarly 
offensive approach. This approach is especially effective if conducted at the tactical level 
against the distributed nodes that form a network. In essence, by taking the offensive 
against these nodes, they are unable to strike using their initiative. Faced with pressure 
from attacking nodes able to deny their use of surprise, nodes within a fighting network 
find themselves in a position where they are either forced to evade, defend at the tactical 
level, or band with other nodes to mount a concerted counterattack. Nodes that are 
evading are at the mercy of their opponent’s ability to maintain contact, or track them. 
Nodes that attempt to defend in isolation are quickly overwhelmed. Nodes able to work  
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in concert may achieve success with a counter-swarm, but will require excellent 
communications, enough agility to reinforce disparate nodes, and synchronized C2 to 
regain the initiative. 
x Network synchronization requires an overarching purpose, which may be 
negated by a focused information strategy.  
This fact is noteworthy because networks require synchronization to be effective, 
and without an overarching purpose, it is difficult to conduct coordinated swarming 
among autonomous nodes. For networks to achieve significant success, they must find 
ways to synchronize dispersed nodes with high degrees of autonomy.252 The purpose 
provides an overall cohesive function that is powerful, and serves as an adhesive that 
permeates every aspect of the network.253 The al-Qaeda network shows how a consistent 
vision and set of ideas may be used to expand influence and generate a significant, even 
global, cohesive effect.254 However, if this purpose becomes less attractive, or if the 
motivating cause loses its luster, the adhesive effect that it provides may not withstand 
the pressures of conflict.  
A purposeful and directed information strategy, aimed at countering a network’s 
purpose and goals, may have significant effect in disrupting a network’s ability to operate 
with unity of effort. Anthony Pratkanis describes the use of social influence as a primary 
element to counter an enemy’s purpose, by changing minds and behavior within the 
network, “social influence uses tactics that appeal to our human nature to secure 
compliance, obedience, assistance, and behavior and attitude change.”255 Moreover, 
Pratkanis notes, “in a social influence campaign, just as in physical warfare, the influence 
strategy of adversaries and competitors must be attacked.”256 The initial aspect of this 
influence strategy is the network’s purpose, or cohesive vision, and it will be the most 
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important aspect of countering networks over time. Unfortunately, its importance rarely 
receives a commensurate level of action, for instance, “of all the U.S. government’s 
actions since 9/11 to counter the threat of global militant Islamism, its weakest response 
by far has been its strategic communications and public diplomacy efforts.”257 Correctly 
assessing a network’s environment and information strategy remains fundamental, and 
disruption efforts should be prioritized against those findings. Interestingly, one of the 
most effective ways to counter a rogue network’s purpose may be to simply expose and 
publicize its violent actions.  
x The extensive communication that characterizes networks may be 
countered by denial and collection activities.  
Communication is essential to synchronizing and utilizing the network form, and 
networks require considerable communication between nodes and clusters of nodes. The 
flattening of information technology and its global access provides capability for 
networks, but also vulnerabilities to disruption activities.258 While the ability to 
communicate rapidly throughout the network is a strong feature of networks, it also 
creates additional requirements for unified action. Networks thrive on constant 
communication, but the pressures they face in conflict, and the requirements for secrecy, 
work against large volumes of open communication. In this way, fighting networks are 
constrained, and where they do use open forms of communication, such as the Internet 
and telephones, they face extensive risk of compromise. 
Concerted effort against a network’s communications, to include person-to-person 
verbal, telephonic, internet, courier notes, and even simple signals, is an imperative to 
countering a network’s communication attributes. These counter-efforts have two basic 
forms, denial and collection, and both serve to disrupt a network’s communications, and 
ultimately, their flow of information. In addition, in many cases, networks use the same 
linkages between nodes to pass resources (economic or material), which adds to the value 
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of disrupting communications. Of the two forms, denial is best characterized as denying 
the opponent the ability to transmit between nodes, or collectively through the network as 
a whole, by severing or blocking, the use of linkages. This denial may be accomplished in 
numerous ways and through multiple mediums; for example, in cyberspace, the use of 
degradation through “blitzkrieg” techniques on message boards, phishing scams, and 
other activities results in a polluted and less effective communications environment.259 
This results in less overall communications between nodes and a dramatic decrease in 
network efficiency. The trade-off with denial activities is that reduced communications 
levels provides less overall signature for illumination, and so they must be undertaken in 
a pulsing manner, or when further collection is not required. The other form, collection, 
focuses on allowing full use of all the linkages in a network, and rather than deny them, it 
gains access to the information or resources flowing across the linkages. This collection 
effort provides the conduit for deception campaigns, or gaining tremendous insight on the 
network’s structure and plans to allow for decisive pulsing attacks. Both aspects, used in 
conjunction and weighted according to priorities, provide the basis for disrupting a 
networks information flow. 
x Network concealment may be diminished by illumination activities.  
The basic force asymmetry in irregular conflict requires networks to maintain 
their concealment. Without concealment, the dispersed nodes within a network are 
increasingly vulnerable, and they obtain this concealment through being able to “hide” 
within population groups, as well as utilize restrictive terrain. Without this concealment, 
the small, dispersed nodes that create a network are vulnerable to rapid identification and 
removal from the network. Intelligence on networked opponents requires maintaining 
close contact with the constantly changing network. The degree to which the network is 
homogenous (physically and ideologically) with the population provides a significant 
indicator of the amount of concealment it will enjoy. Networks that may not be able to 
hide fully within the population will require the use of terrain to gain separation and  
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camouflage. Cyberspace, in addition to providing communicative and instrumental uses, 
also serves a form of terrain, providing concealment in the form of the anonymity and 
freedom of maneuver that it grants nodes within a network.260 
Illumination efforts address the concealment requirement of fighting networks 
and provide a way to expose both their structure and activities. These efforts recognize 
that intelligence activities are paramount in countering networks, and constitute the 
essence of the “hider-finder” dynamic that defines much of irregular warfare.261 
However, illumination efforts go beyond traditional characterizations of intelligence, and 
must infuse every counter-network activity and take on an operational nature that is very 
different from passive analysis. As Gregory Treverton states, “the change [in targets] is 
widely acknowledged, yet its implications run far deeper than are usually recognized. The 
change goes to the heart of how intelligence does business—from collection to analysis 
to dissemination, to use labels that are increasingly less apt.”262 The nature of the 
concealment largely determines the methods and scope of employment to strip away 
concealment and locate elements within the network, as well as develop a larger picture 
of how the network operates. Multiple tools and efforts must be employed, and a baseline 
understanding of the social networking ties is crucial to mapping out larger portions of 
the network, and guides infiltration and disruption efforts. Incorporating some of the most 
visible aspects of network activity, operational actions provide details because networks 
reveal themselves. Operational activity is nearly always visible (it is the most unique as 
visible aspect of clandestine networks) to some degree; fighting networks must fight to 
remain relevant.263 The overt activity they conduct provides strong leads towards 
identifying the actors conducting such activity. In addition, continued pursuit using 
exploitation activities furthers illumination activities, revealing more about the network 
through close, persistent contact.  
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x Network structures are vulnerable to specific damage against their hubs, 
which is achieved through precise and high levels of active targeting.  
The very nature of network structures provide for a great deal of resiliency, as 
well as an impressive ability to grow through preferential attachment. Preferential 
attachment is a common characteristic of social networks, which primarily exhibit a free-
scale nature.264 Fighting networks are free scale and grow by nodes attaching themselves 
to other nodes based on a variety of factors, not through random placement, and the 
increasingly connected nodes become hubs. These hubs serve a critical function, as “it is 
the highly connected hubs that account for the difference between the two networks, as 
the hubs act as a kind of glue within the network. Since an uncoordinated attack targets 
elements at random, it almost always knocks out unimportant elements with few links, 
while missing the hubs.”265 While the nature of free-scale networks make them 
somewhat resilient in the face of random attacks, it appears possible that a concerted 
effort against the highly-connected hubs could lead to dramatic effects. As the ground-
breaking research by Barabási and others describes, this is a classic vulnerability of free-
scale network structure.266 Other research supports this vulnerability, and shows that 
while targeting a leader in a hierarchy has a significant effect, “it may be necessary to 
simultaneously remove more nodes to have the same impact on a distributed 
decentralized system.”267 
In countering free-scale networks, the primary goal is to neutralize hubs at a rate 
faster than which they are able to form. These hubs hold significant expertise, 
communicate extensively, provide direction, and establish cohesion. Sageman discusses 
targeting these hubs as part of a concerted effort to counter terror networks, stating that 
the presence of hubs means that terrorist networks, “…are particularly vulnerable because 
most communications and human contacts go through them. Arresting these individuals 
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would degrade these networks into isolated units, singletons, or cliques, who would 
consequently be incapable of mounting complex large-scale operations…”268 According 
to Treverton, “moreover, the transnational arena involves networked actors subject to 
what students of the emerging science of networks refer to as ‘cascades,’ making them 
more vulnerable to sudden change than state-to-state systems….small changes within the 
network accumulate until the network reaches a ‘tipping point,’ after which a dramatic 
domino-like sequence ensues…”269 This approach requires a high level of operational 
activity, and activity that must be closely tied to an understanding of the network itself, 
which renders the problem of destabilization more difficult for a network than for a 
hierarchy.270  
x Networks are isolated without an effective means to influence public 
opinion, which may be denied through a combination of information 
disruption and operational pressure.  
Networks in the information age grasp the importance of influencing public 
opinion, but this also serves as a limiting function for the type and nature of the 
operations they conduct. The irregular warfare networks that require a significant degree 
of influence among the population, such a popular-based insurgent network, must 
conduct operations consistent with their overall narrative. This limits the activities 
available to these fighting networks, making them reliant on persuading the population at 
a local level. This is evident in amount of time and resources such networks devote to 
these efforts.271 Terror networks employ more of a coercive effect, and use the 
population as a means of transmitting their message through terror tactics. If networks are 
unable to achieve either a persuasive effect, or a coercive effect on their target audience, 
then their operational activity falls short of achieving a larger strategic effect. In fact, this 
operational activity might actually backfire and result in violent action with no meaning. 
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Denying networks the means to influence public opinion is a challenging task, 
given the ubiquitous nature of information technology and access to social media. 
However, denial may be more a form of limiting the nature of the message relayed, rather 
than actually blocking the form of messaging itself. By increasing pressures on the 
network, reducing flexibility in messaging, and proactively determining the nature of the 
information struggle, counter-network efforts may be able to channel the actual 
information content that a network produces. The difficulty of this effort increases with 
the ease of access and openness of information services available to fighting network, but 
it may be the most decisive aspect of countering such networks. Such efforts require 
more than just physical strikes against media broadcasting towers, and require a 
concerted effort against physical technologies, communicating nodes, and audiences. 
Operational pressure complements such focused activity, but reduces options to 
communicate through imposing increased costs. Preventing an information asymmetry in 
the network’s favor is an essential step to reducing their greatest strength in irregular 
conflict. 
x All-channel connections and aspects of larger network formation allow 
infiltration into the network.  
As networks are largely self-generating, open systems, few controlling 
mechanism governing their formation exist. Weak ties provide the mechanism for larger 
network formation by linking clusters of well-connected nodes into other clusters, and by 
doing, so providing a bridging mechanism. While the ability to grow by expanding freely 
and generating connections to new nodes is a positive feature of network organization, 
these advantage also create vulnerabilities. The network form facilitates recruitment, due 
to its dispersed and tailored local nodes.272 This recruitment is largely driven by social 
connections from the bottom-up, rather than any formal to-down vetting.273 In addition, 
the use of the Internet for recruitment provides another avenue for infiltration. Since the 
Internet carries with it a degree of autonomy, it provides a potential access point for 
initial contact with networks. While the proliferation of jihadist website increases the 
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reach of terror networks, and favors recruiting, the fact that “signing up for the jihad was 
just a click of a mouse away,” provides increasing opportunities for infiltration as well.274  
It is easier to infiltrate networks than other types of organizations with formal, 
hierarchically controlled vetting. Although strong ties exist within networks, the weak 
ties that lead to increased scaling provide opportunities for accessing the network. A 
group of infiltrators would find it relatively simply to “bond” within a network by 
utilizing the weak ties that serve as brokers. In this regard, the use of pseudo-ops is 
instructive. These operations, as conducted by counter-insurgents, replicate guerrilla 
units, which then infiltrate and locate actual guerrilla organizations. Overall, they have 
had mixed results, but several effective examples shows potential for their use given the 
appropriate conditions.275 In addition, cyberspace provides a high degree of anonymity, 
which increases the possibility of contact with network brokers and facilitates the ease of 
joining a network. 
4.  Variables Associated with Effective Counter-Network Operations 
Each of the preceding propositions leads to the development of variables, which 
contribute to countering networks. These variables have multiple aspects, and their 
interaction contributes to the overall development of effective counter-network 
operations. These variables do not stand alone, but are essential and mutually reinforcing. 
The first three variables demonstrate actions taken to counter networks, while the last, 
fusion, describes features, which provides the fundamental capability to undertake 
effective counter-network action. 
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Figure 9.   A Framework for Developing Counter-Network Theory 
a. Illumination 
The first variable is illumination, which describes the counter-network 
efforts that address a network’s concealment vulnerabilities. Illumination goes beyond 
traditional intelligence and is based on the nature of how networks fight. It provides the 
means to identify and locate the dispersed nodes within a fighting network. There are 
four primary methods to “illuminate” the dark aspects of fighting networks. Each of these 
ways addresses unique aspects of the network, but they are most effective when used in a 
combined manner. In fact, their fusion produces an overall effort that is far more effective 
than any singular focus.  
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The first method utilizes social ties, or the popular base of support and the 
social networks from which the fighting network formed. The strong social networks that 
provide strength for networks create opportunities for illumination with the right 
perspective. The primary reason that these social structures provide a means of 
illumination is because networks make extensive usage of the strong ties within the social 
structure. Strong ties are a significant aspect of network formation, but the social linkages 
that form these ties exist in an open, “unsecure manner.” Ironically, much intelligence 
collection focuses directly on the irregular opponent, not realizing the vast amount of 
information available that could aid in illumination efforts. In an article calling for a 
restructuring of intelligence collection efforts in Afghanistan, General Michael Flynn 
highlighted the importance of “gaining and exploiting knowledge about the localized 
contexts of operation and the distinctions between the Taliban and the rest of the 
Afghanistan population.”276 This knowledge is critical to understanding the ties between 
fighting network combatants and the local population. As previously discussed, the high-
risk nature of irregular clandestine conflict develops strong ties, which are characterized 
by high degrees of trust. These trust-based relationships are primarily based on friendship 
and kinship ties.277 These dense networks of relationships provide a significant means to 
identify core network segments, despite their efforts to remain hidden. In addition, it may 
be possible to erode trust and create further destabilization within the network. 
Another illumination method is to force the network to display itself 
operationally. In essence, this method forces the network into launching operational 
attacks, which makes operational nodes highly visible, and hence, subject to targeting. 
This operational aspect is a function of the pressure exerted against a network that forces 
networks to either hide or evade. Both of these actions require clandestine mechanisms, 
but the more clandestine a network is, the more inefficient it is. A highly clandestine 
network resorts to a more structured cellular form, and requires more authority to 
enforce. In seeking to maintain these clandestine aspects, ensuring cut-outs, limiting 
communication and travel, etc., a network reduces connections, slows communication, 
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and loses many of the all-channel aspects that made it so operationally effective. Thus, 
this operational aspect and the pressure that it brings presents a fundamental choice for 
fighting networks—either maintain operational activity, and face increased pressure, or 
scale back operational activity and seek to become more clandestine, but in the process, 
become increasingly structured and insular. This balancing activity that a network must 
maintain is a function that may be exploited by those seeking to counter fighting 
networks. By forcing a network to make these difficult choices, they are “putting the 
enemy on the horns of a dilemma.”278 
The third method is the exploitation of the network itself, or using existing 
connections to turn it “inside-out.” Exploitation consists of interrogation, but also 
includes information on the network from a variety of sources, including technical means 
and traditional human intelligence (HUMINT). The primary elements of HUMINT in this 
environment are classic espionage and detainee interrogations.279 Traditional methods of 
countering dispersed and elusive irregular networks focus on the necessity for 
interrogation as a critical part of a larger intelligence gathering enterprise. While some 
counter-insurgents argued for the necessity of interrogations to justify torture,280 the 
British Special Police under Sir Gerald Templar provided examples of interrogations 
conducted in a manner that provided both information, preserved dignity, and expanded 
illumination opportunities.281 Modern COIN doctrine continues to stress the importance 
of interrogation, and its role in understanding the nature of the threats in an irregular 
environment.282 Detainee interviews or interrogations may provide an exceptional level 
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of information because their subjects are actually within the enemy network. Modern 
counter-network efforts reinforce this timeless lesson, simply stated by noted counter-
insurgent theorist Julian Paget, “…patrols, observation and, above all, prisoners who can 
be interrogated are of the greatest value.”283 In fact, it may provide the only means “…to 
reach deeply into small groups—their proclivities and capabilities—to provide an 
understanding that can lead to preventive action.”284 A current example of this level of 
understanding is the capture and subsequent information gained from the German citizen 
Ahmed Sidiqi, which prevented a major series of terror attacks in Europe.285 In addition, 
detainee interrogation is conducted with the aid of law-enforcement-derived techniques to 
ensure that evidence is recovered, and used as leverage. 
The all-channel nature and use of weak ties to connect varies network 
segments provide for increased avenues for infiltration. While a high degree of 
connectivity is an advantage that allows for rapid information flow, it also allows for 
increased access to information and more contact than in other organizational forms. In 
addition, the weak ties that serve as bridges within a network mean that the initial access 
into a network is rarely closely scrutinized, or vetted. Ties formed for recruitment, 
support activities, and even friendship, provide avenues to access and begin revealing 
network activities. The case of the noted terrorist Razmzi Yousef, connected to al-Qaeda 
plots and betrayed by a friend he met at the Islamic University in Islamabad years earlier, 
is a notable example.286 Another notable example, which demonstrates the same effect on 
the Internet, is the Montana mom, Shannon Rossmiller, who uses online social 
networking sites to befriend, and then betray, jihadists; maintaining profiles on over 600-
suspected individuals.287 In addition to these examples of HUMINT penetration, the use 
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of pseudo-operations may prove to be of value as well. In fact, in dispersed networks and 
throughout a larger homogenous population, great potential for decoy activities and false 
groups exists. 
b. Offensive Swarming 
Swarming provides the most valid counter to the distributed nature of 
fighting networks. These networks are composed of dispersed nodes that even when 
converged upon are difficult to target due to their use of standoff and evasion. However, 
counter-nodes that have the same agility and speed may counter these nodes. The 
decisive aspect of the counter-nodes would be a greater empowerment at the local level, 
most likely gained through a combination of nodes and technologies, as well as increased 
situational awareness gained through superior connectivity throughout.  
These counter-swarming units would fight on the offensive, and deny the 
enemy its required surprise by continually forcing it either to hide or evade. Fighting 
networks generally require surprise to be operationally effective. While the nature of 
surprise is not necessarily a zero-sum equation between two opponents, it is largely 
exercised by the side gaining the initiative. This initiative is possible because the 
opponent is caught off-guard. As William McRaven noted, when describing the offensive 
nature of small special operations units, surprise is a factor of deception, timing, and 
taking advantage of an opponent’s vulnerabilities.288 Swarming provides a combined 
method for those countering networks to achieve surprise consistently, and generate the 
operational pressure that denies it to opponents. 
A key aspect of offensive swarming is pulsing. Pulsing is a function of 
watching and waiting balanced with rapid strikes against vulnerabilities, followed by 
redispersal of nodes into a collection posture. Initial descriptions of pulsing describe it as 
a fundamental aspect of swarming, “swarming is seemingly amorphous, but it is a 
deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions, by means 
of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off 
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positions.”289 As a swarming characteristic, pulsing incorporates intelligence gained 
through illumination to determine the tempo and nature of strikes against a network. The 
initiation and re-initiation of sustained pulsing differentiates it from guerrilla tactics.290 
The periods between attacks may be relatively short, but they allow for the identification 
of new vulnerabilities and the synchronization of this intelligence. 
In addition, offensive swarming of this nature would be characterized by a 
high level of operational tempo, or “optempo” designed to destroy hubs rapidly, forcing 
an unsustainable replacement rate. Free-scale networks cannot sustain a high rate of loss, 
especially from those operationally active elements, the hubs that provide such a cohesive 
and critical element of its structure. While it is a generally accepted notion that losses in 
networks are easily filled by replacements, this may not necessarily be the case. In 
instances where losses are replaced, it is questionable whether they are replaced with the 
same level of expertise, and whether actors with the same level of operational importance 
and connectivity fill hub positions. Further, blind attrition may actually “sharpen” a 
network by providing the opportunities for more motivated replacements stepping up, 
replacements trained by current experience. To mitigate such effects, significant 
operational activity must be focused with extensive illumination efforts, which ensures 
that the overall damage created within a network’s structure is greater than the 
replacement value of individual nodes. 
c. Information Disruption 
Information disruption counters a network’s reliance on information, and 
seeks to exploit the weaknesses revealed in a network’s information strategy. As 
Berkowitz indicates, the most important factor defining military power in the information 
age is the “….ability to collect, communicate, process, and protect information,” and that 
winning the information war requires, “…making your own information systems more 
capable, reliable, and secure, or by attacking your opponent’s systems so that they are 
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less capable, less reliable, and less secure.”291 According to Lawrence Freedman, “in 
irregular warfare, superiority in the physical environment is of little value unless it can be 
translated into an advantage in the information environment.”292 Kilcullen reinforces this 
imperative as well, stating that, “it’s now fundamentally an information fight, the enemy 
gets that, and we don’t yet,” when insurgent networks attack a vehicle in Iraq, for 
instance, “they’re not doing that be because they want to reduce the number of Humvees 
we have in Iraq by one. They’re doing it because they want spectacular media footage of 
a burning Humvee.”293 These dynamics make a proper information strategy an 
imperative, and require that efforts to counter networks have a robust information 
disruption component. This component is not a stand-alone element, but must be tightly 
synchronized with operational efforts, fused within a larger illumination effort. 
The primary aspect of this variable is a focus on negating the networked 
opponent’s overall purpose and goals. A strong cohesive element in network formation is 
a shared outlook, or narrative, that unites dispersed and relatively autonomous nodes. 
This narrative is a driving factor in how the network behaves and provides the motivating 
cause for much of a network’s actions. Information disruption seeks to counter this 
overarching purpose through weakening, distorting, and perhaps even ignoring a fighting 
network’s stated purpose. 
The second aspect of information disruption is focused on denying, or 
channeling, a network’s ability to communicate. This effort seeks to reduce the amount of 
information flow within both the network and external communications outside the 
network. Efforts to reduce internal information flows focus on isolating actors that would 
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block information that would otherwise be shared. These efforts, in addition, to the 
normal costs incurred by the clandestine nature of fighting networks, provide critical 
disruptive effects.294 
The third aspect of information disruption is to allow the network to 
communicate as much as possible, and use the information provided to further understand 
and illuminate the network. This technique is increasingly viable in an age in which 
verbal intelligence, primarily in the form of SIGINT, but also in cyberspace, provides 
considerable information.295 This technique requires considerable balance between 
operational activity and the ability to gain additional information on the network.  
Woven throughout the conduct of information disruption is the ability to 
achieve deceptive effects as well. Deception provides strategic options while facilitating 
economy of force, and it may serve as a critical tool in countering a network’s aims. If a 
cloak of deception over the whole enterprise of irregular warfare exists, it may be that 
various deception stratagems may prove effective in disrupting both internal and external 
information flows.296 
d. Fusion 
Fusion is a counter to the synchronized connections employed by 
networked opponents, and has both an organizational element, and a doctrinal element. 
Organizationally, fusion requires a high level of network-like connectivity between 
elements, and is essential for collaborative efforts.297 Doctrinally fusion involves the 
incorporation of a range of operational capabilities and analytic efforts in a systematic 
problem-solving process. It empowers both intelligence and operations by “fusing” them 
                                                 
294 Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld,” 27–31. 
295 Kahn, “A Historical Theory of Intelligence,” in Intelligence Theory, 10. 
296 Latimer, Deception in War, 272. 
297 Organizationally, fusion provides a structural framework that maximizes cultural intelligence and 
collaboration by effectively combining diverse actors or groups in ways that encourages information 
sharing and decision-making. See, for example, Michael Heffner and Nawaz Sharif, “Knowledge Fusion 
for Technological Innovation in Organizations,” Journal of Knowledge Management 12, no. 2 (2008): 79–
93; Maddy Janssens and Jeanne M. Brett, “Cultural Intelligence in Global Teams: A Fusion Model of 
Collaboration,” Group & Organizational Management 31, no. l (February 1, 2006): 124–153. 
 116
in a manner that both acquires tremendous intelligence and produces disruptive 
operational effect against irregular opponents. While preliminary analysis of intelligence 
“fusion cells” notes their effectiveness in combining multiple aspects of intelligence to 
produce a common picture, the fusion described here goes beyond just intelligence 
sharing.298 Intelligence fusion cells are a necessary component for producing greater 
connectivity, but they are not nearly sufficient if not complement and tightly connected to 
operational efforts.  
In the irregular conflict environment, intelligence plays a primary role, and 
even operations must be designed to generate intelligence. According to Frank Kitson, “if 
it is accepted that the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding 
him, it is easy to recognize the paramount importance of good information.”299 Irregular 
warfare history shows that an inability to recognize the nature of the irregular warfare 
environment leads to a failed reliance on simple operational activity to find the enemy. 
For example, during the U.S. Marines counter-guerrilla patrolling efforts in Nicaragua 
over a five-year period from 1927–1932, only one patrol in 20 managed to make contact 
with guerrilla forces.300 Operations and intelligence fusion provides a level of 
connectivity that facilitates synchronization of effort and the sharing of information 
required to achieve success in each of the previous variables. While the previous three 
variables are focused on actions taken specifically against networks, fusion focuses on a 
core capability required to conduct such actions. 
Shared intent provides an overall direction for the counter-network effort, 
and this purpose is critical for any organization, especially one that provides a greater 
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deal of autonomy.301 Fusion requires a shared intent to bring together disparate elements 
and provide an overarching purpose that translates into specific goals. This intent unites 
disparate organizational goals and focuses in ways that maximizes contributions to 
specific tasks. Despite fusion producing an “inversion of expertise,” through greater 
connectivity and innovation at the lowest levels, leadership is crucial in providing and 
emphasizing a shared intent.302  
Comprehensive connectivity between people, information, and effort 
provides the synergy required to facilitate actions like illumination and swarming. The 
connectivity within an organization is a result of its general configuration, and changes in 
configuration may increase effectiveness by an order of magnitude.303 While most 
organizations establish connections between people, information flows and efforts are 
channelized and structured to produce efficient task production. Organizations have 
properties and functions that are larger than the actors within them are. In fact, these 
properties are characteristics of the whole, and are often beyond the scope and 
comprehension of individual actors, but largely determine an organization’s 
effectiveness.304  
The irregular warfare environment requires a system that facilitates fusion. 
Both the pace and disruptive effect of operations places challenging demands on 
intelligence, as friendly operations and the enemy’s adaptive response continuously 
change the enemy’s location and structure. Given this dynamic, operations both require 
and yield intelligence, creating a cycle with the ultimate purpose of gaining a greater 
understanding about the enemy. A notable historic example is the British experience in 
Malaya, where the Special Branch Police provided an over-arching intelligence collection 
                                                 
301 Jon Katzenbach and Douglas Smith, The Wisdom of Teams: Creating the High Performance 
Organization (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1993), 21.  
302 Stanley McChrystal, “Listen, Learn, … then Lead,” remarks presented at the TED Conference, 
March 2011, http://www.ted.com/talks/stanley_mcchrystal.html. 
303 Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler, Connected (New York: Little Brown and Company, 
2011), 8. 
304 Ibid., 25. 
 118
focus, and operational units worked to support these efforts.305 The fundamental 
evolution in modern irregular warfare addresses the illumination challenge by providing a 
decentralized system at the operational level. The focus of this system supports and 
generates intelligence at the lowest levels, rather than simply pushing intelligence higher. 
In essence, a fusion of intelligence capacity with operational efforts provides a new level 
of synergy at the lowest levels, generating un-paralleled agility. While intelligence 
collection is still the over-arching focus, intelligence and operational efforts are 
decentralized, and often co-located through dramatic advances in information technology. 
This is a system where both the collector and the consumers achieve high levels of 
collaborative work since a targeting cycle provides a common focus.306 Intelligence 
collection is the primary focus of operational activity and collected intelligence supports 
further operations. Further, the focus of operational support and advances in information 
technology provide means to ensure that the targeting cycle is as robust as possible. A 
powerful recent example is the dramatic function of airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) within the targeting cycle. “Airborne ISR has become critical 
in this war because it offers persistent and low-visibility observation of the enemy as well 
as an ability to detect, identify, and track him in this low-contrast [urban or rural] 
environment.”307 ISR provides a unique capability that allows for the fusion of all-source 
intelligence and operational input, and is a primary element in the modern targeting 
cycle.  
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Figure 10.   Variable Interaction and Associated Activities 
The interaction of each of these variables is crucial and necessary, and in 
this regard, each variable is highly dependent on each other. Organizational design and 
the fusion that results from enhanced connectivity are crucial for establishing a baseline 
for operational activity. Such operational activity leads to illumination, which builds on 
each other in a reciprocal and cyclical manner. Swarming activities are only possible with 
a high degree of decentralization, and high levels of information, characteristics that flow 
from fusion and illumination. Overall, information disruption facilitates illumination 
efforts, and provides an overarching purpose that enhances each activity. The common 
thread uniting each variable is the importance of information. Whether it is connecting  
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through fusion to generate more information flows, gaining information through 
illumination activities, using information to synchronize swarming, or crafting ways to 
deny it to the enemy, information permeates the interaction of these variables.  
5.  Models for Countering Networks 
An understanding of network vulnerabilities provides the best means to derive 
variables, which may prove effective in countering networks. As an initial test of these 
variables, they are evaluated in light of four models, each representing a potential method 
for countering networks. The first model is a traditional military approach, or the 
predominant method applied against irregular opponents in most conflicts throughout 
history. The second model is the counter-insurgency approach, which involves both 
classic aspects describes by one theorist as “modern warfare,”308 and the modern COIN 
doctrine, as evidenced by the combined U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine in FM 3-
24. The third method is the counter-terrorism model, which is derived from counter-
terrorism practice and current U.S. doctrine. The final method is the netwar model, which 
describes a network-based method of conflict closely attuned to the information age. The 
purpose of these models is to provide a way to examine each variable further, but most 
importantly, to test the specific models for their effectiveness. 
a.  Traditional Military Model  
The traditional military model is the accepted norm of nation-state 
warfare. This model stems from the earliest set-piece battles, and although recent 
advances strive for more effective maneuver, much of this mode strives for what is 
commonly recognized as attritional warfare.309 Organizationally, this model is 
hierarchical and largely bureaucratic in nature. As a product of the Industrial Age, the 
traditional military structure seeks to optimize organizational performance by 
standardization. Henry Mintzberg describes a machine bureaucracy as consisting of a 
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formal hierarchy built to optimize task performance in a stable and simple environment. 
A machine bureaucracy has rigid departmentalization, centralization or authority, and 
standardization of performance.310 Since its doctrine is largely predicated on the use of 
direct and overwhelming force, it relies on mass formations capable of directing large 
numbers of men, equipment, and resources. Doctrinally, the traditional military model 
relies on forms of maneuver largely linear in nature, and that seek to remain on the 
offense. This style of warfare is largely based on the idea of attrition, or that by degrading 
enough of an opponent’s force; it will be ineffective on the battlefield and unable to 
obtain its goals. Operationally, traditional militaries seek to use overwhelming force 
against an opponent, largely in the form of firepower. Technological advance is a primary 
factor in the development of weapon systems, which shapes operational methods. While 
seemingly backwards, this driver is somewhat understandable due to the large economic 
costs and development time that significant weapons require, largely determining that 
“fighting the kind of battle that fits one’s weapons will be the most basic approach for 
any country in handling the relationship between weapons and combat….”311 
Information strategy tends to follow the same approach, which is focused towards 
attacking enemy forces. In essence, information is used to support traditional forms of 
warfare, rather than adapting to the powerful aspects of information in irregular conflict. 
Traditional militaries employ information in ways directed at targeting command and 
control systems, using technology to counter technology, such as electronic-based 
warfare, and focusing on denying the enemy access to intelligence. 
All this is not to suggest that traditional warfare is static, but that instead, 
even the most dramatic changes, those emphasizing maneuver to achieve decisive effects, 
largely preserve its fundamental nature.312 While traditional warfare methods have been 
increasingly modified with rapid advances in technology, leading to efforts to incorporate 
NCW, this step in the right direction is hamstrung by the fundamental reliance on 
outmoded forms of organization, doctrine, operational methods, and information strategy. 
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It is not enough to have forces increasingly linked by modern technology if those forces 
are unable to take full advantage of the increased connectivity that such technology 
offers. While NCW provides considerable advantage against another traditional 
opponent, which is not networked, it is insufficient to address the fully networked-style 
warfare employed by fighting networks. “Compared to these adversaries [non-state 
warriors], professional armies are like gigantic dinosaurs which lack strength 
commensurate to their size in this new age.”313 While the traditional model continues to 
be employed against irregular opponents, past experiences in this arena highlight the 
requirement for dramatic changes, producing the counter-insurgency model.314 
b.  Traditional Model Evaluation 
The traditional military model is designed to confront another traditional 
military opponent on the battlefield. It rarely performs effectively against fighting 
networks, providing a poor match-up against those variables necessary to counter 
networks. Perhaps the most compelling example of this model is the observation that the 
optimized traditional military that proved so successful in the invasion of Iraq, floundered 
dramatically as the situation gave rise to irregular warfare. Rows upon rows of tanks and 
armored vehicles collected dust after the initial invasion of Iraq, largely irrelevant in the 
fight against dispersed and concealed networks. These paragons of the traditional model, 
so effective in countering the formal Iraqi army, are nearly useless in the on-going low-
intensity conflict. The traditional military model places a great deal of emphasis on large 
volumes of firepower to decimate its opponents on the battlefield.315 Such mechanistic 
organization and application is not only ill-suited to countering dispersed and concealed 
networks, it is actually just the opposite of what is required.316 According to van Creveld, 
“in fact, there are solid military reasons why modern regular forces are all but useless for 
fighting what is fast becoming the dominant form of war in our age. Perhaps the most 
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important reason is the need to look after technology on which the force depends…”317 
In light of this, its primary value in evaluation may be to provide a starting point for 
understanding the vastly different requirements for success in irregular warfare.  
(1) Offensive Swarming. The traditional model seeks to defeat 
its opponent using a significant mass of forces, direct sustained combat, and decisive 
engagement. The traditional model forces generally attack in a linear manner, or 
maneuvers to achieve penetration and add depth to their advance. Although distinctly 
non-linear aspects, such as increased mobility, precision fires, and simultaneous 
operations are changing maneuver warfare, the traditional model is poorly suited to 
conduct offensive swarming. While swarming occurred in the past, those instances 
featured military elements utilizing synchronized communications and considerable 
command and control agility.318 The primary organization and doctrine of the traditional 
model make it difficult to swarm. 
(2) Illumination. The key aspects of illumination stem from the 
irregular warfare environment and the traditional model places little emphasis on its 
requirements. While fighting networks are concealed, a traditional enemy is usually fairly 
definable and the larger questions center on how it will maneuver and what capabilities it 
will employ. Traditional armies feature fairly set and establish “order-of-battle” 
organizational structures, with each branch focuses on its role in confronting the enemy. 
Intelligence in the traditional model is primarily focused on understanding what the 
enemy’s intentions are, and how it will maneuver on the battlefield, much less than who 
and where they are. The emphasis on social ties and infiltration required to understand 
networks is not considered when dealing with traditional opponents.  
(3) Info Disruption. The traditional model may conduct 
information disruption, but it is usually an area of secondary emphasis. It places more 
reliance on information warfare aspects, such as command-and-control warfare, and 
electronic warfare than it does on understanding a network’s information strategy and 
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seeking ways to disrupt it. With a primary emphasis on decisive battle, the traditional 
model seeks to confront an enemy opponent directly, rather than focus efforts on 
collection. Information operations are usually geared towards general propaganda efforts, 
which may be effective, but are usually not synthesized with military action.  
(4) Fusion. The traditional model places a large degree of 
emphasis on (C2, but now expanded to include command, control, communications, and 
computers, as well as ISR—C4ISR), and the systems that facilitate achieving information 
superiority and control. While a primary aspect of fusion is the connectivity and shared 
system it requires, fusion requires organizational changes and a system that promotes 
fusion to be effective. The hierarchical structure that dominates much of the traditional 
model reinforces vertical structures that limit connectivity and cannot achieve a fusion-
based system.  
c.  Counter-Insurgency Model 
The counter-insurgency model describes the response by nation-states to 
those that threaten them, which often takes the form of a struggle for legitimacy and 
control, the authority and ability to take action, with respect to a population. With the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, “counter-insurgency is fashionable again: more has 
been written on it in the last four years than in the last four decades.”319 Much of what is 
written and debated about COIN centers on the proper response to insurgent threats, and 
has formed as significant part of an ongoing national security debate.320 Internal to the 
counter-insurgency model are two aspects of it that are generally described as the classic 
form, and the new form “popularized” and formalized in U.S. military COIN doctrine. 
With the idea of state-building receiving closer scrutiny, counter-insurgency as a whole is 
“…moving away from viewing threats to states through ‘Maoist’ models of competition 
toward a wider appreciation of decentralized networks and criminal insurgency.”321 It 
may be that currently known classic notions of insurgency are changing altogether, 
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departing from both the classical model and modern U.S. military COIN approaches. 
Regardless, the counter-insurgency model continues to serve as a framework for efforts 
to counter fighting networks. 
Classic counter-insurgency is largely a product of “small wars,” and their 
revolutionary descendants of the last century. The classical model seeks to incorporate 
the historical depth in strategic thought and practice of irregular warfare. While counter-
insurgency has its roots in small wars and timeless low-intensity conflict, recently, it has 
been interpreted as a response to political strategy. 
Organizationally, the classic counter-insurgency model is based on 
devoting the minimum amount of resources to dealing with an irregular opponent. Since 
counter-insurgency is largely about forcing an adversary to accept the state’s political 
control, classic counter-insurgency uses military and police forces to counter irregular 
opponents. In this way, counter-insurgents organized and applied a similar doctrine to 
that of their guerrilla opponents, leading to an extensive focus on counter-guerrilla 
doctrine. Successful counter-guerrilla efforts were notable for their similarities to 
guerrilla warfare techniques. “Guerrillas and counter-guerrillas alike, resembling hostile 
brothers, must be masters in the art of organizational infiltration.”322 Doctrinally, 
counter-insurgents must also fight like those they face. “Basically this simply means that 
the measures devised and used against guerrillas, saboteurs and spies take on much of the 
modus operandi of the guerrilla.”323 Counter-insurgents also recognized the importance 
of the population and focused measures on how to ensure the populations cooperation.324 
Operationally, most successful counter-insurgent forces are light infantry or special 
operations type forces, which are able to pursue withdrawing insurgents following their 
hit-and-run attacks.325 More indirect measures focus around rationing and controlling the 
population to halt critical resources of food and munitions. Information strategy is 
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focused on external information meant for the global audience, and local information, 
which is focused against the insurgent forces. The major focus of this information 
strategy is to win the active support of the population and to deprive the insurgent of that 
support.  
Above all, counter-guerrilla forces must convince their opponents that 
resistance is hopeless, that the guerrilla leadership is selfish, incompetent, 
corrupt, and divided, that surrender will bring neither dishonor, torture, 
nor death, and that capitulation is the only rational policy. This task is 
essential in the battle for the minds of the civilian population. The 
government forces should, at the same time, attempt to sow dissension 
among the enemy and should not disdain bribery where necessary.326 
Modern U.S. military COIN doctrine and the practices that have evolved 
since the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, focus on the population as the “center of 
gravity.” Ideas derived from French and British experiences in the 1950s, most notably 
David Galula’s work, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, have been 
interpreted through Cold War experiences and support operations to produce counter-
insurgency theory with a principal focus on the needs of the population. The U.S. Army 
relooked its views on irregular warfare in the face of a losing insurgency in Iraq in 2006, 
and General David Petraeus and others produced a new doctrine in the form of Field 
Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. This modern COIN doctrine is widely credited with 
being operationalized in the surge of forces that many credit with restoring stability to 
Iraq.327 According to FM 3-24, “at its core, COIN is a struggle for the population’s 
support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success. Gaining 
and maintaining that support is a formidable challenge.”328 However, it is critical to 
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examples in the recent past, and framed in a nation-building format; used as a tool for 
seeking a “drastic alteration of political, economic, and social structures, a forcible 
reengineering of a nation.”329  
Organizationally, COIN seeks to use conventional military forces as the 
primary tool for restoring security and providing stability. While stressing unity of effort 
between civilian and military organizations, “command and control of all U.S. 
Government organizations engaged in COIN missions should be exercised by a single 
leader through a formal command and control system.”330 While the primary forces 
described are dismounted infantry and special operations, there is little mention of the 
organization of these elements, and traditional command structures remain.  
Doctrinally, the current interpretation of COIN seeks to provide 
“techniques and procedures [which] can keep U.S. forces more agile and adaptive than 
their irregular enemies.”331 Much of COIN doctrine focuses on the ability to integrate 
disparate governmental agencies, military organizations, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Intelligence plays a major factor in COIN, with an emphasis 
placed on the populace, host nation, and insurgents.332 Overall, all actions are taken 
together with a host nation government that seeks to counter the insurgent’s strategy and 
maintain the government’s legitimacy.  
Operationally, COIN operations flow in three phases that seek to first 
protect the population, break the insurgents’ momentum, and establish further 
engagement; second, achieve stability; and finally, expand stability and transition 
responsibility to host nation control.333 Operations focus on intertwining combat, civil 
security, essential services, governance, and economic development into a cohesive 
                                                 
329 Gorka and Kilcullen, “An Actor-Centric Theory of War,” 16.  
330 U.S. Department of Defense, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2–2.  
331 Ibid., ix.  
332 Ibid., 3–1.  
333 Ibid., 5–2.  
 128
overall effort.334 Operations may be conducted in the form of clear-hold-build, combined 
action with host nation forces, or limited action in support of a host nation’s efforts.335  
Information strategy in COIN is focused on information operations that 
support the overall effort and each line of operation being conducted. COIN doctrine 
describes information operations as often the decisive line of operation, which is 
fundamentally required to shape the information environment. In addition, COIN seeks to 
implement functional information engagement at the local level, in personal interaction. 
“Face-to-face interaction by leaders and soldiers strongly influences the perception of the 
local populace,” and according to Field Manual 3-0, may be “critical to mission 
success.”336 
Overall, the current COIN model in practice today represents a dramatic 
leap forward in attempting to formulate a method for addressing the complex dynamics 
surrounding insurgencies. Notably it incorporates the use of social network analysis in a 
basic form, and explains its importance in understanding the myriad networks that COIN 
practitioners face.337 COIN is primarily focused on addressing a broad insurgency 
movement that requires the support of the population that centers on counter efforts that 
seek to win “hearts and minds.”  
d.  COIN Model Evaluation 
Counter-insurgency and its modern variation, COIN doctrine, are 
specifically tailored as responses to irregular opponents—those launching an insurgent 
movement against another authority. Fundamentally, the current COIN model is a 
response to a popular-based insurgency that utilizes guerrilla warfare as a primary source 
of tactics in a struggle for control. Its application requires an understanding beyond just 
the recent U.S.-led conflicts. More importantly, “…we need to be aware of the fact that 
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COIN—in the American mode—is but one small reflection of the much older, even 
ancient, practice of countering insurgents, or irregular enemies.”338 It may very well be 
that the “…constricted foundations upon which classical COIN doctrine was built have 
not only distorted our understanding of the current threat environment, but also 
dangerously limits our ability to defeat current and future enemies.”339 The strengths of 
COIN make it a valuable model and provide a doctrine for countering insurgent 
networks. However, because of its overarching focus on popular support, COIN devotes 
relatively little attention to how to counter increasingly complex, globalized, and 
information-savvy fighting networks. It has limited utility in situations in which popular 
support is either not possible, or a secondary aspect. Another aspect is the relationship of 
tangible support and population support. When support for insurgents comes from the 
population, the popular support is the center of gravity. However, if the insurgent’s 
tangible support is not reliant on the population, then an effective counter-insurgent 
campaign should focus on other areas.340 An example of this type of campaign is the 
increasing violence employed by trans-national terrorist and criminal networks. 
(1) Offensive Swarming. COIN doctrine seeks to establish a 
strong link with the local population and makes this the primary effort. Establishing local 
services, security, and “winning hearts and minds” are very different than, and perhaps 
conflict with, offensive swarming. Local security requires forces dedicated to providing a 
stable security presence at the local level. In this regard, COIN doctrine provides little 
discussion of how to maneuver against insurgents offensively, and focuses instead on 
population-based efforts. However, it may be that offensive actions are not necessarily 
incompatible with local security, and that COIN could place more emphasis on aspects 
required to disrupt violent networks. This aspect would be imperative in situations in 
which an irregular opponent is strong enough to counter local security efforts, or in a 
high-intensity environment, which threatens COIN forces. The later situation requires 
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something beyond COIN fundamentals designed for “low-intensity conflict,” a way of 
countering extremely capable opponents while balancing a population-centric approach. 
(2) Illumination. Classic counterinsurgency places significant 
emphasis on the use of intelligence to understand who the guerrillas are and what amount 
of support they receive. Modern COIN doctrine addresses the tremendous intelligence 
required to counter an insurgency, but focuses primarily on intelligence derived from the 
local population. In fact, this doctrine is the stated primary purpose of some of the most 
insightful COIN thinking. John Nagl states, “the prime requirement for a successful 
military component of a counterinsurgency effort is intelligence derived from a 
supportive population.”341 The “Diamond Model,” described by Gordon McCormick, 
emphasizes the need to obtain information on the insurgents from the population, as the 
primary means to counter the guerrilla’s information advantage.342 However, it is critical 
to determine the level of support the insurgents have from the population and their ability 
to be recognized within it. If the locals have little intelligence on the enemy, then the only 
ones with a preponderance of information about the enemy are themselves. This situation 
appears to be increasingly common, as popular-based rural insurgents give way to 
fighting networks that may require little public support, and whose ability to move and 
communicate is not necessarily tied to terrain or local conditions. Given these conditions, 
exploitation from within the network becomes critical to understanding and knowing the 
enemy, and is more effective than information from local sources. 
(3) Information Disruption. Classic counter-insurgency 
recognizes the information aspect of an insurgency, but in a local context. Psychological 
operations are focused on this aspect, and “effective counterinsurgents use information 
operations (IO) to exploit inconsistencies in the insurgents’ message, as well as their 
excessive use of force or intimidation. The insurgent cause itself may also present 
vulnerabilities. Modern counterinsurgents may be able to “capture an insurgency’s cause 
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and exploit it.”343 Modern COIN places a significant emphasis on information operations, 
but most of these are of a positive nature, and seek to address issues vis-à-vis the 
population. Little recognition of the insurgent’s information advantages occurs, and 
efforts to counter them are either downplayed or not mentioned. In addition, the tension 
that exists between a largely traditional, specialized military and the “…increasingly 
complex social dynamics and political operations…” of modern COIN add to the 
difficulties of conducting information disruption.344 
(4) Fusion. Aspects of fusion are evident in certain areas of the 
COIN model, and classic counter-insurgency provides several early attempts at fusion, 
most notably the British Special Police efforts in Malaya. Recent experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, notably the intensive efforts between conventional and special operations 
forces in the former, show the importance of collaborative effort. However, the COIN 
model provides a cooperative relationship between different units and agencies rather 
than any kind of fusion system. While collaboration is encouraged and recognized as 
essential, connectivity is not fully present, and little discussion of a comprehensive 
system within the COIN model occurs. COIN focuses on the effective passing of 
intelligence, gained primarily from the population, to operational forces. The 
decentralized, tactical nature of COIN provides for elements of fusion at the tactical 
levels, with patrols gathering local intelligence and then acting on that information.  
e. Counter-Terrorism Model 
Counter-terrorism is a response to the increase in terror tactics employed 
within irregular warfare. While terrorism is as timeless as human conflict, a modern 
resurgence of terrorism appeared in revolutionary struggles over the last century. By the 
1970s and 1980s, terrorism filled the global environment due to technological advances 
and an increase in media coverage, as well as covert sponsorship from such countries as 
the Soviet Union, Iran, and Libya.345 By the late 1990s, four trends in modern terrorism 
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appeared: an increase in religiously motivated attacks, decrease in overall attacks, 
increased lethality; and increase in the targeting of Americans.346 These trends produced 
little change in an overall response-based view towards counter-terrorism, one that was 
generally poised to react to an incident or specific threat. Counter-terrorism capabilities 
supported a law enforcement focus, but consisted of “…specialized, but limited, military 
CT capabilities to rescue hostages, take preemptive action or retaliate against terrorists 
because they were geographically or politically beyond the reach of law enforcement.”347 
The 9/11 attacks changed the overall view of counter-terrorism, which has primarily 
focused on military actions against entire terrorist networks, action that expanded from a 
law-enforcement or select special operations focus to a more comprehensive focus. 
Counter-terrorism is now generally understood to be a two-pronged strategy, focused on 
direct strikes against terrorists themselves, and an overall policy that addresses the 
economic, ideological, and religious aspects that promote and sustain terror networks. In 
recognition of these changes, the U.S. Department of Defense produced its newest joint 
publication on CT, defining it as “actions taken directly against terrorist networks and 
indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to 
terrorist networks.”348  
Organizationally, CT is the primary focus of Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) and other paramilitary units that conduct direct and surgical action against a 
specific terror threat or terrorist targets. These units tend to be small, but highly 
resourced, and are supported by their larger military structures. Since CT operations tend 
to be of national-strategic importance, they are highly scrutinized and fall under a formal, 
hierarchical chain of command. Individual SOF units that conduct these operations may 
be fairly decentralized and operate with a great deal of autonomy, but their operations are 
traditionally subject to a great deal of oversight and control.  
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In general, CT doctrine is primarily deterrence focused, with the ultimate 
aim of raising the costs to terrorists of launching attacks.349 Within this deterrence 
framework, however, CT emphasizes offensive actions against terrorist networks, 
whether direct or indirect. The U.S. strikes against al-Qaeda training camps in 
Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom provides a noteworthy example. These 
attacks reflected a U.S. policy shift following 9/11 towards prevention, which promotes a 
larger offensive focus to “…initially disrupt, over time degrade, and ultimately destroy 
terrorist organizations.”350 This policy remains, and contains a core element focused on 
pre-empting signs of terror attacks, as seen in the current National Military Strategy, 
released in February, 2011, “undeterred by the complexity of terrorist networks and in 
concert with our Allies and partners, we will be prepared to find, capture, or kill violent 
extremists wherever they reside when they threaten interests and citizens of America and 
our allies.”351 The same document continues to state that these efforts must complement 
an indirect approach that focuses on economic development, governance, and rule of 
law.352  
Operationally, much of the nature of CT is encapsulated in a high degree 
of secrecy. From recent examples, such as the direct strikes against terrorists in the 
current conflict with al-Qaeda, it is clear that SOF units primarily undertake these 
actions, but, as joint doctrine states, they also rely on interagency and conventional 
military support to a great degree.353 Despite having small units, which operate using 
traditional SOF principles, an overall high degree of coordination and information 
sharing surrounding CT operations occurs. These collaborative aspects apply to both the 
direct and indirect operational approaches, which provide CT operations with a high 
degree of operational fusion. 
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Counter-terrorism requires a comprehensive information strategy, for both 
direct and indirect actions. Much of the emphasis in the area is placed on psychological 
operations, which are “…used to discredit the terrorist activities and to show the benefits 
of rejecting terrorism and its associated activities in an effort to gain popular support for 
the CT operations.”354 However, it is unclear whether an information strategy exists to 
comprehensively address the reality that, “…in the age of mass electronic media 
terrorism is undoubtedly an act of communication. In many respects, the pervasiveness of 
the 24/7 news cycle makes the media one of the single most important components of the 
current dynamics of terrorism and counterterrorism.”355 
f.  CT Model Evaluation 
The CT model is based on the majority of global counter-terrorism 
practices and current U.S. military doctrine. Historically, CT has focused on attacking 
terrorist organizations and providing a response to the threat of terror attacks. Since 9/11, 
CT has served both as an operational distinction, but also as an overall strategy, and as a 
different approach from the population-centric nature of COIN. In this manner, CT is 
commonly understood as an approach that seeks to attack a terrorist network directly. CT 
recognizes that terrorist organizations have vulnerabilities, and it offers a rich history of 
experiences and indicators of success against terrorist organizations.356 More recent 
approaches are defining the cutting-edge of warfare and providing new examples of 
techniques, organizational approaches, and doctrinal innovation. The Joint Special 
Operations Task Force (JSOTF) led by General Stanley McChrystal adopted the premise 
posed by Arquilla and Rondfeldt in their numerous writings on netwar and it became 
their mantra—“it takes a network to defeat a network.” McChrystal claims that, “as our 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan intensified, the number of operations conducted each 
                                                 
354 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-26, Counterterrorism, III–7.  
355 William C. Banks, Renée de Nevers, and Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Combating Terrorism: Strategies 
and Approaches (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 268.  
356 Christopher C. Harmon, “Vulnerabilities of Terror Groups,” Lexington Institute, March 2007, 2, 
www.lexingtoninstitute.org. 
 135
day increased tenfold, and both our precision and success rate rose dramatically.”357 The 
CT model employs operational swarming, focuses on illuminating a terrorist network, 
and incorporates fusion in a systematic way. The CT model, as currently employed, 
utilizes many of the tenets of network-based operations, and by all accounts, appears to 
be fairly successful against fighting networks in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
(1) Offensive Swarming. While CT units are composed of 
smaller elements, their overall small size and limited scope has traditionally limited their 
employment to specific crisis-response missions. It would appear that CT units could 
conduct offensive swarming if employed in such a way that maximized their numbers. 
The CT model clearly provides for achieving surprise, which is a fundamental 
characteristic of the manner in which these SOF units operate. Operational tempo seems 
difficult to achieve given the small number of CT units, especially when they are facing a 
large network. However, indications from recent CT efforts show that it may be very 
possible, as McChrystal’s statements imply an extremely high rate of operations.358 
Pulsing could be achieved as well, if intelligence were the driving factor in controlling 
the operational nature of CT, and operations focused on gaining the most decisive effects 
against the network. 
(2) Illumination. The CT model focuses specifically on 
terrorist networks and looks for operational activity to find and illuminate aspects of a 
terrorist network. Terrorism, despite its intentionally visible acts, is largely a hidden 
threat; the fighting networks that employ it make full use of concealment, and are 
increasingly more diffuse and amorphous. For this reason, and because the doctrinal 
innovation that terrorists employ results in such catastrophic attacks, counter-terrorism 
places more emphasis on intelligence than the other models examined. Many of the 
techniques used to illuminate networks stem from law-enforcement use in combating 
terrorism. Recent uses have employed an examination of social ties, but it is possible that 
more could be done in this arena. While considerable activity is placed against 
understanding the terrorist network, much less effort is devoted to understanding the full 
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range of social networks, which support and create the strong ties in these networks. This 
is not the rule, though, and some countries place extensive emphasis on the social roots of 
terrorism.359 
Infiltration generally takes considerable effort, both in the use of 
classic espionage and pseudo-operations, but it is a “high-payoff” activity. It is widely 
believed that HUMINT capabilities are lacking, and that an increased focus on less-
technical means, such as basic espionage and developing human-based knowledge, can 
provide better illumination opportunities than just technical collection.360  
Recent counter-terrorism activities increase the emphasis on 
operational activity, and use the timeless lesson that the operational activity of terrorist 
networks exposes them to scrutiny.361 Dedicated intelligence work uses all forms of 
intelligence to collect on operational activity, and the German’s comprehensive approach 
to dealing with the Baader-Weinhof terrorist group provides an excellent example, as it 
“…featured great intelligence and superb police effort. A new office for criminal 
investigation based in Wiesbaden employed scores, and then hundreds, and then 
thousands of data specialists, running unprecedented computer profiling efforts.”362 
Technical collection comes to the fore in the CT model when pin-pointing, tracking, and 
analyzing this operational activity. 
The CT model stresses the importance of exploitation, and it is a 
significant aspect of the targeting cycle. As exploitation fundamentally concerns gaining 
intelligence about an opponent’s network, it provides the primary means for illumination 
in CT operations. This emphasis provides a “feedback loop” that enables both horizontal 
and vertical information sharing and is so important that it is being emulated by elements 
throughout the military.363 
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(3) Information Disruption. The CT model places less 
emphasis on information disruption than it does on the other variables. Negating an 
opponent’s purpose is an indirect approach to countering terrorism, and while it receives 
attention, it is secondary to the direct efforts of the other variables. However, information 
disruption is still present, primarily in efforts to collect on communications. Such efforts 
could be expanded dramatically with a greater focus on information strategy. Overall, the 
lack of such strategy appears to be a glaring weakness in the current CT model.364 
(4) Fusion. The CT model places a significant emphasis on 
fusion and recognizes that operations and intelligence must be combined and united in 
their efforts. Much of the recent emphasis on interagency cooperation discusses fusion 
cells as an organizational form and also a means to ensure that vast and complex streams 
of intelligence regarding terrorist threats. In this regard, CT addresses fusion both 
organizationally and doctrinally. In recent counter-terrorism efforts, “operators and 
analysts from multiple units and agencies sat side by side as we sought to fuse our 
intelligence and operations efforts—and our cultures—into a unified effort.”365 The 
doctrinal element is possible through a collaborative network between operational 
elements and intelligence analysts. This collaboration reflects a doctrinal insight 
developed in response to the challenge of fighting networks in both Afghanistan and Iraq, 
challenges that required “…achieving levels of knowledge, speed, precision, and unity of 
effort that only a network could provide.”366 As McChrystal explained: 
This insight allowed us to move closer to building a true network by 
connecting everyone who had a role—no matter how small, 
geographically dispersed, or organizationally diverse they might have 
been—in a successful counterterrorism operation. We called it, in our 
shorthand, F3EA: find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze. The idea was to 
combine analysts who found the enemy (through intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance); drone operators who fixed the target; 
combat teams who finished the target by capturing or killing him; 
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specialists who exploited the intelligence the raid yielded, such as cell 
phones, maps, and detainees; and the intelligence analysts who turned this 
raw information into usable knowledge. By doing this we speeded up the 
cycle for a counterterrorism operation, gaining valuable insights in hours, 
not days. 
This fusion system is clearly a doctrinal innovation, developed within the CT model, and 
is emphasized in organizations that face complex, highly adaptive, networked threats. 
g.  Netwar Model 
The netwar model focuses on the revolutionary changes in the modern 
information age and the recognition, rise and use of networks as a powerful element that 
is not addressed in current terms seeking to describe irregular warfare and low-intensity 
conflict.367 “The term ‘netwar’ connotes that the information revolution is as much about 
organizational design as about technological prowess, and that this revolution favors 
whoever masters the network form.”368 It is important to distinguish that the netwar 
model focuses on an emerging mode of conflict that emphasizes social conflict, much of 
which occurs short of traditional warfare.369 In this regard, some of the attributes of 
netwar may be more applicable in discussions of social conflicts and criminal activities, 
but most remarkably describe the revolutionary blend of activity occurring in irregular 
warfare. Many of netwar’s attributes are found in the description of how networks fight, 
but will be highlighted in this study to present a model for countering fighting networks.  
Organizationally, networks are composed of nodes of various size and 
activity. The nodes in netwar are robustly linked in various structural combinations, but 
trend towards all-channel formation, with multiple linkages forming a robust network 
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communicate, coordinate, and act in an internetted manner, often without precise central 
leadership or headquarters. Decision-making may be deliberately decentralized and 
dispersed.”370  
Doctrinally, netwar provides for both offensive and defensive actions in 
ways remarkably adaptable. This adaptability allows for a unique transition and even 
blending of offensive and defensive actions. Swarming is a distinct reflection of this 
attribute, and it involves self-synchronized nodes or cells able to attack en-mass, but 
utilize dispersion to provide for tremendous resiliency.371  
Operationally, netwar focuses on fluid attacks that seek a decisive effect. 
Often, networks attack in a pulsing manner with cycles of collecting information and 
waiting, then decisive attacks. Networks may benefit from the inaccessibility that 
physical terrain provides, but the networked form allows them to achieve concealment in 
ways that largely reduce the need for a purely physical safe havens. The cyber 
environment provides another way to achieve concealment. 
Netwar is primarily about understanding the dynamics of the information 
age and seeks to dominate information strategy throughout the conflict. Networks go 
beyond such focused distinctions as “winning hearts and minds,” and use information as 
a powerful lever against their opponents. In fact, netwar as a whole tends to place more 
emphasis on information strategy than it does on actual conflict. 
h.  Netwar Model Evaluation 
The Netwar model is based on the use of the network form as an 
organizational and doctrinal innovation uniquely suited to conflict in the information age. 
One of its key propositions is that “it takes networks to fight networks,” leading to an 
understanding that, “…those who want to defend against netwar will, increasingly, have 
to adopt weapons, strategies, and organizational designs like those of their 
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adversaries.”372 The netwar model provides a framework for analysis that includes 
organizational, doctrinal, technology, narrative, and social dimensions, covering the 
primary aspects of the challenges displayed by fighting networks in the information age. 
Bruce Berkowitz succinctly states, “…the information revolution has fundamentally 
changed the nature of combat. To win wars today, you must first win the information 
war.” The netwar model is primarily tailored to this new nature of combat, and depicts 
noteworthy operations, such as al-Qaeda’s attack on the USS Cole, the 9/11 attacks, and 
U.S. SOF and CIA paramilitary units’ initial operations against the Taliban. Each of these 
recent examples of combat involved “small cells, dropped into the middle of hostile 
territory,” that “…coordinated their operations both with each other and with their 
commanders back home, thousands of miles away.”373 The emphasis in the netwar model 
is on the ability of dispersed nodes to communicate and coordinate, and the 
organizational and doctrinal attributes that make such activity possible. 
(1) Offensive Swarming. Networks whose primary doctrinal 
approach is swarming define the netwar model. While the netwar model emphasizes a 
blurring of offense and defense, overall netwar signals an offense-dominant era, with 
“greater disruptive power in small units.”374 As previously discussed, the basic 
characteristics of swarming are decentralization and high information flows, both of 
which are strongly emphasized in the netwar model. While the netwar model does not 
specifically address aspects, such as operational tempo, it is apparent that it could 
incorporate such features. 
(2) Illumination. Netwar identifies the challenge of finding 
networked opponents, and places an emphasis on intelligence that allows for detection, 
prevention, and tracking. While detection and tracking are clearly aspects of illumination, 
illumination as a core activity is not fully developed in the netwar model. The reason for 
this appears to be the primary focus on social aspects of netwar instead of irregular  
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warfare. However, the concepts underlying netwar, and the irregular conflict it describes, 
provide a framework for further development, and operational catalysts continue to 
advance these concepts, as evidenced in the CT model.  
(3) Information Disruption. Netwar places a primacy on the 
information dimension of conflict. It is a concept deduced from the “…effects and 
implications of the information revolution,” and “…helps show that evidence is mounting 
about the rise of network forms of organization, and about the importance of ‘information 
strategies’ and ‘information operations’ across the spectrum of conflict…”375 Netwar 
discusses monitoring, targeting information flows, and safeguarding information 
technology infrastructure.376  
(4) Fusion. While the netwar concept does not explicitly 
discuss fusion, its key implication is that effective netwar will require interagency 
mechanisms and operations.377 The intent is clearly to provide for a level of collaboration 
between various organizations and efforts, emphasizing that “…efforts at counternet-war 
should be grounded in interagency cooperation (a variant of ‘jointness’).”378 Fusion 
describes an operational system that facilitates this interaction, which starts with a 
merging of operational and intelligence-based efforts. 
6.  Model Comparison 
Overall, the models “performed” largely as expected in a strict comparison test. 
The test is notionally based using primary characteristics from each model, and each 
variable is considered with the same weight. Additionally, the model comparison 
highlights some interesting aspects and recent developments that contribute to countering 
fighting networks. 
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Illumination Info Disruption Fusion 
Traditional 
Model 1 0 1 0 
COIN 
Model 1 2 1 1 
CT 
Model 2 3 1 3 
Netwar 
Model 3 2 3 2 
Scale: 0—Not effective 1—Somewhat Effective 2—Effective 3—Highly Effective 
Table 3.   A Comparison of Model Performance with Counter-Network Variables. 
The traditional model exhibits little to no capability to perform against a 
networked opponent. The reasons for this deficiency lie primarily in the organizational 
and doctrinal aspects of the traditional model. Despite an increasing emphasis on 
technology, the hierarchical and mechanistic nature of traditional militaries continues to 
limit their performance in the information age. The hierarchical structure and fairly 
centralized C2 limits the traditional model’s ability to conduct synchronized swarming, 
and certainly not with the agility to conduct pulsing attacks. Information disruption takes 
the form of information warfare and is primarily focused on disrupting another military’s 
C2 or electronic communications systems. 
The COIN model performs better than the traditional model, by recognizing the 
population-based dimension of irregular conflict, and seeking to influence it. However, 
the COIN model makes this a primary dimension, which may work when countering a 
popular-based insurgency, but provides little in the way of addressing networked-
opponents that do not require popular support. The COIN model provides for a degree of 
swarming, but counter-insurgents traditionally have a difficult time balancing offensive 
operations against insurgents with the larger requirement to win hearts and minds. In fact, 
some COIN practitioners would argue that the former is damaging, and even perhaps 
incompatible with the latter. At the least, active measures are taken to ensure that direct 
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offensive operations do not produce results that damage popular support.379 COIN also 
provides for a degree of illumination, by placing an emphasis on intelligence. However, 
few systematic examples of fusion or comprehensive illumination models exist as evident 
in COIN literature or practices. While performing better than the traditional model, the 
COIN model performs marginally overall. 
The CT model addresses the challenge of countering fighting networks more 
effectively than either the traditional model or the COIN model. It places an emphasis on 
each variable, and achieves greater success with each one of them than either the 
previous two models. While CT originated as a reactive response to a growing terrorist 
threat, it has clearly changed in response to the revolutionary threats posed by networked 
opponents. The CT model utilizes aspects of netwar, which indicates some overlap, and 
builds on the primary principle that the networked organizational form is particularly well 
suited for information age conflict. It conducts offensive swarming, but may be limited in 
its capacity to do so due to the small size and limited nature of CT. However, a high 
operational tempo may achieve swarming-like effects, particularly if it is focused with 
effective illumination efforts. CT places a primary emphasis on illumination, as its 
fundamental purpose evolved from reacting to pro-actively countering clandestine 
threats. Recent discussions of SOF conducting counter-terrorism focus on an increased 
emphasis on operational activity and exploitation, but less emphasis occurs on utilizing 
social ties to illuminate and conducting effective infiltration. Information disruption is not 
a primary focus of CT, although it is present, primarily in the form of collection. Fusion 
appears to be most effectively addressed by the CT model, as it uses network-based 
principles to create both organizational and doctrinal innovations. 
The netwar model is clearly based on the concept of networks in conflict. More 
than any of the other models, it emphasizes the importance of networked-based 
organizational forms, emphasizing networks as a unique and empowered structure. The 
reason for this emphasis is the changing dynamics of the information age; dynamics that 
netwar addresses in a revolutionary way. More than any other existing model, the netwar 
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model provides a conceptual basis for addressing the vulnerabilities posed by fighting 
networks. The swarming concept is a doctrinal aspect of the netwar model, which 
proposes that it is equally effective in both offensive and defensive applications. The 
netwar model also provides the pulsing technique, which appears to work well as a 
component of swarming, and may be most effective against clandestine networks. The 
netwar model provides tools and perspective used in illumination efforts, most notably, 
social network analysis. However, it does not fully address the concepts of infiltration 
and exploitation. Information disruption is a key part of the netwar model, and it focuses 
on information strategy as a defining aspect of countering networks. The netwar model 
provides the most comprehensive focus on addressing fighting networks’ overall purpose. 
Fusion provides the capability for countering networks, and draws it strength from 
network organization. However, while the netwar model provides the initial basis for 
organizational fusion, the doctrinal and systematic aspects are not fully present. 
The comparison of the models reveals strengths and weaknesses within each 
model, but when viewed in a comprehensive manner, they reflect the potential for an 
initial theory of counter-network operations. While the variables are not weighted, 
because their overall effectiveness is due to their synchronization, some may be more 
important that others when facing different types of networks. The primary aspect of this 
theory is exposition of the organizational principles and doctrinal elements present in 
netwar. In addition, netwar comprehensively addresses information strategy. While 
netwar provides some basic tools for illumination, this activity is more fully developed, 
and “operationalized” in the CT model. In addition, the CT model proposes and uses 
fusion in ways that neither of the other models addresses, to include netwar. Netwar 
provides the basis for organizational fusion, shared intent, and increased connectivity, 
while the CT model provides doctrinal innovations in the form of collaborative systems. 
The netwar model provides the best overall framework for countering networks, and its 
basic concepts have been enhanced by operational innovations in the CT model. Based on 
this comparison, the fundamental aspects of effective counter-network operations derive 
from the netwar model, while operational design and innovations present in the CT model 
provide further enhancement. 
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C.  COUNTER-NETWORK FRAMEWORK 
The variables provide the initial shape of essential elements in countering 
networks, and the model evaluation serves as an intermediate stage in the formulation of 
a counter-network framework. The development of a counter-network framework is a 
challenging task, given the numerous factors that govern and shape network 
development, as well as the inherent differences in context wherever network-based 
conflict occurs. Networks, by virtue of their fundamental properties, are often self-
generating, and highly adaptive.380 Their adaptive nature produces a unique flexibility 
among organizational forms, and the doctrine employed by fighting networks matches 
such characteristics. Countering this flexibility requires an organizational types and a 
doctrinal approach able to flex and shift as rapidly as the network it faces. 
The framework proposed in this study is a combination of aspects that, overall, 
address the vulnerabilities presented by fighting networks. It primarily utilizes the 
propositions of the netwar model and incorporates innovations from the CT model. 
Original aspects presented by the netwar model are augmented in bold by recent 
innovations and practices to provide an enhanced framework. 
 

































Table 4.   An Effective Counter-Network Framework 
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The counter-network operations framework is organizationally much closer to a 
network than any other organizational form. It is characterized by the advantages inherent 
in increased communication among nodes. Nodes are dispersed to facilitate rapid 
maneuver and information gathering from a variety of sources, and they enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy to react to changing local situations. This is not to suggest that it is 
an organizational form without authority, or any controlling mechanisms, however, 
authority, and many of the other functions, are not limited to vertical structures. Authority 
is present in the form of leadership that provides clear guidance and intent, and then 
facilitates the overall effectiveness of the network. Aspects of control govern the 
communications infrastructure that facilitates all-channel connections while maintaining 
its security, and at the same time, pushing for increased communicating nodes.  
Doctrinally, the counter-network framework utilizes the primary doctrine of 
netwar, swarming. Swarming utilizes many small units in a coordinated method that 
provides the capability to counter the dispersed, highly autonomous actions of fighting 
networks. Swarming both requires a high degree of information, but also provides it, as 
individual nodes act as sensors as well. These individual nodes are able to act on this 
information through a high degree of decentralized C2, to the point where “decontrol” is 
a more appropriate descriptor than commonly accepted versions of military C2. 
Swarming may be utilized effectively in a defensive role, but the concealment challenge 
presented by fighting networks requires an offensive approach. Concealment allows 
fighting networks the ability to conduct attacks with little indication, and the stealthy 
nature of their operations requires an offensive approach that places fighting networks on 
the defensive. When these networks have the freedom to plan and conduct attacks 
without being pressured, they will succeed at a remarkable rate, against nearly all 
defensive measures. 
Illumination is a prerequisite for swarming, countering the essential concealment 
of fighting networks. Illumination is a key variable given the overall nature of irregular 
warfare, and it must be the driving component in a comprehensive approach to countering 
fighting networks. Illumination provides the understanding to “see” the network, enabling 
both direct and indirect swarming attacks, as well as the focused and integrated use of 
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information disruption. Illumination goes beyond traditional intelligence, which is 
usually a supporting function to a primary operational focus. Illumination ensures that 
intelligence is not only the main effort in countering networks, but also the driving focus 
behind all efforts. Exploitation supports the illumination focus and recognizes the 
importance of understanding the network from the inside out. Instead of providing a 
secondary means of information, exploitation becomes a primary aspect supporting 
illumination activities. Exploitation involves both physical, or technical, aspects, as well 
as the social, or human dimension, and is especially critical in the later. Fighting 
networks are social networks and understanding the complex and ever-changing, human 
dynamics requires intimate involvement with members of these networks. 
Operationally, much of countering networks stems from the principles presented 
in the netwar model. Countering networks requires a high degree of synchronization, 
which is obtained through an emphasis on all-channel connectivity. This synchronization 
enables fusion, which is a systematic operational method at the center of counter-network 
efforts. Fusion is about collaboration, and it contains an organizational dimension, as well 
as a doctrinal dimension. Organizationally, fusion is a product of highly connected 
elements with the authority and capability to share information constantly and rapidly. 
Doctrinally, fusion provides a systematic way of melding intelligence efforts with 
operational efforts to achieve greater degrees of illumination against largely clandestine 
networks. While especially evident at the operational level, fusion ties together strategic 
and tactical efforts in ways that are unique to such a system. Fusion provides the capacity 
for a high operational tempo, which appears to be essential in countering the adaptive 
flexibility displayed by networks. All of these efforts contribute to surprise, an essential 
feature most evident at the tactical level, but also a product of innovative strategies. 
An effective counter-network framework recognizes that information strategy 
provides potentially tremendous gains in countering network. Such an information 
strategy provides operational guidelines and is a pro-active and integral part of both 
shaping the information environment and conducting decisive information operations. 
Recognition of the dominant role of information in today’s conflicts provides a guide for 
all actions against fighting networks. Information disruption flows from this recognition, 
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and is focused on countering a fighting networks information strategy, including the 
communications capability it employs. Information disruption seeks to negate, or 
diminish the overall purpose of a fighting network, as well as interdict, deny, and channel 
its communication efforts. Information disruption efforts form part of an overall 
information strategy, and are connected and synchronized within the entire counter-









Figure 11.   Illustrated Effective Counter-Network Operations 
The counter-network framework is composed of variables, which are highly inter-
dependent; that is, they require interaction with each other to produce any degree of 
effectiveness. The framework will be tested for its effectiveness in an examination of 
fighting networks present in each of the three case studies. Each case study presents 
several of approaches, as well as combinations, employed over-time, which will provide 
indicators of the effectiveness of the framework, as well as its applicability to a wide-
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range of irregular warfare environments and circumstances. The framework itself 
provides a model for countering networks, but must be applied in context and is still 
reliant on coherent strategic application. Forms of warfare are only as effective as the 
strategic approach employing them, and the people involved, but it is clear that the 
counter-network framework provides a comprehensive tool for countering networks in 
irregular warfare. As a U.S. Army SF officer stated in the early days of the fight in 
Afghanistan, “I think that the bottom line is that any strategy requires agile, adaptive, 
culturally sensitive forces with the authority to make decisions at the lowest levels in 
order to stay one step ahead of a cunning, ruthless, and determined enemy.”381 The 
current challenge posed by fighting networks against nation-states, and also in 
competition with each other, requires a different approach to war-fighting—one based on 
an effective counter-network framework. 
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IV. RUSSO-CHECHEN CASE STUDY 
Everywhere there are mountains, everywhere forests, and the Chechens 
are fierce and tireless fighters.382 
     - Russian Commander Tornau, 1845 
A kishlak [village] fires at us and kills someone. I send up a couple planes 
and there is nothing left of the kishlak. After I’ve burned a couple of 
kishlaks they stop shooting.383 
- Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi 
A.  CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
The Russo-Chechen conflict provides a vivid example of fighting networks, and 
the ongoing struggles in that region starkly illustrate the challenges they pose. Chechen 
irregular warfare is nearly legendary for both its epic nature and brutality, and multiple 
dimensions are examined in strategic studies on a constant basis. Chechnya’s 
sophisticated irregular warfare, complex population dynamics, and rugged terrain 
confound simple descriptions, and provide for a rich case study. The seemingly 
continuous Russo-Chechen struggle reflects the timeless nature of irregular warfare, as 
well as the dramatic changes in how such warfare is being conducted.384 Since the end of 
the 18th century, dozens of Russian military campaigns in Chechnya have been 
conducted, but the latest series, of the last two decades, is noteworthy as a hallmark of 
change in warfare.385 The Chechen separatists have changed over the course of the  
 
 
                                                 
382 John Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1908), 
206.  
383 Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998), 97.  
384 Recent studies of the conflict focus on the complexity of the irregular warfare, see for example, 
Hahn, “The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus, 1–39; Mark 
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conflict as well, from a majority of primarily secular, nationalists, to radicalized jihadist-
inspired terrorists.386 The changes in warfighting and ideology combine to produce a 
struggle now primarily visible through its terror attacks.  
This case study focuses on the two most recent clashes in the struggle, defining 
them as the 1st Russo-Chechen War (1994–1996) and the 2nd Russo-Chechen War 
(1999–present), to understand highly networked irregular threats, and responses to such 
forms of irregular warfare.387 In the first portion of the study, a traditional Russian 
military launched a largely conventional attack into Grozny that suffered devastating 
blows and ultimately withdrew. The second part of the study focuses on the Russian 
invasion in 1999, and subsequent efforts, which ultimately succeeded in controlling most 
of Chechnya. The differences and similarities between the two conflicts reveal changes in 
military strategy on both sides, as well as each opponent’s adaptation to the changes of 
the information age. Further, examining both conflicts provides significant comparison 
value, and the brief interlude between the wars allows for an examination of the effective 
application of lessons learned. In addition, the overall length of the conflict provides for a 
detailed study to determine the presence of effective counter-network efforts, based on 
the counter-network framework. 
B.  CHECHEN OVERVIEW 
Chechnya is a relatively small, land-locked part of the Caucasus region in 
southern Russia. Located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, it is bordered by 
Dagestan to the north and east, North Ossetia to the northwest, Ingushetia to the west, and 
                                                 
386 The use of the term jihad is used throughout to describe Islamists inspired to conduct violent “holy 
war” as the main aspect of their struggle. While casting such fighters in a favorable light, by using the term, 
they prefer to justify their actions; it is the most commonly accepted reference.  
387 While the Russo-Chechen conflict is generally described as a “war,” in Russia, the phrase a 
“special operation to reestablish constitutional order and the rule of law,” is most common. According to 
Russian military doctrine, the confrontation is a “military conflict,” which is defined wider than overt war 
and which also includes “armed conflict,” a term most closely analogous to the Western concept of “low-
intensity conflict” developed in the 1970s. However, while borrowing the concept, the Russians retained 
much of their own military doctrine, rather than the population-centric focus of LIC and its subsequent 
refinement as irregular warfare. Since the armed conflict in Chechnya did not require the mobilization of 
the entire Russian state, it was not considered a war, but for the Chechens, it is just the opposite, and very 
much a full-scale war. Stasys Knezys and Romanas Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya (College Station, TX: 
Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 1. 
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the Georgian Republic to the south. The capital, Grozny, is in the centre of the region, 
located between mostly arid steppes to the north, and a more rugged, mountainous region 
in the south. The Caucasus Mountains in the south provide a key advantage for Chechens 
seeking concealment, and to facilitate cross-border movement between Chechnya and the 
borders of Georgia, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. In many ways, the mountains provide a 
symbol of Chechnya itself, and the geographic term that refers to the mountainous 
regions in the country, “Ichkerija,” is incorporated into the name of the semi-autonomous 
region—the Chechen Republic of Ichkerija.388  
 
 
Figure 12.   Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus Region389 
                                                 
388 Knezys and Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya, 324–330. 
389 University of Texas at Austin, University of Texas Libraries, Perry–Castañeda Library Map 
Collection, Chechenya (Chechen Republic) Maps, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/chechen.html.  
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The population prior to the renewal of conflict in the mid-1990s was 
approximately 1.05 million, but it has shrunk to half those numbers due to wartime 
deaths, resettlement, and displacement throughout Russia and abroad.390 Among the 
Autonomous Republics of the Russian Federation, Chechnya was one of only three 
whose indigenous population constituted the majority, but even in 1994, nearly 30 
percent of the population was Russian.391 Clan and familial organization continues to 
define much of Chechen society, and its structure provides a fundamental aspect in both 
Chechen political organization and military action. The Chechen clan is called a teip, and 
it is generally composed of 2–3 villages, with up to 600 people per village, with the 
capability of producing up to 600 fighters. Within each teip, there are sub-clans called 
ne’ke or gar, which consist of 10–15 families. Teips have a council of elders and provide 
community policies, regulations, and rulings on economic interests. A total of 150 teips 
exist in Chechnya, with numerous interactive alliances and feuds.392 Teips are grouped 
into larger tribes called tukhum, which are spread across Chechnya and generally grouped 
by location in either the plains or mountains.393 This clan-based society provides 
significant cohesion and connectivity, highlighting the importance of cultural forms in 
generating fighting networks, “Chechen social networks form the basis for their military 
organizational structure, imbuing the later with much flexibility and the sort of durability 
under stress that has been required in the war with the Russians.”394 The clan structure is 
buttressed by a conservative form of Islam, Sufism, which is traditionally organized into 
tight societies, adding another layer to the deep connectivity inherent in Chechen 
networks. Yet, despite such connections, deep divisions, differences, and feuding 
between various clans also occur. Internal Chechen power struggles are legendary and are 
largely formed by infighting between mountain and flatland clans. 
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The struggle for control and autonomy in Chechnya defines much of Russian 
history, and the region has largely been shaped by a clash of cultures from the Ottoman, 
Persian, and Russian empires. By the early 18th century, the Russian Empire was 
exerting consistent influence to control and even subdue the Chechen region.395 The 
Chechen response, led by the Circassian leader Ushurma, who adopted the title of Sheik 
Mansur, provided the beginnings of a modern legacy for autonomy, defined by militant 
resistance and a fiercely independent political organization.396 Sheikh Mansur’s armed 
resistance in 1785 united the Circassian population in a call for a holy war against the 
Russians and managed an initially impressive showing that surrounded and killed 600 
Russian soldiers.397 Although this resistance was effectively over when Mansur was 
captured in 1791, he provided a model of unified resistance for the North Caucasus.398 
Mansur’s historic successor, Imam Shamil, rose to prominence in the Russo-Turkish 
Wars, and also used Islam to aid in uniting against Russian resistance. Shamil’s rebellion 
began in Dagestan in 1834, but quickly spread to Chechnya, where it was ardently 
supported.399 This support led to the development of a rudimentary Islamic state 
comprised of Chechens, Ingush, and Dagestanis, but Shamil’s repressive rule led to an 
inability to unite the Circassians fully, and the Russians finally defeated him in 1859.400 
However, a desire for independence grew in response to increasing Russian control, and 
“a significant portion of the population rallied to rebel leadership as each generation 
brought a new burst of resistance to Russian domination, most often led by men of 
religious status.”401  
                                                 
395 The Circassian term describes the Caucasian people living in the Western Caucasus, although 
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Following in the tradition of Sheikh Mansur and Imam Shamil, the next resistance 
leader, Sheikh Najmuddin, saw the Bolshevik Revolution as an opportunity to rise up, 
and in August 1917, he was elected Imam of Dagestan and Chechnya.402 This attempt at 
autonomy was again fiercely repressed, starting a cycle that featured alternating 
accommodation and revolt against Bolshevik control, culminating in 1937 with Stalin’s 
arrest and execution of over 14,000 Chechen and Ingush.403 WWII provided another 
opportunity for rebellion, which was again crushed by vicious repression and a 
deportation intended to liquidate Chechnya and Ingushetia. In 1956, Khrushchev lifted 
the exile, resulting in a flood of Chechens back into the region.404 Order was again 
imposed by Soviet troops, which led to a fairly long period of relatively low-scale clashes 
and unrest up until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
In 1991, a Chechen government, under former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokar 
Dudayev, sensed weakness during the changes occurring in the Soviet Union, and 
declared independence. As Chechen’s newly independent government sought increasing 
control, opposition groups, which favored remaining as a part of the Russian Federation, 
formed against Dudayev. These groups, backed by Russian military and intelligence 
agency assistance, initiated a series of smaller clashes, even as the Russian Army 
withdrew from Chechnya.405  
C.  THE 1ST RUSSO-CHECHEN WAR: 1994–1996 
The 1st Russo-Chechen War had its origins in Dudayev’s declaration of 
independence in the wake of the 1991 Boris Yeltsin inspired autonomy movement, but it 
would take several years before it flared into a large, open conflict.406 As the newly 
formed Chechen government, the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkerija (ChRI), 
began to acquire former Soviet military equipment and arm itself, which was met by 
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clandestine Russian efforts to back Chechen opposition groups. However, these Russian 
attempts at gradually backing the opposition movement, to include providing tanks and 
crews, were soon made public. In addition, their Chechen proxies were making little 
progress, and were significantly repulsed in an effort to seize Grozny on November 29, 
1994.407 President Yeltsin made the decision to deploy regular Russian forces openly, 
and on December 11, 1994, the Russians entered Chechnya.408 The initial invasion of 
Chechnya was a primarily conventional affair with Russian forces numbering nearly 
40,000, intent on dominating the insurgent Chechen forces of around 1,000 with superior 
mass and firepower.409 The most notable incident during the initial invasion was the fate 
of a Russian armored column spearhead that drove into the capital of Grozny. This 
spearhead was met with a withering counter-attack composed of decentralized and 
autonomous units operating in small teams, which inflicted huge casualties. Then Colonel 
Alan Maskhadov, whose leadership provided a unique vision of warfare, and who was 
promoted for his success, spearheaded the defense of Grozny.410 Ultimately, the Russians 
reinforced their initial elements and succeeded in taking Grozny in February 1995 when 
the last Chechen units withdrew from the city. The Chechens were never beaten on a 
tactical level, choosing to withdraw when Russian forces advanced south and initiated 
their cordon and bombardment of any defended villages or towns.  
The second phase of the war was marked by rural engagements to the east, west, 
and south of Grozny, and was notable for aerial and artillery bombardment against 
villages, resulting in the killing of thousands of civilians.411 By mid-June, 1995 Russian 
forces had penetrated through the mountains to some of the most southern villages, and 
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 158
had declared the campaign a success.412 However, during the same month, one of the 
Chechen commanders, Shamil Basayev, infiltrated into Russia using Russian army 
uniforms and equipment and raided the town of Budinovsk and took over 1,500 hostages. 
After repulsing multiple attempts by the elite Alfa special operations unit, the Chechens 
were allowed to return to Chechnya under the protection of a ceasefire.413 While 
condemned for its terror, this raid on Budinovsk forced Russia to initiate negotiations and 
a brief ceasefire, which is a significant outcome for a “…military-diversion operation 
conducted by, at best, a company of soldiers…,” and it “…succeeded in stopping a vastly 
more powerful country’s savage war of annihilation….”414 The Budinovsk raid was a 
strategic counter-attack that forced the Russians to re-evaluate their position, and 
combined with heavy combat losses on both sides, led to a series of short-lived 
negotiations. A second significant raid occurred in January 1996, when another Chechen 
unit, under the command of Salman Raduyev, penetrated into Russia and took over 3,000 
hostages in the town of Kizlyar. During its withdrawal, with hostages loaded on buses, it 
was stopped in the Russian town of Pervomaiskoya and was besieged by elite forces, 
including Alfa. The assaults lasted over three days, but the Russians were continuously 
repulsed, and eventually, they pulled back and bombarded the town with heavy artillery. 
The Chechen fighters managed to slip out through the Russian positions during the 
bombardment, and the devastation and loss of life resulting from these raids resulted in 
significant media attention and public condemnation.415 In a rather bleak period of 
diminishing Russian gains, they scored a success with the successful targeting of 
Dudayev, finally triangulating the position of his satellite telephone and launching 
aircraft-fired rockets against his vehicle on April 21, 1996.416 
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Regaining the initiative, Chechen forces returned to Grozny in August 1996, in a 
well-planned operation led by General Maskhadov, which served as a gesture of defiance 
on Yeltsin’s inauguration day.417 Dressed as pro-Moscow militiamen, numerous small 
nodes infiltrated the city, bypassing Russian static checkpoints and guard posts largely 
unoccupied at night, and bribing others that were actually manned.418 Early on the 
morning of the 6th, over 5,000 Chechen fighters, led by Shamil Basayev, attacked 
individual Russian strongpoints while other fighters set up ambush positions along all 
possible reinforcement routes. The Chechen forces took the majority of the city and 
pushed Russian forces back to pre-assault positions held in 1994, and in one day, Russian 
casualties amounted to 500 dead and 1,500 wounded.419 The Russian counter-attack was 
primarily a stand-off affair, using artillery, tanks, and aerial bombardment from outside 
the city, but two relief columns attempted to penetrate the city. These armored forces 
were repulsed with vicious swarming attacks much like those that plagued the initial 
drive into Grozny less than two years prior. The Russians realized that any attempt to 
“liberate” Grozny would require massive devastation, and most likely, the loss of 
thousands of surrounded Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) forces, and by the end of 
August, the Khasavyurt peace accords were signed. Russian troops withdrew from 
Chechnya and establishing a five-year ceasefire.420 
The 1st Russo-Chechen war, forecast to last just days, developed into a full-scale, 
but highly irregular war against Russian forces. According to the Russian official 
estimates, 3,826 soldiers were killed and 17,892 were wounded, with over 1,900 missing, 
but other accounts place the Russian losses at least twice as high.421 The Chechen 
fighting network combined clan-organization, Russian army experience, and an influx of 
a number of Afghan jihadists as “’consultants’ to teach Chechens how to fight using the 
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same guerrilla tactics that proved so successful against Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 
the 1980s.”422 The Chechen forces incorporated these tactics into their network-style 
warfare, which was made possible by their clan structure and modern communications, 
and fielded highly capable nodes synchronized into an impressive fighting network. The 
21-month conflict went from being forecast as a “’bloodless blitzkrieg’’ to a full-scale 
defeat of an ill-prepared and almost entirely conventional army, and provides a stark 
example of a traditional army attempting to fight irregular and highly networked 
unconventional opponents.423 The notable brutality of the war was shocking to 
participants, especially outside observers expecting a “low-intensity conflict.” The 
overwhelming Russian repression and destruction they inflicted on the Chechen civilians 
bordered on extermination, and was met by Chechen terror attacks and executions of 
Russian soldiers.424  
The Chechen’s are generally considered to have won an overwhelming victory 
against a superior force. The Chechen military commander and future president General 
Maskhadov’s self-described “semi-guerrilla war,” notable for its swarming tactics and 
decisive battles, illustrated just how challenging a robust network of irregular opponents 
could be.425 Despite initially aiming to develop a conventional army, to demonstrate 
Chechnya’s capabilities and reinforce its independent stature, Maskhadov quickly 
realized that a new strategy would pay far greater dividends, and encouraged his military 
forces to disperse into very capable semi-autonomous units. The Chechen fighting 
networks continued to learn throughout the war, and six months after they had withdrawn 
from Grozny, they were re-established through the countryside and controlled nearly all 
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five-year ceasefire, and the resolution of the final status of Chechnya by the end of 2001, 
these negotiations never occurred due to incursions by Chechen Islamists into Dagestan 
in August 1999, which initiated the second phase of the conflict.426 
1.  Russian Invasion 
The Russian invasion into Chechnya followed the traditional Russian doctrine of 
a deep penetration attack to seize key terrain. It appears that the Russian inner circle 
believed, despite having failed in multiple coup attempts, that the full invasion would be 
a walkover. The Russian Minister of Defense General Pavel Grachev is said to have 
thought that one paratroop regiment would be able to conquer Chechnya in just two 
hours.427 By massing their large army, the Russian high command felt that they would be 
able to overrun the “band of criminals” swiftly.428 Russian soldiers were told that they 
would swiftly dispatch the untrained and unorganized Chechen forces, and that the sight 
of Russian tanks would force the rebels to back down. However, having previously relied 
on extensive clandestine efforts to unseat Dudayev, the detailed planning for a large 
traditional military operation did not begin until just two weeks prior to the invasion.429 
This haste reflected the confidence the Russians had in their much larger and better 
equipped conventional forces. 
Organizationally, the Russian forces were based on a traditional model, the 
former Soviet army, but their performance demonstrated how unsuited the Russian 
military actually was for fighting a network. “It also demonstrated how poorly Russian 
military organizational structures functioned when disparate forces were called to work 
together.”430 The force that was pulled together to invade Chechnya was assembled 
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hastily and demonstrated a dramatic lack of coordination, with no combined training.431 
A number of different ministries and organizations deployed troops to Chechnya, but 
each in their own separate command structures leading to a confusing command structure 
and considerable in fighting over roles. Overall, coordination between the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) and MVD units was nearly non-existent.432 These bureaucratic 
“stovepipes” extended all the way down to the lowest tactical levels, and included each 
respective organization’s air and ground forces. Some analysts cite this as the “single, 
over-riding cause behind the Russian defeat in Chechnya,” and highlight a lack of unity 
of command, “it is not only the lack of cooperation between the troops of the ministry of 
defence, the ministry of internal affairs and the federal security bureau, which could have 
been predicted. It is also the backbiting between units and senior commanders in the 
army which is so alarming.”433 Overall, the Russians were organized in classic, 
hierarchical fashion and this continuation of the centralized, bureaucratic nature of Soviet 
military structure proved ill-suited for complex irregular warfare in Chechnya. 
Following the Russian failure during the initial assault on Grozny, more 
experienced forces, primarily special operations, began arriving alongside thousands 
more MVD forces. These special operations elements were composed of naval, infantry, 
and speztnaz fighting units, and were smaller than the conventional forces they 
replaced.434 This smaller size, combined with greater capabilities and a much higher 
degree of autonomy, produced a greater agility. However, they faced dramatic challenges 
from their own disunity of command, and were not employed as effectively as possible 
due to Russian doctrinal issues. Reserved primarily as “shock-troops” against 
concentrations of Chechen forces, they rarely succeeded in inflicting serious loses, and 
found themselves occupying terrain more than pursuing Chechen cells. 
Doctrinally, the Russian forces that entered Chechnya were products of Soviet 
doctrine, and had, “…focused almost exclusively on war in central Europe against a 
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highly skilled, technologically advanced adversary.”435 This doctrine assumed that 
fighting in Central and Western Europe would present cities either defended, or left wide 
open in the hopes they would not be destroyed by combat. Defended cities were to be 
bypassed, while open cities would be entered in a massive show of force led with tanks 
and following with mounted infantry. Despite a deep legacy of urban combat and 
experience in WWII, by the 1980s, the MoD largely ignored urban combat.436 Instead, it 
focused on a concept of massed forces conducting large-scale maneuver, but often 
applying a linear approach to seize territory. However, for this kind of warfare to be 
successful, even against a similar opponent, a great degree of synchronization must 
occur, and it must be supported by a responsive logistical system .437 The Russians failed 
to deliver either, and instead, produced uncoordinated efforts whose most notable 
doctrinal effect was large-scale indiscriminate indirect fires. Nearly a year into the 
conflict, Russian forces did strive to update their doctrine and develop better small-unit 
tactics, but these had mixed results because their overall doctrinal approach still sought to 
avoid direct small-unit combat and rely more on air and artillery bombardment. This 
heavy repression led to the merciless destruction of numerous Chechen villages, and it is 
likely “…that some of the worst wartime atrocities inflicted in the last half century 
occurred in Chechnya.”438 It may be that the only true signs of unconventional activity by 
the Russian military were the use of “disruption-diversion” groups, which conducted 
abductions, kidnappings, and killings to accomplish political goals and promote a sense 
of overall lawlessness under the assumption that this would drive a desire for Russian 
control.439 
This doctrinal approach was compounded by errors in operational methods. Most 
notable was a lack of intelligence preparation and reconnaissance in advance of their 
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efforts. “Because communications procedures and equipment were often incompatible, 
intelligence frequently could not be shared, and units were unable to transmit their 
locations to supporting air forces.”440 Moreover, the three different invasion groups that 
crossed the border were unsynchronized, which resulted in significant delays and a lack 
of surprise.441 Tactically, the Russian forces were simply unprepared for irregular 
warfare; they lacked the requisite small-unit skills and were especially deficient in urban 
combat training. The initial Russian assault on Grozny in 1994 was an attempt to take the 
city on the march by using tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) in maneuver 
columns. This operation followed their doctrinal assumptions, but the lack of infantry 
allowed the Chechens to funnel Russian forces into complex ambushes, where they were 
decimated in well-prepared kill zones.442 A notable contributing factor was the overall 
inexperience and lack of training of Russian forces, many of whom were conscripts 
believing they would be fighting a short war. The deployment of better-trained soldiers, 
naval infantry and other elite units, served to increase the overall capability, but on the 
whole, the Russian operations proved largely inefficient.  
The Russians had little to no information strategy in during their 1994 invasion 
and even through their eventual withdrawal in 1996. According to Stephen Blank and 
Earl Tilford, the Russian command was nearly oblivious to the emerging effects of a war 
waged in the information age, and failed to account for numerous factors: 
Nor did the planners count on the reluctance of commanders to fire on 
unarmed civilians or on the corrosive effects on the military of official 
lying during Russia’s first ‘television war’. Free broadcasting from the 
war zone belied the hollow claims made about a lack of Russian or 
civilian casualties and brought into question the reasons for the war. Nor 
did Russian audiences enjoy seeing their forces engage in the terror 
bombing that ensued when the ground forces failed to advance over 
land.443 
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Russian forces did attempt to conduct information operations, but this was 
primarily seen in basic psychological warfare, with the use of leaflets, loudspeakers, and 
electronic broadcasts. In many cases, the message, that Russian operations were to disarm 
illegal Chechen “bandits,” sent by Russian propaganda served actually to lull the Russian 
soldiers into a sense of complacency about the true nature of the fighting they would face. 
When received on the Chechen side, these and similar messages provoked Chechen 
resistance by emphasizing treason and promoting Grachev’s orders to deport 
Chechens.444  
2.  Chechen Network Response 
The Chechen response to the Russian invasion produced a unique display of 
irregular warfare. The Chechens fought based on a strong background of military 
experience and within the framework of a socially decentralized society. Ironically, the 
Russian army trained many Chechen fighters, and their participation in conflicts 
occurring in the emerging Trans-Caucasian states from 1991–1994 provided significant 
experience for elements like Basayev’s Chechen Battalion. This unit fought in the 
Abkhazian succession movement, was trained by Russian Military Intelligence (GRU) 
and spetznaz forces, and would go on to be one of the more formidable groups in the 
Russo-Chechen conflict.445 The unconventional tactics Chechen networks displayed 
utilized a few aspects of guerrilla warfare, but reflected a paradigm shift. Maskhadov 
receives most of the credit for this approach, recognizing the unique combination of 
training, connectivity, and “home-field advantage” his forces enjoyed. Encouraging 
considerable autonomy, he promoted high degrees of self-organization and innovation 
through the force. Instead of using just hit-and-run tactics, Chechen fighters aggressively 
attacked Russian elements, with the goal of destroying whole units. Instead of 
withdrawing, small bands of fighters continuously maneuvered against Russian forces 
from multiple directions and displayed a remarkable staying power and penchant for  
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close-in fighting. Chechen fighting networks combined modern information technology 
with a cohesive social network that enabled small, autonomous, swarming units, which 
provided a clear example of dramatic changes in irregular warfare. 
Organizationally, the Chechen forces were largely an ad hoc network that had 
little hierarchical structure. Despite having a senior command, at the operational and 
tactical levels, the Chechen forces were extremely “flat” consisting of numerous smaller 
units, or nodes, of “non-standard squads.” In their excellent study of the assault on 
Grozny, Stasys Knesys and Romanas Sedlickas described Chechen forces: 
During the repulsion of the assault, the Chechen forces operated almost 
independently. Many small groups of Chechen fighters in the city also 
found themselves appropriate places in the city’s defenses. Everyone’s 
basic purpose was, after all, the same: to destroy the enemy. These mobile, 
completely independent groups chose their targets themselves and, being 
always on the move, created for the Russian units the appearance of a 
unified attack. The coordination among the leaders of the Chechen fighter 
groups was, however, exceptional. Even without centralized command, 
they succeeded in fighting their opponent all over the city 
simultaneously.446 
Each element was comprised of heavily armed personnel with a mix of weapons and 
communications equipment, producing highly capable, but still extremely agile teams. 
These teams formed “hunter-killer” groups of fighters, possibly represented by two men 
with RPG-7 or RPG-18 anti-tank grenade launchers, two with medium machine guns, 
several riflemen, and a sniper. Multiple teams formed a cell, with additional support 
elements, such as medical, ammunition bearers, or additional snipers. Three cells 
composed a larger element of 75–100 men, which included a mortar crew and command 
and planning cell.447 This networked organization built on the clan-based social networks 
that play such a significant role throughout Chechen society. William Nemeth highlights 
several points drawn from descriptions of Chechen organization, including the fact that 
teip members rotate in and out of battle, the overall number of fighters can be quickly 
expanded through supporting groups, that the fighters are physically supported by a dense 
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“…network of kinship and religious relationships while engaged in fighting…,” and that 
this flexible organization allows rapid re-organization between smaller-decentralized 
operations and larger synchronized efforts.448 According to both Russian and Chechen 
accounts, Chechen organization was both simple and fluid, but highly effective. It 
allowed dispersed semi-autonomous units to swarm in self-coordinated raids, but also to 
re-consolidate for larger, more complex operations. 
Doctrinally, the Chechen forces made extensive use of rugged natural terrain and 
incorporated the hard-learned urban combat lessons of the Soviet era. They sought to 
maximize the asymmetry in force with a doctrine of swarming that culminated in 
aggressive close-in fighting. The overall outcome of the war was largely shaped by the 
Chechens’ “…exploitation of the network form of organization and a related capacity for 
swarming attacks.”449 This exploitation allowed the Chechen teams to converge against 
exposed Russian forces to attack, and then rapidly redisperse once destroyed. These 
Chechen units provided an ideal fit for swarming, which “…will work best—perhaps it 
will only work—if it is designed mainly around the deployments of myriad, small, 
dispersed, networked maneuver units.”450 Complimenting this doctrine, was highly 
unorthodox techniques, such as arming small cells with heavy weaponry, for instance 
arming a unit of 10–20 men with 12 grenade launchers, when “as a rule, a group of ten 
men had only one grenade-launcher.”451 The swarming displayed by Chechen forces in 
the defense of Grozny, as well as in multiple other significant engagements, highlights 
the differences in doctrine from traditional guerrilla war. The Chechens neither relied on 
traditional guerrilla hit-and-run attacks nor sought to develop larger conventional forces, 
as Mao theorized. Instead, using small bands of fighters, they demonstrated the ability to 
seize the initiative continuously and decisively defeat larger, better-armed forces. Rather 
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than hasty attacks and withdrawals, Chechen swarming attacks sought to deliver 
punishing blows, and on numerous occasions, destroyed complete Russian elements.452 
The operational methods utilized by the Chechens highlight their unique use of 
unconventional tactics, perhaps the most significant display of irregular warfare in the 
modern era. Their small-unit organizing principles were ideal for urban terrain and were 
well suited for the close-in fighting required. Chechen fighting networks utilized 
unconventional tactics based on a deep understanding of urban combat, and displayed the 
operational agility to swarm in concentrated attacks, while still being able to disperse 
rapidly. Chechen hunter-killer teams perfected the art of close in ambushes, stealthfully 
infiltrating as close as possible to Russian forces. Their willingness to utilize all forms of 
concealment provided a significant advantage, and largely negated the Russian emphasis 
on stand-off weapons. The tactics they displayed illustrate the swarming doctrine and 
emphasize the potential for small, but well-connected forces confronting larger, massive 
formations. These tactics were clear in the Chechen employment of rocket-propelled 
grenade (RPG) teams, which swarmed to destroy sixty62 tanks in the first month of 
fighting, and stealthy sniper teams. Effective employment of snipers proved devastating, 
as in one Russian battalion, only one officer and 10 soldiers survived sniper fire.453 The 
sniper teams also successfully attritted and slowed the Russian formations, which forced 
them to deploy indirect firepower, and made them more vulnerable to swarming RPG 
teams. Once they made contact with Russian forces, snipers and machine gun teams 
would establish a hasty ambush, while anti-armor teams move in close for precision kills. 
“The teams deployed at ground level, and also in second and third stories and in 
basements. Normally, five or six hunter-killer teams attacked an armored vehicle in 
unison. Kill shots were generally made, as noted above, against the top, rear, and sides of 
vehicles.”454 Moreover, the Chechens had access to Russian communications, “…which 
in the early days of conflict were transmitted in the clear, in large part because the forces 
operating the equipment were not familiar with the necessary procedures for secure 
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communications.”455 In addition, Chechen forces had access to both Russian radios, as 
well as their own commercial Motorolas, providing them with the capability to monitor 
Russian communications on their own military radios, while still having their own secure 
means.  
We had a special room in the Palace [Presidential Palace in Grozny] for 
radio operators. Whenever we had a moment, we would go there to ‘talk’ 
to the Russians. We listened to their call-up, waited for the moment when 
they were giving orders having determined who was in command and who 
was a subordinate. Then we intervened, giving different orders in a 
confident manner, providing false positions, and so on. As a result, the 
Russians suffered more losses at the beginning of the war through friendly 
fire than through our efforts.456  
The fact that most Russian did not speak Chechen ensured that the Chechen units 
could enjoy secure communications simply by speaking in their native tongue.457 This 
simple difference provided a fundamental advantage for Chechen forces, one that greatly 
enhanced their ability to both disrupt Russian communications and retain the flexibility of 
speaking freely. In addition to collection on Russian communications, Chechen 
commanders also utilized extensive intelligence networks, gathered by the local 
population and special reconnaissance teams.458 
Chechen information strategy derived significant strength from a cohesive 
narrative—one based on the idea of a free and proud Chechnya. This powerful “story” is 
clearly present in the following sections of the Chechen national anthem:  
Our mothers dedicated up to our Nation and our Homeland. 
And we shall all rise up to the last one if our nation needs us. 
We grew up free as the eagles, princes of the mountains. 
There is no threshold from which we shall shy away….. 
Never to bow our heads to anyone, we give our sacred pledge. 
To die or to live in freedom is our fate…. 
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If we shall be forced to starve from famine, we shall gnaw the roots of 
trees. 
If we shall be deprived of water, we shall drink the dew from the grass. 
We came onto this earth when the wolf cubs began to whine under the 
she-wolf’s feet. 
We pledge our lives to God, or Nation and our Homeland.459 
Building on the theme of a free, but oppressed people, the Chechens consistently 
emphasized Russia as an aggressor and highlighted the brutality of Russian tactics. The 
Chechen use of media demonstrated a savvy information strategy that effectively swayed 
global public opinion. A large number of journalists were present for the conflict and the 
Chechens deliberately granted access and took steps to influence public opinion. 
Journalist were provided with open access and encouraged to describe the horrors 
inflicted against Chechen civilians. Further, demonstrating a savvy appreciation for 
globalized networks, Chechen officials enlisted support from nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), which “…brought pressure to bear on Yeltsin from outside 
Russia, while at the same time reaching the Russian mass public, damaging morale, and 
seriously affecting Russian popular support for the war.”460 This element of their 
information strategy displayed many of the core characteristics of the netwar concept. 
Chechen forces also took direct methods to combat Russian information flow at the 
tactical level and blocked and disrupted communications with captured radios. Further, 
they also used radio-jamming equipment to block Russian mass media within Chechnya, 
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Table 5.   Evaluation of the 1st Russo-Chechen War 
3.  Analysis of Counter-Network Framework 
Overall, the results of the 1st Russo-Chechen War leave little doubt that the 
Russian forces failed to achieve any significant aspects of effective counter-network 
operations. The primary strategy in the launching of their conventional military campaign 
was to seize key terrain rapidly and force a capitulation from the ChRI. Russia’s overall 
military organization and doctrine was inconsistent with the counter-network theory 
proposed earlier in this study, and Russian forces never demonstrated any significant 
portion of the four primary counter-network variables. A report released in 1995 
criticized nearly every aspect of Russian military preparations during the initial efforts, 
which provided clear evidence that Russian capabilities were ill-suited to the conflict they 
faced.462  
a. Offensive Swarming 
The Russians employed a doctrine that seemed to run counter to the basic 
elements contributing to effective swarming—operational tempo, surprise, and pulsing. 
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Overall, their forces maneuvered in a fairly linear fashion seeking to “push” Chechen 
fighters out of key urban areas. Despite improvements and adaptations in small-unit 
tactics and organizing in smaller, combined battle groups with more infantry and elite 
unit support, they failed to achieve any of the three aspects of swarming.  
The Russian forces failed to achieve any kind of meaningful operational 
tempo because they were disjointed and lacked coordination, and immediately reverted to 
stand-off attacks with heavy artillery and weapons when confronted by Chechen forces. 
While the Russian’s slight improvements following their initial entry in 1994 allowed 
them to take Grozny after hard fighting, “…the level of military effectiveness that they 
could hope to reach was limited by the Army’s organizational structures. Command of 
even small tactical actions remained centrally controlled, to the point of imposing 
constraints on the ability of field units to talk to each other.”463 Their response to 
Chechen raids and ambushes was to withdraw and engage from afar, or if they were 
static, to remain in secure defensive positions. While later improvements and more 
specialized units brought small unit resoluteness and audacity to bear, overall, the 
Russians lacked the tactical mobility to sustain any significant operational tempo. 
Chechen fighters countered their reliance on helicopter infiltration with mobile anti-
aircraft teams that would attack targets of opportunity, but also swarm to landing zones as 
the Russians attempted to insert.464 
The start of the invasion demonstrated the Russians’ inability to achieve 
significant surprise. Except for aerial bombardment, Chechen forces were rarely caught 
by surprise, and seemed to know nearly every Russian plan. Tactically, Chechen units 
retained the initiative in nearly every engagement, luring both armored columns and 
helicopter assets into pre-arranged kill zones, and then swarming against them. The 
Chechen units’ ability to conceal themselves in Russian uniforms, hide among villagers, 
and infiltrate at night ensured that the Russians were constantly re-acting to Chechen 
attacks instead of achieving surprise. While securing key terrain, such as villages and 
roads, the Russians rarely “found” Chechen fighting elements, demonstrating the 
                                                 
463 Arquilla and Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?,” 215.  
464 Ibid., 216.  
 173
challenges of the hider-finder paradigm in irregular conflict. While Russians would 
appear successful in the capturing of villages, Chechen fighters nearly always withdrew 
prior to the attacks and infiltrated back at night to launch devastating raids against the 
hasty Russian defenses.  
b. Illumination 
Russian intelligence should have been based on a need to illuminate 
Chechen forces using their social ties, operational activity, conducting infiltration, and 
through a focused exploitation campaign. However, Russian forces had extreme difficulty 
in generating even small bits of traditional intelligence on Chechen forces, let alone a 
comprehensive picture generated by extensive illumination efforts. Overall, the lack of 
Russian intelligence gathering efforts was one of the most glaring failures of the 1st 
Russo-Chechen war; much of was due to lack of coordination between the MoD and the 
Federalnaya Sluzhba Kontrrazvedki—Federal Counterintelligence Service of Russia 
(FSK), the Interior Ministry’s counter-intelligence service. Since the MoD was not 
entitled to collection internal to the Russian Federation, by law, the Interior Ministry had 
the responsibility, but had little capability.465 Most of the information that gathered by 
Russian forces resulted from traditional intelligence, and was delivered by anti-rebel 
Chechen opposition, which made it highly dubious. Although numerous Russian citizens 
lived in Grozny and the larger towns, Russian forces had little contact with anyone who 
could provide accurate local intelligence. In addition, the lack of understanding of the 
Chechen culture, and a dearth of Chechen speakers tremendously compromised their 
efforts. In strong contrast, Colonel Husein Iskhanov, General Maskhadov’s deputy 
commander during the 1994–1996 war, stated, “we used our knowledge of the territory 
and our experience during military service with Russians. We knew how Russians built 
their defences; we knew Russian habits and language.”466 Further, most of the Russian 
efforts to identify Chechen fighters and supporters were based on harsh, repression 
measures. The Russians established “filtration” camps to separate Chechen fighters from 
                                                 
465 Gall and de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, 208.  
466 Iskhanov, Interview from June 1999, 3.  
 174
ordinary citizens, but the overwhelming amount detained were civilians, who were 
subsequently beaten and tortured.467 Testimonies from thousands held in such camps 
described, “…mass arrests from the streets and bomb shelters, irrational and cruel 
violence, including vicious beatings, mock executions, psychological and often physical 
torture to obtain confessions, and life-threatening conditions….”468 Instead of 
establishing a system for obtaining information, the Russians had established the 
“…beginnings of a system of mass terror.”469 
c. Information Disruption 
The Russians attempted to disrupt Chechen information strategy, but 
overall, as the Russian Federal Security Forces Chief, Sergei Stephasin bluntly stated, 
“the information war was lost.”470 Effective Russian information disruption would have 
displayed a significant ability to negate the Chechens’ purpose, the denial or channeling 
of communications, collection, and deception efforts. In terms of countering the 
Chechens’ purpose, the Russian invasion served to do almost the opposite, which swelled 
the initial band of Chechen fighters by thousands each week as fighters came to avenge 
the destruction caused by heavy Russian shelling. “Support for Dudayev came second to 
the desire to protect their homes and land. ‘We are here because this is our fatherland,’ 
said Apti Vasarkhanov, one fighter heading in [to Grozny] with a small group from his 
village. ‘We have no choice, we have nowhere else to go.’”471 As the war continued into 
the heaviest fighting of 1996, Russian media became increasingly muted, and Yeltsin’s 
re-election campaign dominated most of the headlines. At the very same time that  
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Russian forces were fighting one of the fiercest battles of the war, for the village of 
Goskoye, Yeltsin was informing U.S. President Bill Clinton, “military actions in the 
Chechnya region are not going on.”472 
d. Fusion 
Russian forces displayed rigid, hierarchical organization, and little to no 
significant coordination between the various ministries, commanders, and separate units. 
The defining attributes of fusion, shared intent, connectivity, and collaborative systems 
were conspicuously absent at nearly all levels. One MVD unit was so angered by the lack 
of coordination and overall command influence that it packed up and departed Chechnya, 
believing there was, “no centralized control over the military operation.”473 Smaller 
units, spetznaz and other elite forces, may have displayed some elements of fusion, but 
for the most part, these were tactical derivations, with forces displaying local connectivity 
as a means of basic battlefield coordination. Fusion has both an organizational element 
and a doctrinal element, and because the Russians were unable to achieve even basic 
organizational connectivity, they were unable to establish any kind of collaborative 
systems.  
D.  THE 2ND RUSSO-CHECHEN WAR: 1999–PRESENT 
After the brutal first conflict, and following an uneasy period of relative quiet, the 
2nd Russo-Chechen War began with an Islamic extremist led offensive movement into 
neighboring Dagestan.474 The Chechen leader Shamil Basayev and Saudi jihadist Ibn al-
Khattab, who maneuvered over 2,000 fighters into neighboring Dagestan, led this large 
raid. This invasion, and five bombings throughout Russia between August 31 and 
September 16, 1999 killed over 300 people and wounded 2,1000, and produced a Russian  
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response—the return of the Russian Army to Chechnya.475 Like the 1st Russo-Chechen 
War, this war was forecast to be a quick victory, and the Kremlin even described it as an 
“anti-terrorist” operation against Chechen rebels.  
Beginning in Dagestan, the Russian forces slowly pushed the Chechen fighters 
under Basayev back into Chechnya, despite being continually ambushed. Prior to actually 
invading Chechnya, the Russian military paused to allow for artillery and aerial 
bombardment of targets, such as communication facilities and bases. In addition to 
striking these key military targets, infrastructure throughout Chechnya, such as dams, 
water treatment facilities, and bridges were destroyed and most larger towns were heavily 
shelled.476 Russian forces entered northern Chechnya in a major offensive on September 
30, 1999, and soon launched large-scale military operations against Grozny, and other 
major towns and their transportation routes.477 A day later, Russian Prime Minister Putin 
officially declared war on Chechnya ordering Russian troops to use “all available means” 
to subdue the insurgents.478 Russian operations were notable for their devastating 
approach, as forces used heavy bombardment to inflict enormous damage of Chechen 
cities, and Grozny in particular was nearly leveled. One retired Russian officer, Major 
General Vorob’yev stated that it took an average of 7,500 bullets and 70 rounds of 
artillery to kill one Chechen fighter.479 By mid 2000, Russian forces had achieved a solid 
presence throughout Chechnya and had basic control of all major towns.480 The taking of 
Grozny was a slow, deliberate affair, with an evacuation period and the methodical 
movement of heavy detachments from neighborhood to neighborhood, garrisoning 
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strongpoints as they proceeded. Still, it would be late March 2000 before Grozny was 
finally occupied, by which time, a large proportion of the Chechen insurgents had 
withdrawn to the mountains in the south. Building on the damage created in the 1994–96 
war, the massive destruction throughout Chechnya resulted in the obliteration of its 
infrastructure, which left many towns and villages nearly uninhabitable.481  
In turn, Chechen networks began a terrorist bombing campaign, with the notable 
incidents being the seizure of the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow in October 2002, in which 
980 Russians were held hostage, and the taking of 1,300 hostages at the Beslan middle 
school in North Ossetia in September 2004. Both incidents culminated in large-scale 
raids by spetznaz, most likely the elite Russian unit Alfa, during which hundreds of 
civilians were killed. In September 2003, the overall command of Russian operations 
transitioned from the Federal Security Services (FSB), the Russian intelligence 
organization, to the MVD, a move meant to signify an end to counter-terrorism 
operations and more normal public security operations.482 However, Chechen rebel 
networks worked hard to reverse the initial Russian gains, and inflicted enough damage 
against Russian forces that by 2005, they were successfully turning “tactical victories into 
strategic gains.”483 Chechen forces continued to display network-style warfare through 
swarming attacks in the North Caucasus, while at the same time, expanding their terrorist 
attacks in Moscow and other Russian cities outside of Chechnya.  
In marked contrast to the first war, after several years of tough fighting, the 
Russian offensive focused on countering the Chechen guerrilla network by a combination 
of fixed conventional security positions, and aggressive pursuit by Russian spetznaz. In 
addition, the overall effort to target the Chechen network was led by intelligence 
organizations partnered with various special operations elements to initiate a “hunting” 
campaign.484 This campaign was notable for the “…severe attrition inflicted over a 
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decade on most of the best-known Chechen rebel field commanders, their subordinates, 
and jihadists and combatants who joined the fight against Russia.”485 Key leaders killed 
during this period included notable operatives, such as Ibn al-Khattab, a Jordanian born 
jihadist and operational commander killed in 2002, as well as Raduyev, who had been 
aggressively pursued since the Budinovsk raid. However, despite the fact that “….good 
intelligence and assistance was sometimes generated by FSB efforts to exploit differences 
among rival leaders and groups,” and a significant number of key leaders killed or 
captured, much of the effort up until the September 2004 attacks in Beslan were 
sporadic.486 The Beslan attacks prompted a tremendous re-organization of the Russian 
war-fighting structures for counterterrorism (inside Russian borders) and 
counterinsurgency (inside Chechnya). Chechnya was subdivided into 12 headquarter 
sections that employed a joint intelligence service in conjunction with special operations 
forces augmented by a motorized rifle company, a combat engineer team, and civil 
defense elements.487 The successful combination of special operations forces and 
conventional elements is discussed in numerous sources on special operations, most 
notably James Kiras’s Special Operations and Strategy, but such a robust joint force is 
rare.488 In addition, a more clearly defined command structure facilitated the employment 
of regional special operations units with the national-level units, Alfa and Vympel.  
The installation of Akhmat Kadyrov, a former Grand Mufti and insurgent, as the 
head of the provisional Chechen government in June 2000 helped with moderating the 
insurgency.489 This began a fairly successful effort that built local networks of co-opted 
Chechens willing to relinquish their struggle in favor of local control. Akhmat Kadyrov’s 
son, Ramzan, is the current prime minister of Chechnya, appointed in March 2006 after 
his father was assassinated by a bomb blast in a Grozny stadium. Still, efforts to 
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transition the bulk of the fighting to Russian-backed local police and pro-Russian 
Chechen security forces have been problematic due to their dubious loyalties and proven 
infiltrations at all levels.490 Overall, these Russian efforts to develop larger Chechen-
loyalist factions played a significant role in reducing the overall intensity of the conflict. 
Like Dudayev, Maskhadov was a constant target of Russian assassination efforts, 
and special operations forces finally succeeded in targeting him in a joint operation 
composed of regional forces and the hastily deployed Alfa and Vympel teams. This 
operation consisted of regional forces cordoning the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, while the 
spetznaz teams, under the FSB commander General Aleksander Tikhonov launched 
“special weapons” rather than choosing to assault the structure.491 Following 
Maskhadov’s death in March 2005, and the rise of Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev to the ChRI 
leadership, the ChRI was further developed as a broad Caucasus jihad under the primary 
direction of one of the most notable combat leaders and terrorists, Shamil Basayev. 
“They [Sadulayev and Basayev] radically transformed the goals of the expanded war 
strategy and refashioned the national independence movement into an Islamist and 
increasingly globally-oriented jihadist movement…”492 The targeting and killing of 
Sadulayev and Basayev in quick succession in June and July 2006 were serious blows to 
the Chechen fighters, and by the end of 2006, Russian forces had taken much of the 
impact out of the separatist struggle in the North Caucasus.493 The success of the 
combined intelligence and special operations units led to an “unprecedented success in 
targeting and eliminating major guerrilla leaders,” and President Putin to declare 
“officially” an end to the war in 2009.494 Still, major terrorist activities continue and 
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activity under Doku Umarov, the 5th President of the ChRI and the “1st Emir of the 
Caucasus Emirate,” included the March 2010 Moscow Metro bombings495 and the 
January 2011 Domodedovo International Airport bombing,496 both suicide attacks. 
The Russian special operations successes in this campaign have shown a notable 
evolution beyond just heavy-handed destruction. However, such repression continued, 
largely by conventional forces and proved effective in exerting control over large areas of 
Chechnya. However, despite increased precision in targeting key leavers, the overall 
repressive nature of the Russian strategy leads most observers to believe that the war has 
simply entered a new phase. The current conflict is marked by dispersed, increasingly 
lethal terrorist attacks in the Russian heartland, and an expansion into neighboring 
provinces.497 Daily attacks against Russian soldiers and facilities receive little or no 
mention in the press, due to strict state controls, but larger terrorist bombings and other 
strikes outside Chechnya continue to draw attention. Ironically, the vicious irregular 
warfare continuing inside Chechnya displays the remarkable ability of Chechen fighting 
networks, despite increasingly successful Russian counter-efforts. 
1. Russian Invasion 
Despite having several years to prepare for the replay, the Russian forces that 
invaded Chechnya in 1999 were once again unprepared for the strength and competence 
of their opponents. The Russians planned to avoid the bloody, vicious urban battles of 
their earlier incursion by forcing the Chechens into submission through artillery and air 
strikes. Once again, although mistaken assumptions justified a lack of preparation, and 
“…almost a complete lack of to urban combat in preparatory training” for most Russian 
conventional units.498 Russian main-line units were augmented by kontrakti, contracted 
mercenaries, as well as buttressed by multiple elite units that aided in combating the agile 
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Chechen forces, but whose effect may be marginalized by the overall repressive nature of 
Russian COIN. As the war progressed, re-organization and an increasing reliance on 
combined special operations and intelligence units led to increasing successes against 
Chechen leadership figures. 
Organizationally, the Russian forces were organized under a single MoD 
command, which simplified and improved command and control. This organization was 
still largely a hierarchical structure based on traditional organizations, but it displayed 
greater unity through the “Unified Grouping of Federal Forces,” (OGV) which had 
responsibility for all military and security forces in Chechnya, and was divided into four 
different sectors. By January 2001, a transfer of authority occurred from the MoD to the 
FSB, when President Putin declared the military phase of the campaign over, to mark the 
shift from full-scale combat operations to a basic counter-terrorism mission.499 The FSB 
ran all counter-terrorist efforts in Chechnya for two-and-a-half years, before President 
Putin transferred full responsibility to the MVD in July 2003. While still under a 
“unified” command, the OGV was headed by a MVD general, who attempted to manage 
multiple staff and operational elements from the MoD, as well as FSB operations.500 This 
structure involved multiple ministries, agencies, and branches, which provided for an 
increase in overall coordination of diverse joint operations. However, despite a more 
integrated command structure, designed to facilitate more effective and synchronized 
operations, major coordination issues remained. After a large raid against Russian 
positions in Ingushetia in June 2004, the Russian State Duma Committee on Security held 
that the “…lack of coordination among the federal and regional security services and the 
army,” was the reason that “allowed the terrorists to strike at Russian units with 
impunity.”501 This lack of coordination led to the creation of a new federal-level 
commission to coordinate the primary ministries of the military, FSB, foreign intelligence 
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service (SRV), and military intelligence services (GRU). The commission was reinforced 
by President Putin’s formation of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAK) in 
February 2006, which gave broad powers to coordinate and develop “new methods and 
approaches for countering terrorism.”502 In addition, the NAK formed an operational 
staff—the Federal Operational Staff (FOSh) to bring together forces and resources, as 
well as share intelligence. This staff supported 12 new federal headquarters, designated as 
an Operational Control Group (GrOU) that had responsibility for each North Caucasus 
administrative region. These GrOUs function as a joint task force, and are designed to 
have assigned forces from various units and agencies, which support the following 
typical organization composed of the following. 
a.  Motorized Rifle Company 
b.  70-man MVD police spetsnaz detachment (quick reaction) 
c.  Combat engineer team 
d.  Civil defense/emergency troops and resources for rescue and 
construction work 
e.  So-called ‘heavies’ or special operations teams comprised of 
elements from the North Caucasus FSB directorates, designated as 
spetsnaz503 
The same pressure for organizational redesign also led to the development of special 
designation forces under the GRU, two battalions whose ethnic Chechen composition 
made them well-suited to their task of “liquidation of suspected insurgents.” These 
battalions are referred to by their sector designations, East (Vostok) and West (Zapad) 
and have been accused of numerous war crimes and atrocities.504 
Doctrinally, the Russian forces adapted from the 1st Russo-Chechen war by 
determining that they would not engage in the close-quarters urban fighting that proved 
so devastating in Grozny and other urban areas. Instead, they based much of their 
doctrine on using stand-off firepower, artillery, aerial bombardment, and even new 
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munitions, such as fuel-air explosives, to raze urban areas and eliminate any threat they 
might contain. However, the expected artillery and air strikes failed to lead to a decisive 
victory in Grozny and other urban areas, and there were no other plans. “The key mistake 
the Russian military made between the wars was in drawing the wrong lesson from urban 
combat: not only that it should be avoided, but that it could be avoided, under all 
circumstances. They were therefore unprepared for it when it came.”505 In addition, they 
increased their focus on leadership targeting, as evidenced by the formation of joint 
groupings and expanded use of elite units. These units and their targeting efforts provide 
much of the successes heralded by the Russian media, and the combination of the two has 
proven fairly effective in swaying opinions about the conflict. Further, the increase in 
techniques, such as “countercapture” operations, which were directed against the families 
of accused terrorists. Such operations, while seemingly increasing pressure against the 
Chechen fighters, also led to widespread condemnation by Russian human rights groups 
and international organizations, while at the same time, adding to the hostility and hatred 
among Chechen civilians.506  
Operationally the Russians made changes to the way in which they fought the 
Chechen networks. The noteworthy changes included a dramatically increased use of 
heavy shelling and bombardment of urban areas, decentralized authority and mixing of 
units, hardening defensive positions, and an increase in the operational employment of 
elite special operations forces. Heavy use of massed firepower and standoff limited 
Russian casualties, but produced a tremendous amount of devastation in infrastructure 
and noncombatants. Russian forces employed devastating amounts of direct and indirect 
firepower to destroy built-up areas as they believed that force preservation was far more 
important, based on the loss of public support due to horrendous loses in the first war. 
Russian forces also sought to create more effective units when they did have to fight. 
Russian assault groups decentralized authority to junior officers, which resulted in small 
units with increased effectiveness and survivability. In addition, “increased use of 
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specialized units [special operations forces] to backstop the mostly conscript motorized 
rifle troops improved effectiveness and decreased casualties and fratricide.”507 Russian 
forces also concentrated on countering the attrition and psychological toll inflicted by the 
Chechen swarming ambushes. Much of this effort focused on installing dense minefield 
and explosive barriers, as well as early-warning devices along all roads leading to 
military posts and bases. However, this increasing reliance on fixed bases and superior 
firepower may not provide much advantage against the agile Chechen forces: 
The large and powerful but disorganized federal units, which are devoid of 
any genuine support among the local [Chechen] population, often have 
been powerless when confronted by much smaller but mobile bands of 
guerrillas in the region….[The Russian government] usually gauges its 
military strength [in Chechnya] by tallying up the numbers of soldiers, 
tanks, guns and helicopters, but experience shows that in Chechnya—and 
in the North Caucasus more generally—all of these indicators are of little 
relevance. Our troops, aside from trying to protect themselves against 
attack, are often unable to do anything.508 
Much of the heavier fighting, especially in the mountainous southern areas of Chechnya, 
has been borne by elite elements, as a senior GRU officer stated, “the GRU spetznaz 
forces have had to undertake at least half of all federal operations [in Chechnya] because 
no forces other than the spetznaz dared venture into the mountainous regions.”509 
The Russians demonstrated remarkable improvements in their information 
strategy for the second war, perhaps the most notable adaptation from the first war. Most 
of these changes were focused on how they dealt with the media, both internally and 
globally. While the 1st Russo-Chechen war displayed the information openness of 
glasnost, in the second conflict, Russian authorities exerted strict control of the press and 
a remarkably professional public relations campaign. Moreover, in the 2nd Russo- 
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Chechen war, the Russians placed a great deal of emphasis on Chechen “excesses” and 
highlighted the vicious nature of the Chechen terrorist actions, as well as their use of 
“barbaric” battlefield executions.  
2. Chechen Response 
Overall, the Chechen fighting networks have continued to display many of the 
same characteristics that emerged in the first conflict. They continue to be a part of the 
strong social networks, which compose Chechen clan-based society, and draw support 
from this base. Their swarming tactics continue to impose significant loses against 
Russian forces, particularly in the complex and potent ambushes of Russian forces 
attempting to move throughout Chechnya. They have also continued the expanded form 
of the conflict, with dramatic raids throughout the Caucasus region, and terrorist attacks 
that strike throughout Russia. If anything, the increased Russian pressure and forcible 
occupation of the region has led to an increasingly dispersed Chechen fighting structure, 
one that actually enjoys considerable freedom of movement throughout the countryside, 
especially in the southern mountains. They continue to rely on their ability to travel using 
Russian documents and many of the terror attacks in Moscow and other cities are simply 
an extension of Chechen units, which rely on small clandestine supporters and 
individuals who either travel for the attack or reside in larger Chechen communities. 
Despite their sophisticated methods and technical armament, Chechen insurgent networks 
are notable because they have not received formal recognition, or external support. They 
obtain most of their weapons and supplies from Russians, either in raids on arms depots, 
or in buying them from Russian troops, and have accumulated significant stockpiles in 
the Northern Caucasus. As Mark Kramer states, “the conflict in Chechnya belies the 
notion that major insurgencies can endure for many years only if they receive large-scale 
external backing. That may have been true of the guerrilla movements in South Vietnam 
in the 1960s, Afghanistan in the 1980s, and Kashmir in the 1990s, but it is not true of 
Chechnya since 1994.”510 
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Organizationally, the 2nd Russo-Chechen war displayed an increase in autonomy 
by Chechen units and a less formal, centralized authority than that displayed by 
Dudayev’s initial version of the ChRI in the first war. In July 2002, President Maskhadov 
held a war council where the increasing jihadization of the Chechen separatist movement 
was formalized through amendments to the constitution establishing shariah as the 
official law for the underground republic.511 This action formalized the increasing 
emphasis on a jihadist ideology, which had been growing due to the risk in ranks of 
young, radical Islamists who were influenced by the global Islamist movement. With this 
shift, the leadership began to create more combined units, composed of foreign 
mercenaries, al-Qaeda operatives, and indigenous Chechen militant units.512 This change 
was a departure from previous divisions between more strictly nationalist-oriented 
Chechen separatists and the jihadist-bent fighters. The current war has brought leaders to 
the forefront who espouse an unreserved jihadist agenda, and increased the influx of 
foreign militants who claim to be fighting on behalf of a wider, global Islamic 
community.513 Overall, the Chechen separatists remain a decentralized, networked 
organization, with elements becoming more autonomous and smaller over the last five 
years. The combined units have served to increase their ranks, while still allowing them 
to maintain connections with the strong clan-based social networks. The combination of 
this strong social infrastructure and well-trained, global jihadists provides a complex 
organizational grouping. 
Doctrinally, the Chechens continue to rely on their ability to swarm, and have 
merged this with an increasing focus on dramatic terror strikes to achieve devastating 
results in raids like the one in Beslan in 2004. This swarming capability is especially 
notable as pro-Russian forces have increasingly adapted a strong-point approach, with 
forays occuring from heavily fortified positions. The Chechen willingness to fight at 
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night continues to give them an upper hand against nearly all Russian units. Most Russian 
forces remain in static positions at night, which allow Chechen raids and extensive 
prepositioning for ambushes. The notable extension of the war outside the Chechen 
region is seen in terrorist attacks involving suicide bombings, remotely detonated bombs, 
and hostage-taking operations. Chechen doctrine seems to be focused on maintaining the 
offensive inside Chechnya, while extending it with dispersed and violent attacks 
throughout the Caucasus region and the rest of Russia.514 In a variation of swarming, 
Maskhadov promoted the “tactic of the bee,” which involves rotating the focus of the 
jihadi attacks from one republic to another, which is designed to keep Russian security 
efforts disrupted.515 This effort has seen the attacks shift from Chechnya, to Ingushetia, 
to Dagestan, Russia itself, and then back in a seemingly random manner. A 2004 
nighttime raid by Basayev and Dokku Umarov into Ingushetia that resulted in severe 
casualties and the capturing of large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and supplies is a 
notable example.516 These actions are consistent with their overall strategy of prolonging 
the “stalemate” while raising the overall costs of the war, to the point that the Russians 
will reshape their calculations, as they did in 1996.  
Operationally, the Chechen forces continue to utilize many of the same methods 
that they displayed in the first war, with an increase in two types of attacks—roadside 
IEDs and suicide bombings. The first, a dramatically increased use of mines and IEDs, 
reflects both their ability to emplace such explosive devices stealthfully, as well as the 
Russian reliance on more static positions supported by road arteries. The ‘mine warfare’ 
employed by the Chechen fighters presented serious problems for Russian troops, causing 
an estimated 40% of the casualties they have suffered during the latest war.517 Colonel-
General Nikolai Serdtsev, the head of the Russian Army’s Engineering Forces, states that 
the challenges faced by demining grew much greater than that seem in from 1994–1996: 
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If we compare the scale of the ‘mine war’ in the current campaign with the 
earlier one, we find that the intensity of it has sharply escalated and the 
number of casualties among our combat and technical personnel has 
sharply increased. All of this confirms that the terrorists are now more 
organized in their preparations, in their accumulation of stockpiles of 
high-explosive munitions, in their development of a network of 
clandestine laboratories to construct improvised explosive devices and 
radio-controlled detonators, and in their plans for laying mines and 
explosive devices.518 
It is likely that this increase in IEDs is a result of doctrinal innovations from Iraq, 
diffused mainly through cyberspace, but also an exchange of fighters.519  
Suicide attacks also dramatically increased, as Chechen forces became more 
infused with jihadist ideals extolling such attacks. These attacks began in 2000, and were 
initially directed at individual Russian troops, or groups manning checkpoints. They 
quickly shifted to larger attacks against headquarters with the use of vehicle-born 
explosives (referred to in U.S. nomenclature as suicide-vehicle-born improvised 
explosive devices—SVBIED), and have resulted in hundreds of large-scale bombings 
throughout Chechnya. By 2004, these tactics had spread throughout the entire Caucasus 
region, with suicide bombing and other large-scale explosive attacks forming a key 
aspect of Chechen operations in a “widened zone of combat operations,” in Ingushetia, 
Dagestan, North Ossetia, and other regions.520 Terrorist attacks against targets deeper 
inside Russia have had a dramatic effect, and their escalation in 2003–2004 marked a 
different type of war. “In 2003 alone, nine suicide bombings in Moscow were attributed 
to the Chechens, and more than 600 other terrorist bombings occurred elsewhere in 
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Russia, especially in or near the North Caucasus.”521 Chechen fighters also continued to 
dominate using night ambushes against Russian forces. Their night-fighting prowess was 
a strong contrast to Russian forces both under-equipped and un-trained for such fighting, 
which made small-unit warfare even more salient in the latest conflict.  
Chechen information strategy seeks to capitalize on Chechen operational effects 
by highlighting the Chechen cause. By increasing terrorist attacks, the Chechens have 
managed to keep the conflict in the spotlight, but such attacks have had mixed results, as 
they have hardened Russian opinions and allowed President Putin to draw strict 
comparison with other terrorists, such as al-Qaeda. In addition, the Russian blackout on 
the state media coverage of the war has hurt the Chechen efforts to keep their message 
and efforts visible. Strict control of journalistic coverage and the overall increase in 
lawless violence in Chechnya also contribute to less ability to reach outside opinions. 
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3.  Analysis of Counter-Network Model 
a. Offensive Swarming 
Russian efforts to counter Chechen fighting networks in the 2nd Russo-
Chechen war demonstrated significant improvements from the mostly traditional 
stumbling of the 1st Russo-Chechen War. Overall, although the larger Russian doctrine 
continued to focus on the use of heavy weapons and destruction of Chechen urban areas 
as a means to deny terrain and avoid fighting against the Chechen bands. This doctrine 
has largely mitigated the wasteful casualties that resulted in initial attempts to take 
Grozny, but it has not necessarily resulted in any significant loss to Chechen fighters. 
Chechen losses are largely the result of improved targeting outside the traditional siege 
mentalities clearly displayed in the first years of the war. A significant portion of this 
improvement was the use of special operations forces in a manner that resembles 
offensive swarming, mostly due to their ability to achieve surprise. However, the 
employment of these elite forces was more attributable to deliberate shooting than a 
faster rate of fire, and never generated significant operational tempo. Largely because of 
organizational inefficiencies and a lack of supporting illumination and fusion efforts at 
the operational level, overall targeting of the Chechen networks continues to be at a pace 
at which Chechens can rebound.  
b. Illumination 
Russian intelligence continues to be marked by significant issues and 
problems in coordination between the FSB and MVD. Both organizations continue to be 
at odds with each other, and reluctant to share information, contributing to the Chechens 
frequent success with terrorist attacks. Overall activities that resemble illumination are 
attempts at increasing Chechens’ operational activity in rural areas, and a very heavy-
handed use of exploitation. The deployment and increased usage of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) brought ISR capability to the battlefield, and increased the Russian’s 
ability to identify operational activity. Still, without an overall collaborative system to tie 
into, these UAVs were primarily employed in a defensive role around static bases. 
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Russian exploitation efforts focused on repression mass arrests aimed at weeding out 
fighters from a larger civilian population, but these crude efforts to identify fighters 
provided little in the way of actual exploitation on the Chechen fighting network. On the 
whole, attempts at infiltration and the use of social ties have been significantly absent as 
well since efforts to recruit Chechens have failed disastrously in the past, and they are 
barely trusted enough to be recruited, let alone infiltrate back into opposition 
networks.522 A notable exception is the use of agents in the special operations targeting 
campaigns, such as the infiltrator who delivered the poisoned letter that killed Ibn al-
Khattab. 
c. Info Disruption 
The primary aspect of information disruption seeks to negate a networked 
opponent’s sense of purpose, which is critical to weakening the overarching ideas and 
goals, or narrative that is so instrumental in maintaining a cohesive network. The Russian 
efforts in the 2nd Russo-Chechen war seemed to actually strengthen the Chechen 
resistance, and their repressive methods actually expanded the overall size of the fighting 
network and attracted numerous foreign fighters. In some ways, the Russian government 
sought to negate the Chechen message by referring to the conflict as a “counter-terrorist 
operation,” and refusing to acknowledge separatist claims. 
The Russian effort at media denial has clearly been one of the most 
important factors in accounting for an overall lack of public protest against the 2nd 
Russo-Chechen war. During the 1994–1996 war, independent TV stations broadcast at 
will, but during the latest conflict, the Russian government imposed stringent controls 
over all media broadcasting. In addition, the “right” Russian message is getting out, with 
Russian news programs focusing on Chechen acts of terror and the heroic exploits of 
Russian troops. However, the Russians focused less on the Internet, whereas Chechen-
controlled sites remained active, and overall, paid little attention to the Internet as a 
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communications medium.523 In addition, as time goes on, the initial heroic accounts have 
lost some of their luster, especially as reports of success became less credible and official 
accounts did not list mounting losses.524 Tactically, the Russians displayed some 
advances in the second war by fielding more electronic warfare units, and improvements 
in training and equipment made it far easier to track the source of transmissions, as well 
as jam them. 
Collection by the two primary intelligence agencies has been remarkably 
ineffective, and is primarily limited by the lack of Chechen language capability. Very few 
intercepted communications are ever translated, and during the October 2002 hostage 
crisis, the FSB was able to intercept all the terrorist phone conversations, but was unable 
to understand them. A prominent Russian journalist, Vadim Rechkalov, noted that, 
“during the many times I have been to Chechnya over the past several years I have never 
met even a single Russian soldier or FSB official who knew the Chechen language.”525 
Deception as a tool of information disruption seems to follow the lack of ability to 
acquire and understand Chechen communications. However, one deception success story 
at the tactical level involved a Russian transmission about a false attack from the east, 
and when the rebels reinforced in the direction of the expected attack, they were 
ambushed, killing 20 and wounding another fifty.526 
d. Fusion 
The creation of the OGV represents an attempt to provide more unity of 
command and an increased connectivity among different forces. These efforts were also 
seen in Russian exercises designed to increased joint cooperation, such as the exercise in 
July 1998 that spanned the territories of Dagestan, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Karbardin 
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Balkaria, and Stavropol, in which MVD commanders exercised some 15,000 troops from 
the MoD, MVD, Border Guards, FSB, and other forces.527 However, rivalries between 
the main intelligence organizations, corruption and lower-mid levels, and differing views 
on the goals and methods for prosecuting the war in Chechnya make attempts at fusion 
difficult. The key elements of fusion are shared intent, connectivity, and collaborative 
systems, and Russian forces demonstrated significant weaknesses in achieving any of 
these aspects. The lack of shared intent among Russian forces manifests itself in the 
rivalries and divisions between the primary intelligence agencies. As Olga Oliker states, 
“…serious problems remained between MVD and MoD units and between Russian 
troops and Chechen loyalist militias. These problems were compounded by distrust 
among the various groups. Moreover, even with a single commander at the top, there 
were too many generals contributing to the confusion.”528 Further, “many, if not the 
majority of the Russian soldiers serving in Chechnya no longer have a clear idea of what 
they are fighting for, and this problem will only grow more acute as the war drags on.”529 
The Russians have made attempts at connectivity, most notably the FOSh intelligence-
clearing center, where they have brought together terrorism analysts from each of the 
Russian special services and agencies for monitoring and forecasting of terror-related 
activities.530 These efforts, combined with Russian elite forces targeting, have provided a 
sense of overall effectiveness, and at the least, demonstrate significant improvement since 
the dramatic terrorist attacks in 2004 and 2005.  
4.  Results of 2nd Russo-Chechen War 
The Russian army displayed significant improvement between the 1st and 2nd 
Chechen wars, but overall, these improvements were not primarily aimed at effective 
counter-network operations. The bulk of the Russian forces focused on very traditional 
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operations designed to seize and hold terrain. Urban terrain was simply destroyed to 
reduce its complexity, and once terrain was secure, it was physically strong pointed. The 
occupation of Grozny in the second war, while still horrendous, was much less costly for 
Russian troops than their earlier penetrations. By avoiding urban conflict, the Russians 
eliminated terrain that enabled the Chechens to maximize their swarming doctrine. A 
notable contrast between the two wars was the Russian blockage and manipulation of the 
media, and overall, it may have provided the greatest strength to Russian efforts.  
As the war progressed, and especially after the large terror attacks, most notably 
Beslan in 2004, Russian command and ministries were forced to re-evaluate their ability 
to coordinate and share intelligence. Once much of the key terrain within Chechnya was 
seized, Russian efforts shifted to a “counter-terrorism” focus, in which their performance 
shows some good efforts to perform effective counter-network operations. This focus on 
intelligence collection, with its main effort focused on stopping attacks inside Russia, 
provided additional connectivity and slightly better coordination. The increased use of 
specialized troops and a greater intelligence focus provides an example of doctrinal 
improvement, but while their role highlights the requirement for such efforts, it is still 
fairly rudimentary. Russian efforts to quarantine the Chechen conflict with a media 
blockade continue, and allow the Russians to determine much of the global public 
opinion about the Chechen conflict. The installation of Kadyrov as the head of the 
provisional Chechen government has allowed for success in “Chechenizing” the conflict. 
This success is definitely mixed, however, as much of the loyalist Chechen forces are 
heavily infiltrated and the lack of a reliable police force contributes to a security vacuum 
within the region, with crime and overall disorder more prevalent than any effective 
security.531 Still, despite continued fighting throughout the Caucasus region, and 
dramatic terror attacks in the Russian heartland, many Russians accept Putin’s declaration 
that the war ended in 2009, which reflects higher levels of Russian control. 
Overall, the 2nd Russo-Chechen war showed the importance of information on 
the conflict, through tight media restrictions, a slight trend towards better coordination 
and intelligence sharing, and a consistent requirement for elite units able to match the 
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flexibility of Chechen fighters. In addition, it demonstrates the remarkable resiliency of 
the Chechen fighting networks. This resilience is even more noteworthy given the 
Russian strategic advantages and proximity, and demonstrates that major insurgencies do 
not necessarily require large-scale external backing.532 Despite Russian occupation of the 
country and the installation of a pro-Russian Chechen government, the Chechen fighting 
networks have continued to conduct dramatic attacks.533 
E.  CONCLUSION 
The Russian experience in the 1st Russo-Chechen War highlights the sheer 
unsuitability of attempting to fight a highly networked opponent in a traditional manner. 
The Russians were soundly defeated in their attempt to subdue Chechen fighting 
networks. During the course of the war, the Russians adapted better small-unit tactics and 
sought to bypass or destroy villages rather than engage in urban fighting. However, 
overall, little display of effective counter-network operations occurred. The Russian 
forces fought largely in a traditional manner, with little to no application of common 
COIN principles. No attempt was made at “winning hearts and minds,” although it is 
doubtful that such efforts would have resonated with the Chechens.  
Russian performance in the 2nd Russo-Chechen War provides varying degrees of 
contrast. Improvements in the capabilities of operational groups, the co-option of 
Chechen loyalists and use of kontrakti, and greater employment of elite forces, all 
provided additional capability. However, despite these improvements, Russian forces 
continued to rely on heavy firepower as a primary measure, which was employed to 
protect Russian soldiers, as well as reduce the Chechen’s resolve to fight in urban areas. 
The increased terror threat forced a focus on counter-terrorist operations. It also displays 
the capabilities of Russian special operations, greater synchronized command and 
control, and some integration of intelligence. The Russians have been able to obtain a  
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measure of security in Chechnya, largely as the result of transferring responsibility to a 
Chechen provisional government, and continued repression, but they still face a capable, 
dispersed, and radicalized Chechen fighting network. 
 
Russian Counter-Network Performance 




Chechen War - - - - 
2nd Russo-
Chechen War - + ++ + 
Table 7.   Overall Russian Performance against Chechen Fighting Networks534 
The Russians never sought to swarm against the Chechen networks; instead they 
preferred a combination of traditional warfare and counter-terrorist operations best 
described as leadership targeting. The reasons for this lack of offensive swarming are 
most likely the overall weakness of Russian forces in small-unit tactics and larger 
organizational requirements that dictate firm control of maneuver units. The counter-
leadership efforts of the 2nd Russo-Chechen war provide notable successes on a regular 
basis, but do not appear to be occurring at the pace required to generate a disruptive 
operational tempo. 
Significant gaps in Russian understanding of Chechen culture and a lack of 
language capability provide the fundamental weakness in any Russian attempts at 
illumination. While the Russians have utilized some of the aspects of illumination, such 
as operational activity, their blunt, repressive attempts at acquiring information through 
exploitation create more resentment than anything else. In addition, it would appear that 
the cooperation with large numbers of Chechen proxy forces would increase illumination 
efforts, but it appears that this is a double-edged sword, with large levels of corruption 
and infiltration preventing the necessary trust. 
                                                 
534 This basic table highlights the Russian performance of a few aspects of the counter-network 
variables, and the differences in their approach to each conflict. The addition symbol (+) indicates 
performance with a highly effective performance assigned three symbols (+++). 
 197
Russian attempts at achieving fusion are seen in efforts to increase overall 
coordination between the major ministries, as well as in efforts at the tactical and 
operational levels in their counter-leadership targeting efforts. These basic organization 
steps are improvements to the lack of unity and little coordination in the first war. 
However, the connectivity required for the organizational component of fusion may not 
be achievable given the intense rivalries and distrust between various organizational 
structures. Doctrinally, little evidence indicates that the Russians understand the 
requirement for collaborative systems merging operations and intelligence, except at the 
most tactical level. 
Russian efforts at shutting down media access to the Chechen conflict and 
disseminating only officially approved news show a dramatic improvement from the 
almost complete lack of information awareness displayed in the 1st Russo-Chechen war. 
This change is the most significant between the two wars, and demonstrates an 
understanding of basic information age principles. A lack of language and cultural 
understanding contributes to their inherent weaknesses in collection and denial 
capabilities. 
Overall, Russian forces showed some improvements in coordination and doctrine 
between the 1st and 2nd Russo-Chechen wars. Analyzing this case study using the 
proposed counter-network framework shows that the Russian performance improved 
somewhat in the 2nd Russo-Chechen war and slight degrees of performance occurred 
with respect to the primary independent variables. Mostly,, the Russians displayed 
increased coordination and an increased a greater agility through the use of special 
operations units. Increased efforts at network-style warfare are further seen in the 
relationships formed with Chechen loyalists and the dramatic changes in Russian 
information strategy. Still, even in the 2nd Russo-Chechen war, Russian forces fought in 
a mainly traditional manner, or with a strict leadership targeting focus. They achieved a 
greater degree of control through a COIN strategy that used brutal repression to secure 
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areas, while building partnerships with pro-Russian Chechens.535 The Russian effort in 
Chechnya, to date, has largely suppressed the secular secessionist movement, co-opting 
most of it into a loose confederation run by the repressive Kadyrov. However, even this 
pro-Russian element of society has turned into an anarchic region, based on competition 
between warlords, gangs, and Russian security services, displaying “…underlying trends 
which are gathering momentum as a result of an increasing cycle of violence.”536 Further, 
the increasing terror attacks throughout Russia are a clear sign that the Chechen fighting 
networks have grown more extreme, despite being increasingly isolated. 
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V. ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH CASE STUDY 
So the best fortress that exists is to avoid being hated by the people. If you 
have fortresses and yet the people hate you they will not save you; once 
the people have taken up arms against you they will never lack outside 
help.537 
       - Niccoló Machiavelli 
Some speak about the resistance’s weapons as being separate from the 
resistance itself; [but] weapons without the resistance have no value. The 
real value of the resistance and its religious and national duty is its 
humanity…the weapons come after all this.538 
     - Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah 
 
A.  CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
This case study focuses on the Israeli conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah, and in 
particular, analyzes the results of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon from 1982–2000 and 
the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah. This examination of Lebanese Hezbollah is multi-faceted and 
considers both regional and global actions, acknowledging that Hezbollah’s activities are 
globally dispersed. It is recognized as a terrorist organization, as Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet stated, “Hezbollah, as an organization with 
capability and worldwide presence, is equal [to al-Qaeda], if not a far more capable 
organization. I actually think they’re a notch above in many respects.”539 However, 
Hezbollah is much more than just a terrorist group, and its complex diversity defies many 
traditional descriptions. From its inception in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has been a 
violent non-state actor, acting with support from various sources, but always 
characterized by a popular socially based militant movement focused on resisting the 
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actions of Israel and its supporters.540 In this sense, it is an instructive case, because it 
highlights the character of irregular warfare, with a non-state actor challenging national 
powers by directly confronting their military forces.  
This case is examined in two main sections, which focuses primarily on Israeli-
Hezbollah interaction, but also includes Hezbollah global support activities and terror 
attacks. The first section of the case concentrates on the initial stage of the conflict, 
beginning with the formation of Hezbollah in 1982 and its role in driving Israel from 
southern Lebanon. The last units withdrew in 2000. This first section briefly examines 
the initial invasion and fighting against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to 
provide a basis for comparison with efforts against Hezbollah, as well as to show that 
these events were not independent. The invasion created the Hezbollah Shi’a threat, and 
the 1982–2000 conflict, which was emerging nearly simultaneously with the Israeli fight 
against the PLO. The second section of the study analyzes the 2006 Lebanon War, 
beginning with the Hezbollah ambush of an Israeli patrol, which formed the pretext for 
an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. The short war that followed highlights the 
complexity and further changes in irregular warfare, to the extent that some observers 
have called it a classic example of “hybrid-war.”541 Both phases of the Israeli-Hezbollah 
conflict feature different aspects of irregular warfare and a comparison of the two reveals 
a strong contrast between classic guerrilla warfare and terrorism, and network-style 
warfare.  
B.  LEBANON OVERVIEW 
The idyllic scenery provided by Lebanon’s position on the Mediterranean coast 
belies its recent chaotic history, and the devastation it has seen in the last 30 years. Until 
the brutal civil war, which turned its capital, Beirut, into a devastated war zone, it was a 
popular vacation destination, with tourists enjoying the combination of coastline and 
scenic mountains. It is bordered by Syria to the north and east, the Mediterranean Sea to  
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the west and Israel to the south, along a 79-kilometer border. Most of Lebanon is fairly 
rough terrain, with rolling hills and rugged mountains, with the exception of the Beqaa 
Valley to the northeast. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Lebanon and the Northern Levant Region542 
Centuries of trade and migration shaped Lebanon, and contributed to its mosaic of 
cultural diversity. Its physical terrain has helped isolate, protect, and generate numerous 
factions based on religion, ethnic, and clan differences. Ethnically, it is 95% Arab, with a 
Muslim majority of 59.7% (Shi’a, Sunni, and Druze) and 39% Christian (primarily 
Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic), with over 17 different religious sects 
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recognized.543 The Shi’a sect is the majority sect along the Israeli border area, although it 
also occupies a large area in the northeast, including much of the Beqaa Valley. Lebanon 
is truly a complex, jigsaw of different ideologies, ethnic groups, political factions, and 
armed organizations.  
Likewise, brutal invasions and internal conflict have also played a powerful role 
in forming and shaping this diversity. While most modern accounts reflect on the 
prosperity prior to the Lebanese Civil War in the mid 1970s, internal conflict and external 
influence in WWI and WWII, and the political struggles following independence, left 
Lebanon with a shaken sense of normalcy.544 Its establishment as a modern, independent 
state following the departure of Vichy French colonial occupation in November 1943 was 
based on a power-sharing arrangement between each of the three major religious sects.545 
This system managed to maintain stability until increasingly violent internecine struggles 
exposed the many, sharp divisions in the country. The Arab-Israeli conflict exacerbated 
these struggles. The Arab-Israeli wars, most notably the 1967 war, forced an immigration 
of Palestinian refugees into southern Lebanon, where they formed militias to attack 
Israel. The Jordanian expulsion of thousands of armed guerrillas following the Jordanian 
civil war in 1970–71 led to the movement of the PLO into southern Lebanon, where it 
was able to control much of the region, and play a role in the outbreak of civil war in 
1975.546 
These divisions are reflective of regional complexity and differences and have 
invited numerous state and non-state actors’ participation inside Lebanon. Such 
participation has largely shaped what modern Lebanon is today, and continues to fuel its 
internal and external struggles. Both Syria and Iran have been deeply involved in 
Lebanon. Iranian influence grew dramatically following the Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 
Islamic Revolution. Each of these states sponsors various groups and interests within 
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Lebanon and uses them to further their interests. Israel’s involvement follows much the 
same pattern by backing numerous political and militia groups over the years and uses 
them to further their national security interests. 
C.  HEZBOLLAH BACKGROUND 
Hezbollah arose in 1982 after the Israeli invasion in June to force the PLO and 
other Palestinian militants out of southern Lebanon. Its initial beginnings may be traced 
to several factors and events, but the civil war, which began in 1975, was a major 
precipitating event. This internal conflict may have resulted from increased pressure 
caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rise of active Palestinian militant groups, and 
it fragmented Lebanon at its socio-cultural fault lines. The Palestinian resistance 
movement directly challenged Lebanon’s elites, while various ethnic and political groups 
formed numerous militia groups to assert their identity and hold on power. Notable 
among these groups was Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya, or Lebanese 
Resistance Detachments), a Shi’a resistance group that joined a coalition opposed to 
Maronite control, and which surged in power following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 
1978 and the Iranian revolution of 1978–79.547 As Amal tacitly supported Israel in its 
efforts to destroy the PLO, was backed by the Syrian government, and expanded into a 
larger political movement, a small cadre of its members began to oppose Amal’s de facto 
secularism and hold on power. These members were young Shi’a leaders, trained in the 
Iraqi seminaries of Najaf and Karbala, who viewed themselves as revolutionaries in the 
Iranian mode, and sought to develop an Islamic style of rule.548  
Iran, for its part, viewed Amal and the emerging political structures in Lebanon as 
a pro-Western influence, and aimed to counter its rise. In late 1982, Iran sent several 
hundred members of its Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also known as the 
Pasdaran to Lebanon to support the newly formed Shi’a organization.549 The IRGC was 
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familiar with Lebanon, as many of its senior members had trained with the PLO in the 
Beqaa Valley, prior to Khomeini’s return to Iran.550 The arrival of these trainers and full 
Iranian support initiated efforts that catalyzed the movement, provided resources, and 
supplied a full-fledged ideological purpose. This purpose drew other Shi’a leaders who 
favored an Islamic state, including Abbas Musawi, Amal’s second-in-command, who 
brought additional fighters and resources to the Beqaa valley. Islamic fervor took root in 
the town of Baalbeck, and it became a revolutionary nursery filled with an “Iranian” 
atmosphere.551 Syria also provided support to maintain its alliance with Iran, keep its 
Lebanese ally, Amal, in-check, and gain a means for striking at both Israel and the United 
States, but it has been motivated more by convenience than common cause.552  
Ideologically, Hezbollah closely follows the Iranian line, as evidenced by its 
“founding” document of 1985, which is in the form of a letter addressed to the 
“Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World.” This letter cites the Iranian revolution as a 
model for action and anticipates the possibility of an Islamically-motivated revolution. 
While the Iranian revolution produced a demonstration effect throughout the Middle East, 
it was felt most strongly amongst the Lebanese Shi’a.553 Still, replacing the Lebanese 
government was never the main focus, despite its corruption and use as a scapegoat. 
Instead, the Hezbollah leadership focused on a sacred obligation to conduct violent jihad 
against those who had occupied Muslim lands—the Israelis, whom they viewed as the 
primary cause of the suffering of the Muslims in Lebanon. Beyond Israel, the United 
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stated, “Imam Khomeini, the leader has repeatedly stressed that America is the reason for 
all our catastrophes and the source of all malice. By fighting it, we are only exercising 
our legitimate right to defend our Islam and the dignity of our nation.”554  
Hezbollah draws considerable strength from a cohesive social network among the 
Lebanese Shi’a, as well as a globally dispersed network of supporters, all of who are 
united in a common ideology. This strong base of support originated in the Baalbeck 
region, as Nisar Hamzeh describes, “…the makeup of the local population, totally Shi’ite 
and organized along kinship networks, was extremely advantageous for recruitment, 
information, and refuge. As a matter of fact, the vast majority of Hezbullah’s leaders 
came from the towns and cities of Baalbeck-Hirmil.”555 It expanded this initial base to 
the southern suburbs of Beirut, and since the initial launching of its resistance activities, 
to diaspora elements throughout the globe.  
D. SOUTH LEBANON CONFLICT: 1982–2000 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, code-named Operation Peace for 
Galilee, ended an 11-month ceasefire with the PLO, which renewed hostilities originally 
started when Israel launched Operation Litani in 1978 to create a buffer zone in southern 
Lebanon.556 While the attack was largely in response to the Abu Nidal faction of the PLO 
and its assassination attempt against Israeli’s ambassador to the United Kingdom (UK), 
Shlomo Argov, its main purpose was to secure a buffer zone in South Lebanon. The 
Israelis invaded with heavy divisions and air strikes in a three-pronged advance, 
including an amphibious landing that pushed all the way to Beirut, trapping and killing 
numerous PLO elements. This blitzkrieg-style assault, using six divisions and air force 
support, seized more than a third of the country and fought against irregular PLO forces, 
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as well as Syrian regular forces, including armor.557 Militarily, this assault was highly 
successful. Both a guerrilla force and conventional Syrian units were defeated in 
simultaneous action over three weeks. Of note, in some urban areas, PLO guerrillas stood 
and fought against overwhelming odds and displayed a remarkable tenacity.558 While it 
successfully forced the PLO to withdraw, the Israeli invasion provided a galvanizing 
effect on the Shi’a revolutionaries and aided in their transformation from a loosely 
affiliated cabal of like interests into a recognizable organization.559 As former Israeli 
Prime Minister Ehud Barak stated, “when we entered Lebanon…there was no Hezbollah. 
We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our 
presence there that created Hezbollah.”560 Little doubt exists that the Israeli invaders 
provided a more compelling enemy than the infighting, which had characterized the 
Lebanese civil war. Moreover, with the expulsion of the PLO, Hezbollah was really the 
only Lebanese militia movement able to step in and represent the Shi’a against the Israeli 
invader and its Lebanese proxy-force, the South Lebanese Army (SLA). As the situation 
deteriorated, and warring factions continued to attack each other, the United States, 
France, and Italy deployed peacekeepers as part of a Multi-National Force (MNF) to 
facilitate demobilization and the departure of the PLO. 
Hezbollah fought back, launching numerous guerrilla attacks against the MNF 
and Israeli forces, and spearheading the efforts of other militias as well. The first notable 
attack was a suicide attack against the seven-story Israeli military headquarters in Tyre, 
on November 11, 1982, which resulted in 91 Israelis killed.561 This attack represented the 
first significant Hezbollah terrorist strike against Israel Defense Forces (IDF) forces, but 
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many more would follow. The significant destruction and the embarrassment of the 
bombing was such that Israeli would not admit it was a suicide bombing.562 Such attacks 
made international headlines with the April 18, 1983 suicide bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy in Beirut, which killed 63 people and was claimed by the Islamic Jihad 
organization.563 This attack was followed by another suicide bombing on October 23, 
1983, which destroyed the U.S. Marine headquarters compound, killing 241 Marines and 
wounding 100. Almost simultaneously, another truck laden with explosives smashed into 
the French peacekeeping compound, resulting in 150 casualties.564 Just days later, 
another suicide bombing targeted Israeli forces in headquarters outside of Tyre, killing 28 
Israeli military and security personnel and 32 Lebanese and Palestinian detainees.565 By 
1985, the IDF had withdrawn back into southern Lebanon and established a security zone 
covering 10% of Lebanon. This security zone was fortified with company-sized outposts 
manned by the IDF and SLA forces.566 Hezbollah sought to continue the offensive 
against the IDF and its Lebanese allies, attacking asymmetrically with the goal of 
“confusing the enemy and obliging its command to call for a constant state of alert, 
eventually leading to the exhaustion and decline in power.”567 This offensive slowly 
eroded Israeli public support for the war, compounding the frustration felt by the IDF, 
who were challenged with such an aggressive guerrilla force. A steady stream of suicide 
bombings, devastating ambushes and indirect rocket attacks represented offensive action 
designed to force an Israeli withdrawal. 
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In 1993, Israel launched Operation Accountability, a massive air and artillery 
campaign in response to increased Hezbollah action. This operation was largely a 
standoff attack relying on the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and long-range artillery to strike 
suspected Hezbollah positions. The next major clash occurred in 1996, when Israeli 
initiated Operation Grapes of Wrath, in response to Hezbollah rockets wounding 38 
civilians in northern Israel.568 This operation again relied mostly on air and long-range 
artillery using precision fire against a vast array of targets. The Israeli bombardment 
targeted Hezbollah positions, but also placed a significant emphasis on civilian 
infrastructure targets and civilian population centers in southern Lebanon. The purpose of 
these attacks was to force Lebanese civilians from the area and to compel Lebanese and 
Syrian governments to act against Hezbollah. Israeli airpower demolished significant 
portions of the Lebanese infrastructure, warning the government that further inactivity 
towards Hezbollah would lead to wider destruction.569 However, an impressive 
government humanitarian and reconstruction response to the damage, as well the regional 
and global condemnation over the Israeli shelling of the United Nations (UN) base at 
Qana, which killed 98 and wounded 101 Lebanese civilians, mitigated any positive 
effects Israel hoped to achieve.570 Most significantly, while Hezbollah suffered some 
losses, its military operations remained largely unaffected. Throughout the bombings, 
Hezbollah struck back at Israeli with hundreds of Katyusha rockets and forced Israelis in 
the north into bomb shelters. Despite a tacit Hezbollah-Israeli agreement not to target 
civilians, the war in southern Lebanon continued and the IDF continued to take losses. A 
growing public dissatisfaction with the effort led to calls for a withdrawal, and in 1999, 
newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak promised Israel that he would withdraw 
the IDF from southern Lebanon within 12 months.571 As Israeli units began transitioning 
to withdrawal, they moved into a series of 50 fortified positions, 42 of which were 
                                                 
568 Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, 9. 
569 Harik, Hezbollah, 117. 
570 Ibid. 
571 Norton, Hezbollah, 88.  
 209
manned primarily by the SLA.572 Hezbollah continued devastating attacks, using modern 
weapons, such as TOW missiles, to inflict losses despite the fortified positions. With 
Barak’s announcement of withdrawal, the badly shaken SLA began to evacuate its 
positions, completely disintegrating in the face of Hezbollah’s onslaught. Eyewitness 
reports stated, “Israeli troops staggered back across the border, telling reporters that their 
military equipment and training had proven useless against Hezbollah, and its Lebanese 
allies.”573 The planned withdrawal turned into a rout, with Israeli and SLA forces literally 
stampeding back across friendly lines. 
1.  Israeli Invasion and Occupation 
The Israeli military organization was based on a traditional military hierarchy 
during their 1982 invasion, and subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon. Israeli’s 
military is organized and structured similar to most modern Western armies. Its initial 
assault into Lebanon and the advance to Beirut consisted of combined arms with 
intensive air support, gained by air supremacy established in the first day of the war. The 
invading forces, totaling 76,000 IDF troops, were organized into division-sized task 
forces, called ugdah. These task forces were organized in a traditional manner and 
combined different infantry and armored units based on their proposed tasks and area of 
operations.574 Following the invasion, most of the IDF withdrew, and by mid-summer of 
1983, there were 15,000 Israeli occupying forces. These forces were responsible for 
controlling nearly 2,800 square kilometers inhabited by a population of over 5000,000, 
composed of Shiite and Sunni Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Palestinians.575 It was this 
force, flush with its recent victory, which established fortified outposts throughout the 
occupied sector. Company-size units manned these outposts, assigned to strongpoint key 
areas throughout a designated sector.  
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Israeli military doctrine generated over its early wars placed an emphasis on, 
“speed, daring, and deep penetrations without regard to flank security….fire support was 
to be provided by ground attack aircraft to maintain the pace of advance.”576 These areas 
of emphasis were battle tested by one of the most combat-proven modern militaries, with 
an unparalleled record in multiple wars over the last half century. Many of the lessons 
that formed Israeli doctrine were based on the successes in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, 
primarily the simultaneous use of combined arms in a fluid manner. The intelligence 
function, to support such rapid operations, is viewed with equal emphasis, and given 
parity with operational commands and efforts. However, this doctrine, displayed so 
vividly in the initial invasion, provided little basis for an occupying force faced with a 
growing irregular opponent.  
The operational methods employed during the initial invasion stressed 
synchronized maneuver, close coordination between a ground unit’s advance and air 
support, bypassing areas of resistance where possible and using aerial bombing in areas 
where it could be employed, including several Palestinian refugee camps. These methods 
were largely successful against PLO and Lebanese forces that fought in a fairly 
conventional manner, notwithstanding their organization into smaller guerrilla units. 
During the following occupation, Israeli operational methods became much more static, 
based largely on securing a framework of outposts, and less on proactive attempts to 
dismantle a growing Hezbollah threat. 
The core of the Israeli information strategy was simply providing a justification 
for the invasion against the PLO, which used the attempted assassination against Argov 
as a pretext for intervention. Beyond this, little information strategy was employed, other 
than to portray the PLO as terrorist aggressors who continued to threaten security in 
Israel. Information operations during the initial invasion consisted largely of the use of 
propaganda and early-warning leaflets, which informed civilians of impending bombings. 
At the tactical level, Israeli forces strictly controlled journalists and media access. 
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However, despite their best attempts, the siege of Beirut became a divisive affair, as the 
images of civilian casualties and horrific destruction resulting from the fighting in a 
densely civilian-occupied area were broadcast to the world. These images led to a 
growing dissatisfaction among the Israeli public, and even field commanders resigned 
rather than participate in any advance into Beirut.577 By that point, the main elements of 
the initial information strategy had worn out, which were replaced with growing 
condemnation over the destruction. As the occupation continued, overall support 
continued to drop, and the Israelis lacked an information strategy that could successfully 
counter Hezbollah’s growing image. 
2.  Hezbollah’s Irregular Response 
Initially operating as an independent irregular force, separate from the Lebanese 
government, Hezbollah began regularly attacking Israeli and SLA forces. These attacks 
were largely classic guerrilla actions, and also incorporated “terrorist” actions, such as the 
use of suicide bombings—aimed primarily at IDF forces. At the same time, Hezbollah 
was also asserting itself against other Lebanese militias and fighting for increased control 
against Amal and other Lebanese confessional groups, most notably the Maronites. Even 
after the Taif Agreement on a national reconciliation, Hezbollah maintained its arms, 
using the Israeli presence in South Lebanon as justification, which kept its “…military 
capabilities intact after the end of the civil war in 1990, when all of the other paramilitary 
groups were forced to disarm. This left them as the predominant actor in South 
Lebanon….”578  
Organizationally, Hezbollah’s original formal structure was fairly centralized and 
hierarchical, but operationally and at the local level, a high degree of connectivity 
existed, which was facilitated by local tribe and village connections. Organizational 
connectivity, the overarching purpose, was based primarily on ideology, even more than 
kinship—as evidenced by other Lebanese Shiites loyalty to more moderate groups, such 
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as Amal. This purpose provided cohesion and unity between a larger network at the level 
of the “masses,” and an elite leadership group heading the formal structure. The 
ideological unity allowed Hezbollah to adapt itself organizationally; thus displaying a 
great deal of flexibility, and allowing for a broad range of functions within the 
organization. As Mona Harb states, this results “because they operate as an integrated and 
holistic network. This network produces individual and collective meaning to its 
beneficiaries, which in turn, explains how and why Hizballah is legitimized as a 
dominant order among Lebanese Shi’a.”579 Structurally, the organization features 
collective leadership. A seven-member Majlis Shura council is composed of six clerics 
and one lay member, led by Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah as the senior cleric.580 
This body is nominally elected, but its elite membership is tightly controlled, and 
resembles more of an appointment by select influential members and the Central Council 
than any open election.581 The management of the organization is delegated to an 
administration apparatus, the Shura Tanfiz, which oversees five councils, the Executive 
Council, the Politburo, the Parliamentary Council, the Judicial Council, and the Jihad 
Council. Each of these councils oversees most of the parties’ business. The Executive 
Council runs the day-to-day social outreach and interaction programs. The military and 
security apparatus of the organization are separate and surrounded with a great deal of 
secrecy, but it appears that there are two main elements, the Islamic Resistance (al-
Muqawamah al-Islamiyah) and the Party Security (Amn al-Hizb), both of which report to, 
and closely coordinate with, the party’s Shura Council.582 The Islamic Resistance was 
Hezbollah’s original paramilitary organization, and the covert nature of membership in 
these organizations reveals Hezbollah’s ability to manage both an overt political party, as 
well as its original resistance activities.  
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Much of Hezbollah’s doctrine resembled classic guerrilla warfare, but they 
applied it in a relentless manner, which demonstrated an increasing capability for 
devastating swarming. Beginning in 1985, it aggressively attacked IDF and SLA outposts 
throughout the security zone, basing its actions on a set of principles formulated to 
“defeat a relatively fixed, technologically advanced enemy.”583 These irregular warfare 
tenets provide a doctrinal blueprint for Hezbollah’s actions: 
1. Avoid the strong, attack the weak—attack and withdrawal! 
2. Protecting our fighters is more important than causing enemy 
casualties! 
3. Strike only when success is assured! 
4.  Surprise is essential to success. If you are spotted, you have failed! 
5. Don’t get into a set-piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before the 
enemy can drive home his advantage! 
6. Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the 
enemy’s weak points! 
7. Keep moving; avoid formations of a front-line! 
8.  Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the rear! 
9. The road to the great victory passes through thousands of small 
victories! 
10. Keep up the morale of the fighters; avoid notions of the enemy’s 
superiority! 
11. The media has innumerable guns whose hits are like bullets. Use 
them in the battle! 
12. The population is a treasure—nurture it! 
13. Hurt the enemy and then stop before he abandons restraint!584 
These principles provide a concise summary of Hezbollah’s guerrilla operations, as well 
as reveal an insightful understanding of irregular warfare. In addition to publishing such 
principles, one of Hezbollah’s earliest, and continued, strengths was the disciplined focus 
of its members, which is clearly evident in the nature of its operational activity. The 
emphasis on martyrdom operations, extolled in the Iranian-influenced jihadist ideology, 
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provides a purpose and motivation that confounds the argument that guerrilla warfare 
“…is not for innocent youth motivated primarily by romantic idealism but for seasoned 
veterans whose living conditions are constantly in flux.”585 The combination of lessons 
learned during the 1982–2000 conflict, and the growing connectivity and consolidation of 
the organization, provided the elements that would generate into an effective fighting 
network. 
Operationally, Hezbollah focused mainly on the primary methods of guerrilla 
warfare—the raid and the ambush. One of the more notable ambushes occurred in 
September 1998, when 12 Israeli naval commandos from the elite unit, Sayyit, were 
decimated outside the Insariyyah village in South Lebanon.586 Hezbollah’s growing 
ability to fight IDF forces was further displayed in the killing of a paratroop unit 
commander and three of his lieutenants, during an Israeli raid into the Beqaa Valley in 
February 1999.587 In addition, it established the use of suicide bombings as a key aspect 
of its operations, utilizing the principles behind a raid, but achieving devastating effects 
in a “stand-off” manner, thereby eliminating the hardest aspect of raid planning—
withdrawal.  
 
Hezbollah Martyr (Suicide) Operations 
Group Name Target Location Casualties Date 
Hezbollah Israeli Military HQ Tyre 90 Israelis killed November 1982
Islamic Jihad U.S. Embassy Ras-Beirut 80 killed April 1983 
Islamic Jihad U.S. Marine HQ Beirut 241 U.S. killed October 1983 
Hezbollah French Military HQ Beirut 80 French killed October 1983 
Hezbollah Israeli Military HQ Tyre 
29 killed, 30 
injured October 1983 
Hezbollah IDF command post Khiam 
12 killed, 14 
injured March 1985 
Hezbollah IDF motorcade Tal-Nhas 25 killed, 11 injured August 1988 
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Hezbollah Martyr (Suicide) Operations 
Hezbollah Motorcade Qliy’a 25 killed and injured August 1989 
Hezbollah Infantry Patrol Al-Jarmaq 9 killed and injured April 1995 
Hezbollah Command Post Rab-Thalathin None March 1996 
Hezbollah Military Camp Marja’youn None December 1999
Figure 14.   Hezbollah Suicide Operations Against International and IDF Targets, 1982–
1999588 
Buttressing these higher profile martyrdom attacks was a constant use of explosive 
ambushes, which grew in sophistication over the years. IDF forces attempting to travel 
throughout the region were subject to constant IED attacks, and in March of 1999, a 
powerful explosive device killed Brigadier General Erez Gerstein, the head of the IDF’s 
liaison unit in South Lebanon, and three others.589 This attack was a tremendous setback 
for Israeli operations, and may have been the final shock for an Israeli public weary of 
the occupation. Of note, although its field and operation security is robust, Hezbollah is 
fairly overt about displaying its military formations, and groups of up to 5,000 have been 
reported on parade.590 
Hezbollah’s use of information strategy, emphasized from its founding, grew in 
sophistication during the period of occupation. Initially visible in publically released 
statements following attacks, Hezbollah’s information campaign grew to include multiple 
newspapers, journals, radio stations, and even its own television broadcasting station. By 
1988, Hezbollah had three radio stations, and it latest one, Al-Nour, is one of the leading 
professional radio stations in the Middle East. Television broadcasting is perhaps the 
most visible and most influential aspect of Hezbollah’s information architecture, and its 
sophistication continues to grow since the founding of its Al-Manar (“lighthouse”) 
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channel in 1991.591 Its primary audience is the Shi’a population of southern Lebanon, and 
it portrays a mix of jihadist ideology with news, political commentaries, and 
announcements. It also is notable for being the first, and only, place where the Arab and 
Muslim have seen Israeli soldiers killed and dying at the hands of the Islamic resistance. 
These images turned the feeling of a defeat following the Israeli invasion into a growing 
sense of victory, especially following the Israeli withdrawal, and generated a 
considerable following throughout the region.592 Hasan Nasrallah describes the role of 
media in asymmetric conflict:  
The relationship between the media and the resistance, I can assure you 
from experience is very strong and close. It is said that the media aspects 
represent half of the battle, or three quarters or two thirds. These 
calculations are inaccurate, but without doubt the media are one of the 
most important weapons of combat and resistance; it has considerable 
effects on the enemy, on allies, and the morale of the resistance. We lived 
this experience ourselves and found that, in certain cases, the media 
performance affects the cause of the battle, the course of the 
confrontation….593 
An indicator of the growing effectiveness of Hezbollah’s use of information is its 
propaganda coup achievement following the Insariyyah ambush. Images and press 
releases about the elimination of a team from one of Israel’s most elite units provided a 
considerable boost to Hezbollah forces, while sowing further doubt among the Israeli 
population. Since 1996, Hezbollah has had an official organization website that provides 
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1st Israel-Hezbollah War 















































Table 8.   Evaluation of the 1st Israel-Hezbollah War 
3.  Analysis of Counter-Network Framework 
Much like the initial Russian efforts in the 1st Russo-Chechen war, it is difficult 
to discern much application of any of the principal variables comprising the requirements 
for effective counter-network operations. Still, their absence and the events of the case 
study provide some grounds for inference, if not causal explanation. 
a. Offensive Swarming 
The Israeli offensive in 1982 was a full-scale maneuver operation 
involving traditional combined-arms doctrine. Much of the efforts that followed, up 
through and including the withdrawal in 2000, were aimed at holding terrain and 
maintaining a buffer zone. While elite units attempted raids against Hezbollah targets, 
these were largely ineffective and the devastating ambushes against some of them reveal 
a lack of surprise. Israeli actions taken against Hezbollah were largely aimed at their 
leadership structure, much like similar actions taken against the PLO. However, these 
actions rarely succeeded, largely because intelligence about the organization was difficult 
to gain, and also because Israeli operations were focused on sustaining their role as a 
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“peacekeeping” force, however embattled. What few operations that did succeed had 
little effect against the growing network. The medium-sized operational sweeps 
(Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996) were largely 
conventional cordon and search campaigns, and Hezbollah fighters flowed right back into 
the areas as soon as the IDF vacated them. For most of the time, Israeli forces occupied 
southern Lebanon and focused on simply securing the northern border area. Some efforts 
were directed towards focused targeting, but they generated little significant operational 
tempo, and occurred later in the war. As Thomas Henricksen reports, “to counter the 
growing battlefield skills of the Islamic Resistance, the IDF turned to unique units such 
as Sayeret Egoz that conducted aggressive patrolling and ambushing of insurgents. These 
units were effective but not on a decisive scale.”594 Further, targeted killings, such as the 
notable assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Abbas Musawi in 1992, brought 
additional Hezbollah rocketing of the northern Galilee, further weakening Israeli public 
support.  
b. Illumination 
Israeli efforts at illumination focused primarily on generating operational 
activity and then reacting to it. Many of the Israeli operations were aimed at disrupting 
Hezbollah’s ability to launch rockets against the northern settlements, and were more 
terrain- and capability-based than focused against Hezbollah as an organization. Still, 
efforts to collect intelligence against Hezbollah existed, but were rather limited in scope. 
At the end of 1989, the Israeli intelligence organization, Shin Bet, established the Mabat. 
This SLA organization was designed to be a network of intelligence collectors able to 
report to both SLA and IDF forces, but its lack of local connections and poor capabilities 
resulted in little gains.595 For the most part, attempts at infiltrating the Hezbollah 
organization were frustrated by a robust security apparatus, and it was clear that 
Hezbollah’s growing sophisticating was a stark contrast to the complacent, centralized, 
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and fairly corrupt PLO.596 Moreover, Israeli intelligence was generally more concerned 
with force protection, and preventing security-zone outposts from being overrun. Despite 
Israel’s reputation for effective HUMINT, it found itself largely at a loss in trying to 
penetrate Hezbollah. In addition, Hezbollah’s disciplined approach and sophisticated 
counter-intelligence training frustrated most efforts at exploitation.597 
c. Information Disruption 
In stark contrast to Hezbollah’s growing use of information and a 
sophisticated strategy employing mass media, Israeli counter-efforts demonstrated little 
success. Clearly, Hezbollah’s deeply rooted Shi’a jihadist mindset was difficult to 
counter, and even Lebanese moderate groups opposed Israeli intervention and presence. 
Israeli efforts during the invasion were focused almost entirely against PLO forces, and 
as the war progressed into its occupation phase, Israel never fully pursued efforts to 
attack Hezbollah’s information strategy.  
d. Fusion 
Although recent Israeli efforts seem to emphasize both organizational and 
doctrinal fusion, these developments were not evident prior to 2000. It is unclear if such 
capabilities would have provided much assistance without the strategy to utilize them, 
especially since Israel only actively sought to target Hezbollah when it had already lost 
most of the initiative. 
In the end, an irregular opponent whose asymmetric tactics revealed 
Israeli errors in strategy, and perhaps an unwillingness to change its tried-and-true 
approach to warfare, brought Israel, a country that had achieved success in four 
consecutive military victories in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, low.598 Israel’s lightning 
success in the conventional invasion resulted in a reliance on a traditional approach to 
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securing a security zone in southern Lebanon. The flaws in this traditional approach were 
increasingly revealed as Hezbollah developed its strategy to force the Israelis into a 
strategic dilemma; a strategy made possible by increasingly sophisticated irregular 
warfare and terrorist attacks. Ultimately, neither Israel nor its SLA allies were able to 
bring Hezbollah into any kind of significant engagement, and the overall casualty ratio 
was nearly 1:1, with Israel and the SLA losing 1,250 to Hezbollah’s 1,248.599 The final 
ceasefire established a border zone, and a “Blue Line” of demarcation on June 7, 2000 
that was over watched by UN peacekeeping forces. 
E.  GLOBAL TERROR ATTACKS 
In addition to guerrilla attacks against IDF forces, Hezbollah was responsible for, 
or complicit in, a host of significant “terrorist” attacks. The primary focus of these attacks 
was against Israeli forces, and in many ways, they could be considered “battlefield” 
actions against an occupying military force. Others are clearly terrorist attacks, focused 
beyond Israeli forces, attacking U.S. and international peacekeepers inside Lebanon, and 
other designated targets around the globe. In addition to the bombing in Beirut, in July 
1994, Hezbollah added a new tactic to its arsenal, terrorist attacks against Israeli interests 
worldwide. Truck bombs that targeted Israeli and Jewish targets in both Buenos Aires 
and London showed the global reach of the terrorist organization, and became a 
significant weapon with which to counter-balance Israeli targeting.600  
These terror attacks are significant because they demonstrate a level of global 
connectivity and networking that cannot be countered in a classic irregular warfare 
setting, such as seen in a COIN doctrine and historical efforts. Hezbollah’s international 
terror campaign paved the way for similar approaches by other irregular networks, 
whether insurgents or global terrorists. 
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F.  THE 2006 CONFLICT 
By 2006, Hezbollah had transformed itself from just a radical militia and terrorist 
organization into a full-fledged mainstream political party. Its overall success on the 
battlefield helped in this transformation as well, as the Lebanese realized that without 
Hezbollah’s capability, no one else could resist Israeli aggression. This transformation 
actually began as early as 1990, when Hezbollah began making plans to field candidates 
for upcoming elections, and with the evacuation of the SLA and Israelis from southern 
Lebanon, it rapidly consolidated physical control.601 As Lebanon slowly rebuilt during 
the first five years of the decade, Hezbollah continued to gain more support, achieving 
electoral success, winning 14 parliamentary seats, and holding two cabinet posts in the 
Lebanese government by 2005.602 Overall, the interlude between wars brought an 
increasing number of tourists back to Beirut and Lebanon, and it had recovered its status 
as a high-end vacation destination. At the same time, Hezbollah reach out to other 
Lebanese parties, building a framework for increasing political control that brought 
stability back to southern Lebanon. 
Despite the peaceful outlook, tensions were growing between Hezbollah and 
Israel, and the “rules of the game,” that had allowed for a moderate level of tit-for-tat 
violence, were slowly being ignored.603 Intercepted communications between Hezbollah 
and Hamas, an attempted Hezbollah kidnapping in November 2005, and increasing levels 
of retaliation all pointed to an increased probability of future conflict.604 In light of this 
potential, Hezbollah’s daring operation on July 12, 2006 was intended to accomplish 
three things: deliver on its wa’d al-sadiq (“faithful promise”) to secure the release of 
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prisoners in Israeli jails, demonstrate Hezbollah’s capabilities and will to resist Israel, and 
show the necessity of retaining these capabilities to Lebanese officials calling for 
disarmament.605  
Infiltrating across the border in an area known as milepost 105, near the village of 
Zarit, Israel, a 20-man Hezbollah team established a complex ambush on the night of July 
11.606 IDF reporting monitors picked up electronic and visual signatures that night, but 
this information never made its way down to the IDF reserve unit scheduled for a 
daylight-motorized patrol. At 0900, the patrol was hit with a massive IED and seven anti-
tank missiles impacted against the unarmored vehicles. With the vehicles burning, 
Hezbollah fighters moved forward and extracted two of the wounded soldiers from the 
wreckage. Simultaneously, other Hezbollah units employed indirect fire, anti-tank 
missiles, and snipers at other IDF positions in the sector. By the time IDF response units 
reached the site, nearly an hour later Hezbollah had withdraw, and the few vehicles that 
crossed over into Lebanon were hit with another complex ambush, resulting in the death 
of four soldiers.607 
Israel retaliated with immediate air strikes on 69 bridges in southern Lebanon, 
designed to frustrate the ambusher’s escape, while planning a fuller response. The course 
of action proposed by Chief of the IDF General Staff Dan Halutz was an air campaign 
against Hezbollah that would last 48–72 hours. This plan focused on “effects-based 
operations” that would not strike directly at Hezbollah’s military capability, but that 
would instead exert enough pressure, striking against symbolic Lebanese targets and 
Hezbollah command infrastructure, that would “force Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon 
and cause them to disarm.”608 On the night of July 12, IAF jets and artillery began 
bombardment against targets throughout Lebanon, focusing on Hezbollah’s rockets, 
communications centers, and notable infrastructure. In an interview following the war, 
Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah revealed that the Israeli response and 
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attacks were unexpected and that the kidnapping operation was not as “clean” as 
planned.609 These attacks continued through July 16, with Hezbollah responding with 
rocket salvos against northern Israel. Halutz was under pressure to do something to stop 
the rocket attacks and decided to conduct limited battalion-size raids, which was a 
compromise between solely maintaining air attacks, or launching a full-blown ground 
offensive to destroy Hezbollah forces.  
The first raid commenced on July 17, and the elite Maglan unit that penetrated 
into the Maroun al-Raus area was quickly ambushed, trapped by Hezbollah fighters who 
were defending a tunnel complex. Reinforcements totaling several battalions, including 
armored units, the elite Golani Egoz unit, and Battalion 101 paratroops, sent in to achieve 
a breakout, were quickly swarmed by well-armed Hezbollah fighters, who fired anti-tank 
missiles with devastating effectiveness. As Matt Matthews notes, “Hezbollah’s tactical 
proficiency bewildered the IDF. Hezbollah was not simply hunkering down and 
defending terrain, but using its small arms, mortars, rockets, and antitank weapons to 
successfully maneuver against the IDF.”610 With the air campaign proving ineffective 
against the onslaught of rockets, and the fierce engagements in Maroun al-Raus, Halutz 
called up the Israeli reserve forces on July 21 to create the impression of a larger force 
array, as well as ordered forces towards the town of Bint Jbeil, just north of Maroun al-
Ras. His intention was to capture the town in a symbolic manner to “create a spectacle of 
victory” that would lead to a Hezbollah “perception of defeat.”611 With this guidance, 
only one battalion of the Golani Brigade entered Bint Jbeil from the east, and “at 0530 
Companies A and C of the 51st Battalion ran headlong into a withering array of 
Hezbollah small arms, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), antitank 
missiles, mortars, and short-range rockets.”612 The attack at Bint Jbeil utterly failed, and 
Hezbollah held onto the village through the close of the war. The same disastrous 
outcome happened throughout the front, and into early August, the Israeli battalion and 
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brigade-sized raids into southern Lebanon had barely penetrated more than a few 
miles.613 As reserve units began to move in the border area, it became clear that these 
forces, comprising nearly 80% of the IDF’s ground capability, were seriously 
undertrained and incapable of fighting such an opponent. Many of the commanders 
hesitated, due to a growing realization that sending Israeli troops into battle would have 
been sending them on suicide missions.614 By August 5, the IDF had nearly 10,000 
soldiers in southern Lebanon, but had only managed to penetrate four miles, and the 
entire border zone remained insecure. In addition, the entire Hezbollah force south of the 
Litani River consisted of only 3,000 fighters, all original forces from the local areas, with 
no reserve deployments. On August 11, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
approved Resolution 1701, which was designed to implement a ceasefire. In response, 
Olmert and Peretz ordered forces north to the Litani River, as a “kind of show designed 
to demonstrate to Hizbollah who is the boss,” but advancing forces faced fierce resistance 
and barely managed to advance a mile. A notable action that resulted was Brigade 401’s 
crossing of the Wadi al-Saluki, tanks in column formation, which sprung a complex 
ambush, resulting in 11 of 24 Merkava tanks hit with anti-tank missiles.615  
This final attempt at a show of force ended with the August 14 ceasefire, 
culminating Israeli efforts and allowing them to withdraw multiple units whose fate 
would have likely been much worse. On the whole, Israeli efforts to accomplish either an 
effects-based operation to deny Hezbollah southern Lebanon or achieve any substantial 
military gains failed at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Not only were the Israelis 
not successful in regaining a buffer zone, but they had little effect against Hezbollah’s 
military capability. Hezbollah rockets struck 160 cities, towns, and settlements 
throughout Israel, and more than one million people were forced to live in shelters.616 
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Throughout the conflict, Hezbollah’s successful media operations highlighted victory 
after victory, while showing the horrendous devastation caused by Israeli bombings. The 
2006 War demonstrated the increasing importance of information strategy in an age in 
which media networks are now able to project the battlefield’s grim realities—in real 
time.617 While Israel attempted to impose its will on Hezbollah through generating 
significant battlefield effects, Hezbollah demonstrated a sophisticated form of irregular 
warfare, one not addressed in current doctrinal definitions. In fact, while many analysts 
debate whether Hezbollah’s irregular war fighting is a closer approximation to guerrilla 
warfare or conventional warfare, it is very likely that it represents something unique; an 
approach that features a fighting network able to utilize multiple aspects and techniques 
of war. 
1.  Israeli Traditional Attack 
The July 2006 Israeli invasion was a spur-of-the-moment response, but rested on 
plans developed to address the growing Hezbollah threat. These plans were developed in 
the years preceding Hezbollah’s kidnapping incursion, and the first was based on a 48–72 
hour air campaign against Hezbollah while the second was a ground invasion plan to 
drive Hezbollah north of the Litani River.618 Both plans were designed to be activated 
simultaneously, but Halutz chose to execute a stand-alone air campaign, based on the 
idea that “…when we hit all these targets Hezbollah will collapse as a military 
organization.”619 Despite such plans, the Israeli performance in the war reveals a number 
of strategic issues, looming over their actual war-fighting performance against Hezbollah 
forces. The primary one is that the IDF believed it could achieve success through a 
strategic air campaign, without deploying ground forces. Further, when it did finally 
commit ground forces, it did so haphazardly, without surprise, revealing numerous errors 
and deficiencies. Overall, Israeli goals in the war were the following. 
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x Destroy the “Iranian Western Command” before Iran could go nuclear. 
x Restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence after the unilateral withdrawals 
from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and counter the image that Israel 
was weak and forced to leave. 
x Force Lebanon to become and act as an accountable state, and end the 
status of Hezbollah as a state within a state. 
x Damage or cripple Hezbollah, with the understanding that it could not be 
destroyed as a military force and would continue to be a major political 
actor in Lebanon. 
x Bring the two soldiers whom the Hezbollah had captured back alive 
without major trades in prisoners held by Israel—not the thousands 
demanded by Nasrallah and the Hezbollah.620 
Organizationally, the IDF was still largely traditional in its structural design, as 
are most modern militaries and relied on a hierarchical command and control system for 
orders processing. However, the IDF’s combat experience over the years and doctrinal 
employment stresses a great deal of autonomy on the battlefield. In past wars, lower-level 
leaders were usually given intent and the resources and latitude required to achieve 
flexible action in combat. However, during the 2006 invasion, the IDF was subjected to 
significant organizational friction that resulted in the inability to create autonomy at 
lower levels. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz, headed the 
organizational hierarchy with control passed to LTG Halutz’s General Staff, and the 
Northern Command under MG Udi Adam. Recognizing the importance of intelligence 
collection, the Israeli military intelligence organization, AMAN (Agaf ha Modi’in) is a 
separate, independent organization commanded by a general officer as well. The major 
ground units participating in the invasion were two maneuver divisions, the 91st Division 
headed by BG Gal Hirsch (composed of eight brigades) and the 162nd Division 
commanded by BG Guy Tzur (composed of two brigades).621 Most of the fighting was 
conducted by the 91st Division, with units from the 162nd brought up and fighting during 
the last week of the war. Special operations units that participated, mainly conducting 
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deeper strikes into Lebanon and assisting the IAF with targeting, were the Sayeret 
Matkal, Shayetet 13 naval commandos, and the IAF’s Shaldag unit. Organizational 
friction resulted from several factors, but the most often cited was the disconnect between 
Halutz’s focus on air-power effects and ground-force commanders who recognized the 
requirement for a significant employment of ground forces,622 which led to conflicting 
orders as the fighting continued, and further exacerbated strategic errors. 
The IDF doctrine entering the second war with Hezbollah was a strange 
concoction of military theory, incorporating recent theories, such as Effects-Based 
Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD).623 According to Matt 
Matthews, “the IDF’s transient embrace of these post-modern theories at the expense of 
traditional principles of war is, arguably, one of the strangest episodes in the history of 
military doctrine.”624 A primary premise of EBO is that attacking an adversary’s systems 
instead of combat formations would produce an effect on the enemy’s cognitive domain. 
General Halutz, a strong proponent of EBO, believes that airpower, supported by precise 
intelligence, can effectively prevent an enemy from accomplishing actions on the 
battlefield, without the requirement for ground troops.625 The primary reason for the 
attempt at a new doctrine would be to avoid manpower-intensive, and necessarily 
casualty-producing, conflicts that entail the full commitment of the IDF’s resources and 
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by virtue of its reliance on the reserve forces, much of Israeli society as well. SOD sought 
to apply a war-fighting doctrine that encompasses all the complexities of modern military 
operations, because the enemy and the environment are a complex adaptive system. 
However, as Milan Vego states, proponents of SOD “…mistakenly argue that such 
systems cannot be destroyed but must be pushed into disequilibrium—that is, into 
chaos.”626 In addition, SOD concepts used overwrought phrases, such as “rendering the 
enemy incoherent,” “consciousness of victory,” and “standoff domination of the theater,” 
which only a limited number of individuals understood.627 Most IDF military officers, 
used to straightforward and decisive military terminology, simply did not understand 
much of the new doctrine, and it promoted confusion, even where such concepts might 
had some relevance. The plan for a large ground force lost out to an EBO-focused air 
campaign, and when ground operations finally commenced, the confusion brought by the 
new doctrinal approaches was revealed. 
Operationally, the IDF’s performance received significant criticism. Numerous 
reports from the battlefield confirmed a lack of combined arms expertise and proficiency 
in tactical maneuver, and it was clear that years of COIN operations against Palestinians 
had greatly eroded the IDF’s small-unit combat skills.628 The overall outcome of the war 
led to internal soul searching, political in fighting, and a special investigative committee, 
the Winograd Commission, to investigate the reasons for Israel’s performance. In 
addition to focusing on COIN in the occupied territories, Israeli defense requirements cut 
large amounts of training and resources from the reserve forces, notable because the 
reserves comprise 80% of the IDF’s total strength. Operationally, the ground forces that 
advanced into northern Lebanon displayed an overall lack of coordination with air-power 
assets, and very little of the combined-arms attributes that once generated their success. 
Overall, the IDF fought in ways that increased Hezbollah’s capabilities, as their sporadic 
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advances provided ample time for Hezbollah to establish ambushes, and the tentative 
nature of their advances featured little maneuver.629 Notable operational deficiencies 
included the lack of training in close urban combat; poor and infrequent employment of 
special operations forces; a lack of training, preparation, and logistical support for the 
reserve units; insufficient crew training in armor units, and massive bombings that 
destroyed infrastructure, but very little of Hezbollah’s military capability.630 The latter 
proved to be a fundamental flaw in Israel’s prosecution of the war, as the destruction they 
caused, coupled with Hezbollah’s anticipatory use of media, generated intense 
international criticism, which led to the cease fire. 
One area in which the IDF displayed notable success was its initial targeting of 
Hezbollah medium and long-range rockets. IDF sources claim to have destroyed 90% of 
Hezbollah’s medium-range rocket capacity, which may or not be accurate, but it is 
significant that Hezbollah never fired a single medium or long-range rocket.631 
Tactically, Israel units were caught off guard by the ferocity of Hezbollah’s attacks, many 
of which utilized swarms of 2–3 man cells employing powerful anti-tank missiles against 
both vehicles and troops. Displaying a lack of combined arms sophistication, on multiple 
occasions, Israeli commanders spearheaded their advances with armored forces, 
unaccompanied by the engineers and infantry units, which provide them essential 
security. Israeli units also a displayed poor understanding of Hezbollah capabilities in 
relation to the terrain in which they fought. On numerous occasions, IDF troops advanced 
through constricted terrain and encountered devastating ambushes. Armored forces were 
engaged in defiles and infantry when clustered in urban areas. 
The Israeli invasion displayed little appreciation for wider information strategy, 
and Israeli strategic decision makers took few efforts to justify the war to the rest of the 
world, let alone ensure that both tactical and strategic actions were in tune with such a 
strategy. Surprising, in an era in which it is widely recognized that, “…full-spectrum 
information activities must be fully integrated with combat operations,” senior Israeli 
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officials and IDF planners launched the 2006 invasion with little integration.632 This 
action is not necessarily specific to the 2006 war, however, as Anthony Cordesman 
states: 
The Israeli government and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have always 
tended to see war in terms of their own internal politics and perceptions 
and to ignore those of other states, cultures, and religions, particularly 
when dealing with hostile Arab states and movements. The result is that 
Israel has relied far too much on force and far too little on information 
operations and politics, and it has repeatedly made strategic mistakes it 
could have avoided with a more realistic perception of how its enemies 
and other nations and peoples perceived its action.633 
In this case, Israel appears to have thought that it could achieve tactical military victories 
against Hezbollah, while intimidating the Lebanese government with an overall campaign 
of infrastructure attacks. These flawed assumptions led to significant failures in 
information strategy, which were aggravated by the fact that what media efforts did exist 
were largely focused on internal Israeli politics, or in influencing its external 
supporters.634 Despite a military doctrine that described a total system of interaction, 
information was singularly focused on military operations, and neglected the primary 
opinions it should have sought to influence—global actors and Hezbollah decision 
makers. Despite having a strategy deliberately focused on intensive bombardment and the 
destruction of civilian infrastructure and lives, Israel employed too little pro-active 
measures to mitigate the reaction to such destruction, or its display in the court of world 
opinion. 
2.  Hezbollah Network Response 
Hezbollah’s response to the IDF invasion into Lebanon revealed significant 
capabilities and displayed a fighting network equipped and capable of inflicting 
tremendous damage on a first-rate military force. The outcome was largely unexpected, 
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as many within the IDF remembered their dramatic success against another irregular 
opponent, the PLO, during the last incursion into Lebanon, and failed to account for 
Hezbollah’s transformation during their prior conflict. Hezbollah’s initial volley of 
rockets, numbering in the hundreds, was just the opening salvo in what would be 
continuous rocket attacks throughout the course of the month. Despite the IDF’s best 
efforts, and extensive bombing by IAF aircraft, Hezbollah managed to employ rocket 
teams throughout all of southern Lebanon. Even after the IDF commitment of ground 
forces and the invasion across the Blue Line (page 22), Hezbollah successfully blunted 
and then stopped multiple Israeli advances into southern Lebanon. Hezbollah’s actions on 
the battlefield were unexpected in multiple ways, including its use of complex defensive 
structures, excellent concealment, employment of the latest precision weaponry, and 
remarkable intelligence on Israeli intentions and actions. Its advanced capability 
differentiates it from classic guerrilla warfare, and in many ways, places it closer to the 
military capabilities of a nation-state. As Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey Friedman describe, 
“Hezbollah does demonstrate, unambiguously , that even today’s non-state actors are not 
limited to the irregular, guerrilla model military methods so often assumed in the future 
warfare debate.”635 
Hezbollah’s organization was established based on a social network composed 
primarily of the radicalized Shi’a community in Lebanon, and has evolved to consist of 
numerous connections throughout the years. These connections, combined with religious, 
economic and social aspects, as well as global scale, make it, “…one of the most complex 
organizations of all Islamist movements in terms of structure and functions…”636 This 
organizational complexity defies most analysis, especially those that label the network as 
either just a “terrorist” organization, or a political party. Hezbollah is deeply embedded in 
the Shi’a Lebanese society, where its “…social and political activities operate as an 
integrated and holistic policy network, disseminating the values of resistance while 
constructing a collective identity derived from the notion of hala al-islamaiyya, or the 
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‘Islamic sphere’.”637 These service-oriented networks are fully connected to and an 
essential part of Hezbollah’s notion of resistance, and are not in opposition to the 
organization’s military agenda.638 Much of Hezbollah’s upper-level leadership structure 
remains unchanged since its founding, but as the grassroots political structure expands, 
the interconnectedness between the two functions grows as well. Moreover, the Islamic 
Resistance, which has always been a clandestine network, benefits from a society that is 
further connected by the same ideals, which makes it easier to recruit, vet, and mobilize 
willing fighters. As Daniel Byman describes, “many of its recruits were bonded through 
kinship and regional ties, as well as through a shared ideology.”639 Strictly viewing 
Hezbollah through organizational terms, it is possible to describe its military arm as a 
network that works for a hierarchy (formal leadership). In many regards, this military 
wing resembles an all-channel network, and is broken down into elite fighters, numbering 
around 1,000, and village fighters, whose numbers are difficult to measure. As 
Cordesman states: 
During the fighting with Israel, Hezbollah further organized its fighters 
into small, self-sufficient teams capable of operating independently and 
without direction from high authority for long periods of time. Although 
an elaborate system of radio call signs, a closed cellular phone system, and 
two-way radios allowed these teams to stay in touch with their higher 
units, a great level of wartime decision-making leeway was given to the 
junior ranks, largely mitigating the need for such communications….As 
for its counterparts in Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Hezbollah’s 
looser structure may have worked to its distinct advantage during the 2006 
war, allowing units the flexibility necessary for quick reaction and 
adjustment to Israeli offensives.640  
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In addition, Hezbollah successfully networked with other organizations and formed ties 
with unaffiliated villages or other political parties. Notably, a significant portion of the 
fighters defending Maroun al-Ras were Amal members, and might have produced the 
first Israeli casualties.641  
Doctrinally, Hezbollah’s response to the 2006 invasion reveals that it no longer 
fights simply as guerrillas, but displays doctrinal aspects at the cutting edge of irregular 
warfare. The reason that some label Hezbollah “the best guerrilla force in the world,” is 
largely because it has transformed itself into a fighting network that utilizes modern 
innovations and technology to fight decisive battles aggressively.642 Overall, it displayed 
a defensive doctrine, one highlighted by its remarkably aggressive ambushes and constant 
barrage of rockets into northern Israel. At the same time, despite being strategically 
defensive, Hezbollah largely maintained the initiative. As one observer stated, “this was a 
very good lesson in asymmetric warfare. This was not Israel imposing its battle on 
Hizballah but Hizballah imposing its battle on Israel.”643 Hezbollah forces utilized the 
relative simplicity of its weapons and light forces to achieve a level of stealth, which 
confounded Israeli forces. The largely conventional IDF units had great difficulties in 
detecting the small or non-existent signature of Hezbollah’s light weapons and small 
maneuver nodes. While part of an overall defense, tunnels connected small groups of 
fighters, which allowed for local swarming, especially where IDF forces attempted to 
take key terrain. IDF forces faced small teams that attacked from all directions, and no 
clear line of separation existed between the advancing IDF in South Lebanon and its 
Hizbullah foes, with IDF troops repeatedly saying that they were coming under fire from 
all directions.644 Simultaneously, Hezbollah’s defense displayed sophisticated elements 
and the highest levels of preparation and planning, reflective of an enemy determined to 
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fight decisive engagements, not simply “will-o-the-wisp” guerrilla encounters. Further, 
Hezbollah’s use of high-tech weapons, such as the RPG-29 anti-tank missiles and the 
fielding of the latest in Iranian and Syrian missiles, demonstrates the potential capabilities 
of irregular forces with nation-state support. The ability to combine these elements 
produced unique capabilities rarely seen in combination, and reflect a level of doctrinal 
innovation that took Israeli forces by surprise. In this regard, Hezbollah’s doctrine 
reflects a new level of capability for non-state actors, one gained through its ability to 
employ synchronize the employment of the most lethal weapons. Rather than rely on its 
previous guerrilla warfare doctrine, despite its successful application from 1982–2000, 
Hezbollah adopted a new and unique doctrine, as Nasrallah indicated, “the resistance 
withstood the attack and fought back. It did not wage a guerrilla war either…it was not a 
regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It was something in 
between. This is the new model.”645 
Operationally, Hezbollah functioned in a very decentralized manner and the 
flexibility its small units were given enabled them to take the initiative against IDF 
troops. In addition, its largely local nature provided the ability to be self-sufficient, and 
eliminated any need for a logistical supply line. Like many irregular fighters, it utilized 
economy of force to gain advantages in maneuver capability and flexibility. Hezbollah’s 
operational focus centered on the systematic employment of its rocket cells, local attack 
cells, and elite fighting cells (snipers, bunker defense teams, reconnaissance, etc.). The 
former provided much of its offensive capability and remained capable of attacks through 
the duration of the war, and some even sustained attacks through the cease fire, despite 
being behind IDF lines. The other two elements provided local security for the rocket 
cells and initiated elaborate ambushes, and moved to key defensive locations as 
necessary. All these units utilized a complex underground defensive system comprising 
more than 600 structures. Major Sharon Tosi Moore describes Hezbollah’s operations in 
relation to this underground terrain: 
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Hezbollah did not fight a static war from these tunnels but rather 
employed an organized mobile battle plan. Its fighters could hide in, 
maneuver through, and fight from dozens of prepared battle positions, 
sophisticated supply bunkers, and complex tunnels dug both inside the 
villages and into the hillsides. These positions were so well hidden that 
IDF soldiers did not discover them until they had occupied the area.646 
This system resulted from a close analysis of how the IDF fought, as one IDF 
commanders stated, “Hezbollah had spent the years from 2000 to 2006 thinking about the 
coming war in tactical terms.”647 One of the most notable tactical aspects of the war was 
Hezbollah’s sophisticated use of anti-tank weapons, employed by small teams of three, 
which displayed considerable ability to engage IDF targets. These weapons were 
employed in a stand off “swarming” effect against armored columns, being fired in the 
dozens at times, as well as with great effect against infantry formations and structures. 
Linking these dispersed elements together was a sophisticated communications 
architecture, which provided for a significant range of connectivity throughout 
Hezbollah’s forces. Much of this system took Israeli electronic warfare units by surprise 
as it had advanced protective measures, and was connected by optical fibers to avoid 
jamming attempts.648 Further, Hezbollah enjoyed much better intelligence overall, 
especially at the tactical level, largely because of its familiarity with the local terrain and 
conditions, but also because it was able to generate a large network of sympathizers.649 In 
addition, it took advantage of the overflowing nature of information in Israel’s open 
society, using Internet postings, media reports on Israeli movements, cellular intercepts, 
and footage of IAF bombing strikes to build a collective picture.  
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Hezbollah’s information strategy is powerful, and derives its strength from a 
compelling narrative best summarized by the word Muqwama, or “resistance.”650 
Standing as a model of resistance against Israel, Hezbollah generates vast support, not 
only in Lebanon, but also throughout the Arab world. This “story” formed a core element 
of Hezbollah’s war-fighting strategy and,  
It was hardly an accident that Hezbollah, in this circumstance, projected a 
very special narrative for the world beyond its kin—a narrative that 
depicted a selfless movement touched by God and blessed by a religious 
fervor and determination to resist the enemy, the infidel, and ultimately 
achieve a ‘divine victory,’ no matter the cost in life and treasure.651 
Buttressed by this powerful idealization of resistance to Israeli aggression, Hezbollah’s 
display of information awareness and its strategy to maximize its benefits stood in stark 
contrast to Israel’s neglect. Hezbollah maximized its ability to control access to the 
battlefield and the amount of information available, demonstrating that a closed society 
can control the image and message it wishes to display far more effectively than an open 
society. In doing so, it was able to portray the Israeli actions as a “disproportionate” 
response to the July 12 kidnapping, usually by emphasizing the destruction caused by 
Israeli attacks. To enhance this effect, it limited access to those events and scenes that 
would benefit this theme and led reporters on tours and even staging or recreating events 
for media footage. For the most part, journalists followed the Hezbollah-generated script, 
grateful to get any access as well. These dimensions of information strategy reveal its 
impact, and it is clear that, “civilians and battles of propaganda and perception are the 
natural equivalent of armor in asymmetric warfare.”652  
In contrast to the open access showing civilian damage, Hezbollah tightly 
managed any depiction of a martial image or its military capability, and “throughout the 
conflict the rarest picture of all was that of a Hezbollah guerrilla. It was as if the war on 
the Hezbollah side was being fought by ghosts.”653 Hezbollah’s skillful employment of 
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such tools influenced perception in three important ways: generating an impression of a 
modern army versus civilians, the “absence” of fighters subtly undercut the claim of 
using human shields, and it removed Syrian and Iranian military signatures.654 Further, 
Hezbollah’s concealment of its military image and activities demonstrated a significant 
use of deception in other ways. Its ability to conceal defensive preparations provides a 
clear case of tactical deception, with fake bunkers being built to conceal the extensive 
real ones. This use of “displays” attempts to “…make it [the display] appear other than 
what it really is,” in order to “…make the enemy see what isn’t there.”655 It also 
portrayed an extensive EW intercept capability, bluffing that it could listen in to most 
Israeli communications, when in reality, it was most likely simply intercepting cell phone 
and Internet traffic about Israeli forces.656 The most significant asymmetry in the 2006 
conflict had little to do with military weapons, but was the disparity between skillful and 
effective use of information strategy. 
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3.  Analysis of Counter-Network Framework 
Despite watching Hezbollah’s build up and generation of military capabilities 
between 2000 and 2006, the IDF misread the threat this irregular opponent posed. Most 
likely using their experiences against a strictly guerrilla force, the PLO, in 1982, and their 
COIN operations in Gaza and the West Bank as a basis for decision making, the IDF was 
caught by surprise in 2006. Their initial aerial strikes were based on significant 
intelligence, although some were drastically inaccurate, and displayed a few aspects of 
swarming. However, overall, the IDF demonstrated few of the proposed requirements for 
effectively countering networks. They sought to counter a highly adapted and socially 
integrated fighting network with largely conventional means, married to newly formed 
and debated doctrine. Political indecision and errors in strategic decision making 
compounded the IDF’s efforts, but on the whole, they demonstrated few successes in 
fighting a sophisticated network.  
a. Offensive Swarming 
Israeli’s initial offense displayed a swarming characteristic, in the form of 
focused attacks by numerous assets on high value targets, but these aspects were limited 
to the aerial engagement of Hezbollah’s strategic rocket positions and stocks. Beyond the 
initial aerial engagements of templated Hezbollah positions and infrastructure, the IDF 
attack against the Hezbollah network failed to swarm systematically against its 
vulnerable positions. Operationally, especially with regard to its ground offensives, the 
IDF never gained the element of surprise. Any attempts at generating an operational 
tempo floundered in the face of strategic indecision. Delays in advancing north provided 
Hezbollah with additional time to gather intelligence, prepare defenses, and “the IDF also 
gave Hezbollah ample strategic and tactical warning when it finally did decide to move 
north.”657 Pulsing relies on the ability to generate intelligence, and but is closely tied to 
the capability to illuminate the enemy, which must be synchronized with operational 
efforts. The processes that would facilitate pulsing, both generating intelligence and an 
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ability to swarm against targets, were simply not present in Israel’s largely conventional 
maneuver operations. Likewise, the employment of special operations units for targeting 
purposes achieved little strategic gains, and such strikes were not generated to produce 
any significant operational tempo. Israeli press accounts depict only 20 deep operations 
by Israeli special operations units, the full results of which are still classified.658 Overall, 
however, the use of special operations did not affect the war.659 
b. Illumination 
Israel’s strategy focused primarily on eliminating Hezbollah as a military 
threat and IDF actions revealed how little they appreciated Hezbollah’s true strength. 
Beyond the sophisticated technology it received from Syria and Iran, Hezbollah’s ability 
to conceal the entire range and intermeshing of its political, social, and military 
capabilities provided its most significant advantage in the 2006 War. As Cordesman 
noted, “the ability to fight on local religious, ideological, and sectarian grounds that the 
IDF could not match provided extensive cover and the equivalent of both depth and 
protection.”660 
Israeli intelligence focused primarily on Hezbollah’s military positions, 
templated rocket firing positions, and suspected command and control centers. It 
employed sophisticated reconnaissance and surveillance assets, as Isaac Ben-Israel, a 
retired IAF Major General stated, “this was the first large-scale use of UAVs, not only for 
providing a continuous presence over the entire battle area, but in delivering smart 
munitions to these very small, well-hidden, moving targets.”661 In addition, Mossad and 
other Israeli intelligence agencies gathered significant amounts of information on 
weapons shipments and bunker locations, as well as used agents to “mark” various 
targets. These efforts featured the infiltration of agents into the Hezbollah network, which  
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demonstrated some capability for illumination efforts. As a result, in the first two weeks, 
the majority of Hezbollah’s longer-range missiles and key command and control 
locations were destroyed.662 
However, this focus on significant military capabilities and high-end 
threats only aided efforts in the initial strikes of the war, and was not matched by efforts 
to understand Hezbollah’s entire network and way of fighting. The level of information 
the IDF received may have been significant for conducting stand-off strikes, but it was 
not commensurate with the requirements to illuminate an entire network. For IDF ground 
offensive success, significantly greater illumination effort was required at the operational 
and tactical levels. Despite Israel’s success in previous counter-terrorism efforts, and its 
beliefs in the necessity of HUMINT, its “…apparent failure to recruit or retain human 
sources within Hezbollah explains, therefore, the futile attempts to target the 
organization’s leaders for elimination.”663 These failures are based on Israeli’ 
prioritization of technical development over human collection, but also reveal 
Hezbollah’s efforts at compartmentalization, communications security, and counter-
intelligence measures.664 Efforts focused on understanding the interconnections between 
fighters and technology, linking operational activity to the social networks generating it, 
and providing time for focused exploitation to drive operational efforts. While these 
efforts require extensive preparation and may require changes to the strategic pace of the 
campaign, Israel efforts that focused primarily on military capabilities missed the 
significance of the illumination required. 
c. Information Disruption 
As previously discussed, Israeli information strategy was not attuned to 
the enemy or the type of war it was fighting. As a result, it displayed some aspects of 
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information disruption, but neglected others. Rather than negating Hezbollah’s narrative, 
it played right into it, which provided demonstrable and vivid examples of Israeli 
aggression. Israeli air strikes against urban areas, and in particular, the strikes against the 
“Hezbollah stronghold” of al-Dahiyya in the southern suburbs of Beirut, produced such 
outrage that Israel’s strategic communications became fixated on defensive justification. 
Entire villages in the south of Lebanon were flattened, nearly a million civilians were 
displaced, and estimates of infrastructure damage range from 3–8 billion dollars.665 By 
focusing an impressive amount of firepower and devastating aerial attacks against 
civilian infrastructure, whether “associated” with Hezbollah or not, Israel reinforced 
Hezbollah’s narrative, rather than negated it. Some analysts, such as Reinoud Leenders, 
make the case that Israel actually shored up a Hezbollah narrative tarnished due to 
political infighting, competitive Lebanese politics, and relative peace with Israel.666 
Further, tactical successes, such as fighting back Israeli elite units at Bint Jbeil, provided 
much needed capital to develop the heroic image of Hezbollah military capability. 
Israeli efforts to deny, or channel communications, mainly focused on 
attacking Hezbollah’s media capability. Strikes against the five-story headquarters of Al-
Manar television in south Beirut occurred during the first night of strikes, even before 
Israel attacked leadership targets, and were followed up with subsequent attacks, as well 
as strikes against other media transmission stations.667 In addition, Israel also conducted 
extensive jamming and cyberwarfare, and managed to corrupt Al-Manar broadcasts with 
inserted Israeli messages and programming.668 However, efforts to silence Al-Manar 
achieved little as the signal re-appeared within minutes of targeting and Hezbollah was 
able to continue broadcasting throughout the conflict. 
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Multiple reports show that Israel conducted collection operations against 
Hezbollah’s communications and the Lebanese communications infrastructure, but most 
of this collection was prior to the start of the conflict.669 Israel’s intelligence agency, 
AMAN, collected extensive information on Iranian and Syrian arms shipments, locations 
of medium and long-range rockets, and bunkers and tunnel locations. This information 
guided the initial aerial strikes in the first part of the war, but such collection efforts 
contributed little to efforts of the IDF troops at the operational and tactical levels. In 
addition, extensive efforts by the Mossad to identify Hezbollah command and control 
systems prior to the air campaign were not initially acted upon, and a lack of follow-on 
operational targeting resulted in no Hezbollah senior leaders being killed.670 Tactically, 
the IDF was unaware of the exact location of many of the bunkers and tunnel positions 
due to their concealment by Hezbollah’s extensive deception efforts. Once the ground 
forays of the war began, little collection efforts to guide advancing units occurred, many 
of which were caught in complex ambushes as a result. Ground commanders had little or 
no “real-time” intelligence on Hezbollah forces or positions, despite the extensive 
collection capacity fielded by the IDF.671  
Israeli displayed no strategic deception prior to the invasion, and instead 
slowly telegraphed nearly every move. The initial air campaign caught Hezbollah by 
surprise, but merely because the scale of the response was unexpected. The halting 
manner in which ground forces crossed the border gave Hezbollah plenty of warning, but 
at the least, could have featured different forms and direction of maneuver to deceive the 
Hezbollah defenders. 
d. Fusion  
Doctrinally and organizationally, little fusion existed on the Israeli side of 
the conflict. Most of the Israeli intelligence assets focused on the strategic level, 
identifying Hezbollah capabilities, but failed to synchronize these efforts with the 
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information maneuver units required. Even the Interim Report produced by the Winograd 
Commision concluded, “…in the years that preceded the war, AMAN provided its 
political and military consumers with a comprehensive, reliable and a correct picture of 
Hezbollah,” but at the same time, also concluded, “at the tactical level the intelligence 
picture was less clear and exposed significant gaps.”672 
Indecision at the policy and command levels led to a lack of shared intent 
and purpose during operational execution. While the unique doctrinal frameworks 
proposed by Halutz and others contributed to confusion during the war, poor decision 
making led to a clear vision and intent for what Israeli forces hoped to accomplish at the 
operational level.673 Initially basing its policy decisions and application of military force 
on a doctrine that promised swift results with little regard for the fundamentals of ground 
warfare, Israel never truly developed and diffused a shared purpose throughout the force. 
Connectivity between IDF units, especially the combined arms integration 
that is an Israeli hallmark, was notably absent. This lack of integration between IDF units 
was exacerbated by an overall lack of collaboration between all elements involved in the 
war, from the IAF to AMAN and maneuver units on the ground. Nearly 30 years of 
lower-intensity employment in COIN operations and a lack of training, revealed a serious 
drop in Israeli capability since its vaunted battlefield victories. Collaborative systems that 
fused intelligence and operational experience did not exist, and as a result, bureaucratic 
competition led to insufficient examination of existing intelligence, and a failure to 
understand what was required in view of the threat. Israeli intelligence gathered 
significant quantities of information prior to the war, but much of this intelligence was 
not shared with operational units and its tactical significance was unexploited.674 The 
reasons for this were twofold; the first was that much of the information was classified at 
levels that prevented sharing with tactical units, and the second was a lack of integration 
between intelligence and operational elements that would have enabled collaboration. At 
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the tactical level, “…the interaction between intelligence officers and their consumers in 
the IDF was ineffective,” which contributed such instances as AMAN having intelligence 
of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), but not discussing this information with 
operational commanders who could understand its significance and develop counter-
tactics.675 As the Winograd Committee reported, the main problem in combat 
performance was the lack of a doctrinal system that fused intelligence with operational 
insights, and “the limit of the intelligence to translate a large part of the information it 
had…into the operational language used by the fighting forces.”676 
G. CONCLUSION 
The long-term outcome of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict may still be uncertain, but 
it provides numerous definitive lessons, which significant implications for irregular 
warfare. The primarily guerrilla war Hezbollah fought against the Israeli occupying force 
between 1982–2000 highlights the potential for a irregular opponent against a much 
superior traditional military force. Israeli forces discovered the difficulties between 
successfully invading a country and achieving stability with an occupying force. 
Throughout much of this conflict, the IDF focused on maintaining control of terrain, 
ensuring a border zone, but did so using largely static, traditional methods. Hezbollah 
confronted this strategy with a combination of aggressive guerrilla action, launching 
significant attacks as IDF and SLA border forts, and an overall outreach that gained the 
support of and mobilized much of southern Lebanon. A reflection of this aggressive 
action, and commitment was the innovative use of suicide bombing against IDF targets. 
These bombings significantly damaged IDF command and control and intelligence 
collection, but more importantly, demonstrated that the growing strength of Hezbollah’s 
military power. Reinforcing these dramatic terror attacks was an information strategy that 
portrayed Israel as a heavy-handed occupying force, and highlighted Hezbollah’s 
resistance capability. Israeli bombings and raids grew increasingly ineffective in the face 
of growing popular disproval for the war in Lebanon, and small changes, such as 
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attempting a more aggressive targeting effort, came too late. Overall, the conflict reveals 
basic truths about irregular warfare, highlighting the critical importance of a purposeful 
policy backed by a robust information strategy, as well as the potential for a disciplined 
guerrilla force in a war of attrition. It also demonstrates the ability of a network to 
employ multiple forms of warfare by relying mostly on guerrilla warfare during this 
conflict, but shows increasing capabilities as the war progressed and they forced the 
Israeli forces out of Lebanon. In revealing such basic aspects of conflict, it serves a useful 
comparison, and at the time, a harbinger of the unique aspects of the war to come. 
The 2006 War with Hezbollah provides a near laboratory-like test of a traditional 
military attacking a network-based organization. As many observers have noted, 
“Hezbollah acted as an informal and adaptive ‘distributed network’ of small cells and 
units that were acting with considerable independence and were capable of rapidly 
adapting to local conditions using media reports, verbal communications, and the 
like.”677 The conflict was notable not only for the asymmetries in military force on each 
side, but more significantly, for the tremendous asymmetries of motivation and will 
between the two combatants. In addition, it highlights the gap between loose political 
goals and military strategy, and the requirement for an effective grand strategy that unites 
the two and is reinforced with a meaningful information strategy. Information is truly a 
powerful weapon, as U.S. military analyst Steve Fondacaro states, “the new element of 
power that has emerged in the last thirty to forty years and has subsumed the rest is 
information. A revolution happened without us knowing or paying attention. Perception 
truly now is reality, and our enemies know it.” 678 While some debate occurs about who 
“won” the war, it is clear that in much of the world, the perception is that Hezbollah won. 
In addition, it is possible that Hezbollah’s true military capability and will to resist was 
not fully tested. It is likely that Hezbollah reserved the majority of its defense and forces 
for key actions deeper into Lebanon, and especially, the defense of the Litani River, 
where it is known that its best anti-tank teams were positioned. The 2006 War revealed a 
powerful organization, a fighting network whose unique doctrine complimented its 
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organization and provides an example for a new, or “hybrid” form of warfare. Ironically, 
while many reports focus on Iranian support to Hezbollah, “the fighters of Hizballah have 
acquired infinitely more combat experience and tactical nous than their Iranian sponsors, 
leading one independent observer to wryly note that Hizballah trains Iran, not the other 
way around.”679 In light of the IDF’s performance against such a fighting network, “the 
value and capability of such asymmetric net-centric warfare and comparatively slow 
moving wars of attrition should not be exaggerated.”680 
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Table 10.   Overall Israeli Performance Against Hezbollah Fighting Networks681 
The IDF performance against such a network reveals significant gaps in its ability 
to meet the requirements of the proposed counter-network framework. The IDF displays 
only slight counter-network capabilities, despite historically demonstrating greater 
capacity in such areas as decentralized combined operations. Overall, the outcome of the 
2006 War reveals significant shortfalls, both the IDF’s own basic doctrine and training, 
and in comparison with effective counter-network operations.  
The IDF never sought to swarm against Hezbollah, deciding instead to expand its 
limited air campaign into a very linear, traditional ground offensive. This offensive 
consisted of brief forays by multiple independent units, and the common assumption 
appears to be that they were facing a guerrilla threat, such as the PLO, that would be 
easily overwhelmed by superior force. The brief raids across the border and the slow and 
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deliberate advance towards the end of the war were still met with significant resistance. 
Overall, the sporadic pace of operations produced little resembling an operational tempo 
that would pressure a fighting network. 
Israeli intelligence displayed significant capability for identifying targets and 
facilitating the initial IAF strikes, but beyond this, there was little that demonstrated 
illumination. Israel largely ignored the social ties that provided Hezbollah with such a 
significant advantage, and its near-complete lack of HUMINT capability produced little 
useable infiltration attempts or use of exploitation. Technical collection, much of which 
provided the initial targeting templates, lost much of its usefulness as forces on the 
ground wrestled with the dynamic, and largely concealed, nature of Hezbollah’s fighters. 
An approach that sought to achieve illumination of Hezbollah’s capabilities might have 
sought more of a provocation strategy and forced Hezbollah to reveal more of its forces 
operationally. 
Israel’s information strategy failed to comprehend the environment that IDF 
forces were operating in, and military tasks were not synchronized with a realistic 
information disruption campaign. Israeli actions failed to negate Hezbollah’s purpose, 
and in fact, significantly reinforced its image as the vanguard of Lebanese and Arab 
resistance. The openness of Israeli society and the comparative discipline imposed by 
Hezbollah produced a very lopsided demonstration of information awareness and 
employment. Further, Israel’s military actions served to reinforce each stereotype 
Hezbollah projected, from wanton aggression against civilians to weak military 
performance. 
Fusion requires a high degree of connectivity between elements, connectivity that 
is based primarily on doctrinal principles, which promote organizational shaping. The 
disconnect between policy, military actions, and operational capability reveals a lack of 
fusion throughout the IDF’s performance during both the 1982–2000 occupation and the 
2006 War. This lack of fusion appears to be based primarily on the multiple organizations 
and hierarchical structure of the IDF. Further, although Israel’s performance in lower-
intensity conflict, such as Gaza and the West Bank, demonstrated a capability for  
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operational and intelligence integration, these aspects were not incorporated into a 
doctrine that would produce success in a high-intensity environment against a robust 
fighting network. 
This analysis of Israel’s two major conflicts with Hezbollah demonstrates the 
differences between classic guerrilla warfare and network-style warfare. In the first 
conflict, Israel’s successful invasion and expulsion of the PLO provided a baseline for 
analysis that revealed the shortcomings of a hierarchical guerrilla organization lacking an 
integrated local social network, while demonstrating Hezbollah’s growing capability. 
Further, the 2006 War provides a strong example of a traditional modern military denied 
its goals by a much smaller force. Despite facing a modern fighting network, the Israeli 
military conducted a deeply flawed campaign demonstrating little of the requirements for 
effective counter-network warfare. Israel expected to bomb both Hezbollah and the 
Lebanese government into submission by targeting the former’s military capability and 
the latter’s infrastructure. The failure of this policy led to the employment of ground 
forces, which floundered against a modern fighting network. Israel’s performance served 
notice to the rest of the world, and has since forced dramatic internal changes and 
revisions in organization, doctrine, operational methods, and most significantly, use of 
information strategy. 
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VI. U.S.—AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ CASE STUDY 
If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after 
effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost 
certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another 
war.682 
      - Basil H. Liddell Hart 
Sharpen your swords and burn the earth under the feet of the invaders.683 
      - Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi 
A.  CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
The clash between the United States-led coalition that toppled Saddam Hussein 
and AQI provides a noteworthy case study that highlights modern professional militaries 
opposed to a complex fighting network. This case study features a primary clash between 
the most advanced modern military on the globe and a diverse, loosely organized network 
of insurgents armed almost exclusively with light weapons. This focus on AQI examines 
its formation and rise to power as the most deadly insurgent group countering the U.S.-
led coalition and developing Iraqi forces. AQI rose out of an insurgency following the 
U.S. invasion in 2003, but like many other fighting networks, it is also a terrorist 
organization. The devastating violence it inflicted primarily against civilians, inside Iraq 
and in surrounding countries, marks it as a particularly brutal terrorist organization, 
despite its initial growth within a popular insurgency. In this regard, the study of AQI 
provides noteworthy insights into one of the most robust terrorist organizations, and 
perhaps, the most violently active, in modern irregular warfare.  
As in previous case studies, the fight against AQI is examined in two sequential 
sections, with a final comparison of performance between both. The reason for this 
delineation is a series of events that produced a different environment and combatant 
interactions between the two different phases of the war. The initial section focuses on 
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the rise of AQI as part of a growing insurgency that reached a violent climax in 2006 
with a sectarian civil war. While U.S. forces hunted for the remnants of the Ba’athist 
hierarchy, what would become AQI began as a growing group of jihadist-inspired 
fighters who would wreak havoc on coalition efforts to create post-war stability.684 AQI 
would go on to terrorize both coalition forces and Iraqi civilians with its increasingly 
violent tactics before instigating a deeply divisive civil war pitting Sunni versus Shi’a. 
Along with the civil war, the death of AQI’s founder, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, and the 
formation of the new Iraqi government ended an increasingly violent phase of the war. 
The second section of the case study begins with the first part of 2007 and the 
understanding that few hard lines of demarcation exist in describing events of this scope. 
A surge of U.S. forces, a change in strategy, and relentless targeting of AQI elements all 
mark the second phase of the war, which saw a Sunni shift to support coalition efforts 
and a significant drop in violence. While the war in Iraq against AQI continues, the Iraqi 
government, supported by U.S. advisers, continues to dismantle the AQI network and for 
now, it poses no significant threat to Iraqi stability. 
B.  IRAQ OVERVIEW 
The Mesopotamian region of modern day Iraq is called the “cradle of 
civilization,” and the country’s history and central position in the Middle East make it a 
crossroads for trade and a flashpoint of conflict. Sharing borders with Jordan, Syria, 
Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, Iraq sits in the center of the region. 
Geographically, the notable features of Iraq are the Zagros Mountains to the north along 
the border with Turkey, the al-Jazeerah Desert in the west and south along the border 
region with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. 
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Figure 15.   Iraq and Surrounding Region685 
Iraq’s population, while largely Arab and Muslim, is also composed of the non-
Arab Kurdish people in northern Iraq, as well as numerous smaller groups both ethnically 
and religiously separate. Even within a larger adherence to Islam, deep dissenting 
opinions separating the Shi’a from the Sunni views, a theological split that strongly 
                                                 
685 University of Texas at Austin, University of Texas Libraries, Perry–Castañeda Library Map 
Collection, Iraq Maps, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/iraq.html. 
 252
influences social and political differences in Iraq.686 The most commonly accepted 
numbers for the Iraqi population list 60 percent Shi’a, 15–20 percent Sunni, 18 percent 
Kurd, and 2–7 percent additional minority groups.687 Iraq, while having a central 
government since its foundation, is very much a tribally organized society. Tribes form 
the social framework for much of Iraqi society, especially in the rural areas, and provide 
“protection, representation, and a sense of identity,” that holds sway even with modern 
changes.688 Tribal identity actually has grown stronger in recent times, and 75% of all 
Iraqis claim identifiable tribal ties, with some of the largest tribes actually having a mix 
of Sunni and Shi’a. The primary subunit of Iraqi tribes is the kham, which includes all 
those having a single great-great-grandfather, out to five generations. Multiple tribes are 
unified in a qabila, or tribal confederation, which operates at the national and even 
transnational level in some cases.689 Tribal organization, and specifically the Sunni Arab 
tribal structure, played a significant role in the dynamics of the Iraqi insurgency, as “an 
individual’s tribal, clan, or sub-clan membership determines the rights he possesses, the 
fixed obligations he is expected to meet, and the blood loyalties he must defend.”690  
In the modern era, Iraq’s formation resulted from the division of the Ottoman 
Empire and British colonial rule led to the establishment of an independent monarch in 
1932. This monarchy was overthrown in 1958, which led to a series of coups and power 
struggles that culminated in the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party taking control in 1968.691 
While originally inclusive, comprising a loose coalition of Kurdish nationalists and Shi’a 
who viewed themselves as Iraqi Arabs first, the Ba’ath Party that took control in 1968 
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was primarily Sunni, experienced and more ruthless in its hold on power.692 Saddam 
Hussein fought his way through the Ba’ath Party ranks to assume control of its security 
force in the early 1960s and he led a tightly controlled group called the Jihaz Haneen, or 
“instrument of yearning” that tolerated no challengers to its control.693 While multiple 
Middle Eastern governments were being toppled from within, the Ba’ath Party security 
forces repressed all opposition and imposed a reign of fear that would allow increased 
control. Taking the role of the party’s strongman, Hussein increasingly gained power 
until he was the de facto ruler and barely tolerated the formal president Ahmed Hassan 
al-Bakr, who had built the ruling political circle from their shared al-Tikriti clan. 
Following bloody internal purges in 1979, Hussein accepted Bakr’s resignation and stood 
as the supreme ruler of the country. Along with gaining political control, the Tikriti 
Ba’athists imposed a Sunni-dominated cultural perspective on the country, combining 
elements of Ba’ath doctrine with an emphasis on Iraq’s unique history and civilization.694 
This combination served to reinforce the idea of a dominant leader, while covering over 
sectarian divisions with a strong sense of historical greatness derived from the ancient 
empires, which ruled Mesopotamia in the past. Implicit in these efforts was the 
understanding that the Sunni minority held sway over society through its dominance of 
the key apparatus in the country, the political system, security organizations, armed 
services, and key ministries controlling finance, education, and essential services. In 
addition, Hussein and the Ba’ath Party co-opted the tribal power structures, legitimizing 
the idea of tribes and using sheikhs as a tool to be manipulated, while legitimizing 
kinship as a principle for selection.695 
After consolidating power, one of the first challenges facing Hussein was attacks 
from the growing ranks of Shi’a militants, including the al-Dawah Party and other semi-
clandestine organizations whose raids and terror attacks threatened the party and led to 
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violent clashes.696 This internal threat, fueled by a revolutionary Iran, and a desire for 
increased control in the region, led Hussein to attack Iran aggressively in September 
1980, which led to an eight-year war that ranks as the longest conventional war of the 
20th century. The war engulfed the two nations, at least a million people died and over 2 
million were wounded, at an estimated cost of $1.2 trillion dollars and incalculable social 
impacts.697 It ended in a stalemate and ceasefire but decimated Iraq’s social fabric, 
created enormous physical destruction and imposed economic strain that would lead to 
the next war—sparked by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The response by an 
international coalition of forces was the 1991 Gulf War, led by a month-long aerial 
bombing campaign, followed with an allied coalition that swept into Iraq and liberated 
Kuwait. The terms of the Gulf War ceasefire at Safwan allowed Hussein to keep his elite 
Republican Guards and continue flying helicopters, thereby, maintaining his ability to 
repress Shi’a and Kurdish internal uprisings brutally. 
In the decade that followed Hussein’s survival in the face of the allied coalition 
and internal uprisings, Iraq suffered under United Nations Security Council sanctions 
meant to dissuade Hussein from building his weapons arsenal. Inspectors from the UN 
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) would spend much of the decade in a hide-and-
seek game focused on the weapons capability of the Iraqi regime, while U.S. aircraft 
enforced a no-fly zone and struck selected targets to reduce Hussein’s capacity.698 
Despite multiple attempts at pressuring Hussein, little succeeded, and even coalition-
imposed sanctions began to wear thin in the court of international opinion. Following 
September 11, 2001, the preventive “Bush Doctrine” led to a full-court press to include 
Iraq in its list of targets and build a coalition willing to overthrow Hussein and his 
regime. All of this history built into shaping the events that would follow the U.S.-led 
coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
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C.  AQI BACKGROUND 
While most of the insurgent organizations in Iraq began after the fall of the Iraqi 
regime in 2003, al-Qaeda in Iraq had early beginnings. The organization evolved from a 
salafist jihadi group, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (One Unique God and Jihad), founded by Abu 
Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian born charismatic leader.699 As his name depicts, Zarqawi 
grew up in Zarqa, Jordan and dropped out of school to attend the war in Afghanistan as a 
young jihadi in 1989. While he missed the war against the Soviets, he participated as a 
makeshift reporter and then fighter during the battles between Islamist factions and the 
procommunists, and the civil war that followed. It was there that he met and was 
influenced by notable jihadist fighters and ideologists, such as Abu Mohammad al-
Maqdisi, and attended military training camps run by many of al-Qaeda’s early 
leaders.700 Returning to Jordan in 1993, Zarqawi was a marked Afghan veteran and 
formed a cell, Bayt al-Imam, with Maqdisi and other Jordanian jihadists. This cell 
conducted attacks against Jordanian authorities until it was disbanded and Zarqawi and 
Maqdisi arrested and placed in At Suwaqah prison in 1994.701 Upon his release from 
prison in 1999, Zarqawi returned to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and rallied a contingent of 
Jordanian Islamists who were introduced to and swore allegiance to al-Qaeda by the 
noted Jordanian confident of Osama bin Laden, Abu Zubaydah.702 Although welcomed 
as one of many foreign groups by al-Qaeda, in time, Zarqawi moved his group to the 
western city of Herat, where he displayed an increasing autonomy, set up a camp 
disguised as a religious school, and flew a banner at the entrance, which read Tawhid 
wal-Jihad. While in Herat, Zarqawi grew his organization, launched attacks, and 
established a small community of jihadists in Iraqi Kurdistan as a new front in the jihadist 
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struggle.703 Meshing with the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam (AI) paid dividends 
through a symbiotic relationship, based on Kurdish funding and contacts in Europe and 
training and links to al-Qaeda through Iran. These ties became more obvious when 
Mullah Krekar, the head of AI, was indicted in the wake of the “millennium plot” to 
bomb tourist targets in Jordan.704 
When the hunt for al-Qaeda began in 2001, Zarqawi and his group fled 
Afghanistan and moved across Iran to settle in the mountainous Kurdistan region of 
Iraq.705 The network of relationships Tawhid had formed allowed them to establish 
themselves rapidly in the Sargat region. Zarqawi used this base of operations to move 
throughout the region to conduct attacks, such as the one that killed the USAID diplomat 
Thomas Foley in Jordan in October 2002. While Zarqawi and Tawhid used the Kurdistan 
region as a base, their network ranged from Iran to Syria, and included contacts in 
Europe. While U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell cited Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq as 
proof of the country’s collusion with al-Qaeda, Zarqawi crossed multiple borders over 
nine years, facilitated by a network that spanned multiple countries.706 His long-standing 
nickname, al-Gharib, or the Stranger, seemed to reflect this level of transient activity, and 
would be emblematic of his organization’s foreign jihadi composition in the years to 
come.707 
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The U.S. invasion in 2003 brought a direct assault by U.S. Army SF and Kurdish 
Peshmerga forces against Zarqawi and the AI base in Sarqat, killing hundreds and 
scattering those that survived.708 As the larger Iraqi insurgency grew, Tawhid focused on 
rebuilding itself following the strikes in the north, but its first major attack, in August 
2003, which brought international attention, was a suicide attack on the UN headquarters 
in Baghdad. This noteworthy attack killed the chief of the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq 
Sérgio Vieira de Mello and another attack shortly after led to the withdrawal of most of 
the UN staff. Ten days later, a second major suicide attack, a car laden with explosives, 
killed the Shi’a Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Kaim and hundreds of Shi’a in the Imam 
Ali Mosque in Najaf.709 Further major suicide attacks followed against Shi’a worshippers 
in Baghdad and Karbala on March 2, while they were celebrating the Shi’a holiday of 
Ashura. Yet, even with these major terrorist bombings, the act that brought the most 
notoriety was the kidnapping and beheading of U.S. contractor Nicholas Berg in April 
2004, by Zarqawi under a Tawhid wal-Jihad banner.710 The savagery of this act shocked 
watchers, revealing its effectiveness as an act of terror, and with it, Zarqawi sent a 
message for the world to take notice, as well as a call to other jihadist groups to unite 
under his leadership to, “…make jihad and brandish the sword that the prophet has sent 
us.”711 In a letter captured by U.S. forces in January 2004, Zarqawi outlined Tawhid’s 
goals and methods and proposed a formal affiliation with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda: 
If you agree with us on it, if you adopt it as a program and road, and if you 
are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, we will be your 
readied soldiers, working under your banner, complying with your orders, 
and indeed swearing fealty to you publicly and in the news media, vexing 
the infidels and gladdening those who preach the oneness of God.712 
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This letter was part of a dialogue between Zarqawi and al-Qaeda senior leadership 
over his strategy to conduct terror attacks against Shi’a civilians, in an attempt to force 
division, a matter that became contentious and was always a source of frustration 
between the leadership elements.713 However, by late 2004, Zarqawi had sworn bayat to 
bin Laden, and in a response from bin Laden, he was introduced as the “commander of 
the al-Qaeda organization in the land of the Tigris and the Euphrates,” an organization 
named Tanzim al-Qaeda al-Jihadi fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Al Qaeda Organization in the 
Land of the Two Rivers, referred to as TQJBR or QJBR).714 This organization would 
subsequently be referred to by its shortened form of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) by both 
group members and the greater Iraqi population, and it assumed a semi-affiliated 
franchise status of the greater al-Qaeda organization. 
D.  THE IRAQ INSURGENCY: 2003–2006 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq was a showdown between two nation-states, resulting in 
a rapid victory, but it precipitated a much longer, and in many ways, more complex 
struggle. The initial invasion of Iraq in March 2003 featured unprecedented joint 
operations and a rapid advance to penetrate deep into Iraq from the north, west, and 
south, which resulted in the rapid disintegration of Iraqi forces, and their almost 
“mysterious” evaporation from the battlefield. U.S. and coalition special operations 
forces played a large role in the success of the initial invasion, which was a “lightning 
campaign” that lasted only 21 days.715 The Iraqi military was truly “overmatched” on the 
battlefield by the coalition’s combination of forces and capabilities, which featured, 
“…integrating ground maneuver, special operations, precision lethal fires, and non-lethal 
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effects.”716 Yet the rapid success of the invading forces in this first phase of the war 
quickly gave way to a far more difficult occupation. Former Iraqi dissident Ali Allawi 
explained, “the euphoria that accompanied this effortless victory quickly gave way to 
increasing bewilderment as to what to do with the ‘prize,’ as the occupiers came face to 
face with the realities of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and the mysteries of this most 
complex of countries….Nothing…could have prepared the Coalition…for what they 
actually found.”717 
By mid-July 2003, General John Abizaid, the new U.S. Central Command 
Commander, described the “postwar” levels of violence as a “classical guerrilla 
campaign,” and that “…the mid-level Ba’athist threat is the primary threat that we’ve got 
to deal with right now.”718 Yet even at that point, clandestine Ba’athist organizations 
were being overwhelmed and subsumed into a growing network of diverse and loosely 
affiliated insurgent groups. The majority of these groups were composed of Sunni Iraqi’s 
whose resistance to the U.S.-led occupation took strongest root in the Sunni tribal areas 
along the Euphrates and Tigris River valleys, and in such cities as Fallujah, Ramadi, 
Samarra, and Mosul. While most Shi’a, having been oppressed under Saddam Hussein’s 
Sunni-dominated rule, initially welcomed the overthrow of the regime, Iraq’s Sunnis lost 
much of their pre-eminent status.  
The combination of Sunni disenfranchisement exacerbated by Ambassador Paul 
Bremer’s decision to purge the government of Ba’athists and then disband the Iraqi Army 
produced a volatile mix of opposition. The insurgency that grew after the 2003 
occupation of Iraq was different from the unified and systematic efforts featured in Mao’s 
“people’s war,” but instead consisted of a diverse collection of multiple groups with 
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different aims. This complex, dynamic environment pitted over 40 named insurgent 
groups, each with their own ideological variations, motivations, and even tactics against a 
coalition of countries seeking to establish a central Iraqi government. Hardly a classic 
guerrilla war, as Bruce Hoffman stated, “…what is found in Iraq is the closest 
manifestation yet of netwar, the concept of warfare involving flatter, more linear 
networks rather than the pyramidal hierarchies and command and control systems (no 
matter how primitive) that have governed traditional insurgent organizations.”719 The 
majority of these groups were nationalistic in orientation, either fighting against the 
coalition occupation and/or to preserve their cultural, political and economic status. In 
addition, Iraq became a destination for transnational jihadis, attracted to the latest jihad to 
follow Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, and other flashpoints. Zarqawi’s QJBR, 
and then AQI, became a national organization to gravitate to, with its external networks, 
multi-national composition, and global salafist orientation. As Andrew Phillips stated, “in 
the chaotic aftermath of Saddam’s fall Iraq became an ideal venue for deterritorialized 
[sic] nomadic jihadists to prosecute their dream of unifying the ummah under the banner 
of a universal caliphate.”720 Despite the capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination 
of the Ba’ath Party hierarchy, the insurgency grew in size and scope. 
By April 2004, the insurgency flared into major combat when Sunni insurgents 
established a base of operations out of the city of Fallujah, and backed a growing foreign 
jihadist presence. The savage killing and celebration of the deaths of four contractors in 
the city sparked a U.S. Marine-led invasion against the growing jihadist presence. Led by 
AQI, a significant number of Sunni jihadists fiercely resisted U.S. Marine efforts to 
retake the city. After the Marines withdrew, the city became a further hotbed of insurgent 
activity, with AQI and other jihadist groups imposing harsh, puritanical practices based 
on sharia. These efforts, such as imposing salafist ideology, soon led to more coercive 
measures and horrific acts of violent intimidation as AQI sought to impose acceptance on 
the population by force. Also in the same month, the revelation of prisoner abuse at Abu 
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Ghraib prison greatly damaged the U.S. coalition’s credibility and added fuel to the 
already blazing insurgency. In November 2004, U.S. forces retook Fallujah in a massive 
urban battle, Operation Al Fajr (“New Dawn” in Arabic), but much of the AQI leadership 
and senior operatives had fled the city well in advance and sought to regain control in 
other areas through the Euphrates River Valley (ERV).721  
The election of the Iraqi Transitional government dominated the early part of 
2005, but its boycott by Sunni tribes showed that the main core of the insurgency still 
refused coalition and Iraqi government control. In addition, the large numbers of Kurdish 
and Shia participation ensured that the government was largely dominated by Shi’a 
parties, which furthered the threatened perception of the Sunnis. Fighters that had fled 
Fallujah were being pursued in the ERV and the northern Ninewah Province to which 
they had fled, and some even attempted to impose the same levels of control in Tal Afar. 
The newly elected Iraqi government became solidly Shi’a controlled, and more power 
was passed to newly formed elements of the Iraqi Army. In an effort to put Iraqis “in-the-
lead,” U.S. forces in and around Baghdad were pulled back to their forward operating 
bases (FOBs), believing that this would also reduce the escalating violence. 
The al-Askari, or “Golden,” Mosque bombing in Samarra on February 22, 2006 
resulted in no injuries, but the explosion destroyed much of the mosque, one of the holy 
sites of Shi’a Islam, and sparked intense sectarian violence. AQI claimed the attack, 
justified by Zarqawi’s strategy that, “our fighting against the Shi’a is the way to drag the 
nation [of Islam] into the battle,” and after countless high-profile bombings against Shi’a 
targets, the al-Askari mosque bombing provided the final straw.722 The bloodletting that 
followed split sectarian fault lines, and resulted in a sectarian civil war that raged for well 
over a year, which resulted in the ethnic cleansing of whole sections of Baghdad, and the 
weak, Shi’a-dominated government “…becoming an open partisan in a nasty civil war 
between Sunni and Shiite Arabs.”723 While Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike at a 
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house outside of Baqubah in June 2006, the clash he unleashed pitted Sunni versus Shi’a 
and would be the dominant feature throughout 2006, and threatened the very idea of Iraq 
itself.724 
1. U.S. Invasion and Occupation 
The initial invasion of Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), achieved historical 
levels of joint synchronized operations, and despite resistance from irregular Iraqi units, 
swiftly moved towards securing key objectives. The overall invasion forces were 
relatively small, which demonstrated that force ratios matter less than other elements of 
combat power and capabilities that were overwhelmingly in the United States’ favor. In 
addition, the invasion made extensive use of U.S. and coalition SOF, combining them in 
ways that provided additional capabilities. Their employment included subversion, 
strategic reconnaissance, deceptive maneuver, and, in conjunction with Kurdish 
Peshmerga forces, the truly unconventional direct confrontation and defeat of the 
Northern Iraqi Army. This initial success highlighted integration in support of coalition 
forces, and overwhelmingly surmounted the “difficulties” associated with the 
employment of special operations in the support of conventional forces.725 
However, the initial occupation of Iraq grew problematic almost as soon as the 
initial objectives were seized. To begin with, U.S. senior leaders failed to understand the 
complex dynamics of Iraq, had no overall strategy for peacekeeping and stability efforts, 
and made costly mistakes that fueled growing resentment from Iraq’s population.726 It 
was, as Kilcullen stated, “a disaster of our own making.”727 In addition, the lack of a 
coherent focus on the changing situation meant that the war shifted to “…a forward 
operating base defense plan and a main supply route (MSR) sustainment operation, with 
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the force becoming languid and complacent, fixed in an effort just to maintain.”728 U.S. 
forces, focused on their recent, largely conventional victory, failed to understand that the 
nature of the environment had changed. “Instead of switching to an unconventional 
approach for defeating the insurgency, however, the coalition maintained a conventional 
style in most of its engagements, all the while building bureaucratic systems to emulate 
garrison activities found on installations in the U.S. and other military compounds 
throughout the world.”729 Conventional forces that had prepared to fight a war of 
maneuver, complete with tanks and artillery, were now searching for ways to cope with a 
new form of opponent, and an asymmetry in warfare that was both difficult to accept and 
comprehend.730  
Small teams of U.S. Army SF and other SOF elements understood the changing 
situation, having prepared and trained for just such an environment, and continued to 
attempt to influence local security and pursue those responsible for the growing levels of 
violence.731 In addition, far-sighted local conventional commanders, usually at the 
battalion levels, understood the changing dynamics, and instituted policies and local 
outreach that achieved levels of effectiveness with little to no guidance from higher 
headquarters. SOF were successfully employed throughout the evolving conflict against 
numerous insurgent groups, and while the invasion witnessed the largest use of special 
operations in history, it was actually their performance after the initial phase of the war 
that would prove the most significant.732  
The U.S. occupation force was organized as a traditional military hierarchy, one 
that retained much of the combat headquarters from the conventional invasion. However, 
despite a change in mission, these larger headquarters remained, providing additional, 
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and at times, competing layer of bureaucracy. Three major headquarters, the Multi-
National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and the Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), provide four and three star 
level headquarters inside Iraq. These major headquarters provided for division of labor, 
but also contributed to confusion in strategy and competition for resources, as Colonel 
Dominic Caracillo recounted, “more specifically, there are too many headquarters in Iraq 
vying for power and the limited resources available. A running joke in the theater among 
subordinate commanders, when posed with the challenges of answer to multiple 
headquarters, was ‘never have so few been commanded by so many.’”733 An excess 
bureaucracy, combined with many leaders without combat experience at lower levels led 
to increasing oversight and micromanagement. Caracillo described the effects well, 
noting, “bureaucracies lead to commands starved for information, which leads to mistrust 
of subordinate commanders and staff, which in turn leads to countless investigations and 
overly structured hierarchical command.”734 Further, divisions in higher-level 
headquarters translated to ambiguous command relations further down the chain of 
command, which resulted in difficulties in the development of overall capability among 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Tellingly, the notable successes that occurred from 2003–
2006 resulted from tactical units, usually at the brigade-level and below, taking initiative 
based on the local situation.735 Notable examples include the 3rd Armored Calvary 
Regiment (ACR) under Colonel H.R. McMaster successfully providing population-
centric security in Tal Afar, the combined efforts of the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry 
(Airborne) and Army SF establishing a viable police force and security presence in the 
city of Kirkuk, and the bold clear-hold-build strategy employed by Colonel Sean 
MacFarland’s 1st Brigade, 1st Armor Division (1/1 AD) in Ramadi. 
A lack of overall counter-insurgency strategy in the early years of the war 
reflected a lack of understanding and willingness to accept the situation in Iraq, as well as 
a lack of coherent doctrine. While some tactical-level commanders understood the nature 
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of the environment, and relied on fragments of counter-insurgency doctrine in older 
manuals, most defaulted to conducting largely military-focused operations, such as direct 
targeting and large-scale cordon and searches. Many other junior leaders, seeking the 
most current lessons-learned, built a network of understanding on the website, 
CompanyCommand.com.736 The most current doctrinal manual available was the U.S. 
Army Field Manual 3-7, Stability and Support Operations, which was released just prior 
to the start of OIF. While far too broad to cover COIN details, it did provide useful 
general guidelines , but it was limited by its assumption that U.S. forces would provide 
advice and support rather than conduct operations themselves.737 Realizing that it needed 
a comprehensive doctrine specific to COIN, the Army released Field Manual Interim 
(FMI) 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, which elaborated on previous concepts 
and doctrine. Yet, even this step in the right doctrinal direction was not enough to change 
practices on the ground, as Austin Long describes in the RAND assessment of U.S. 
COIN practices from 2003–2006:  
The U.S. military’s actual conduct of COIN in Iraq from 2003 to 2005 can 
charitably be described as highly variable. The military used an array of 
approaches ranging from firepower intensive raids to population security. 
This variation seems to have depended partly on understandable 
differences, such as the region and time period, but mostly appears to be 
due to different commanders.738 
Although the establishment of a “COIN Academy” for all incoming leaders commanding 
in Iraq was a step in the right direction, most forces continued to implement very 
different practices from the emerging COIN doctrine. An example is Operation Swarmer 
in March 2006, conducted by the 101st Infantry Division (Air Assault) in and around 
Samarra, which was described as the largest air-assault operation to-date, but which 
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swept through areas largely empty of insurgents.739 Robert Komer spoke to this 
difference between doctrine and organizational practices in a 1972 diagnosis of the U.S. 
Army’s performance in Vietnam, noting: “equally striking is the sharp discontinuity 
between the mixed counterinsurgency strategy which U.S. and GVN policy called for 
from the outset, and the overwhelmingly conventional and militarized nature of our 
response.”740 The reasons for which lie deep in the organizational culture of traditional 
militaries’ penchant for high-intensity conflict, a culture that emphasizes large battles and 
maximum use of firepower, while also emphasizing friendly force protection measures 
leading to large bases separated from the population.741 Some examples of practices 
matching doctrine existed, as U.S. SOF sought to follow COIN principles within their 
doctrinal Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission. Throughout the country, small teams 
were embedded, or stood up Iraqi Army and police units, generally lived off the FOBs, 
and conductedg HUMINT-driven operations with their local Iraqi partners. However, 
overall, these efforts were too few, disconnected, and dispersed to truly pressure a 
shifting insurgent network, and with few exceptions, primarily focused on developing 
local ISF capability to conduct raids against insurgent threats. 
As a fragmented implementation of doctrine would imply, operational methods 
used by U.S. forces also varied. The standard practice was large-scale cordon and 
searches for insurgents; while these usually featured Iraqi Army forces, they were short-
duration operations that provided little enduring security, nor did much to gain local 
support.742 As U.S. forces consolidated themselves even further onto FOBs, their only 
real presence in many areas was such large-scale operations, which promoted a vicious 
cycle in which insurgents were provided freedom of maneuver most of the time, and 
could flow back into areas and capitalize on local dissatisfaction with a heavy occupation 
presence. Caught between an increasingly level of deadly insurgent capabilities, such as 
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IEDs, RPGs, and armored-piercing grenades and light-skinned vehicles, coalition forces 
were challenged just to maintain freedom of movement in many areas. As John Arquilla 
and Doug Borer describe, “American troops, laagered in for the most part on about three 
dozen large forward operating bases (FOBs), were necessarily slow to reach sites that had 
been attacked, predictable in their patrolling movements, and of little deterrent value.”743 
Operationally, SOF focused on targeting enemy insurgent leadership and added the 
growing number of groups to target lists that had once been exclusively focused on 
Ba’ath Party leadership, or foreign regime elements (FRE). In many ways, SOF remained 
true to its core missions, with Army SF and Navy SEALS focused on partnering with 
small Iraqi units to fight at the local level and JSOTFs targeting senior leadership. 
Following the second offensive against Fallujah, these JSOTFs began pursuing the entire 
AQI network, and focused on capturing or killing foreign fighters and the elusive 
leadership. The brunt of this effort centered on the ERV, where AQI had insulated itself 
in several tribes, most notably the al-Rawi tribe. Efforts to deny AQI a sanctuary in the 
ERV, such as Operation Snake Eyes, were the first true counter-network operations 
conducted in Iraq, in which the focus extended beyond a single leadership figure.744 
These efforts dramatically increased pressure against AQI along the river valley, which 
forced most of their leadership out of the ERV and into the areas surrounding Baghdad. 
The U.S.-led coalition began the war with every effort to provide for a high 
degree of information flow, with embedded media in nearly every unit participating in the 
invasion. Yet despite this open acceptance of media, as the coalition faced challenges, it 
appeared to be constantly on the defensive with respect to information strategy. In an 
open letter to President George Bush in January 2006, Joseph Collins, a former Bush 
administration official, predicted, “if our strategic communications on Iraq don’t 
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improve, the strategy for victory will fail and disastrous consequences will follow.”745 
Ironically, the radically changed environment in Iraq meant that where formerly satellite 
TV was forbidden, soon after the invasion, the country was flooded with satellite dishes 
and an information-starved society was inundated with media. In this atmosphere, one 
would have expected U.S. and coalition forces to make a major communications effort to 
educate the people of Iraq concerning the goals of the coalition forces and the transition 
to democratic rule. However, the United States seemed to have had no real outreach plan. 
Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz, former MNC-I commander succinctly stated: 
We are not consistently achieving synergy and mass in our strategic 
communications (consisting of IO, public affairs [PA], public diplomacy, 
and military diplomacy) from the strategic to the tactical level….The 
collective belief is that we lack the necessary skills, resources, and 
guidance to synchronize IO in order to achieve tangible results on the 
battlefield…..In some respects we seem tied to our legacy doctrine and 
less than completely resolved to cope with the benefits and challenges of 
information globalization.746 
Overall, the U.S.-led coalition displayed a dramatic disconnect between stated 
strategies and actual actions, which demonstrated a lack of meaningful information 
strategy. An emphasis on withdrawal, when Iraqis wanted security, an emphasis on 
freedom, when Iraqis wanted justice, and a general display of actions that undercut U.S. 
efforts “…indicates the administration [U.S.] lacks the flexibility that is an absolute 
requirement to deal with a networked, agile enemy.”747  
2.  AQI Network Response 
The Iraqi insurgency resulted from a complex combination of factors, some of 
which were both foreseen and preventable.748 Yet, regardless, the threat it posed to 
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coalition forces and an emerging Iraqi government presented difficulties that seemed 
insurmountable. The primarily Iraqi-led popular insurgency grew in scope and diversity 
to include numerous insurgent groups. AQI was the most catalytic and infamous of the 
groups, recognized as a part of the Al-Qaeda network by Osama bin Laden in December 
2004.749 AQI’s violent tactics, use of information operations, and quest for organizational 
control combined to make it a unique opponent. The sophisticated nature of AQI’s 
tactics, its ability to connect with global jihadist networks, and its funneling of foreign 
fighters into the insurgency led to its designation as a primary threat to coalition efforts.  
Initially, AQI sought to achieve control of western Iraq, primarily the ERV, and 
use it as a safe haven from which to launch attacks against coalition forces and the 
emerging Iraqi government. This safe haven required the support of the tribal Sunni 
population, which was recognized by AQI as necessary for concealing its growing 
foreign composition.750 Forming ties with the Sunni populace provided access to 
information on local conditions and a base of popular support for the jihadist struggle. 
Zarqawi sought to build a network of areas throughout the country that would support 
such activity, claiming early in the war that “we have taken possession of growing 
numbers of locations, praise be to God, to be base sites for brothers who are kindling [the 
fire of] war and drawing out the people of the country into the furnace of battle so that a 
real war will break out, God willing.”751 His strategy consisted of two main components 
focused, not on the U.S. occupation forces, but on the “underlying sectarian divisions in 
Iraqi society,” as well as an unyielding salafist ideology.752 However, AQI’s partnership 
with the Sunni tribes in al-Anbar was short lived and their coercive practices provided the 
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motivational roots for Sunni tribal resistance, beginning as early as 2005.753 Further, 
dramatic targeting efforts by coalition SOF throughout the ERV pressured AQI, forcing it 
in turn, to resort to more heavy-handed methods to maintain control. As Marine Major 
General John F. Kelley described, “over time, however, it [AQI] overplayed its hand and 
wore out its welcome by forcing an extreme Islamic agenda on a generally secular and 
very tribal culture. Al-Qaeda’s campaign evolved from assistance, to persuasion, to 
intimidation, to murder in the most horrific ways, all designed to intimidate Anbari 
society….”754  
By 2006, heavily pursued by coalition SOF in the ERV, AQI consolidated control 
in key areas surrounding Baghdad, such as Yousifiyah, Abu Ghraib, and Tarmiyah, and 
embarked on a campaign for control of the “Baghdad belts.” The focus of these attacks 
was against targets in Baghdad, recognizing its primary role as a hub of media operations. 
In addition, it sought to maintain control in Ramadi and Mosul, viewing them as strategic 
sites for Al-Anbar and Ninewah Provinces, respectively.  
As an organization, AQI expanded from its initial core of Tawhid operatives by 
starting small, connected, cells throughout the country, initially gaining local support for 
its efforts to oppose the U.S. presence. These cells were spread into nine regions within 
northern and western Iraq, headed by notable leaders, such as Umar Bazyani in Baghdad, 
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Abu Talha in Mosul, and Abu Nawras al-Faluji in Fallujah.755 It did this by forming ties 
with local tribes through a variety of ways, including offering training assistance, bribery, 
and intermarriage within the tribal structure. Although effective in securing initial 
support, the coercive presence and strict salafist practices of AQI offended much of the 
tribal Sunni population. As the senior sheikh of the Albu Mahal tribe stated after the six 
months of AQI control of Fallujah, “…the second one [Battle for Fallujah] changed the 
view and the vision of the people against al-Qaeda, because they started to realize who al-
Qaeda are. Al-Qaeda are people who kill, demolish houses, rape people, so the people 
started to change their view of the resistance.”756 Within the AQI organization, a core 
group of foreign jihadists provided leadership and direction, establishing connections 
with a dispersed network of regional cells. These cells were headed by “Emirs,” which in 
some cases, were promoted into those positions based on the number of people they had 
killed.757 At the higher leadership levels, AQI maintained a tight cadre of foreigners, 
providing a semblance of hierarchy, and emulating the larger al-Qaeda core leadership 
structure, which functions as a command cadre.758 While descriptions of such structure 
use terms like chain-of-command and hierarchy, the levels of connectivity within the 
organization creates a larger network, as evidenced by AQI’s regional connections, 
flexibility, and information flow. In this sense, AQI functions like a core-periphery 
network, maintaining a central leadership structure, but forming connections and 
providing autonomy to dispersed cells to conduct operational activity. In an effort to 
broaden its appeal following the December elections of 2005 and reconnect with its 
diminishing Sunni base of support, AQI formed the “Mujahedeen Shura Council” (MSC), 
                                                 
755 Brisard, Zarqawi, 137; “Copy of Security Report on Al-Zarqawi, Ansar al-Sunnah Groups,” from 
“Al-Zarqawi Was the mastermind of the attack on Dr. Barham,” published by Iraqi independent weekly 




756 Despite these initial reactions to AQI’s brutal practices and strict ideology, it would take the proper 
circumstances for the tribes to truly stand up to AQI. Sheikh Sabah al Sattam, as quoted in Montgomery 
and McWilliams, ed. Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume II, 143.  
757 Hashim, Insurgency & Counter-insurgency in Iraq, 144. 
758 Gunaratna and Oreg, “Al-Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution,” 1045, 1065.  
 272
in January 2006.759 The concept behind the MSC appeared to recreate some of the initial 
unity of purpose during the early stages of the war, such as the early siege of Fallujah 
when most of the mujahedeen factions were proud to conduct joint operations with AQI. 
An indicator of this effort is the appointment of an Iraqi, “Abu Omar al-Baghdadi,” as the 
titular head of the MSC, allowing Zarqawi and other key foreigners to move out of 
spotlight.760 With Zarqawi’s death in June 2006, and his replacement by another 
foreigner, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian jihadi with field experience since the 1980s, 
AQI again sought further integration with Sunni insurgents. After a period of internal 
reorganization, on October 15, 2006, the MSC spokesman. al-Baghdadi, announced the 
formation of the “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI).761 Each of these efforts reflected an overall 
strategy of portraying the AQI organization as part of a larger, inclusive struggle. 
While utilizing guerrilla-like raids and ambushes against U.S. and coalition 
forces, AQI quickly adopted a larger doctrine emphasizing terror attacks that would have 
a more significant effect than just military losses. This doctrine was largely based on 
intimidation using terror attacks that utilized suicide bombers and vehicle-borne IEDs 
(VBIEDs), kidnappings and executions, and assassination of Iraqi figures and coalition 
supporters.762 Realizing that over time the Sunni population might gradually be drawn 
into the growing ISF and co-opted by coalition promises, Zarqawi’s strategy was to 
provoke the Shi’a into a fury, and thereby, create a threat that would rally the Sunni’s 
under AQI’s banner:  
In our view they [Shi’a] are the key element of change. I mean that in 
making them our targets and striking at the heart of [their] religious, 
political, and military structures we will trigger their rage against the 
Sunnis…[forcing them] to bare their fangs and reveal the sly rancor that 
drives them from deep within. If we manage to draw them onto the terrain 
of partisan war, it will be possible to tear the Sunnis away from their 
heedlessness, for they will feel the weight of the imminence of 
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danger….Most of the Sunnis are aware of the danger these people 
represent, distrust it, and know what would happen if they let them gain 
power.763 
This overall strategy promoted an offensively focused doctrine that used terror tactics to 
generate significant effects against the Shi’a population, or symbolic targets, and/or 
generate significant media coverage. In addition, AQI clearly demonstrated the ability to 
swarm in ways that provide a significant challenge to combat. Using suicide bombers and 
VBIEDs, AQI conducted terror operations that featured multiple attacks simultaneously 
across Baghdad. These attacks were designed to intimidate the local population, portray 
the Iraqi and coalition forces as incapable of providing security, and generate significant 
media coverage. For example, in July 2005, 27 civilians were killed when a suicide attack 
struck U.S. soldiers passing out aid, and another 25 killed when 10 suicide bombers 
struck targets in coordinated attacks in Baghdad.764 
Operationally, AQI cells conducted terror attacks within this rough doctrinal 
framework, striking coalition forces with ambushes and raids. Drawing on past jihadist 
experience, its organizational framework, and the asymmetric nature of the fight in Iraq, 
AQI (and the greater Iraqi insurgency) featured raiding as a central operational concept. 
In many ways, these surprise attacks had come full circle because they had been a core 
aspect of an original Bedouin way of fighting that originated in Arabia. Such tactics were 
well suited to rural areas, but were also adapted to fighting in urban areas, as the fierce 
fighting in the complex urban terrain of Fallujah demonstrated. As Richard Shultz noted, 
“these highly unpredictable, loosely networked, and adaptive groups of guerrillas and 
terrorists come together to strike and then disperse with considerable skill. They 
epitomize the urbanization of conflict today.”765 AQI also emphasized high-profile 
VBIED attacks, and this weapon became a hallmark ingredient of AQI’s campaign of 
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bombings and deadly mass attacks.766 The use of VBIEDs provided a stealth capability 
for devastating attacks displaying potent economy of force, even when guided by a 
suicide driver. An early 2005 assessment of Salafi Web sites found 154 names of foreign 
jihadist fighters that had died in Iraq, with 33 of those reportedly “martyred” while 
executing suicide attacks.767 Another report estimates that of the 440 suicide attacks 
occurring between March 2003 and August 2006, at least 30 percent were AQI 
operations.768 In addition to providing the spark that started the Sunni-Shi’a civil war 
inside Iraq, AQI also became its chief executioners. Small cells conducted kidnappings, 
executions, and assassination of those who opposed its efforts at control. During the 
vicious sectarian struggle for control of Baghdad neighborhoods, AQI cells would 
literally kidnap entire families from their homes, execute them and dump the bodies in 
the streets. These attacks provoked a vicious Shia response, as “death-squads” led by 
Shia militias, retaliated in kind. AQI drew financial support from a variety of sources, 
including donations from both internal and external sources. Further, AQI generated 
increasingly used criminal operations to generate larger amounts of money inside Iraq, a 
component that grew to become a significant operational endeavor. Much of their 
bankroll was gained through physical extortion of Iraqi business and U.S.-funded 
contractors, a practice so pervasive it touched nearly every enterprise, which 
demonstrated the extensive operational efforts. Further highlighting the abilities of 
fighting networks, AQI displayed an ability to innovate through adaptive tactics: 
As a result, the astute enemy has continued to outpace us in the use of 
actions combined with information and backed up by more actions. 
Kidnappings followed by video tapes of beheadings are designed to shock 
and strike fear into the hearts of soldiers and civilians alike. Terrorist acts 
that target anyone working with U.S. Coalition forces are aimed at 
preventing such cooperation. Destruction of pipelines is designed to give 
the population of Iraq the idea that the Coalition cannot secure anything. 
IEDs are aimed at making the U.S. forces, in particular, ‘heavy up,’ and  
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avoid contact by staying in their base camps. Interestingly enough, these 
IEDs are frequently videotaped and put up on blog sites for the media to 
pick up in the nightly news.769  
AQI’s operational efforts display a strong information component, and its overall 
campaign reflects an understanding of information strategy. As Lt. Gen. Metz stated, 
“further complicating our efforts in the information domain is the fact that we are facing 
an adaptive, relentless, and technologically savvy foe who recognizes that the global 
information network is his most effective tool for attacking what he perceives to be our 
center of gravity: public opinion, both domestic and international.”770 AQI’s information 
strategy sought to achieve three broad objectives: first, rally Sunni support and recruit for 
their brand of insurgency; second, demonstrate to al-Qaeda that it was capable of carrying 
the torch of jihad in Iraq; and third, mobilize public opinion in the West against the 
occupation. The tools available to them included advanced digital imaging, broadband 
Internet connectivity, satellite communications, all of which could be accessed from 
nearly everywhere on the modern irregular battlefield. AQI quickly demonstrated the 
power of information in modern conflict, which validated the claim that “the camera has 
more importance than the weapon, video is worth more than a thousand sermons.”771 As 
an example of this importance, one of AQI’s most critical posts was the “Media Emir,” 
held by Abu-Maysara al-Iraqi for some time. Most of AQI’s operations have an 
information component to them, from an IED attack to a large-scale suicide bombing. 
The “flash-to-bang” between a bombing and its posting on the Internet was, in many 
cases, just minutes. In addition, many operations, most notoriously kidnappings and 
filmed executions are planned and conducted for the express purpose of sending a 
message. Beginning with the execution of Nick Berg in May 2004 and lasting until the 
killing of Zarqawi, such executions formed a critical part of AQI’s messaging, and 
provided one of the most effective ways of ensuring a terror threat is both “more horrible 
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and more credible.”772 In addition, his graphic use of beheading followed extensive 
efforts designed to communicate its legitimacy to the Muslim world. Combining such 
horrific, very real, actions that shocked audiences, with misleading information, such as 
the imprisonment and abuse of women in American jails, actually contributed to the 
“emotional” power of AQI’s overall message.773 Further, AQI’s use of the Internet and a 
myriad of jihadist websites have a greater reach than most leading Arabic-language 
newspapers, and they promote the “truth” AQI wants its audience to see.774 
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3. Analysis of Counter-Network Framework 
a. Offensive Swarming 
Critical components of offensive swarming are surprise, operational 
tempo, and pulsing. Each of these elements requires having precise intelligence, or 
information about where targets are located, patience to collect intelligence in view of 
long-term effects, and the ability to strike without revealing oneself. The majority of U.S. 
forces simply lacked intelligence about the insurgency, and in the early days of the 
conflict, even denied that it existed. The daunting task of pursuing an irregular enemy in 
a foreign culture led to large-scale operations that attempted to deny areas to the enemy, 
cordon-and-search missions for “suspected” insurgents, and sweeps for caches and IED-
producing materials. While these efforts were conducted with the best of intentions, its 
largely conventional nature had little overall effect on elusive enemy networks. While 
offensive in nature, the attacks on Fallujah provide an example of AQI’s ability to dodge 
even the heaviest of blows; although deciding to fight, many fighters and most leadership 
dispersed to other locations. Even SOF missions, largely intelligence-driven, aimed 
primarily at capturing key leaders, or high-value individuals (HVIs) within the AQI 
network, were a legacy from the leadership targeting of the FRE. It would not be until 
several years into the war that SOF elements would transition to effective offensive 
swarming.  
b. Illumination 
Displaying a dramatic deficit of cultural understanding and awareness of 
the nature of the irregular struggle, U.S. forces largely lacked both the insights and the 
capabilities required for successful illumination of the AQI network. As one U.S. 
intelligence officer said, “this lack of understanding has chased us since our haphazard 
beginnings of the war to the fitful, reactive, and stodgy manner that we prosecute the war 
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today.”775 The complex network of insurgent groups, with different compositions, 
motivations, and aims all served to complicate efforts to further understand the enemy 
threat, let alone isolate the most deadly group. As Bing West wrote, “American and Iraqi 
soldiers have no idea who their enemies are. In the rare instances when insurgents are 
actually captured, American rules and a corrupt Iraqi judicial system have converged to 
ensure that most are released….”776 Most efforts at illumination were focused on enemy 
operational activity once an attack occurred, an IED exploded, or kidnapping occurred, 
but was usually limited to addressing that specific incident rather than using that event as 
a lever for further insights into the network. Local collection efforts were largely 
confounded by the lack of skilled HUMINT practitioners throughout the force, and 
infiltration efforts a bridge too far.777 Following the revelations of Abu Ghraib travesties 
in April 2004, much of the coalition recoiled from efforts to conduct meaningful 
exploitation, and detainees were shuttled to larger holding facilities, and in many cases, 
quickly released. In fact, this recidivism came to be seen as a symbol of the larger 
Sisyphean struggle U.S. forces faced, as “the net result is that more than 80 percent of 
those detained are released within six months and usually in less than one month.”778 
While many of those released were obtusely detained during large-scale sweeps, releases 
also included hard-core fighters. These shortcomings, combined with a lack of 
information management and sharing, or a lack of organizational fusion, served to short 
circuit illumination efforts. Multiple factors led to an ignorance of “…one of the most 
fundamental axioms of counterinsurgency warfare: an insurgency cannot be defeated if 
the enemy cannot be identified.”779 
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c. Information Disruption 
Information disruption capability and activities flows from a proper 
overall information strategy, which, as discussed previously, was largely lacking in early 
U.S. efforts. AQI’s overall purpose was to conduct jihad against the U.S. occupation and 
deny Shi’a control in Iraq, and many U.S. actions contributed to reinforcing this 
narrative. In addition, even U.S. statements reinforced this message, as displayed by a 
White House statement that “we’re dealing with some foreign terrorists, who are coming 
in from outside the country to fight what they believe is an extremely important jihad.”780 
Efforts to deny, or channel, AQI’s information flows were largely non-existent due to its 
access to multiple avenues of communication, most notably the Internet. Clearly, some 
collection efforts were in place, but for most of the early years of the war, these efforts 
had little focus. Most deception efforts remain classified, but with few other noticeable 
information disruption efforts, it is logical to assume that they were rarely incorporated. 
d. Fusion 
Fusion is primarily about shared intent that creates organizational 
connectivity and doctrinal synchronization. While U.S. forces in Iraq were clear on their 
primary task—to defeat Saddam and overthrow the Ba'athist Regime—once that was 
accomplished most of the strength of intent was lost. The primary reasons for a weakened 
intent were a lack of shared doctrinal understanding, mixed messages about how the war 
was being fought, and what the future held for U.S. forces. Notably, even into mid-2006, 
many U.S. forces were preparing for withdrawal and saw transitioning most of their 
efforts to ISF as the way ahead.781 Given the lack of overall shared strategy, units shared 
little connection throughout the country and were primarily focused on maintaining an 
“over watch” status for their respective areas. SOF, while developing their own internal  
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systems for meshing operations and intelligence actives, were still largely focused on 
unilateral targeting, working with other forces where required, but not in an integrated 
fashion. 
E.  THE IRAQ INSURGENCY: 2006–PRESENT 
The second phase of the Iraqi conflict witnessed significant shifts and the gradual 
assumption of control by U.S. and Iraqi forces. This shift, while dramatic, had multiple 
antecedents, the most significant of which began in 2006, but whose full effects were not 
realized until more than a year later. The most significant of these antecedents was an 
increase in SOF’s precision targeting of AQI, the horrific sectarian violence instigated by 
AQI, and the Awakening movement by the Al-Anbar tribes.  
By early 2006, SOF efforts against AQI in the ERV resulted in an AQI shift 
towards a strategy of surrounding Baghdad by staging in the areas encircling Baghdad, or 
it’s “belts.” Baghdad, with its large population and densely vegetated surrounding 
regions, provided a better safe haven than the narrow corridor of the ERV. Further, by 
concentrating its attacks in Baghdad, AQI was able to maximize its information effects, 
and gained considerable coverage with near daily devastating bombings throughout the 
capital. 
Following the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006, Shi’a reprisals against 
Sunnis brought the bloodletting that AQI’s strategy sought. In the midst of U.S. 
withdrawal discussions, Iraq was suddenly pitched into a massive sectarian confrontation, 
as Kilcullen explained: 
During the rest of that year, an immense tide of blood washed over Iraq. 
Large parts of Baghdad were ‘ethnically cleansed’; entire populations 
were killed and driven out. Hundreds of Iraqis died every week—Shi’ites 
in AQI and insurgent terrorist attacks, Sunnis in death squad executions by 
Shi’a communitarian militias retaliating for those attacks.782  
As violence grew dramatically, reaching horrific proportions in the winter of 2006–2007, 
the landscape of Baghdad and surrounding areas slowly changed. Shi’a militias, many in 
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ISF employment, actually gained the upper hand against AQI and the Sunni population 
was the ultimate loser as entire neighborhoods were driven out. Although part of 
Zarqawi’s plan, the Shi’a violence he provoked led to a loss of control of large areas of 
Baghdad, these internal struggles, combined with aggressive targeting of AQI, resulted in 
the loss of once strongly held AQI neighborhoods and regions. 
A significant factor in breaking AQI’s stranglehold, and reversing the momentum 
of the conflict was the Sahwah, “Awakening,” of the Al-Anbar tribes. This awakening 
signaled a dramatic overt conflict between AQI and the Sunni tribes in the western 
province. Origins of this conflict appeared earlier, as the first evidence of strains between 
Sunni tribal leaders and AQI was the fighting that occurred beginning in May 2005, 
between tribal leaders in Husaybah and Al-Qaim. While tension existed between some 
tribes and AQI, overall, the strained relationship continued due to AQI’s violent control, 
and the tribes’ vacillation about firmly picking sides between AQI and a Shi’a dominated 
government. Increasingly coercive local actions by AQI, such as the mistreatment of the 
daughter of the Albu Jassim tribe and the brutal execution by beheading of Sheikh Abu 
Ali Jassim of the Anbar People’s Council, provided the sparks that ignited the 
awakening, and were used by tribal leaders to rally support.783 The leading spokesman 
for the Anbari tribal coalition resulting from the awakening, the Anbar Salvation Council 
(ASC), was Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha who defiantly spoke out against AQI. Having 
lost his father and three of his brothers to fights with AQI, and with a “gangster” 
background, he willingly became the front man for the awakening, declaring war against 
AQI in September 2006.784 The partnership that resulted between Col. MacFarland’s 1/1 
AD in Ramadi and the ASC sheikhs would provide the catalyst for contesting AQI in 
Ramadi, and then throughout Al-Anbar. Capitalizing on the growth of the Al-Anbar tribal 
militias securing their own region, U.S. commanders initiated a complimentary program, 
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the Sons of Iraq (SOI) to put other local, part-time security forces in charge of securing 
other areas. These programs proved highly successful and essentially incorporated former 
insurgents providing local security, and drew fighters away from AQI with a paycheck. 
By the end of 2006 and into early 2007, most senior U.S. officials were calling 
AQI the driving force behind the insurgency. On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus called 
AQI “probably public enemy number one,” in Iraq. While several months later, MNF-I 
spokesman Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, stated that AQI was responsible for 80–90 
percent of the suicide bombings in Iraq, and that its defeat was the main focus of U.S. 
operations.785 Yet, over the course of a year, AQI forces were dramatically disrupted 
throughout the Baghdad belts, highlighted by the destruction of key leadership and 
operational capabilities. The primary factor in this effort was a JSOTF-led campaign that 
connected multiple organizations, units, and capabilities together in a combined targeting 
effort. This effort was driven by joint employment of a unique combination of 
intelligence and operational activity, enhanced by an integration of technological 
breakthroughs. As General David Petraeus stated in a September 2008, BBC interview, 
“in fact, the breakthrough is not any one technological capability or intelligence advance: 
it is the fusion of all of those.”786 The fusion of high levels of intelligence with 
experience and ground-level tactical understanding of the environment presented a 
powerful display of joint operations.  
In January 2007, President Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq, built on a 
counter-insurgency focus developed by an advisory team, and which “surged” U.S. forces 
to key areas. These forces provided a critical component missing in much of the counter-
insurgency efforts to date, local presence to ensure security. Following on the heels of the 
awakening and the relentless pursuit of AQI, these forces allowed for sustained local 
engagement and security with physical control of Baghdad’s key sectors. More 
importantly than just forces, however, was the strategy that employed them in small units 
and emphasized their connection to the local population. 
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By 2008, severely disrupted AQI elements were primarily focused further north, 
seeking to re-organize and establish safe havens in northern Iraq.787 Simultaneously, the 
flow of foreign fighters and resources was shifted further north, and operational activity 
in Baghdad limited to increasingly infrequent, but notably spectacular, attacks. Special 
operations efforts with partner Iraqi forces were also developing into robust counter-
insurgent capabilities throughout the country. This synchronized combination of special 
operations employment provided a unique capability that allowed coalition forces to 
regain control within Iraq, and begin the long process of transition to stability. In General 
Petraeus’s testimony to Congress in April 2008, he stated that the SOI, coupled with 
“relentless pursuit” of AQI by U.S. forces, had “reduced substantially” the threat AQI 
posed.788  
Within a year, violence fell dramatically in Iraq, and the death of numerous AQI 
leadership figures prevented AQI from regenerating. Further, intensive targeting 
systematically collapsed critical AQI infrastructure, such as its media operations and 
extortion-based financing. A prominent feature of this targeting was combined efforts 
with increasingly capable Iraqi forces, which led to numerous breakthroughs against the 
network, including the death of Abu Umar al Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri in 
2010.789 In a larger sense, SOF employment supported the comprehensive 
counterinsurgency strategy, and did so by providing special operations expertise against a 
challenging opponent in an unprecedented manner. By the close of 2010, most observers 
were saying that AQI had been severely degraded, to the point that it no longer posed a 
significant threat to the government of Iraq.790  
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1. U.S. and Iraqi Counter-Network Fight 
Just when it seemed that the levels of violence in the Iraqi insurgency were 
spiraling out of control, and possibly taking the entire country along, the trend began to 
change. Overall, the levels of violence “decreased about 70 percent from June 2007 to 
February 2008, a significant reduction from the high levels of violence in 2006 and the 
first half of 2007, a trend that continues to the present.”791 In a February 16, 2008 
statement, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated that AQI had been largely driven 
out of Baghdad.792 The remarkable turn around in the Iraq conflict, as evidence by 
increasing security and a decrease in enemy-initiated significant actions (SIGACTS) 
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Figure 16.   MNC-I Reported SIGACTS, January 8, 2004–April 24, 2009793 
Numerous viewpoints exist, which have generated multiple theories to explain the 
reasons for the decline of the Iraqi insurgency. While many of these theories point to a 
specific cause, the story is much more complex, goes beyond key events, and requires an 
examination of the conflict, through multiple events, to the present. The full explanation 
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x The rejection of AQI by Al-Anbar tribal leadership, following vicious 
struggles for control. 
x An increase in counter-network capability, primarily by U.S.-led coalition 
SOF, but facilitated by fusion cells and partnership with local 
conventional force commanders. 
x A change in U.S. security strategy, which included multiple components, 
but the most effective was ensuring local security through small outposts 
and on-the-ground patrols that partnered with local Iraqi forces.794 
In keeping with the scope of the study, this case focuses primarily on the last two 
factors, while including the Al-Anbar Awakening, and recognizing the dramatic shifts in 
the environment created by events, such as the sectarian bloodletting that changed large 
areas of Baghdad and surrounding provinces. In addition, multiple sources cite the 
interactive effect of the last two factors in allowing for these changes in the environment, 
for example, SOF targeting of AQI, which according to Col. MacFarland, “scared the 
bejeebers out of them,” and provided a “critical enabler that gave the tribes breathing 
space,” in and around Ramadi, further enabling the awakening.795 This focus allows for 
the examination of the nature of the fight between the AQI network and those actively 
pursuing it, a fight that continued for years after the dramatic changes in 2006–2007. As 
General Petraeus stated in his September 10, 2007 address to Congress, “al-Qaeda is 
certainly not defeated; however it is off balance and we are pursuing its leaders and 
operators aggressively….These gains against al-Qaeda are a result of the synergy of 
actions by: conventional forces to deny the terrorist sanctuary; intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance assets to find the enemy; and special operations elements to conduct 
targeted raids. A combination of these assets is necessary to prevent the creation of a 
terrorist safe-haven in Iraq.”796 
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Organizationally, U.S. forces began to change and adapt to the increasing 
challenge of fighting the AQI network in mid-2006. These organizational changes were 
complemented by a surge of five U.S. Army and two Marine brigades, which was 
effectively the strategic reserve of the U.S. military.797 This change increased the total 
number of forces in Baghdad from 17,000 to 40,000. These numbers would have an 
effect in nearly any city.798 Yet, despite the numbers, organizational design and 
employment actually produced the dramatic effects leading to AQI’s disruption. The 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) concept brought significant flexibility with the capability 
to tailor units to respective areas and operating environments, as well as granted further 
autonomy to tactical commanders. Increasing levels of partnerships occurred as units 
became more integrated under a common strategic focus, and units of all types became 
increasingly focused on supporting the local commanders. “By the summer of 2007, the 
new Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) commander, Brig. Gen. Jim Yarborough, recognized 
the need for unity of command for the BCTs. In an unprecedented and completely 
selfless move, he detached all MiTT [Military Transition Team] teams from the IAG’s 
command and control to that of the land-owning commander.”799 This move placed 
oversight and advice for nearly all Iraqi forces, to include police and border patrols, under 
the operational control of the local commander, ensuring greater unity of effort. Further, 
and perhaps most significantly, the development of fusion cells promoted increasingly 
connected collection and operational efforts throughout the battlefield.800 These 
intelligence collection and targeting cells provided a level of connection that spanned the 
entire theater of operations, which linked conventional, special operations, and coalition 
force targeting efforts. The fusion cells were consistently described as a major factor 
behind the declining violence in Iraq, with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael 
Mullen stating that the cells produce intelligence leading to 10 to 20 captures a night in 
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Iraq, “to me it’s not just war-fighting now but in the future,” Mullen said, “it’s been the 
synergy, it’s been the integration that has had such an impact.”801 Finally, organizations 
across the board sought to integrate with Iraqi forces at all levels, from national level 
counter-terrorism units, to local police and militias, such as the SOI. Even the once 
highly classified fusion cells were adapted and integrated with Iraqi forces, which 
provided an unparalleled level of information sharing.802 
Doctrinally, the second phase of the war was driven by a coherent COIN doctrine 
both preached and practiced. The new Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, released in 
December 2006, provided an expanded manual, and both services also released 
complimentary manuals for small-unit leaders. The formative influence behind the 
manual was Gen. Petraeus, whose promotion to MNC-I commander, provided the 
leadership to synchronize doctrine across the theater. The primary tenet of this 
counterinsurgency doctrine was to protect the population by providing security, first and 
foremost. This approach was an offensive focus, requiring U.S. forces to engage the 
population and the enemy actively, rather than remain in a defensive posture in FOBs. As 
Thomas Ricks would write in his discussion of the Marine killings in Haditha in 2005, 
“indeed, another year would pass before the U.S. military would take the first step in 
counterinsurgency and begin to implement a strategy founded on the concept that the 
civilian population isn’t the playing field but rather the prize, to be protected at almost all 
costs.”803 Further, such doctrine allowed other strategic efforts to occur, and by 
separating the population from other insurgents, it facilitated reconciliation with 
moderate factions, and allowed for increasing isolation and targeting of irreconcilables, 
most notably AQI. Doctrinal innovations resulting from bottom-up efforts greatly led to 
significant gains in the fight against AQI. The fusion cells provided an organizational 
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flattening and connectivity, but also brought with them a doctrine focused on 
understanding the nature of the networked enemy. Doctrinal fusion is really the 
institution of collaborative systems, and, “having intelligence and operations working 
together in common space on a sustained basis produced persistent surveillance, 
improved discrimination, and better decision-making.”804 Rather than focus exclusively 
on capturing or killing AQI members, this doctrine sought to gain information on the 
network through a comprehensive targeting system. This doctrine evolved from targeting 
concepts generated as early as 2004, but reached new levels of effectiveness by 2006–
2007, as it was increasingly understood and expanded upon. Incorporating aspects of 
network-style warfare, this doctrinal element provided an entirely new outlook on CT 
operations. The combination of both doctrinal elements provided a remarkable synthesis 
that both protected the population, but ensured a robust, precise targeting focus against 
the hard-core irreconcilables. 
Operationally, the combination of a coherent strategy and doctrinal innovations 
resulted in an increasing security presence and enhanced targeting efforts against AQI. 
Small unit tactics received proper focus while cordon and search operations were 
intelligence driven, and employed against larger concentrations of AQI fighters. Combat 
outposts and the Joint Security Stations (JSS) became the operational paradigm, as 
platoon and company-sized units formed a network of outposts throughout Baghdad, 
initially, and then in contested areas. These outposts, manned 24/7 by U.S. and Iraqi 
security forces, provided constant security and interaction with local Iraqis to ensure a 
force that could find and fight AQI and other insurgents locally. In stark contrast to 
buttoned-up patrols along IED infested routes, local security emphasized dismounted 
patrolling and provided ground-level situational awareness. Patrolling in this manner 
allowed for U.S./Iraqi force integration, the ability to converse and interact with local 
Iraqi’s, and the infantry flexibility to respond to urban and rural threats. Increasing 
connectivity and collaboration among SOF allowed for precision raids that dramatically 
increased in overall effectiveness, as multiple authoritative sources reported, “these 
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covert activities had a far-reaching effect on the violence and were very possibly the 
biggest factor in reducing it. Several said that 85 to 90 percent of the successful 
operations and ‘actionable intelligence’ had come from these new sources, methods and 
operations.”805 The most notable aspect of these operational methods, in addition to their 
overall focus on information collection, was a focus on disrupting the entire network 
through systematic targeting. Rather than attempt to capture just HVIs, this operational 
focus latched onto any visible node within the network, as one analyst described, 
“success against al-Qaeda in Iraq was achieved, in part, by targeting low-level fighters 
which generated the intelligence that allowed for the targeting of higher level 
commanders. This slowly tears the network apart from the inside, simultaneously forcing 
senior commanders to continually attempt to reboot defunct cells.”806 In a 2008 
operation, which captured Abu Uthman, a legacy AQI member, “U.S. intelligence and 
defense officials credit the operation and its unusual tactics—involving small, hybrid 
teams of special forces and intelligence officers—with the capture of hundreds of 
suspected terrorists and their supporters in recent months.”807  
Coupled with increasing operational success, the U.S.-led information strategy 
displayed notable changes. The primary change was simply a common vision and shared 
intent, which provided U.S. forces in Iraq with a much-needed sense of purpose. As 
General Petraeus stated on his fourth day in command in Iraq, “we are in an information 
war, sixty percent of this thing is information,” signally a dramatic shift in focus and 
encouraging commanders to engage in information strategy actively.808 In addition, an 
emphasis on information engagement (IE, primarily in the form of tactical-level public 
affairs) led to generating timely products for media consumption and distribution and 
provided increased capability for generating reports and footage emphasizing the impacts 
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of success.809 Much of the information strategy during the initial crux of regaining 
stability focused on perception, and ensuring that the local Iraqis understood that the 
environment was changing. Moreover, these local perceptions were reinforced with news 
broadcasts that portrayed coalition successes. Complementing this effort was AQI’s 
continued fixation on gaining attention through violent attacks, even after the bloodletting 
of the sectarian infighting left most Iraqis wearied from such repetitive violence, and 
craving basic stability. The latest version of Field Manual 3-0, Operations, reflects U.S. 
force lessons learned in Iraq, and highlights a shift towards embracing information 
employment as a fundamental aspect of irregular conflict. Its introduction reads, 
“informing the public and influencing specific audiences is central to mission 
accomplishment.”810 Reflecting such doctrine, the Multi-national Division-Baghdad 
(MND-B)’s also employed information operations (IO) “…adjusted to focus on 
informing the Baghdad population of imminent threats such as suicide vests and vehicle-
borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) attacks and disrupting AQI Support 
Zones.”811 Other aspects included using a “flashlight” approach to focus intense IO 
efforts along a particular operation, “highlighting security and essential services” to the 
Iraqi Government an ISF, as well as demonize AQI by focusing on its increasing violent 
acts.812 
2. AQI Response  
Despite the Sunni rejection in Al-Anbar, AQI aimed for increasing control and 
organizational supremacy over the insurgency in Iraq, as seen in violent clashes with 
other insurgent groups and the formation of its umbrella organizations, the MSC and ISI. 
The bitter struggle for control with other insurgent groups actually contributed to a spike 
in violence, as some groups, such as Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) and the 1920s 
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Revolution Brigade, engaged in open fighting against AQI. Despite facing a common 
threat in the Shi’a death squads, these Sunni insurgents retaliated against AQI abuses, 
took back neighborhoods, and formed alliances with local U.S. forces.813 
As it was pushed out of Baghdad, AQI sought to intimidate local populations 
further north, thereby creating safe-havens and buffer zones between populated areas and 
the desert wastelands it believed would allow its reconstitution. The dramatic suicide 
bombings, which totaled nearly 1,000 casualties, against rural villages in northern Diyala 
Province in July 2007, and in the Sinjar region of Ninewah Province in August 2007, 
served as clear messages—to support AQI, or die, to the locals in the area.814 However, 
by displacing to these primarily rural areas, AQI became increasingly easier to find and 
target, despite its efforts at coercing local popular support.815  
While still attempting to maintain influence in Baghdad, AQI shifted its 
operations north to the city of Mosul, a hub in Ninewah Province that provided support to 
cells throughout northern Iraq. The political fight for control between Sunni Arabs and 
Kurds within Ninewah Province provide room for AQI to exploit. AQI’s use of Mosul as 
a base of operation began in the early years of the war, but as AQI’s freedom of 
maneuver became more constrained, it became more significant.816 With the Al-Anbar 
tribes controlling nearly all of the ERV, AQI’s foreign fighters were routed through the 
last remaining foreign fighter facilitation network in the northern al-Jazeerah desert, 
making Mosul and the northern Tigris River Valley (TRV) even more critical. Still, 
despite desperate attempts to retain influence, a September 2009 Department of Defense 
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814 The geographic location of these remote attacks differed from AQI’s usual tactics of suicide 
bombings in large urban areas. The bombing in Qahtaniya, near Sinjar, used four vehicles and is the 
second-largest casualty producing terrorist attack on record. Notably, coalition forces conducted a strike on 
a desert tent south of Sinjar in October 2007, which provided extensive evidence of AQI’s foreign fighter 
facilitation through the region and its desire to maintain control of such areas. Damien Cave and James 
Glanz, “Toll in Iraq Bombing is Raised to More Than 500,” New York Times, August 22, 2007; Stephen 
Farrell, “Around 150, Death Toll in Iraq Attack Among War’s Worst,” New York Times, July 9, 2007; 
Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter, Al-Qaida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records 
(West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007). 
815 Ricks, The Gamble, 174.  
816 Brian Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (West Point, 
NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2009), 24.  
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reported, “significant leadership losses and a diminished presence in most population 
centers…”817 Internally, AQI realized its weakening state, and one captured document 
even provides a summary of lessons learned, including the following. 
x Failure to Understand the Iraqi People 
x Unreliable Smugglers in Syria 
x Propaganda Created Unrealistic Expectations among Foreign Fighters 
x Bureaucratic AQI Emirs Failed to Coordinate 
x Tension between Foreign Fighters and Iraqi Members of AQI 
x Suicide Bombers Changed Their Mind 
x Too Many Leaders Diluted Command Structure 
x Bureaucratic Stovepiping 
x Poor Use of Financial Resources818 
Overall, despite attempts to re-organize and integrate itself using Iraqi social networks, 
AQI found itself increasingly isolated, disconnected, and pursued. As Fishman noted: 
AQI’s efforts failed, in no small part because the public and private efforts 
at conciliation [with other insurgent groups and tribal leadership] were 
inconsistent with AQI’s continued tactical violence. Effective insurgent 
and terrorist campaigns depend on tight coordination between political 
goals, tactical violence, and strategic communications.819 
Despite publicly declaring the ISI cabinet in April 2007, to feature its Iraqi “cabinet 
ministers,” pressure against the AQI organization led to a smaller, more clandestine 
leadership core.820 The dispatching of senior al-Qaeda figures to assist in AQI’s 
expansion evidenced greater affiliation with core Al-Qaeda leadership, largely due to 
long-standing relationships between al-Masri and Zawahiri, and efforts to regain control 
of the Iraqi insurgency. Most notable was Abu Hadi al-Iraqi, a former Iraqi Army officer 
                                                 
817 U.S. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2009, as cited 
in John Rollins, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspectives, Global Presence, and Implications for 
U.S. Policy, R41047, (Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, February 5, 2010), 13.  
818 Harmony Database Document: NMEC-20080612449, as compiled in Fishman, Dysfunction and 
Decline, 16–20.  
819 Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline, 11.  
820 Kohlman, “State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: August 2007,” 5. 
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and Afghanistan veteran who served as a trusted al-Qaeda military operations leader for a 
significant period of time.821 Other senior leaders included Mehmet Yilmaz (Khalid al-
Turki) and Mehmet Resit Isik (Khalil al-Turki), and Turkish fighters with Afghanistan 
experience who were killed by coalition forces in June 20007.822 Yet, regardless of their 
attempts to shore up the organization with experienced personnel, AQI continued to face 
dramatic losses, which exacerbated leadership problems. The Sunni tribal rejection, and 
AQI’s increasingly bitter infighting with other insurgent groups, also further inflamed 
organizational issues, primarily the integration of foreign fighters into the network. As 
Brian Fishman states, “ultimately, those problems became so important that, according to 
a document captured in 2008, al-Qa’ida’s leadership made the strategic decision to reject 
foreign fighters trying to enter Iraq.”823 Increasing pressure resulted in reduced 
communication throughout the network, as the “postal service” and other forms of 
communication were disrupted or increasingly compromised by tribal and insurgent 
differences.824  
Doctrinally little changed for AQI from 2006 onward, although the formation of 
the ISI and its attempt to gain control over the Sunni insurgency reflect its most notable 
strategic aspect. The attacks against Shi’a population targets declined more due to a lack 
of access than a change of doctrine. The doctrinal hallmark of AQI’s offensive terror 
remained massive suicide bombings, which were designed to produce large-scale civilian 
casualties, as evidenced by the attacks in northern Iraq in 2007. Terror bombings 
continue in Baghdad, although relatively infrequently, and it appears that the Iraqi 
security and intelligence apparatus is gaining capability, and often rapidly capturing those 
responsible. 
 
                                                 
821 Katzman, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” 17. 
822 Kohlman, “State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: August 2007,” 8. 
823 Damages to the foreign fighter facilitation network also likely contributed to this decision. 
Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline, 16.  
824 Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline, 15.  
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Operationally, AQI continued its campaign of intimidation through bombings and 
raids against U.S. and Iraqi outposts. In addition, the summer of 2008 saw a noticeable 
spike in targeted assassinations of Iraqi officials, many of whom were killed with the use 
of magnetic “sticky-bombs,” which could be easily emplaced on the target’s vehicle. As 
AQI faced increasing pressure and a loss of both internal resources and external support, 
it began to employ “organized” crime by using vast extortion networks to generate 
revenue. 
The change in leadership from Zarqawi to al-Masri produced notable effects in 
AQI’s information strategy. Whereas Zarqawi charismatically engaged in media 
operations, filming and conducting vicious beheadings and releasing propaganda videos, 
al-Masri assumed a lower profile. While this posture may have been safer in light of 
increased targeting pressure, it continued to marginalize the organization. This reluctance 
to engage contributed to a disconnect between public statements and AQI actions, 
suggesting that AQI’s leadership did not understand the entirety of the backlash against 
it, which further reveals the increased difficulties in communication within the 
network.825 Overall, AQI sought to regain lost ground by down playing the foreign status 
of its key leaders and instead utilized Iraqi leadership, most notably Abu Umar al-
Baghdadi, as its public voice. Ironically, despite this effort to maintain a clandestine face, 
“AQI’s failures were terribly transparent,” and attempts to assert itself through bold 
propaganda worked to some degree but, 
…Iraq was different because AQI was not the only armed group with a 
media wing and a website. Iraq’s tribes had internet campaigns as well, 
not to mention easier access to Arab satellite television media than did 
their jihadist counterparts. Not only was AQI starting to lose ground on 
the physical battlefield in Iraq, it was losing ground on the global media 
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Iraq Insurgency: 2006–Present 
















































Table 12.   Evaluation of the 2nd Phase of the Iraq Insurgency 
3. Analysis of Counter-Network Framework 
The dramatic turn around that occurred in 2006–2007, and the subsequent pursuit 
and disruption of AQI throughout Iraq over the next 3–4 years, was largely a result of 
U.S. forces employing a synthesized strategy to protect the population, while 
simultaneously employing a robust counter-network approach. This later approach and 
the framework it employed resulted from innovations early in the conflict, but developed 
to fruition at a critical period to ensure AQI’s subsequent defeat. This unified approach 
nested well within a robust counterinsurgency strategy, initiated beginning in 2007, 
which provided a common intent and purpose for U.S. forces. The overall focus on 
providing security for the population was absolutely consistent with, and complimented 
by robust, precise targeting efforts against irreconcilables, primarily AQI. The details of 
the targeting approach against AQI remains classified, but Christopher Lamb and Evan 
Munsing described three of its innovations, which were summarized as network-based 
targeting, fusion of improved all-source intelligence with operational capability, and 
integration of counterterrorist and counterinsurgency efforts.827 Lamb and Munsing state, 
                                                 
827 Lamb and Munsing, Secret Weapon, 1.  
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“…the new capability reportedly captured or killed enemies so fast it put their clandestine 
organizations on the defensive and gave population security measures a chance to shift 
public support to government forces,” and make the case that the “…interagency teams 
used to target enemy clandestine networks were a major, even indispensible, catalyst for 
success.”828 
a. Offensive Swarming 
Operationally, U.S. forces applied each aspect of offensive swarming 
against AQI. The integration of focused all-source intelligence collection and fusion 
provided the capability for dramatically increased operational tempo. Instead of 
conducting a single, deliberate raid as intelligence allowed, intelligence became the 
driving aspect of operations and even the slightest sign of AQI activity became a 
potential lead for further collection and targeting gains. Precision raids against AQI 
targets consistently achieved surprise, even more so when conducted in a rapid manner, 
with information from one mission leading directly to another target, and so on. The 
combination of conventional and SOF efforts led to a greater understanding of the local 
environment, which was crucial to effective pulsing. This understanding ensured the 
maximum potential gained through direct strikes, and often, large sections of the network 
were “illuminated” prior to operations to achieve larger effects and ensure that those 
effects were synchronized with local U.S. and Iraqi security efforts. Perhaps the most 
notable aspect of the operation that killed Zarqawi was not the AQI leader’s death, but 
the following 450 raids in little more than a week.829 Swarming occurred in the form of 
multiple 24/7 strikes against these illuminated nodes, operations that would continue until 
they achieved decisive effects. Further, the growing Sunni militias, most notably SOI, 
added considerable capability for rapid attacks against AQI that denied them freedom of 
movement through aggressive attacks wherever fighters concentrated. 
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b. Illumination 
As previously outlined, efforts against a clandestine irregular force require 
considerable information, primarily focused on identifying whom and where the 
opponents are. The U.S. illumination efforts during the second phase of the war present 
an overall marked contrast to early efforts. A greater degree of security meant greater 
integration with the local population, and as a result, the overall understanding of social 
ties and tribal networks within Iraq grew considerably. The use of the F3EA cycle relied 
on interagency organization and gave primacy to intelligence collection, which 
dramatically changed the nature of targeting in Iraq by incorporating multiple assets and 
combining these with a greater awareness of local interaction. This cycle proved 
instrumental in “…charting the clandestine terrorist and insurgent cells and their 
immediate supporters to attack them, but also using all-source intelligence to reveal the 
local environment, its social networks, and key decision-makers and their 
motivations.”830 A significant aspect of this cycle was aerial surveillance, and in 2007, 
the number of drone reconnaissance aircraft operating in Iraq would increase tenfold, 
which furthered the ability to gain information, and complimented collection on the 
ground.831 Moreover, this and other collection capabilities were making a significant 
difference at the tactical level, as a 1st Cavalry Division report stated, “synchronization 
of ISR/HUMINT/SIGINT (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance/human 
intelligence/signals intelligence) has significantly reduced IED cells and threat.”832 
The sectarian violence and infighting between insurgent groups provided 
another type of operational activity, which forced visible, violent action that provided 
additional insight and areas of focus for further illumination. Infiltration, while still the 
most difficult aspect of illumination efforts, increased as well, with HUMINT providing a 
greater component due to a greater degree of local interaction and a sense that the tide 
had turned that motivated former AQI to turn against the violent activities of the group. 
Exploitation dramatically increased as well, which built on the overall degree of insight 
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into the network. The detention system was structured to provide humane, efficient 
treatment; professional and effective interrogation techniques; and other options for 
fighters willing to provide information. Led by Maj. Gen. Douglas Stone, efforts the 
revamp the prison system paralleled the overall counterinsurgency effort to reduce the 
risk of prisons continuing as “…breeding ground for extremist recruitment.”833  
c. Information Disruption 
Information disruption efforts capitalized largely on mistakes made by 
AQI, and more specifically, its use of indiscriminate attacks and brutal intimidation. 
While U.S. forces sought to negate AQI’s violent media campaign, it retained its 
effectiveness until the larger population rejected it. While AQI’s overall narrative 
changed as it attempted to embrace moderate Sunni Muslims, the damage had largely 
been done, and it was fairly straightforward to capitalize on its failing efforts. U.S. forces 
conducted effective channeling as well that overemphasized AQI’s attack claims and 
highlighted the most horrific aspects of its violent tactics. In many ways, this channeling 
was more effective than outright denial, as most of the population either recoiled from 
such action, or had grown weary of the instability it promoted. The awakening tribes 
contributed to the overall information disruption efforts by conducting their own media 
campaigns against AQI and highlighted many of AQI’s horrific acts. Their visible 
information efforts contributed to the growing perception of AQI’s loss of popular 
support, and thus, reinforced U.S. efforts. Collection efforts against AQI grew in 
effectiveness, with the fusion of multi-source intelligence and increased presence on the 
ground. The former provided a means of disrupting technical sources, while the latter 
increasingly shut down the use of couriers and sympathetic support mechanisms. AQI’s 
displacement from existing safe havens and operational areas in and around Baghdad 
forced increased communication, as it sought to re-establish itself, leading to better 
collection of all types.834 
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d. Fusion 
At its core, fusion relies on a shared intent and purpose throughout the 
effort that united disparate agencies and groups into a unified team. U.S. forces 
understood the overall intent, and as a review of fusion cells in Iraq determined, the 
primary unifying element was “the sense of urgency, purpose and commitment to 
accomplish a mission.”835 Organizational fusion became a necessity in many parts of 
Iraq, and a notable example was the success enjoyed by Task Force Freedom in Mosul in 
2005. While this success was a precursor to more robust integration in later years, the 
success it brought in Mosul foreshadowed the powerful role it would play. “The dynamic 
that made all this work was the personal involvement of individuals from each agency 
and their dedication to serving the task force and its mission, rather than their parent 
organization. New levels of interagency trust and combat-necessity gave birth to an 
unprecedented innovation: a national level intelligence team in direct support of a tactical 
task force.”836 Another notable example of fusion was provided by Col. MacFarland’s 
1/1 AD in Ramadi and SOF units when, “the brigade staff and SOF Task Force personnel 
in particular exchanged targeting files and prisoners and sat in on each other’s targeting 
meetings, eventually leading to a ‘seamless targeting process through liaison officers and 
the fusion center.’”837  
F.  CONCLUSION 
The U.S. and Iraqi fight against AQI continues today, although it is widely 
believed that AQI is no longer in a position to threaten the government of Iraq. However,, 
despite the lack of media coverage, a bitter struggle continues, with AQI occasionally 
succeeding in devastating bombings against Iraqi civilians and political figures. As a case 
study, the fight against the AQI network provides numerous insights about how to 
counter fighting networks and reveals the cutting edge of irregular warfare. The complex 
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insurgency in Iraq formed the venue for this conflict, which provided a unique 
environment as well. The initial phase of the war against AQI, from 2003–2006, revealed 
an inexcusable lack of overall U.S. understanding of the environment and the threat. 
Despite basic COIN doctrine and the notable examples of a few units “getting it right,” 
most of the U.S. and coalition forces applied concepts were based primarily on traditional 
forms of warfare. These largely conventional approaches were ill-suited to a complex 
irregular war set in a culturally diverse and fragmented society. As a result, the United 
States sought to transition responsibility quickly to Iraqi forces, maintain a force 
protection posture, and was determined to stay out of the internal fight. AQI’s strategy of 
devastating attacks succeeded in starting a sectarian civil war, and brought the country to 
the brink of collapse, but its coercive attempts at maintaining control in Al-Anbar 
backfired and resulted in the loss of much of its Sunni support base. In effect, AQI’s 
overall strategy fragmented the very social networks it relied upon to build a cohesive 
resistance. 
During the second phase of the conflict, from late 2006–present, U.S. efforts 
changed dramatically and the Sunni tribal leadership rejected AQI’s violent dominance. 
This rejection allowed for the building of popular-based U.S. support networks, 
composed of tribal leadership and their militias. A comprehensive strategy and a new 
commander who emphasized its application provided strategic unity and direction for 
U.S. forces. At the same time, violence in Iraq was at epic proportions and people were 
willing to embrace the security provided by U.S. forces. In addition to providing local 
security, the strategic emphasis translated into tactical innovations as small units began to 
adapt to understanding the environment and interact with the population to a greater 
degree. These small units, many at the platoon level, formed numerous outposts 
throughout contested areas, ensuring 24/7 security and empowering local Iraqi security 
efforts. Overall, organizational integration between conventional, SOF, and inter-agency 
elements provided a high degree of collaboration, which developed the capability to 
execute effective strategy. This strategy maximized the utility of each element involved 
in the fight and allowed for a “squeeze” against irreconcilables at the fringes, which 
provided them with the existential decision to support local security efforts or be targeted. 
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U.S. Counter-Network Performance 
 Offensive Swarming Illumination 
Information 
Disruption Fusion 
1st Phase of 
Iraq Insurgency - + - - 
2nd Phase of 
Iraq Insurgency +++ +++ ++ +++ 
Table 13.   Overall U.S. Performance against AQI Fighting Network838 
The U.S. effort against AQI provides clear indications of a successful counter-
network framework, one that developed through experience gained in a complex irregular 
war. The threat posed by AQI revealed itself in horrific attacks, launched not by a 
centrally, controlled hierarchical organization, but by cells acting in a decentralized 
manner. Despite the overwhelming traditional superiority of the U.S. military, combating 
this threat required a strategy that integrated multiple entities, most notably the Sunni 
tribes and insurgents who rejected AQI. The application of this new strategy 
demonstrated a willingness to change and negated the threat in multiple ways through the 
effective application of counter-network variables. 
The U.S.-led JSOTFs provided a high degree of offensive swarming, which 
complemented similar operations designed to control contested terrain, most notably in 
critical urban areas, such as Ramadi and Baghdad. An overwhelming operational tempo 
led to an increased amount of knowledge about AQI that provided benefits that led to 
further targeting and greater fidelity about the network itself. The latter facilitated greater 
pulsing to allow for patient collection against more significant segments and clusters 
within the network. At the tactical level, 24/7 raids, coupled with U.S. and Iraqi force 
partnership through contested areas, continually surprised AQI, which forced it onto the 
strategic defensive, shifted further north and become more isolated. 
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In stark contrast to earlier U.S. efforts, improvements in illumination activities 
allowed for greater insight into AQI and the overall insurgency. The most telling aspect 
of illumination was a greater focus on social ties, insight gained through an increased 
understanding of the overall insurgency, and U.S. forces that doggedly connected with 
the local Iraqi population. Focusing such overall information was the increasing 
efficiency of exploitation activities, which meshed with multiple intelligence forms to 
provide the most valuable form of understanding the inner-workings of AQI’s network. 
Exploitation both facilitated and benefitted from advances in infiltration and generated a 
combined level of HUMINT that became increasingly important, as AQI’s pressured 
status that forced it to become even more clandestine in nature. Rapid advances and a 
dramatic increase in ISR led to the ability to focus quickly on operational activity, which 
contributed to the combined illumination gains.  
Information disruption also provided significant gains, and its synchronization 
with operational activities formed a key element of U.S. information strategy. Consistent 
efforts at negating AQI’s overall narrative were reinforced by its continued and 
overplayed application of horrific violence. Even the sectarian clash it provoked 
ultimately contributed more to its disruption and weakening than inciting Sunni backing. 
The successes displayed by U.S. information strategy were largely a result of AQI’s 
information failures. U.S. collection and denial activities, more clearly focused, became 
increasingly effective as both technological and HUMINT capabilities developed in a 
synchronized manner. While time will tell how much deception was actually employed 
during the conflict, it most likely increased along with other information disruption 
efforts. 
Providing an organizational and doctrinal basis for the combined interaction of 
the other counter-network variables, the U.S. application of fusion provides the clearest 
example of effectiveness. Organizationally, early fusion efforts were a tactical adaptation 
by innovative commanders and units that agreed to combine efforts against common 
problems. These efforts were then understood and capitalized on throughout the force and 
became more relevant under a common strategy of aggressively providing security and 
protecting the population. By incorporating each operating unit and supporting agencies, 
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fusion cells throughout Iraq provided the forum for a common understanding of the 
enemy, which led to a greater degree of fidelity and operational capability. The 
increasing incorporation of Iraqi intelligence and security forces into these efforts only 
enhanced their overall effects.  
Overall, the U.S. and AQI conflict in Iraq provides perhaps the most balanced 
example of network-style warfare, which demonstrates the capabilities of a robust 
fighting network, but also a sophisticated counter-network response. A primary factor in 
this outcome was the synchronized effect of SOF, inter-agency and conventional units 
that showed a remarkable degree of collaboration against a fighting network. Further, the 
support of the tribal networks proved crucial to the overall pressure exerted against AQI. 
The initial phase of the conflict revealed, once again, the tremendous disparity between a 
modern military’s capability and performance in an irregular warfare environment. 
However, the dramatic changes and experienced-based adaptation of the U.S. effort 
resulted in a remarkable turnaround that marked a second phase in which AQI lost the 
initiative. This loss of initiative resulted in its relentless pursuit and increasingly isolated 
position in Iraq.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The dramatic changes of the information age affect modes of conflict as well, and 
even war is becoming “networked on an international scale.”839 Most attempts to 
describe the changes occurring in irregular warfare, whether military doctrine or 
academic literature, remain fixed on traditional modes of thought and corresponding 
definitions. While these schemas are not entirely invalid, as a whole they fail to address 
the nature of warfare in the information age, and in particular, the increasing 
empowerment of fighting networks. This study provides insight by applying a network 
perspective to irregular warfare and drawing this perspective beyond a conceptual level to 
a framework for countering such networks. This effort rejects basic attempts to reify 
networks, but instead utilizes the principles of the network perspective to demonstrate the 
dynamic nature of fighting networks, and the complexities of countering them.840 Does it 
take a network to defeat a network? The simple answer is yes, but the full answer 
transcends organizational forms, which reveals war-fighting combinations that are truly 
unique.  
A network is commonly thought of in strictly organizational terms, but the 
information age and the corresponding dynamics of globalization empower these 
organizational forms. In like manner, the fighting networks that increasingly dominate 
irregular warfare employ networked forms of organization, but they are just the 
fundamental building block for empowering other elements of war-fighting capacity. 
These irregular opponents form in networked configurations, which facilitate innovative 
doctrines, operational methods, and the use of information strategy to thrive in the 
information age as fighting networks. The organizational capacity of these networks is 
well-suited to benefit from the rapid advances of modern technology, but still retain the 
ability to do without, which demonstrates their remarkable flexibility.  
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The ability to acquire, utilize, and create meaningful information is at the core of 
the changing nature of irregular warfare. This essential nature focuses on basic questions 
of what, where, when, and why concerning one’s opponents, and understands that the 
answers may be difficult to reach. In many ways, the changes in the information age 
favor the weaker opponent, by placing more value on the ability to shape information, 
than on the ability to employ forces or weapons. Given the premium on information, it is 
evident that the nature of irregular conflict is ambiguous and fluid, with hard-won 
information usually limited, fairly ambiguous, and often time sensitive. 
Fighting networks thrive in such an environment, as their organizational design 
provides unique advantages for acquiring, processing, and most importantly, 
redistributing information. These organizational, doctrinal, and technological aspects of 
networks provide levels of functionality centered on the use of information. These 
systematic processes form much of their relevance and how they fight, and require a new 
way of looking at such threats. Prior descriptions, such as guerrillas, terrorists, and even 
insurgents, only capture a portion of what may be attributes of a fighting network. Useful 
in distinguishing various attributes of irregular networks, such as in describing tactics, or 
focusing on the political nature of a struggle, they are increasingly less relevant in 
capturing the changing nature of irregular warfare. In fact, modern fighting networks 
often blend these forms of warfare in ways that maximize their most positive attributes, 
which then produces hybrid forms whose flexibility is difficult to match.  
Throughout this study, the use of network-style warfare, or netwar, provides a 
perspective that synthesizes many of these characteristics. While the netwar concept was 
originally framed to capture aspects of social conflict of a less violent nature, the rogue 
networks present in irregular warfare generate exceedingly violent versions. Network-
style warfare defines much of current conflict, and while its proponents draw on other 
aspects of warfare, from the purely guerrilla to the conventional, this form of warfare is 
unique. Figure 17 illustrates the normal continuum, or spectrum of warfare, which is 
usually marked by low-intensity actions on one end, and high-intensity actions on the 
other. Netwar displays multiple characteristics, providing a unique form that challenges 




















Figure 17.   An Information Age Form of Conflict. 
A.  HOW NETWORKS FIGHT 
Fighting networks display similarities to irregular combatants throughout the 
ages, with the distinguishing exception that they are not limited to just basic 
unconventional tactics, or guerrilla warfare. Instead, their form provides the means to 
utilize multiple styles of warfare, and provide the capability for a new range of doctrine 
and operational functions, which exploits the possibility that “the fundamental dynamic 
in future wars will more likely be that of ‘hiders and finders,’ with opposing forces 
surfacing only long enough to strike, then disappear.”841 Hezbollah provides a telling 
example of this blending of fighting styles and doctrine, so much so that it has generated 
                                                 
841 Arquilla, Worst Enemy, 27. 
 308
significant debate about whether it is more conventional or guerrilla-like in nature. 
However, the diversity they display is not something that falls on a spectrum between 
guerrilla and conventional warfare, but is something entirely different.842 Other 
information age networks reveal the same attributes, as Bruce Hoffman noted,  
It is possible then, that the insurgency in Iraq may perhaps represent a new 
form of warfare for a new, networked century. It is too soon to determine 
whether this development, involving loose networks of combatants who 
come together for discrete purpose only to quickly disperse upon its 
achievement will prove to be a lasting or completely ephemeral 
characteristic of postmodern insurgency. However, if it gains traction and 
is indeed revealed to be a harbinger of the future, the implications for how 
military forces train, equip, and organize to meet this challenge and avoid 
preparing to fight yesterday’s—mostly, conventional—wars, will be of 
paramount importance.843 
Further, due to their decentralized and generally distributed nature, networks are more 
readily able to take advantage of the increasing opportunities provided by modern 
information technology. This technology provides the means to further connectivity in 
ways unobtainable by irregular combatants of just 50 years ago. Yet, technology is just 
part of the story, which enhances what in many ways are more important organizational 
and doctrinal attributes. Perhaps most telling, the most advanced networks are those that 
arise from strongly connected societies that feature dense relational structures, such as 
clans and tribes. These traditional groupings provide unique bonds and levels of 
connection not readily obtained in today’s modern nations, in which even the most 
professional militaries continue to strive for such levels of comradeship. The Chechen 
networks provide telling examples of these characteristics and their enhancement of 
warfighting ability.  
However, networks have significant strengths and weaknesses, both of which 
provide aspects contributing to potential vulnerabilities. These strengths and weaknesses 
reside primarily in their organizational attributes, necessity for concealment, and 
information requirements. Understanding these strengths and weaknesses is crucial for 
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interaction with networks of any type and function, but especially critical when seeking 
to counter their violent actions. Networks cannot be fought using traditional methods, and 
the application of normal military force highlights their resiliency, adaptability, and 
concealment skills. However, understanding the informal, human connections that form 
networks provides the means to counter effectively, and even dramatically disrupt their 
efforts.  
B.  COUNTER-NETWORK THEORY 
The identification of vulnerabilities provided the structural foundation for 
hypotheses leading to ways in which to counter networks. These hypotheses are directed 
at the question—how to fight networks? The recognition of shared characteristics 
between each hypothesis generated key variables for countering networks. At the core of 
these variables, and specific to their interaction, is the usage of information. However, 
recognizing the centrality of information does not mean that efforts must be directed to 
generate “information dominance,” or that information technologies will provide a clear 
understanding of the battlefield for omniscient, centralized control. Ambiguity is a central 
aspect of war, as seen in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan where “…enemy 
forces employed traditional countermeasures to coalition technological capabilities—
measures such as dispersion, concealment, deception and intermingling with the civilian 
population.”844 Rather, understanding the importance of information leads to new 
doctrine, and operational methods, which maximize its role. The counter-network 
framework proposed in this study recognizes that a high level of ambiguity will always 
exist in irregular warfare, but that key variables contribute to a systematic approach to 
operations within such an environment. 
These variables are fusion, illumination, offensive swarming, and information 
disruption, which provide the basic elements for countering fighting networks. Each of 
them addresses certain hypotheses-derived requirements for countering networks, and 
their combined nature provides a comprehensive approach to tackling and effectively 
                                                 
844 H. R. McMaster, “On War: Lessons to be Learned,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 50, no. 
1 (2008): 21, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330801899439. 
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conducting operations against these tough opponents. Their common characteristic is 
information, which provides both requirements and the important synthesis of multiple 
activities. Each variable either provides ways to gain, process, or redistribute information, 
as well as disrupt an opponent by countering and denying their use of information, or 
using it to expose their activities. 
Fusion addresses the requirement for a high level of connectivity within an 
organization. This connectivity promotes shared expertise and collaboration, which are 
essential qualities for understanding the complexity and cultural context of social 
networks, as well as forming the initial capacity to be as “agile” as networks. In addition, 
fusion requires a doctrinal component based on the unique requirements of irregular 
warfare, which recognizes the overwhelming importance of information, and combines 
operational and intelligence efforts to gain and understand information. Fusion provides 
the essential component upon which the other variables interact.  
Illumination describes the process of understanding and identifying the key 
attributes and actions of fighting networks. Further, it begins with an effort to understand 
the social and cultural aspects of the human terrain in which networks form. This 
understanding recognizes that fighting networks are inherently different from traditional 
military opponents, and that traditional intelligence methods are insufficient for 
collection and analysis against them. Illumination covers the range of activities required 
to understand fighting networks and builds on the fusion of operations and intelligence to 
gain a greater understanding of networks than simply traditional intelligence methods. 
Offensive swarming provides a doctrinal element, which is only possible through 
high levels of information and decentralized action. This capability stems from 
organizational fusion and the illumination efforts necessary to acquire and understand 
information about networked targets. The offensive nature of this swarming stems from 
the requirement to pressure clandestine fighting networks; thereby, depriving them of the 
initiative they gain from concealed, patient plotting. By retaining the offensive, swarming 
denies an enemy’s requirement for surprise, and ensures that counter-network efforts 
retain the initiative. 
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Information disruption works in conjunction with kinetic offensive swarming, and 
should be applied in the same manner. Information disruption focuses specifically on 
addressing an opponent’s information strategy, through collection, denial, and disruption 
of such efforts. The fundamental aspect of information disruption is countering or 
negating a fighting network’s primary narrative, and nearly every other effort should 
support this strategy. Information disruption is also a synchronized effort, benefitting 
from, and generating, swarming and illumination. Recognizing the importance of 
information in irregular conflict, a strategy whose primary emphasis and majority of 
efforts are focused on information disruption, is most likely to succeed over any other 
approach.  
C. CASE STUDY COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS 
The cases examined in this study are each notable in their own right and highlight 
numerous irregular warfare truths. In addition, they each reflect the toughest irregular 
opponents of the emerging information age and feature fighting networks that have 
successfully countered much “superior” nation states. The examination of each case 
reinforced the basic fundamentals about how networks form, organize, and fight. 
Moreover, they reinforced the importance of strong social networks; fighting networks 
with such strong connections maintained a higher degree of effectiveness, while those 
who lost or failed to create such expanded structures, floundered. Each case expanded 
further upon the range of tactics and techniques employed by fighting networks, and 
demonstrated the remarkable innovation and change in irregular warfare, developments, 
which were diffused between the fighting networks in these case studies. 
1. Russo-Chechen Case Study 
The Russo-Chechen study revealed the inherent failure of traditional, largely 
conventional military attempts to counter a robust fighting network, but later reflects 
some degree of improvement. The 1st Russo-Chechen War resulted in a significant defeat 
for the Russians, which is the clearest such example among each of the clashes featured 
in this study. As a result, Russian efforts during their second invasion demonstrated some 
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degree of change, but this change was largely focused on repression of the Chechen 
fighting networks and their social foundations. Contributing factors, which display some 
aspects of the counter-network framework, were increased efforts to co-opt and partner 
with Chechens, greater illumination capabilities, and an information strategy that almost 
completely denied Chechen media access. Despite only displaying minimal counter-
network characteristics, the Russians achieved a degree of success against Chechen 
fighting networks. However, this success was largely based on a strategy for control that 
is anathema to most modern Western militaries, and would most likely be far more 
effective, and longer lasting, in a counter-network framework. Overall, this case study 
demonstrated a slight degree of counter-network application and proportionate results.  
2. Israel-Hezbollah Case Study 
The Israel-Hezbollah case also featured a nearly entirely conventional attempt to 
fight a capable network, and with nearly no demonstration of counter-network capability. 
Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah began in the early 1980s, and its evolution provided 
insight into the overall changes occurring in irregular warfare, as well as the increasing 
sophistication displayed by fighting networks. In the first conflict, initiated by the 
invasion in 1982, Israel’s traditional efforts to maintain a buffer zone in southern 
Lebanon were increasingly undermined in the face of increased guerrilla activity. This 
conflict demonstrated Hezbollah’s ability to build strong social networks, while 
developing the capability to transition from guerrilla tactics to more networked forms of 
military action. Hezbolllah’s increasing ability for surprise swarming against Israeli 
outposts led to a growing loss of Israeli popular support and the eventual withdrawal of 
Israeli forces in 2000. In the 2006 campaign, Hezbollah demonstrated that fighting 
networks are increasingly able to confront, and defeat modern, professional militaries. A 
combination of factors, to include poor strategy, lack of training, and a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the enemy, led to Israel’s poor performance. Hezbollah’s remarkable 
defense demonstrated its unique blend of military doctrine and operational capability, and 
perhaps most significantly, the ability to dominate the information environment. Overall,  
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Israel demonstrated a near complete lack of counter-network understanding and 
capability. Israel’s minor degree of offensive swarming was its initial aerial attacks 
against Hezbollah’s missiles.845 
3. U.S. vs. AQI Case Study 
The U.S. conflict with AQI during the Iraqi insurgency provides another 
remarkable contrast between a superior military force and a highly networked opponent. 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrated the combined war-fighting capabilities of 
a highly advanced military, but it was increasingly frustrated by the networked nature and 
sophisticated attacks launched by AQI. During the initial phase of the war, U.S. forces 
transitioned into an “overwatch” posture as political discussions and military strategy 
focused on withdrawal. AQI demonstrated success with its ability to inflict casualties and 
incite a sectarian conflict that nearly ripped Iraq apart. However, in the second phase of 
the insurgency, the United States changed its strategy and demonstrated remarkable 
capabilities for countering networked opponents. The second phase of the Iraqi 
insurgency provides the most complete application of the counter-network framework, 
and demonstrates the clearest example of success against a fighting network. 
















                                                 
845 Israel’s more recent actions against Hamas in Gaza demonstrate a much higher level of success, 
which demonstrate increased capability following the 2006 conflict and reflect increased counter-network 
capabilities. 
 314







- - - - 
2nd Russo-
Chechen War 




- - - - 
2nd Israeli-
Hezbollah War + - - - 
1st Phase of 
Iraq Insurgency - + - - 
2nd Phase of 
Iraq Insurgency +++ +++ ++ +++ 
Table 14.   Cross-Case Comparison of Counter-Network Performance 
Comparisons across the cases reveal the remarkable ability of fighting networks 
to persist against far superior professional militaries. As a test of the counter-network 
framework, each case study provides examples of a confrontation between a modern, 
professional military and a networked opponent. In two of the cases, some application of 
the counter-network variables occurred, which resulted in demonstrated successes. 
Repressive actions that resulted in some success in the Russo-Chechen conflict run 
counter to both the ethical restrictions governing most professional Western responses 
and the dynamics of information age conflict. Due to these imperatives, they were not 
used to modify the counter-network framework. Overall, the U.S. strategy and counter-
network actions against AQI provide the most comprehensive example of the counter-
network framework, and demonstrate remarkable success through its application. A look 
at the “results” demonstrates the following outcomes, in which success is a “win” with 
the opponent generally achieved its primary goals. 
x 4 x “Win” for fighting network vs. traditional (Chechen, Hezbollah, and 
AQI) 
x 2 x “Win” for counter-network vs. fighting network (Russian and U.S.) 
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x 4 x “Loss” for traditional v. fighting network (Russian, U.S., and Israel) 
x 2 x “Loss” for fighting network vs. counter-network (Chechen and AQI) 
Overall, these results demonstrate the ability of fighting networks to, at the least, deny 
their opponents their objectives, especially if those opponents are fighting in a traditional 
manner. In each portion of the study, networked forces succeeded against their 
opponents. The lack of success demonstrated by even the most sophisticated, 
technologically advanced militaries against fighting networks provides counter-factual 
suggestion in favor of a more networked approach. Likewise, the application of the 
counter-network framework generated success in two case studies, which provides 
evidence that reinforces the proposition that it takes a network to defeat a network. The 
U.S.-AQI case study provided a clear example of a highly networked professional force 
successfully demonstrating a counter-network approach and defeating a fighting network. 
D.  HOW TO FIGHT NETWORKS 
These early conflicts between modern militaries and fighting networks provide 
consistent evidence of the nature of changes occurring in irregular warfare. Primarily, the 
nature of such conflicts features a highly networked opponent able to deny a nation-
state’s attempts at control. In most of the clashes examined in this study, the fighting 
network succeeded, which clearly demonstrates their growing capabilities. While it is 
only one case, the results from the successful application of a counter-network 
framework in the U.S.-AQI case study provide a significant example of success. Further, 
because it is the most recent case studied, it highlights the adaptation of some forces, and 
perhaps, a trend toward more effective counter-network operations. 
It is clear that irregular warfare cannot be separated from its inherent 
psychological, cultural, and political aspects, and that any attempt to counter networks 
must keep this as a core. In addition, this basic truth goes to the heart of building counter-
networks and the strategies they employ. As Hammes states, “Western forces have tried 
to substitute technology for human connections. This is a fundamental difference [with 
our enemy] that must be recognized in the West. Once recognized, it should result in 
major efforts to build similar human networks among allies and neutrals when we are 
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fighting a networked insurgent.”846 Understanding the context of irregular warfare is 
essential to creating effective efforts against fighting networks. This understanding 
provides the initial, and what should be the primary, focus on the human and social 
dimensions of such conflict, and leads to the creation of effective strategic goals. 
However, the principles and strategic application of network-style warfare are not 
limited to success in countering rogue networks. Beyond fighting these irregular 
opponents, the capabilities generated by a modern professional military that adopted 
network-style warfare could prove formidable against any other conventional force. The 
stark evidence for this capability is the performance of fighting networks with far fewer 
advantages derived from training, technology, and secure communications.  
Organizationally, an effective counter-network framework requires emulating the 
increased connectivity and lower-level autonomy displayed by networks. While this 
imposes challenges for hierarchical military bureaucracies, much of the challenge results 
from simply adopting a different mindset, one that seeks to further connections. As 
Zanini and Edwards state, “while militaries and governments will never be able to do 
away with their hierarchies entirely, there is nonetheless much room for them to develop 
more-robust organizational networks than they currently have—a change that may offset 
some, if not all, of the advantage now accruing to networked terrorist groups.”847 An 
increased emphasis on lateral communication and connections throughout a military 
organization would promote many of the same connections. Fostering such connections 
requires training and employing individuals in such a manner that they seek to build such 
ties, which leads to a robust informal network. Developing such organizational capability 
is about valuing expertise and experience more than position, and promoting connections 
for the increased power they provide for greater information acquisition and 
redistribution. These efforts should be complemented with an increased emphasis on 
training and rewarding those confident and capable of operating within a fluid, networked 
environment. In addition to internal connections, an effective counter-network 
                                                 
846 Thomas X. Hammes, “Rethinking the Principles of War: The Future of Warfare,” in Rethinking the 
Principles of War, ed. Anthony McIvor (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 276. 
847 Zanini and Edwards, “The Networking of Terror in the Information Age,” 55.  
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organization builds external connections, and is able to form rapid partnerships oriented 
towards a common purpose. This aspect requires additional effort, but it appears it is the 
most effective way to maximize the various skills and expertise required to counter 
networks. Further, networking externally provides the means to enhance opportunities 
and invigorate much of the bureaucratic inertia and restrictions within static 
organizations. It may be that more static hierarchies remain, but that they provide 
resources and efficient backing to further networks at the operational level. 
The doctrinal challenge in countering networks is to develop principles and 
practices that seek to maximize the inherent superiorities of a professional military by 
combining them in ways better suited to effective information age organization. The 
primary challenge is the inherent levels of control in a machine-type bureaucracy, a 
requirement that drives doctrine requiring a high level of command and control. 
However, recent experience in irregular warfare reinforces the necessity of small-unit 
action, empowered lower-level commanders, and change driven by innovative operators. 
As seen in multiple examples of swarming, many of the doctrinal types well-suited for 
information-age conflict require both significant amounts of information and a great deal 
of decentralization. This decentralization is imperative for bottom-up innovation and 
fostering connections at the local, or lowest, levels. As seen in the Iraq case study, the 
application of a common strategy promoted doctrinal innovation and lower-level action 
by providing an overarching purpose. While a COIN focus provided the umbrella for 
multiple types of successful action, it may not prove to be the most effective doctrine for 
countering future irregular threats. Countering future irregular forces will most likely 
require indirect elements of COIN, but also elements of direct disruption, such as CT. 
Moreover, as the intensity of irregular warfare increases, it is likely to require the 
innovative blending of heavy weapons with precision application. These changes, and 
numerous others, will require new doctrinal aspects, which will most likely be generated 
by a new generation of network-focused forces with combat-generated learning and 




superior information and precisely control a combat environment, doctrine stemming 
from a netwar focus will recognize the chaos and complexity inherent in conflict, and 
generate increased levels of flexibility in spite of it. 
Operationally, those seeking to counter fighting networks must realize the 
asymmetric nature of their enemy’s tactics and the synthesis between tactical action and 
information effects. While fighting networks utilize many of the basic methods employed 
by irregular opponents throughout guerrilla warfare, they have also adapted and 
generated new methods for the information age. Actions, such as human-guided suicide 
attacks and systems disruption, reflect a blending of operational methods, tactics, and 
information designed to achieve greater effect. Cordesman provides a sense of this 
blending in his assessment of required operational changes: 
In optional and limited wars, Western nations must learn how to fight in 
built-up and populated areas in ways that do as much as possible to 
deprive the enemy of the ability to force modern military forces to fight at 
the enemy’s level, as well as in asymmetric ways that deprive 
conventional forces of their technical advantages and give the enemy the 
initiative. This change not only involves altering tactics and targeting but 
also means funding suitable ISR assets; putting HUMINT in the loop; 
having dedicated cells to warn when given targets or when targeting data 
prevent special sensitivities; and using small, reliable, precision weapons 
wherever possible. It also means tailoring information operations to fight 
what will inevitably be a global battle to prove that targeting is valid and 
that every effort is being made to reduce civilian casualties and collateral 
damage.848 
These changes are essential for countering networks, which rely on the fact that 
traditional asymmetries between professional militaries and irregular forces favor their 
flexible, adaptable nature. Operational methods must synchronize efforts that deny a 
network’s concealment, to disrupt its use of surprise. This effort requires small units that 
are just as flexible, and which, turn the tables by utilizing the same aspects of 
concealment and rapid strikes to surprise and achieve the initiative. These small units 
achieve greater effectiveness by being connected and taking self-synchronized actions 
against a rapidly changing enemy network. 
                                                 
848 Cordesman, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, 49. 
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At its core, irregular warfare is about information, and a conflict between 
networks is truly a contest between information strategies. On the strategic level, 
effective counter-network efforts place the primary emphasis on disrupting a fighting 
network’s overall narrative and information campaigns. For these efforts to be effective, 
they must both disrupt a network’s external information flow, or public message, while at 
the same time, “claiming the space” with another message. This other message, or 
counter-narrative, must by consistent and synthesized with operational action to produce 
a compelling link between word and deed. As evidenced in AQI’s excessive coercion 
producing the Al-Anbar Awakening, as well as the fallout from Abu Ghraib, information 
strategy without corresponding action is meaningless. Where clashes occur, the outcome 
usually favors the opponent with greater information, and those small units able to 
leverage the most information against their targets. In this regard, the targeting cycles 
employed by counter-network forces are examples of focused information collection and 
processing, applied most effectively to disrupt a fighting network’s connections, and as a 
result, their ability to collect, process, and redistribute information. 
In summary, the threat posed by fighting networks requires a concerted counter-
network effort, which adapts to and innovates in the changing environment of the 
information age. Fighting networks present a unique challenge, one that reflects the 
timeless nature of irregular warfare, while simultaneously ushering in dramatic changes. 
Displaying a fairly remarkable “track-record” against the most sophisticated modern 
forces, these networks highlight the empowerment of unconventional forces and doctrine. 
The framework proposed and tested in this study provides an synthesized operational 
perspective to counter these fighting networks. 
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